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SMEs Behavioral Models of Risk-Adjusted Performance  
(A cross-sectoral empirical inquiry from Albanian market) 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
INTRODUCTION: This research study assesses into a business intelligence prospect the 
performance of SMEs operating in Albanian market and pertaining to trade, service, production 
and construction sectors.  
OBJECTIVE:   
MATERIALS AND METHODS: In this light the research put confidence on SMEs 
organizational behavioral features interacting with financial ratios regarding their performance 
prediction (estimated through: return on assets, return on equity and gross operative margin) in 
a cross-sectoral context. On this purpose there are analyzed five qualitative variables and forty 
one quantitative data (concerning: liquidity/16, operational efficiency/12, risk/6 and growth 
areas /7).  These analyses were conducted through a radial basis function at 95% confidence 
level referring to a sample of 33 SMEs in each sector.   
RESULTS: The prediction of SMEs performance in a cross-sectoral context revealed as main 
determinant factors: the long-term debts to equity ratio, interest coverage ratio (leverage area),  
inventories, payments accounts turnover ratio (liquidity area), firm age (growth area), 
ownership gender, equity origin, borrowers’ status and business ownership structure 
(organizational behavioral features).  
 CONCLUSIONS:  The study highlights the fact that operating through certain levels of relevant 
indicators (pertaining to liquidity, leverage and growth areas) fosters business performance 
meanwhile the contrary results risky.  Moreover, it is also evidenced the importance of some 
organizational behaviors that proactively help in the further development of this productive 
research area. 
KEYWORDS:  
"Sectoral economy", "Multivariate analysis", "Liquidity", "Leverage", "Performance", 
"Organizational behavior" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modelos de comportamiento de las PYMES del desempeño ajustado al 
riesgo 
(Una investigación empírica intersectorial del mercado albanés) 
 
RESUMEN 
INTRODUCCIÓN: Este estudio de investigación evalúa en una perspectiva de inteligencia 
empresarial el desempeño de las PYMES que operan en el mercado albanés y que pertenecen a 
los sectores de comercio, servicios, producción y construcción. 
OBJETIVO: Analizar cómo la gestión de los elementos de emprendimiento: liquidez, 
apalancamiento y rendimiento, constituye el punto clave del éxito de las PYMES para 
proporcionar resultados prácticos y las principales claves académicas. 
MATERIALES Y MÉTODOS: En este contexto, la investigación se centró en las características 
del comportamiento organizacional de las PYMES que interactúan con las ratios financieras, 
respecto a su predicción de rendimiento (estimada a través de: rendimiento de los activos, la 
rentabilidad del capital y margen operativo bruto) en un contexto intersectorial. Con este 
propósito se analizan cinco variables cualitativas y cuarenta y un datos cuantitativos (en 
relación con: liquidez / 16, eficiencia operacional / 12, riesgo / 6 y áreas de crecimiento / 7). Estos 
análisis se realizaron a través de una función de base radial con un nivel de confianza del 95%, 
en referencia a una muestra de 33 pymes en cada sector. 
RESULTADOS: La predicción del desempeño de las PYMES en un contexto intersectorial  
reveló como los principales factores determinantes: el índice de deuda a capital a largo plazo, el 
índice de cobertura de intereses (área de apalancamiento), los inventarios, el índice de rotación 
de cuentas de pagos (área de liquidez), la edad de la empresa ( área de crecimiento), género de 
la propiedad, origen de la equidad, estado de los prestatarios y estructura de propiedad de la 
empresa (características de comportamiento de la organización). 
CONCLUSIONES: El estudio destaca el hecho de que operar a través de ciertos niveles de 
indicadores relevantes (relacionados con las áreas de liquidez, apalancamiento y crecimiento) 
fomenta el desempeño del negocio, mientras que los resultados contrarios son riesgosos. 
Además, también se evidencia la importancia de algunos comportamientos organizacionales 
que ayudan proactivamente en el desarrollo de esta área de investigación productiva. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVES:   
"Economía sectorial", "Análisis multivalente",  Liquidez "," Apalancamiento "," Desempeño "," 
Comportamiento organizacional”. 
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I - INTRODUCTION 
Statistically based as in other Balkan economies and worldwide even in Albania  
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent an extremely important partner 
concerning the contribution to country’s  gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
which is expressed also in terms of innovative processes/products stimulated 
under the flexibility of doing business climate. Correspondingly, they proactively 
help in the maturation of labor market by contemporaneously fostering the social 
cohesion and not only. The latest national statistics prove that more dominant 
activities pertaining to service, trade, production and ultimately to construction 
sector (respectively constituting 46.65%, 16.85%, 13% and 9% of GDP) are mainly 
represented from SMEs, thus, sectoral pertinence becomes one of various key-
elements of this research ground. 
 
Logically, by generally treating the main country economic indicators during 
2015-2016 period concerning macro, financial and fiscal stability through which 
public finances underwent substantial and ongoing reforms as per Stabilization 
and Association Process, with the aim of reducing government spending and 
increasing revenues simultaneously with administrative territory reform 
implementation it was pointed out the decreasing tendency of indirect tax rates 
(consumer price pressure) and the increasing tendency of direct taxes (corporate 
profit and personal income impact). Which clearly reflect the effects of 
government fiscal policy, concerning the redistribution of revenues by benefiting 
more from capital gain tax.  
Rationally under the above mentioned (a/m) business climate they were affirmed 
different growth rates referring to sectoral pertinence by reflecting SMEs behavior 
regarding: their birth rate, ownership structure, employees no, managerial 
framework, business size, borrowers’ status, location, etc.  
With special regard to this study, in each ‘sector-data pool’, statistical 
examinations are performed at 95% confidence level aiming to figure out the 
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impact of qualitative and quantitative research variables referring to SMEs 
internal management as following: 
 
-Liquidity management decisions handled as a pattern recognition process; 
-Capital structure approaches under debt reconciliation framework; 
-Behavioral Models of Risk-Adjusted Performance.  
 
In this merit, the research questions are hypothetically raised on a single as well 
as in a multiple examination spectrum.  
As by this way it can be possible to initially understand SMEs integrative 
liquidity management processes with the profitability ones concerning working 
capital management and other key-indicators related. The latter is considered an 
important process through which the management can create business health 
while correcting defective areas not only under liquidity context but even under 
functional-operability, effectiveness and profitability ones. Under these 
circumstances, adequate empirical examinations revealed the qualitative and 
quantitative predictive factors affecting businesses liquidity management 
strategy. Intuitively the maintenance of the necessary liquidity level due to 
business constrains requires the appropriate patterns almost when it is externally 
ensured. And obviously this enhances the businesses prospective in quoting 
higher profit rates by appropriately designing target strategies.  
In this regard businesses are obligated in undertaking short and long–term debts 
equally sustained from the financial prospective which is also expressed in terms 
of risk. Whereas worth highlighting and understanding the factors which 
simultaneously affect liquidity by also creating the leverage effect. Thus, with the 
help of different statistical results all the significant qualitative variables 
(examined in the liquidity management section) are re-estimated simultaneously 
with other predictive factors related to leverage structure. In the first part of the 
examination short-term leverage structure predictive models are explored. Then, 
long-term debts structures are further explored by arguing on the significant 
qualitative factors prevalence (previously examined) simultaneously with other 
quantitative factors. Closely referring to both leverage-term results it was 
assumed a more precise result concerning SMEs ‘risk-dynamics’ approach which 
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from one hand competes with daily-routines of business doing and from the other 
one accumulates financial resources to foster growth.  
And finally, the SMEs behaviors were reconciled in an aggregated way by dealing 
with liquidity and leverage risks, in a performance model aiming to enhance 
additional value-based mechanisms. Considering that the relevance of qualitative 
and quantitative predictors provides right signs as per profitability increase 
which concerning SMEs randomly debuts as an efficiency/growth indicator 
(considering here SMEs operational range).  
 
Unlikely other studies, this research argue how the proper management and 
interaction of multiple financial and organizational behavioral factors constitutes 
the key point of SMEs success by simultaneously providing practical results (in a 
micro-macro challenge context) and foremost academic clues.  
 
 
 
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD AND THEMATIC   
INTEREST 
This research study promotes the capability of Neural Networks Analysis 
concerning the implementation of Radial Basis Function as an alternative 
predictive model (useful in a micro and macro context) almost considering the 
particularity of data explored contemporaneously with SMEs segment 
weaknesses and the underlying phenomena complexity.   
 
The main advantage of neural networks exploited concerns their flexibility and 
lack of distributional data assumptions. Thus, the study simultaneously analyzes 
qualitative and quantitative behavioral data pertaining to four distinctive 
sectoral-affiliations. Considering that the latest provide the input data produced 
as a result of strategic policies implemented in SMEs and other external factors 
affecting their activity. Without forgetting that  adequate predictive models could 
not be solely based upon financial ratios as the latter are often open to 
manipulations and by this way become less reliable to performance approaches.  
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Consequently the multi-functionality of SMEs ratios is considered in compliance 
within the operability of this business segment. In addition to provide a more 
rational framework though the analysis deployed several behavioral variables are 
empirically tested trying to find the hidden interaction that exists among 
themselves as well as among them and quantitative variables, even they often can 
be difficult to interpret as produce extremely complex models with multiple 
layers. Maybe that’s the reason why none of these models were specifically 
addressed to SMEs or even targeted to certain SMEs patterns.  
Anyway, the algorithms deployed known as ‘supervised networks’ reserve the 
opportunity to compare the known values against the targeted variables as the 
behavioral and financial input data are the result of a certain decision making 
process. 
 
Foremost in each of three SMEs spectrums (liquidity-leverage and performance) 
analyzed above there are explored predictive models with more than one 
predicted variable, which in any case provides a reliable output for the managers 
concerning the potential stimulation of paths development for the firms’ future.  
And obviously these ‘business intelligence models’ lead to corrective implications 
needed to be undertaken aiming the firms’ performance optimization while 
continuously controlling negative business tendencies in different business units 
or even argue on their simulation procedure.  
 
On a macro context instead worth highlighting that these models can be useful to 
governmental interventions, as they may use the combined information to assists 
even SMEs in non-performing status and not only while continuously enhancing 
and transforming business climate.  And ultimately the additional relevance is 
that through them it can also be studied the impact of different policies 
implemented which comparatively helps in the designation of sustainable 
business policies as SMEs are the most vital and significant business segment in 
the country.  
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THEORY, EVIDENCES, MEASURES AND MODELS EXPLORED CONCERNING 
SMEs LIQUIDITY, LEVERAGE, PROFITABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
A fragile economy like the Albanian one has strongly entrusted its development 
on SMEs catalyst growth system considering that over 80 % of the proactive labor 
force is concentrated among them compared to the EU average of around 67 % by 
providing about 68 % of country's total value added meanwhile EU average is 
around 58 %.  Together “high-growth”, “start-ups”, “life-style” businesses and 
“social enterprises” account for over 99.9 per cent of the total number of Albanian 
firms and generate 67.7% of total turnover by also positively affecting country’s 
budget revenues (1 and 2).  Moreover, as evidenced SMEs are recognized and 
acknowledged worldwide as vital and significant contributors to economic 
development, introduction and diffusion of new technology, ability in generating 
potential entrepreneurs and skilled workers for the industrialization process both 
nationally and internationally (3). 
In this context, different empirical researches have been undertaken in emerging, 
developing and developed economies, trying to highlight the economic climate 
effect on SMEs profitability and growth issues despite their most crucial financial 
management aspects remain Working Capital Management (WCM), Leverage 
Effects and Performance/Profitability aiming to simultaneously reach internal and 
external goals. Related to the first element it was argued that an efficient and 
effective management makes substantial difference between the success/failure of 
a SME, thus, liquidity and leverage risks consequently may serve and used as a 
value-based mechanism (4). Seemingly, other studies are focused on the impact 
that value-based mechanism has on SME’s profitability by almost treating the 
latter as a performance measure (5-10).  
Therefore this study is conceived in the exploitation of a deeper research 
approach oriented toward the a/m factors as well as potentially other in order to 
be identified a “value system”, in whilst should be trusted and continuously 
invested regarding the sustainable development of SMEs not only under a multi-
sectoral prospect but even in different macro-environments, whereas in 
unanimity are considered as the most dynamic force of economic growth.  
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WORKING  CAPITAL AWARENESS  IN RESPONSE OF PERFORMANCE VALUE 
CHAIN 
By especially considering SMEs patterns financial behavior, WCM is a key feature 
through which they perceive alert signals toward strength or weakness; hence, 
various research studies worldwide are further developed.  Under a more 
proactive approach a recent study investigated the impact of WCM practices on 
the profitability of 150 SMEs in Nigeria. Concretely, it was revealed a positive 
relationship between cash management, inventory turnover and trade credit 
practices with profitability by concluding that SMEs efficiency and sustainability 
mainly depends from good WCM practices (11). In this regard it can be explained 
that a negative coefficient concerning inventory holding period means that the 
longer inventory is hold, less working capital is available which causes a 
reduction on SME’s profitability terms.  
Except this, on the other hand regarding the accounts receivable period and 
profitability it can be pretended that a more restrictive credit policy 
implementation may improve the company profitability by concluding instead 
that short cash conversion cycles mean more profitable SMEs in compliance with 
research no 9 argumentation. Meanwhile, the contrary is demonstrated on the 
positive relationship between accounts payable period and profitability argued 
that if SMEs payments delay increases the working capital (WC) level maintained 
and enhances the possibility to increase the profitability.   
In a more restrictive line instead remained another research (12) which used a 
sample of 6,063 Portuguese SMEs, pertaining to 2002-2009 period.  It evidenced 
the simultaneous effect of inventory reduction and cash conversion cycle on 
business profitability by conducting them toward aggressive working capital 
management policies.  
In controversy with the previous study the conducted studies imply that in a 
certain way the positive relationship between average payment period and 
profitability indicates that profitable companies prefer to delay payments aiming 
to explore all the market opportunities (11).  
A prior study undertaken from Gul et al. (13) comparatively examined the 
relationship between WCM components and SME’s profitability in Pakistan for 
the period between 2006 and 2012, by using as a dependent measure return on 
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assets (ROA) in the quality of profitability proxy. Here the results confirm that 
account payables have a positive impact on profitability whereas the contrary 
occurs per average collection period, inventory turnover and cash conversion 
cycle.   
Few years later another study (14) examined the influence of cash management 
practices and inventories on SMEs financial performance in trading companies of 
Machakos Sub-County/Kenya. The findings demonstrate that due to the lack of 
WCM practices the businesses performance is low. Furthermore the study 
revealed that SMEs financial performance is positively related to efficient cash 
management and inventory practices.   
Throughout it was determined a significant positive relationship between the 
time taken to convert inventory into sales and profitability explaining that high 
inventory levels reduces the costs of possible interruptions in the production 
process as well as business losses due to scarcity of resources. While in some cases 
the negative relationship between cash conversion cycle and profitability was 
explained to consider that the investment minimization in current assets can help 
in boosting profitability by ensuring that cash is not generally preferred but used 
to generate profit.  
The influence of WCM components such as: cash conversion period, average 
account receivable days, average inventory turnover days and average accounts 
payable on 400 SMEs performance operating in Ghana during 2011-2015 period 
was also treated (15). The study found that cash conversion period, account 
receivable days and inventory turnover days were significantly and negatively 
related to performance. In controversy, account payable days were ascertained to 
have a positive relation with performance. In general it implies that by decreasing 
the cash conversion period, account receivable days and inventory turnover days, 
SMEs profitability increases. By this way is strongly recommended to SMEs to 
review working capital management practices.  
 
Alternatively (16), it was explored ROA as a measure of profitability/performance 
and examined the relation of WCM components (i.e: cash conversion cycle, 
inventory, accounts receivable and accounts payable) to evidence the importance 
of working capital management and its components on the profitability of Indian 
SMEs by elaborating a sample of 433 SMEs for the period spanning from 2007-
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2012. The analysis showed that the number of days of inventory, number of days 
of accounts receivables, the number of days of accounts payables and cash 
conversion cycle are negatively correlated with profitability of SMEs in India.  
Subsequently, the study highlights that the management of inventory and 
accounts receivables are important for SMEs profitability in India, even the latter 
is considered relatively less important than inventory management.  
Unlike the previous one, a study undertaken in Nigeria (17) demonstrated that 
mainly SMEs do not care about their working capital position by also acting 
without a well defined credit–policy framework as the main focus remains only 
cash receipt. Correspondingly, the firms selected for the a/m research show signs 
of overtrading and illiquidity that provide not only turbulences concerning profit 
maximization but also creditors payments delay. Logically, to them is 
recommended the designation of a ‘tailored’ credit policy aiming to ensure the 
control and financial reporting directly correlated to other improved working 
capital practices as per solvency and growth.  
And in accordance with the previous study, is also measured the effect of 
working capital components on Czech SMEs gross operating profit corresponding 
to a five year period. It ascertains that the planning of in and out-cash flows 
manages business liquidity (18). From the other hand, the monitoring and 
controlling of working capital becomes a further crucial instrument concerning 
business continuity and performance.  
In addition, Greek evidence (7) suggests that an effective working capital 
management is a necessary component of firm's future growth and profitability 
expressed in terms of return on assets by considering a sample of 459 SMEs from 
2008 to 2012 period. In this case it was highlighted that a proper maintenance of 
working capital increases the reliability of business processes, backup movements 
involved in working capital itself and lower funding costs. Accordingly it was 
suggested that less profitable SMEs’ will delay the payments meanwhile the 
decrease of cash conversion cycle increases their profitability.  
With the same intent, it was collected a panel of 8872 Spanish SMEs covering the 
period from 1996 to 2002 (9) and against return on assets was used as a measure 
of profitability. The study reveals a significantly negative relationship with: 
inventory holding, accounts receivable/payable period and cash conversion cycle. 
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By concluding, that SMEs profitability could be improved by reducing the 
inventory holding period through adequate marketing campaigns and by 
contemporaneously implementing a restrictive credit policy toward the 
customers.  
Furthermore there was analyzed the effect of WCM on SMEs profitability over a 
sample listed in Istanbul SME Industrial Index during 2011 to 2014 period. And 
the authors confirmed a negative relationship between net margin, short term 
debt turnover days and cash conversion cycle. Also they interpreted that effective 
management of working capital such as decrease in short term debt turnover 
days can positively affect firms’ performance (19).  
While Afrifa et al. (20) adopted a sample of 802 British quoted SMEs listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market as per 2004 to 2013 period aiming to capture the 
relationship between working capital management and their performance by 
taking into consideration the plausible effect of cash flow. They found out that 
working capital management has a significantly negative impact on SME 
performance and the contrary is remarked concerning cash flow. According to the 
findings, WCM has a significantly negative impact on SME performance. 
However, regarding the available cash flow, it was found a significantly positive 
relationship. By this way, it can be argued that SMEs through an accurate 
management of cash flow are able to enhance their performance.  
Trying to further extend the examination context (21) by controlling for 
unobservable heterogeneity and possible endogeneity in German SMEs, it was 
against analyzed the relation between working capital management and 
profitability. The research undertaken proved a non-linear relation between these 
two variables by demonstrating that there is a non-monotonic relationship 
between working capital level and firm profitability. Simultaneously the study 
ascertains that SMEs have an optimal working capital level that maximizes their 
profitability. In addition, a robustness check of results confirmed that firms’ 
profitability decreases as they move away from respective optimal level. 
 
From another aspect Goel et al. (22) treats the WCM of business operational 
liquidity framework by involving decisions regarding: 
(a) choosing between high costs of leverage due to inventory issues;  
(b) the level of receivables to promote;  
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(c) benefits of payments delay;  
(d) cash holding vs. opportunity cost.  
Consequently, there can be mainly identified three major approaches to liquidity 
management namely: aggressive, moderate and conservative. The first one 
(defined as “risk taker”) requires keeping a low level of short term assets and 
high level of short term liabilities by requiring higher amount of current assets it 
can be treated as a conservative approach (defined as “risk averse” position). 
While the hybrid one (the moderate approach) represents an intermediary status 
of both previously mentioned states and constitutes the most essential status 
regarding an efficient business operational framework.  
 
The same concept was previously given while targeting the huge amount of 
working capital as a cost generating instrument referring to unemployed assets 
funding cost and respective interests (23). The vice versa occurs in case of low 
working capital limits by causing production breakdowns translated against in 
losses. Ultimately each specific strategy chosen will determine the current 
assets/liabilities kept by a company and respectively they impact the profitability 
level.  
In this merit worth highlighted the research of Koury et al. (24) which confirmed 
that 28.5 % of Canadian SMEs companies follow the conservative strategy, whilst 
only 10.2 % pursue the aggressive one.   
 
Beyond this, it was confirmed that the degree of aggressiveness of WCM strategy 
increases the returns (25). But, different disputed empirical results are achieved 
on behalf of strategy type pursued on the relationship between working capital 
management and profitability (9, 18 and 26-29).   
Nonetheless in practice, it is very common that the potentials associated with an 
intelligent optimization of capital are strongly correlated with inventories, 
receivables, liabilities, liquid assets and correspondently to profitability are not 
systematically addressed. Properly for  the a/m reasons if the company holds too 
much inventories or maintains very high receivables the working capital 
management process can be expensive.  
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That’s why deemed that the main priority of managers is the settlement of 
triggers concerning working capital management practices because the necessity 
may vary from firm to firm regardless the environment as well as from one 
industry to another one but always keeping in mind the profitability level 
established as target.  
 
 
 
1.3.1. Investment capital efficiency paradigm vs  liquidity optimization  
The optimization of capital investments is treated as one of the most important 
levers for improving value-based performance indicators from one hand as well 
as for securing the availability of sufficient liquidity from the other one. Aiming 
to provide increase of capital efficiency and install a permanently monitored 
system, a special attention goes to capital expenditures including also WC 
investment. As proven especially regarding to SMEs business size, liquidity 
management is the major issue, thus, it should be managed day by day in order to 
meet short-term obligations due to agency1 and asymmetry2 issues (30-35). 
 Typically SMEs working capital financing process is closely restricted to 
respective short assets composition as audited financial statements are missing 
(36). It can be conveyed in the same result explaining that collaterals used from 
short-term loans are the receivables while inventory/work-in-progress is the 
second choice (37). Accordingly (30, 38) it can be added  that in order to manage 
liquidity in long-run SMEs act through the renewal of existing short-term loans 
and preserve the same strategy toward the suppliers by causing a cost increase. 
Despite this, even unconventionally due to profitability constraints the credit-
rationing pushes they to explore different forms of short-term financing 
                                                          
1 Agency problems in SMEs occur when managers are delegated from owners to act 
according their interests. Inherently this relation creates conflict of interests in respect of 
each individual benefit clue.  
2 An asymmetric information situation occurs when one of the parties involved in 
economic transaction posses greater information than the other (i.e: buyer vs seller).  
Under these circumstances it can be deducted that almost all economic transactions 
involve information asymmetries.  
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considering that a certain level of liquidity accelerates their growth process by 
giving the chance to capture additional market opportunities.    
Nevertheless (39) in this prospect is confirmed a significant negative relationship 
between firm's profitability and liquidity levels measured by current ratio. This 
relationship seems to be more pronounced for firms with high current ratios and 
long cash conversion cycles. In this regard, different researches have been 
conducted to examine the industry effect on the financing behavior of SMEs in 
short and long term liquidity in various countries.  
By this way, states that European manufacturing firms have large investment 
needs in machinery and ‘hard' assets, and respectively have greater access to 
fixed collateralizable assets (40). Michaelas et al. (41) instead examined 3.500 UK 
small firms representing ten industries by demonstrating that in each case the 
industry effect is more pronounced on short-term debt ratios compared to long-
term debt ones. It’s important to highlight also the fact that the difference 
between the magnitude of the industry effect on short and long term debt varies 
across industries.  
By employing the same database and same number of businesses as (41) another 
study (42) suggested that the wholesale and retail trade industry on average uses 
very little long-term debt and that the education, health, and social work industry 
uses almost equal amount of short and long-term debts.  Under this light, it was 
additionally revealed a significant influence of industry on short-term debt into a 
1.000 Spanish SMEs sample conducting to the result that firm size is another 
important influence on financial behavior (43).  
Contemporaneously, two authors (44) explored the relationship of liquidity and 
cash conversion cycle in Greek food industry. They estimated a considerable 
positive relationship among cash conversion cycle and current ratio, average age 
of inventory and average collection period whilst identifying inverse relationship 
between it and average payment period.  Concluding that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between variables used for liquidity 
measurement and those used for profitability measurement while the same 
results are achieved regarding cash conversion cycle and debt ratio.  
Comparatively in an Indian study (16) it was examined the national consumer 
electronic industry and discovered that profitability for the overall industry 
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hadn’t any recognized relationship with liquidity, even majority of the companies 
belonging to this industry showed a positive performance according to 
profitability and liquidity measures. A controversial result instead was retrieved 
from another study handled before (17) conducted on telecommunication & 
equipment industry by considering a sample of 349 firms. Thus, it was declared 
that in the a/m industry effective working capital management and financial 
performance do not have any significant inverse relationship with each other 
meanwhile exists a strong and inverse relationship between financial 
performance and liquidity.  
Some other authors (45-47) referring to five district clusters of Australian SMEs 
based on key liquidity funding sources: trade credit, debt, bank loan, related 
personal debt, other debt equity and owner equity retrieved that industry is not a 
significant predictor of debt as a source of financing meanwhile trade credit debt 
cluster is strongly related with wholesale and retail trade sectors. While another 
study conducted (48) on the matter in the same market focused on the cross-
industry differences in SME financing documents that the a/m industry does not 
simply process for one or more other factors (i.e : age, size, profitability, growth, 
asset structure of firms).  
Generally, as manifested (1,49, 50) the most essential SMEs’ values are: the 
current assets, while current liabilities are one of their main sources of external 
finance because of the financial constraints they face.  In a certain way the 
argumentation pursued regarding the working capital management and SMEs 
survival complies with the ones of 51 and 52 studies.  
In this prospect it was argued, that unfortunately, the assessment of liquidity 
management practices in small firms is quite inexistent, and obviously should be 
improved, being that’s based solely on the standards and practices used by large 
companies or those adopted by professionals such as accountants, consultants, 
banks, etc., with relatively little attention being paid to the practices actually used 
by owner-managers themselves (1). In a distinguished way it is accepted that 
owner-managers in their survey of 200 small firms in the West Midlands did not 
use financial management techniques very effectively (53). As better explained by 
Deakins et al. (54), the techniques used in these cases are those designed for large 
companies and consequently the process of financial liquidity management and 
the decision-making one in SMEs remains something of “a black box”.  
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Related to the latter some other specific internal problems are identified, such as: 
the inadequate capital, cash flow mismanagement and inventory control (1, 55) by 
declaring that 20% of firms’ failures were due to bad debts or poor receivables 
management. In fact, referring to (1,39) an efficient working capital management 
is ment the adequate planning and controlling of current assets and current 
liabilities in a manner that eliminates the inability to meet short term obligations 
from one side and avoid excessive investment in respective assets from the other 
one.  Because referring to liquidity for a performing firm (56), is not reliant on the 
liquidation of its assets value, but rather on the operating cash flows generated by 
assets. By this way, working capital management becomes a very sensitive area 
(57) in the field of financial management and directly impacts the net operative 
cash flow activity. It engages the decision regarding the level of current assets 
needed to be maintained as well as the investment on these assets. Considering 
that current assets represent all assets which can be converted in cash shortly 
(normally within a year) and otherwise can be treated as speculative investment 
which can be easily converted into cash upon needs. As far as can be understand 
the working capital management of a firm closely affected from liquidity 
management issues in part influences firms’ profitability. Intuitively concerning 
the permanent performance, liquidity preservation remains an important 
objective. But while trying to increase the profits at the cost of liquidity firms may 
face serious problems. Therefore, a trade-off between these two firm objectives 
reveals. In any case, must be clear that one objective should not be treated at cost 
of the other.  As firstly, if we do not think about profit, the firm cannot survive for 
a long period. And in following, if we do not think about liquidity, the firm may 
face insolvency or bankruptcy problems. For these kinds of reasons and not only 
to the working capital management should be given a proper consideration being 
that in long-run it inevitably affects the entire firms’ profitability.  
Under the same context, is seen the soundness of liquidity management as the 
most critical influence on the survival and financial well-being of small 
enterprises (58). Generally, liquidity management takes the form of cash and 
credit management. Whilst the most important aspect of cash flow management 
is avoiding extended cash shortages, and credit management involves not only 
the giving and receiving of credit to customers and suppliers, but also the 
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assessment of individual customers, the credit periods allowed as well as the 
steps taken to ensure that payments are made in time by closely referring to 
financial planning (59). Considering that, the latter stated that another component 
which should be considered is the payable accounts component. Thus, the 
delayed payments to suppliers allow firms to appraise the quality of bought 
products, by representing a flexible financing source for firm itself. 
Notwithstanding, the late payment of invoices can be very costly if to the firm is 
offered a discount option. For this reason instead of working capital measurement 
is treated cash conversion cycle (i.e. the time lag between the expenditure for the 
purchases of raw materials and the collection of sales of finished goods,1).  
According to empirical results (7) longer this time difference becomes, larger 
investments are needed for working capital management purposes. For this 
purpose, it is required a constant supervising to maintain its adequate level in 
various liquidity components i.e. cash receivables, inventory, payables etc. 
Due to liquidity examination, small firm’s financial management points out (60) 
that working capital management takes a major proportion of a small firm owner-
manager’s time, and precisely the latter is devoted into the management of 
excess/shortage of liquid funds. In following (61) it is argued that the difference in 
liquidity between large and small firms supports the belief that working capital 
shortages are a common problem for small firms, and this difference could be the 
result of the small firm’s limited access to capital markets and/or the basic nature 
of the enterprise. It is concluded by stating that liquidity should be a matter of 
concern for the small enterprise because cash is such a critically scarce resource as 
a result of supply constraints, which do not exist to nearly the same extent for a 
large firm. Furthermore, as explained from Curran et al. (62) this cause of concern 
is reinforced by the fact that small firm owner-managers are inclined towards 
risk-taking in an inherently risky and uncertain environment.  
In this respect, liquidity management strategy becomes a crucial factor in the 
survival of the firm because the survival in a risky and competitive environment 
requires innovation and innovation requires new knowledge or a new way of 
combining current knowledge (63).  
Correspondingly, it can be understood that the nexus between SMEs structure 
and liquidity represents another pure “trade-off” in ‘value-chain mechanism’. The 
first is one of the most debatable issues in the theory of finance since the 
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celebrated work of two authors (1, 64-65). However, a number of theories have 
been put forth by bringing forward a number of frictions omitted in the original 
work as to explain firms’ optimal capital structure, should this exist, as a function 
of the various costs and benefits from debt and equity financing. The most 
celebrated ones : are the Static Trade-off Theory3; Agency Theory (66-67); 
Signaling Theory4 (68); the Pecking Order Theory5 (pioneered by 69 and largely 
drawing by 70); and the Credit Rationing Theory6 (71).  
But against, the research in the area is mostly confined to the determinants of 
capital structure, among which there are often performance measures (e.g.; 30, 42, 
72-75). While, pecking order theory holds up well for SMEs suggesting that there 
is a negative relationship between leverage and debt with the more profitable 
firms needing to borrow less where growth results have been mixed but generally 
show a positive whereas not always a statistical significant relationship. And the 
liquidity itself, understood in terms of cash availability or near cash resources to 
meet short-term obligations, is also associated to the problems posed by 
asymmetry of information, agency relationships and credit rationing; inevitably it 
becomes the major problem especially for SMEs (1).  So, the latest is an extension 
issue of capital structure by considering that smaller firms live under tight 
liquidity constraints and basically seems to be a matter of consensus referring to 
the researches undertaken (30, 32-35). 
Thus, is evidenced the traditional way of liquidity ratios used to analyze the 
above mentioned problem which fostered the researches to develop alternative 
liquidity measures by contemporary minimizing respective deficiencies through 
the implementation of mixed liquidity approaches.  Especially, the latter include: 
working capital leverage ratios, quick and current ratios, net trade cycle, etc even 
                                                          
3  The trade-off theory of capital structure treats the balancing of costs-benefits idea 
concerning the amount of debts and equity financed by a certain business.  
4 Alternatively called ‘asymmetric information approach’ it explains the cases 
where business insiders preserve information that the market hasn’t  and properly the 
capital structure signals to the outsiders above the businesses value change.  
5 In finance, pecking order theory (or pecking order model) argues that the cost of 
financing increases with asymmetric information.  
6 Credit rationing treats credit limiting by lenders to borrowers who need 
additional funds, even they are willing to pay higher interests.   
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it can be explored additional indicators more appropriate regarding the 
circumstances (1).   
As previously mentioned, many studies have dealt with working capital from 
different views, environments and by using different evaluation techniques. For 
example the relation between profitability and liquidity was examined, as 
measured by current ratio and cash gap (cash conversion cycle) on a sample of 
joint stock SMEs (30). The analysis demonstrated that cash conversion cycle has a 
direct impact on profitability. Furthermore (7) it was treated the impact that  
working capital has on firms‘profitability while revealed a significant negative 
relationship between gross operating income and the number of days of accounts 
receivable, inventories and accounts payable in the sample used.  Other studies 
(76-77) support the existence of a positive relationship, insofar as an increase in 
liquidity can be a consequence of positive operating incomes and financial results. 
In this manner, high profitability strengthens liquidity, which means that 
investments/inventories can be self-financed.  In parallel with sufficient liquidity, 
investments boost growth and future profitability in a virtuous cycle. In contrast, 
low levels of liquidity may lead to higher borrowing requirements and a 
reduction in the levels of return on investments (ROI).  
In this respect, low profitability does not generate sufficient liquidity nor self-
financing of investments, which ultimately hinders future growth and 
profitability in a vicious circle due to equity restrictions. In the same 
argumentation line merely remain the studies conducted by also noting that 
liquidity does not hinder performance (78). From the other hand, Harford et al. 
(79) confirmed that maintaining certain levels of cash can resemble a reserve 
capacity for possible investments in downturns, reflected in better operating 
performance and higher post-downturn growth through the maintenance of a 
solid capital structure as far as in literature this argument is largely elaborated.  
 
 
 
THE LEVERAGE  EFFECT ON SMEs  MANAGEMENT 
In principle, debt entails the net sum of money that a business must repay until a 
precise time frame. Randomly it is not limited to borrowed funds but extends to 
51                                                                                                   ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
outstanding payments and receivables and hence debt management involves 
maintaining a balanced level of borrowed funds versus advances to customers in 
form of credit sales. As can be clearly understood debt management practices as 
integrative part of financial practices applied at small business which logically 
affect the ability of the latter to grow, while move with the dynamics in the 
business environment. Sounds also true that small businesses carry different 
types of debt depending on their services or products delivered (80). Obviously to 
correctly manage the business debts, is crucial related to the appropriate 
estimation of current debts, minimum payment schedules and respective interest 
rates almost considering that the success or failure of a firm depends from the 
ability to secure adequate funding. Comprehensively it can be typically affirmed 
that small and medium sized firms suffer from lack of adequate cash flow and 
working capital at large extend (80). But considering that the same issues also 
affect big firms, small firms are often at bigger risk since they have greater 
scarcity of cash flows and limited sources of capital as well as cannot manage the 
raise of extra capital through equity by issuing shares to the public almost when 
the latter is strongly related to collateral issue and other environmental 
restrictions.  
Even previously admitted SMEs debt management involves generally two 
distinct processes which include making financing decisions and defining the 
level of working capital (81).  
The first step follows with the identification of financing source such as: debt, 
retained profits/earnings and owner funds in form of equity.  From a necessity 
concern the appropriate mixture of cash flows boosts the profitability by this way 
it can be reconfirmed the evidence regarding small firms which are able to 
convert stock into cash faster by selling more and collecting receivables faster 
(80,82). Throughout they generate more capital to run the operations and notably 
reduce debt levels.  
 
Especially in developing countries the success of the SME depends on 
appropriate financial management practices. The researchers have found that 
failure rate of firms is mainly attributed to lack of financing and inappropriate 
financial management practices mostly related to the debt ones. Being that many 
businesses seek external financing to meet their cash demands in order to create 
value leads to the understanding that managers and owners should carefully 
evaluate their debt management strategies.  
Rationally the debt financing strategy significantly differs between SMEs due to 
the varying motives which may be present also among their owners and 
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managers, but in any case the exact influence of the debt financing is not clear. 
Although is opted that debt increase can reduce the agency costs that may result 
from information imbalance. Accordingly Wu et al. (83) described that the 
information asymmetry problems are more acute in SMEs than in large firms, so, 
long-term lending relationships are important for SMEs in order to deal with the 
resultant agency problems. Recognizing that SMEs’ managers have a limited 
range of debt financing they normally tend to be more dependent to commercial 
lenders especially to institutional lenders. Comparatively it should be highlighted 
that the insolvency of many small businesses not depends only from the owner 
underperformance, but because their firm is not run like a business (84). And at 
this stage the cash management strategy predicts also the one related to debts.  
Therefore, it can be added that the poor debt management issue from owner-
managers or lack of financial management is the main cause underlying the 
problems in SMEs (85).  Reasonably as of today their big issue remains the 
maintenance of an optimal capital structure ensuring guaranteed and sustainable 
growth.  
The very first modern theory of capital structure was developed by Modigliani 
and Miller as manifested per Hillier et al. (86) who in parenthesis posed the 
irrelevance theorem arguing that the firm’s capital structure does not have any 
impact on its value (the latter was determined strictly to assets value). More 
specifically the value is generated by the earning power and risk of the 
underlying asset. Thus, internal funds used to increase equity, stock/bond 
issuance as well as lending options have the same impact on firm’s value.  
The first proposition made from them refers to the capital structure, and the 
second one concerns its cost. In other words, they configured that the value of 
levered firm is equal to the value of un-levered firm and that cost of equity is a 
linear function of firm debt to equity ratio. 
Later7 on, there was a necessity to revise their theory consistent to transaction 
costs and taxes implemented in the market which are also important matters to a 
firm value as the leveraged firms can take advantage from deducible interests and 
taxes burden.  Under this context firms financed only by debt can maximize their 
value in comparison with the un-leveraged ones.  
 
The trade-off theory instead points out the balance between benefits and costs 
from their financing choices, preferring debt financing over equity by using the 
transversal logic of tax shield. Henceforward more debt is employed, higher 
becomes debt ratio by giving chances to bankruptcy probability increase, and 
                                                          
7 Modigliani and Miller corrected their initial work in 1963. 
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properly for this an optimal capital structure is required.  And the latter occurs 
when the marginal cost of debt is equal to its marginal benefits (87). 
Using debt tax benefit arguments the agency-cost theory is further treated. It 
describes the way how managers of levered firms transfer free cash flow risk to 
particularly risky investments aiming to spread the binomial effect of gain-losses. 
As a consequence the owners choose to operate through risk premium 
mechanism. Thus a contradiction arises, the stakeholders do not focuses on high 
premium investments if only owners benefit, by constituting a leverage 
disciplining effect. While it should be assured in any case that debt interests and 
principals payments are the further most important goals not only for the market 
but mainly for firm growth itself.  
In respect of agency theory, it was also argued that there is less conflict between 
principals and agents in small and medium size enterprises as is often statistically 
evidenced that the SMEs’ owner and manager are the same person (66). In 
conformity with their argumentation line, Ang et al. (88), demonstrate that family 
or small firms can be considered as zero agency cost since the level of conflict 
quite inexistent. The idea of zero agency cost is further supported and explained 
how the existing incentive structured in the small and medium size firms create 
fewer agency conflicts between different claimants (89-90). But obviously the 
issue consists in SMEs when the principals and agents are separated. Furthermore 
as explored from Gomez-Mejia et al. (91) and Schulze et al. (92) problems like 
entrenched ownership and asymmetric altruism within SMEs may create 
difficulties while describing that generally they face agency cost problem when a 
separation line is established between owners and stakeholders. 
 
An additional raised issue causing a significant agency cost in SMEs case is that 
they do not have to disclose their financial information in financial statements 
and they tend to suffer more the asymmetric information (93). Almost the latter is 
present when managers give more priority to respective areas of interest 
considering that monitoring process in these cases is very expensive. As SMEs 
temp generally to be free from any financial disclosure whilst restrictive rules and 
regulations force large companies to be transparent regarding financial activities 
undertaken. Moreover Schulze et al. (92) added that the existence of conflicts may 
paralyze SMEs to make a decision which threaten its survival.  Consequently they 
increase debt in order to control self- interests of the agents and to limit the 
negative consequences of altruism within the firm and solve the problem of free 
ride. Because the phenomenon of altruism shows how the agency problem 
becomes more apparent in SMEs due to resources misallocation by affecting their 
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capital structure and properly this idea is supported from the study of Gomez-
Mejia et al. (91).  
 
Another capital structure theory is the pecking order one developed while 
describing the asymmetric information between managers and outside investors 
leading to adverse selection, so managers may issue new equity only when the 
firm is overvalued (69-70). Technically, this theory has no predictions about an 
optimal leverage ratio even keeps always in mind the cost of adverse selection by 
giving priority to those debt sources which represent less asymmetric information 
and the lowest adverse selection cost. So, the debt is firstly financed from internal 
funds and then it is issued in accordance with specific needs and circumstances.  
 
Various approaches pertaining to the same year set of researches (68, 94) related 
firms’ capital structure choice through the outside stakeholder’s signal which 
conveys information from inside to outside investors. The next set of approach is 
that capital structure is shaped to decrease the inefficiencies in the firm’s 
investment decisions; likewise it was believed that inefficiencies in investment 
decisions happen due to the information asymmetry among insiders/ managers 
and outsiders /creditors and investors (69).  
 
Under these circumstances is also believed that an asymmetric information 
phenomenon is highly destructive due to the fact that well informed group has 
the power to take advantage to the other one at each transactional basis 8 (95). 
Barnea et al. (96) charges more likely to the SMEs the asymmetric information as 
the information transparency is costly almost related to financial statements 
publishing. And in fact should be admitted that investors instead prefer to have 
an audited financial statement even the latter isn’t yet a legal requirement. In the 
same time due to the existing circumstances the managers aren’t too focused on 
this point by creating asymmetric information issues.  
Credit rationing evidences from the other side (being strictly related to 
asymmetric information) confirm that it is smaller in short term period for small 
businesses than in faster growing firms with a low return on assets, added value, 
quick ratio, cash flow to assets ratio and much less accounts receivable and 
inventories to offer as collateral. For long term credit instead, credit rationed 
firms are in general smaller and younger firms, preserving some interesting 
features such as: low cash flow to assets ratios, low growth rate and much less 
                                                          
8  Considering that adverse selection phenomenon occurs before executing the 
transaction and the moral hazard after.  
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tangible assets to offer as collateral even though they have a higher added value 
and return on assets ratio (71).  
 
However deemed necessary the examination of capital structure choices 
depending on SMEs circumstances regarding decisions strongly correlated with 
‘business-risk appetite’ which in turns are supported from performance targets.  
 
 
1.4.1. Capital structure choices 
Basically stating, firms finance their assets through equity, debt or more 
frequently, a combination of both. The first option represents the amount invested 
by shareholders while constituting a long term financing source since it does not 
obligate to an effective and immediate repayment. Intuitively, a certain return is 
expected by the shareholders for the sustained risk, which vary from firm’s 
profitability whilst the vice-versa leads to a situation of bankruptcy. Debts instead 
require a strict payment of interest and principals at maturity date to the firms’ 
creditors and is correlated to an increasing risk which should be covered from 
equity return (97). Throughout debt can be subdivided in short and long-term 
according to its maturity. Rationally the first types of debts are more relevant 
when companies need working capital for small equipment purchases, while 
long-term instruments are more important as per new investments. And finally 
the strategy used from the company to combine them both represents its capital 
structure. Mota et al. (98) underlined that restricted to several factors, such as: 
industry, tax policies, type of asset, costs of financial distress, uncertainty about 
the future, company’s life cycle and borrowing decisions the firms’ capital 
structure varies. Especially referring to Borges et al. (99) and (97) the main 
indicators related to capital structure choices revealed to be: equity-debt-
solvability ratios. It was argued that they determine the level of equity and debt 
while companies finance their assets independently from respective nature and 
function, as well as express the ability to pay corresponding debts. Due to the a/m 
reasons the argument is further elaborated by paying particular interest over 
capital structure determinants nature evidences even in different theoretical 
contexts as deemed necessary to better understand the strategy implemented 
from SMEs accordingly.  
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1.1.1.1.  Capital structure determinants  
Various empirical studies have been conducted to analyze which factors affect the 
capital structure of companies (87, 100-108) and the factors most quoted by the 
literature are: asset structure, non-debt tax shield (NDTS), size, profitability, 
growth, liquidity, cash flow and industry.  
The very first one regards to the segregation of the economic resources owned by 
a company in tangible or intangible, thus, is proposed that firms with tangible 
assets that can be used as collateral in the case of default and with respective debt 
obligations are expected to issue more debt including here lending and other debt 
instrument issuance (109, 101). In the same argumentation line remained even 
other authors (e.g 110) by stating that firms with more tangible assets have higher 
liquidation rate and consequently have more possibility to issue debts.  The 
assets-debt issuance mechanism was later analyzed while treating assets as the 
collateral for debt issuance, so, the lending counter-parties undertake a minor risk 
(107).  According to the latter, Michaelas et al. (41) and Hall et al.(42) it is 
ascertained that tangible assets have a positive correlation with long-term debts 
(LTD). Comparatively, short-term debts (STD) are disputed about the relationship 
of tangible asset with debt ratio because some researchers suggest a positive 
correlation (such as: Michaelas et al. (41); Esperança et al. (106)), while others a 
negative one (such as: Hall et al. (42) and (107)).  
Meanwhile it can be mentioned that tax deductibility of interest payments may be 
the main benefit of debt, however, the determination of the optimal level of debt 
is influenced by the existence of other NDTS such as depreciation, provisions, 
allowances for doubtful accounts and others (100). 
The literature also proposes a negative relationship between NDTS and LTD, as 
well as lack of statistical evidence concerning STD (e.g. Michaelas et al., (41), 
Esperança et al. (106) and Mira and Garcia (111)). Despite this, a vast literature is 
contradictive by suggesting a positive correlation between NDTS and LTD and a 
negative relation between NDTS and STD while arguing that firm size is another 
feature that may influence capital structure choices (107). In addition referring to 
the latter is concluded that firm size is positively related to debt (101). 
Throughout the extensive research work developed over this topic from 
Michaelas et al. (41); Hall et al.(42), Esperança et al. (106); Vieira and Novo (107) 
agreed that SMEs are expected to show a positive relationship between size and 
LTD, but a negative one with STD. Furthermore it was demonstrated that the 
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transactions cost of financing externally is lower in large firms which makes the 
debt access harder for smaller ones (112).  
Accordingly other researches (112 and 113) followed the argumentation that a 
diversified strategy enables large firms to stable earnings by reducing the risk of 
bankruptcy and contemporaneously contributing to meet their debt obligations 
on time. Meanwhile another study (114) evidenced that SMEs are averse to risk 
because they are less leveraged and prefer to use more self-financing.  
 
In respect to profitability instead as predicted in another work (69) it’s directly 
related to the pecking order theory which pursues a hierarchical order on behalf 
of firms’ financing decision: first internally with generated funds, then externally 
by issuing debt, and only as a last resort the new equity issuance. As it can be 
understand, the previous result contradicts the main study (64)  prediction, since  
firms’ don’t take advantage of debt tax shields benefits as they prefer to be 
internally financed almost referring to funding cost (115). In a certain extend 
(116), it was explained that in small companies the risk is not shared by multiple 
investors, and managers will be more averse to take risk through borrowing 
money from outside financers. And the same result is perceived from the vast 
majority of researchers such as: Michaelas et al. (41), Hall et al. (42), Esperança et 
al. (106), Mira and Garcia (111), Cabaço (108) and Vieira and Novo (107) referring 
SMEs by showing a negative relationship between profitability and debt ratios.  
Growth is another indicator widely used from investors, creditors and 
shareholders to measure the growth of an investment or project, leading to a 
profit derived mainly from sales/asset/earnings before interests and taxes growth. 
Recognizing this attribute, should be admitted that prior studies are controversial 
and there is no consensus in the relationship between growth and debt ratios. For 
example it is positive as a high growth firm rate can transmit a positive signal to 
creditors and they obviously will operate in favorable terms of credit (38). Due to 
this, other researches (87 and 102) state that the problem of overinvestment and  
recognition of companies’ growth by the creditors, granting credit easier are the 
causes of a positive relationship between growth and debt showed by prior 
empirical studies. In controversy, Hovakimian et al. (117) assume that growth is 
negatively related to debt, as companies like to finance growth through retained 
profits over debt in conformity with underinvestment reason as explained in 
other studies (103 and 118).  
Further evidences (67,116) also demonstrated that investment in growth will 
increase agency costs of debt and this could lead to less borrowing of money 
outside and consequently to a negative relationship between growth and debt. 
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Intuitively (119 and 120) it was supported the idea that if market prices were 
determined by rational investors then bankruptcy costs would not exist. While 
the development of static trade-off theory (121) proposed that debt should be 
obtained to balance bankruptcy costs and tax savings. But on the other hand other 
authors (122) concluded that the existence of bankruptcy costs reduces the value 
of tax shield.  
 
Additionally, as a quick solvency test is used liquidity ratio being that it measures 
the company's ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Under this light (104) it is 
evidenced that liquidity ratio has a negative impact on debt ratios as firms with 
higher liquidity ratios would use them to finance their investments. 
Comparatively, the first cause of businesses’ default is the lack of liquidity which 
is perceived as a bad signal from creditors. Hereinafter it can be affirmed that 
firms with high liquidity ratios prefer to issue LTD instead of STD. So, the conflict 
between managers and shareholders gets worse when companies generate 
relevant free cash flow by demonstrating that companies with high cash flows 
tend to issue more debt in order to discipline and motivate managers to work 
harder and take right investment decisions instead of wasting those cash flows in 
projects with lower returns compared with the cost of capital (87 and 102). Similar 
results were obtained (111) while exploring some SMEs’ behavior as it was 
revealed a negative relationship between cash flow and debt.  Concretely, in this 
case SMEs tend to invest in internal funds instead of accessing external debts.  In 
contradiction with the latest researches (123 and 124) it was argued that asset 
substitution problem (such as using debt to finance high risk projects instead of 
equity) could be reduced because of the management’s reputation being at stake. 
Therefore, as a firm gets older, it chooses less risky projects, by reducing its 
defaults probability which would lead to a lower cost of debt.  Trying to go ahead 
to the problem, agency models have used different factors in order to explore the 
relation that exists between leverage and firm value, regulatory abidance, 
probability of defaults, value at the time of liquidation, available cash flows and 
the significance of managerial reputation. So, the last research conducted 
manifested that leverage is expected to be negatively correlated with interest 
coverage, growth opportunities, while firm value is positively correlated with it 
in response to some exogenous factors. Apart of the latter it was declared that 
agency problems between owners and managers tend to be insignificant in SMEs 
because the managers are the companies’ owners most of the times (125 and 126).  
But disputed results were also achieved (127), by this way a negative relationship 
between the level of the stock market and leverage was found, the contrary 
instead revealed between bank development and leverage. Special attention is 
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also given to models based on industrial organization; such theories examine the 
relationship between a firm capital structure and its strategy whiles other the 
relationship between firm’s capital structure and products/inputs characteristics. 
Properly, an interesting result was achieved (128) considering that under certain 
defined oligopolistic assumptions firms in equilibrium chooses positive debt 
levels. The idea was also consistently supported from another research (129) 
concluding that debt capacity increases with elasticity of demand for a product 
and decreases with the discount rate. A previous investigation (130) instead 
commented the influence of capital structure on customers and suppliers, and 
stated that capital structure was designed to ensure that shareholders did not 
liquidate a firm, debt holders from the other side would liquidate a firm only 
when it declared bankruptcy, as well as that the firm would default only if the net 
gains to liquidation exceeded the cost to the company’s customers. 
Comparatively, an interesting result (131) is that firms which employed workers 
with highly transferable skills would have more debt necessity. But usually firms 
raise funds for new investments through retained earnings and externally 
through equity issues. Referring to the latest, it was observed a fall in the overall 
firm leverage between 1946 and 1986 period (132), and a general rise in leverage 
since the Second World War (133).  
 
Empirically driven it is described that the most firm-specific factors affecting their 
capital structure are: firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth and volatility 
while considering among others that industrial characteristics also influence the 
capital structure (134).  Other authors (135) added also that their relative leverage 
rankings are retained over time.  Within the same logic, another examination 
(101) revealed that leverage increased with non-debt tax shields, fixed assets, size 
of the firm, and growth opportunities, and decreased with profitability, research 
and development expenditures, advertising expenditures, uniqueness of the 
product and volatility.  
Properly, the latter is an extremely prominent element which may be addressed 
to interest rates and stock markets by becoming a particularly key-factor in the 
academicians, industrialists and regulators attention regarding their theoretical 
and practical investments. In such cases seems very interesting also the 
involvement of macro-factors in the firms’ capital structure empirical 
examinations such as: market structure, stock market development, country’s 
financial stability, fiscal characteristics, terrorism threat, direct foreign 
investments, exchange rate volatility and so on.   
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As contemporaneously is very interesting even the exploitation of firms’ patterns 
such as: collateral value, sales discount rates, products quality, customer loyalty 
premiums, etc which may in/directly affect their capital structures choises which 
afterwards predicts their performance.  
 
 
1.5. EXOGENOUS RISKY FACTORS AFFECTING SME´ S SUCCESS  
A special interest obviously goes to different and ambiguous results found from 
empirical researches dealing with macro factors over SMEs success stories and 
not. Under the same prospect, Simpson et al. (136) defines the macro-environment 
as containing factors external to company that present situational variable which 
may facilitate or inhibit entrepreneurship since the start-up and during all SMEs 
lifecycle.  
 
Moreover the evidences (137) supported this concept by listing external factors 
such as: socio-demographics, markets (local, international, emerging and 
established markets), cultural, economic, political, institutional, legal, productive, 
technological, infrastructure and other physical factors of environment with 
respective pros and cons. Notwithstanding, Mazzarol et al. (138) and Viviers et al. 
(139) point out that these macro environmental factors are unfortunately not 
controllable and the success of SMEs often depends on management’s ability to 
deal with them either with their volatility over time.  
 
From the other side (140), it is discussed that the success of a new venture 
depends on the state of specific factors within the boundaries of specific nation-
states with their own distinct economic, political and social factors. Obviously 
these factors have implications for education and skill bases, labor, expertise risk, 
access to resources, subcontractors and corresponding markets, networks, and so 
on by defining the entire framework which influences SME’s success chances.  
 
Opting to be focused on macro-economic context different arguments regarding 
SMEs success can be found out referring to following four groups of factors.  
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1.5.1. Political-institutional factors 
As it is clearly predicted from Themba et al. (141) the political climate and legal 
requirements of doing business in a country represent the prior enhancer 
regarding entrepreneurship development and vice versa.  
In the same line it was additionally stated that macro-economic policies, 
legislation, frameworks, regulations and laws are factors that can facilitate or 
hinder entrepreneurship development (142,143). Other author studies such as: 
Themba et al. (141); Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) argue that appropriate 
trade, labor, investments, tax policies and regulations encourages the investments 
sustainability not only by getting “self-financial wealth” but also by creating new 
job opportunities. The opposite occurs when the external environment presents 
legal and regulatory constraints related to entrepreneurship while increasing the 
costs of doing business (145). Properly referring to the latter deemed necessary to 
examine some evidences on this regard.  
 
 
 
 
1.5.1.1. The judiciary system 
The peculiarities of judiciary help in its reliability enhancement according to 
Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) research, furthermore it represents an 
important mechanism for entrepreneurial development by providing legal 
protection against intellectual property rights, enforce contractual obligations 
between parties, implement competition laws, as well as effectively administer 
commercial and administrative law.  
 
Meaning that legal environment forces constitute labor law, antitrust laws, 
regulations, occupational health and safety policies implementation on behalf of 
specific interest in a given business industry (145). In some cases the regulations 
adopted concerning controlling of a certain industry includes: screening of 
premises, monitoring or registration of renewal permissions applications, 
inventories registration etc. But beyond them the combined effect of legal 
environment with business features provides adequate forces to orient business 
strategy.  
 
And this sounds true, apart from the apparent burdens established as evidenced 
in some researches where businesses response was proactive referring to 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 62 
 
profitability targets set (146-147), thus, a special attention goes to judiciary system 
strengthen.  
 
 
 
 
1.5.1.2. Bureaucracy and compliance 
The practice demonstrates that bureaucracy and compliance is not welcomed in 
business routine because according to Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) white 
collar crime can significantly increase business costs while takes also too much 
time to execute business transactions as well as creates an uncompetitive market 
context. Furthermore is explained that business feels constraint to fulfill the 
ongoing governmental requirements without having the possibility to a prior 
negotiation (148 and 149). Anaway seen from a different point of view, 
bureaucracy and compliance helps in a better understanding of SMEs needs 
closely related also to training and other government support activities even why 
evidences may confirm the contrary (150).   
 
 
1.5.1.3. Public support 
In various studies reveals the fundamental role of public infrastructure in 
businesses performance, concretely it was affirmed that public support is a very 
important instrument to SME success (148). Through it is ensured that SMEs get 
ongoing support in the form of knowledge and expertise to provide business 
sustainability beyond the initial incubation and early survival. In addition, two 
authors in their work (142) confirmed that the lack of public sector support has a 
negative impact on SMEs development in a country.  
The support is typically provided in the form of incentive programs or 
inducements to encourage the funding of new enterprises, but no rarely the SMEs 
have no knowledge about existing government support mechanisms or don’t 
know how to access them (151, 152). Anyway Fielden et al. (153) ascertained that 
some SMEs find that services like grants or procurement opportunities are 
complicated, inflexible or inadequate for current SME needs.  
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In another study it was made a distinction between entrepreneurs in terms of 
ethnic backgrounds and accordingly government support resulted more 
important for the success of small indigenous entrepreneurs than for the non-
indigenous ones (154). Similarly, in a general way Sarder et al.(155) through a 
further research found that firms receiving support services, such as: marketing, 
education and training, technical, extension and consultancy, information, and 
common facilities from the public / private agencies experienced a significant 
increase in sales, employment and productivity. Intuitively this makes the public 
support a relevant mechanism especially in the initial business life-cycle.  
 
 
 
1.5.1.4. Political instability 
In their study Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) convincingly express the negative 
role of the political instability over SMEs development. And the reason is 
attributed to the turbulences that political instability causes into business 
environment by negatively influencing the competition and consequently SMEs 
success. Without forgetting that SMEs environment preservation at early stage is 
the most necessary action to be undertaken into a business climate almost where 
they are the majority force of country’s economy.  
Likewise another research drew a ‘spicy’ conclusion considering the relationship 
between SMEs bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and 
cost of capital under political instability conditions (156).  This sounds true by 
recognizing that business needs time to strengthen the steps undertaken to reach 
the targets set.  
 
However must be admitted that SMEs are more sensitive to economic policies 
results almost until they mature in ‘destination-market’, then, additional factors 
may be predictive to respective success.  
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1.5.2. Economic policies effectiveness to entrepreneurship   
At first sight, the varieties of economic policies implemented reflect at least the 
country’s stage of development through specific incentives or barrier 
mechanisms. But, some studies (153 and 157) count the social conditions and 
aspects which create environmental goodwill from which benefit SMEs, or may 
present pressures that stifle entrepreneurship on behalf of Themba et al. (141, 158 
and 159). Basically economic policies effectiveness is ensured through public 
infrastructure and credit access, labor force promotion, economic resources and 
technological progress mainly on behalf of socio-cultural context as described in 
following.  
 
 
1.5.2.1. Access to public infrastructure 
Some studies (e.g: 160, 142 and Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144)) underlined the 
access to public physical infrastructure services including: water, electricity, 
serviceable roads, telecommunication, telephones, electronic media and postal 
services as essential for business start-up, development and growth. By admitting 
that recently internet is another support-option which avoids different 
bureaucratic transaction stages as well as reduces costs. Additional researches 
(142 and 159) explained that limited access to public infrastructure services is a 
major constraint to SME survival and growth, as it limits operations and restricts 
access to markets and raw materials.  
 
Nonetheless generally the literature concludes that an adequate quality and 
accessibility of infrastructure services encourage investments, productivity and 
growth of businesses; whereas, the vice-versa conducts them into a slowing 
productivity growth (142, 161,162). Therefore, the public infrastructure access 
awareness becomes an essential element for business development path and not 
only.  
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1.5.2.2. Credit accessibility 
The practice dictates that appropriate economic resources availability is important 
for small and micro business development. In addition, Robertson et al. (163) 
emphasized that availability enables SMEs to secure the necessary expertise and 
raw materials to put entrepreneurial ideas into practice, to be competitive, to 
survive during unfavorable conditions and to grow faster. Another group of 
studies (164, 151, 165, and 148) instead treated the lack of capital and limited 
access to finance as a factor that inhibits entrepreneurship and impedes the 
growth as well as the progress which comes even from timeout application of 
such essential resources.  
Saying that, a special attention goes to the financial institutions which design 
tailored–SME lending product but in any case worth mentioned that they 
normally avoid SMEs that are considered risky and have no collateral or 
dependable track records (166). Under this logic the evidences (158) affirmed that 
most of those SMEs that are able to secure start-up finance find the cost of capital 
too high.  
From the other side, Cole et al. (167); Beck et al. (168); (169) and (170) papers have 
investigated over additional SMEs incentive policy orientation factors and 
obstacles considered significant in constraining bank lending to them.  
Notwithstanding a considerable literature exists regarding the economic benefits 
and SMEs products lending between banks and business customers (e.g. 171-181, 
Bharath et al. (182), 183, Benvenuti et al. (184), Uchida et al. (185)).  
Concretely, it is argued that the above mentioned lending benefits derive from:  
-information efficiency in loan origination process pertaining to screening and quality 
of lending decisions information availability;  
-cost effectiveness of relationship lending: risk premium estimation;  
 -customer satisfaction: customer monitoring and advising;  
 -business expansion: due to business relationship the bank expand products 
portfolio offered to existing customers even implementing preferential charges;  
-loan performance/provisions calculation: measured by ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loan portfolio through which the bank can also calculate risk adjusted 
performance and further think about appropriate SMEs lending policies.  
 
In this purpose it was empirically proved that bank characteristics have decisive 
effects on loan pricing and maturity (186 and 187).  In second stage, the research 
shows that lending process depends from the technology used from bank and 
SMEs accordingly, which in a certain level tends to be risky.  Another aspect 
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explored regarding the quantum of their lending infrastructure 9 to SMEs using 
different lending technologies is that the further key factor is financial 
institution’s structure (188).  
Pertaining to different (189, 176) papers elaboration is also raised the hypothesis 
that the globalization10 of financial services has an adverse effect on small 
businesses lend amount even it seems that technological progress has expanded 
their credit sources. In facts, statistics show that banks offering “standard” 
lending products worldwide support the strategy through a mix-marketing 
scheme which somehow is expected to produce respective effects only in the near 
future. Stating that, it must be admitted that technological progress is another 
factor which should be taken into consideration on the matter.  
 
 
 
1.5.2.3. Labor force, economic resources and technological progress 
Some references (190, 191) permit to the understanding that access to labor 
markets is a key factor pertaining to entrepreneurship management as in 
compliance with other findings (182) it offers the appropriate expertise that 
enables ventures to explore all market opportunities. Accordingly skilled and 
professional human capitals always improve and boost SMEs development 
process. In this process an indisputable role is maintained from professional 
schools and universities curricula at each faculty program almost considering 
inter-faculty opportunities in globalization era.  
Properly for this, (193 and 194) studies highly quote the access to other economic 
resources like: suppliers, lawyers, training and all intermediaries needed 
affirming that they create the value chain for entrepreneurial success. From the 
other hand, globalization, technological sophistication, access to technology and 
technological discoveries have seen an increased numbers of businesses built on 
quality assurance, high-tech innovations and intellectual property while giving to 
                                                          
9 Generally refers to the conditions provided by governments/ regulatory 
authorities affecting financial institutions lending process. Berger and Udell (2006), 
described it as following: (a) the typology of information retrieved; (b) the legal and (c) 
fiscal context.  
10 Typically in this process are involved foreign owned banks which pursue the 
same strategic line as the holding group. So, lending to SMEs isn’t a customized process to 
certain main characteristics which vary from country to country.  
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them the flexibility to be part of the market and explore respective opportunities 
which contemporaneously become more competitive. By this way, it was 
evidenced that inability to secure technology at start-up phase can impact 
negatively on the entrepreneurship development process (142). However it 
should be highlighted that technological progress is a vital process inevitably 
required even for further business climate improvement.  
 
 
 
1.5.3. Cultural living context 
For many researchers point of view 152, 195 and Stewart et al. (196)  culture is 
considered as shared values, beliefs and norms of a society and therefore 
represents an important contextual factor, collectively programming and affecting 
entrepreneurs in a given community, ethnic group, region or country which 
generate differences across national and regional boundaries.  
Even through detailed empirical estimations (148,197) the level of entrepreneurial 
activity in a country revealed to be affected by cultural norms, thus under this 
aspect, extensive studies were undertaken (151, 152 and 198).  
 
In this regard, interesting results are achieved from (148) and Dreisler et al. (199) 
by describing that national culture that emphasizes achievement and social 
recognition for all forms of entrepreneurial success is more conducive to 
entrepreneurship. Consequently it was drawn the result that areas with low 
entrepreneurial culture may discourage entrepreneurs, who fear social pressure 
and furthermore market competition.  
 
Another indisputable factor affecting SMEs birth and later on their success rate 
treated from Robertson et al. (163) is health care, especially while dealing with 
extraction and production activities. The continuous investment on it creates a 
better work climate for the entrepreneurs. Foremost considering a sustainable 
business climate Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) mentioned the low crime rate 
and security as a key factor for business progress. Particularly, as also previously 
mentioned is pointed out that crime and insecurity negatively affect investment 
levels, sales and business success without neglecting that they increase the cost of 
doing business (148,149).   
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1.5.4. Economic factors 
Thinking about the economic factors impact on business success the studies 
undertaken from Viviers et al. (139); 148 and 157 demonstrated that the state of 
the national economy at the time when business is launched is decisive.  Relative 
findings are briefly described as following. 
 
 
1.5.4.1.  Enterprise concentration rate 
Merely enterprise concentration rate can be defined as the number of firms in a 
certain population at a given time while referring to a description it includes also 
the percentage of existing and possible entrepreneurs (200). Related to this 
measure, on behalf of a specific investigation work (201) it was concluded that 
low enterprises concentration rate means expanding opportunities whilst in the 
same time it can be disincentive for enterprises existence itself. In this regard it 
can also be affirmed that most successful businesses are those located in highly 
populated areas.    
 
 
 
1.5.4.2. Inflation 
Viviers et al. (139) and (148) works demonstrated that inflation affects 
entrepreneurship. Accordingly high inflation rates discourage venture activity as 
consumers become conservator in spending while requiring higher salaries. In 
other words, for the entrepreneurs this means less supply and consequently 
lowers profitability rates. Otherwise sales may be positively affected by inflation, 
therefore is important to use several indicators together to study the growth and 
development of enterprises under inflationary circumstances (202). In the same 
argumentation line remains the theory which implies that inflation is necessary to 
business development when it serves as ‘business-lubrificant’ element otherwise 
it becomes dangerous.  
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1.5.4.3. Interest rate 
The debate over the interest rate effect on entrepreneurship is blatant because the 
literacy itself has shown contradictory results, for example a study argues that 
independently from risk premium attributed to the counterparties during credit 
worthiness process a liberal monetary policy assures a direct capital access to 
entrepreneurs (152). Nonetheless another research (203) founded a direct positive 
relation between SMEs growth inflation rate and interest rate.  
The contrary instead was strongly supported from Viviers et al. (139), explaining 
that higher interest rates obviously implies limited consumption whilst the 
amount of available capital rises.  In addition, over a theoretically basis it can be 
said that high inflation rates negatively impact capital access as by this way 
higher interest rates are applied in lending products and this consecutively is 
translated in higher product and service prices by limiting SMEs access. Thus, the 
proper addressing of monetary policy is a necessity in the countries with high 
SME concentration rate.  
 
 
1.5.4.4. Unemployment rate 
As a derivative of monetary policy instrument unemployment impacts the 
entrepreneurship process on behalf of Viviers et al. (139).  From one hand as 
empirically proved in case of a high unemployment rate a lot of people are 
obligated to be employed into enterprises on the other one instead as argued, 
properly because of the high unemployment rate business earnings and markets 
are naturally limited (152, 204, 205). In controversy high unemployment rates also 
mean that more people prefer to be engaged in self-employment activities 
considering that spending power is limited which constitute an important signal 
in business prospect. Comparatively worth mentioned that lower unemployment 
rates deal with an extensive technological progress meaning that all skilled 
workers and professionals are integrative part of proactive labor force which in 
case is not directly involved in business activities continuously interacts with 
them.  
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 70 
 
 
1.5.4.5. Exchange rate 
The studies undertaken from Viviers et al. (139) and (152) promote exchange rate 
as the major factor affecting entrepreneurship. Generally developing economies 
which demonstrate a high SMEs birth rate are threaten from import products 
whilst opt for exporting opportunities by mentioning also that less capital is 
invested from local SMEs.   
Notwithstanding exchange rate fluctuation is considered as another very 
important factor directly affecting business volume especially while dealing with 
sensitive activities within SMEs. Concretely, is confirmed a very high sensitivity 
concerning SMEs performance and cost of operations to exchange rate 
fluctuations (206) mainly related to financial activities.  
 
 
 
 
1.5.4.6. Taxation 
Taxation in the quality of fiscal policy product as per Robertson et al. (163) study 
represents an inhibiting SME development factor. The same argumentation line 
was pursued even from Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarary (144) confirming that if tax 
rates are high the profit incentive can be drastically reduced and contemporary is 
explained that the complexity of tax system raises the business doing cost 
including here even the reporting frequency. Without considering the turbulences 
created from systematically complex challenges implemented in taxation system 
the SMEs survival and then success becomes quite impossible. Under the latter 
circumstances the best fiscal approach may be the one designed on business-life-
cycle progress.  
 
 
 
1.5.4.7. Business climate  
The remarkable work of two authors (193) found as key SMEs / entrepreneurial 
success factors the positive features that a country provides related to 
opportunities, threats, information and access to role models in compliance also 
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with Pretorius et al. (207) study. Rationally, worth highlighting that political 
turbulences make unsecure the business climate by creating different risks which 
threaten business success and survival realities on behalf of Themba et al. (141). 
Throughout should be mentioned that Viviers et al. (139) offer as a key success 
factor the ability that SMEs themselves have to change over time by proactively 
acting against different risks (208) aiming also to capture the market 
opportunities. Alternatively it means changing technological practices and why 
not products’ portfolios offer (148).   
Because it was also deducted, that SMEs frequently miss the market opportunities 
while facing eventual extinction concept (149 and 200). And all this seen from a 
risk-environment framework leads to the understanding that business exposure 
depends to some risks which by the way influence risk decisions. 
Correspondingly, staff-quantum issue instead can be translated in a safer 
environment, considering that they act more proactively toward business risk 
management process by providing additional chances concerning employment.  
 
 
 
1.1.1.2. THE METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH CONCERNING SMEs 
LIQUIDITY, LEVERAGE AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
MODELS 
Trying to investigate through the appropriate methodologies used to reveal and 
further understand different phenomena explored under the a/m context, two 
researchers (209) affirmation must be highlighted:  
“Research method embraces the examination and explanation of a 
phenomenon which takes account of the underlying philosophical ideologies 
assumption, research design and analysis”.   
Under this light and following the literature examination order, must be added 
that usually working capital effects on SMEs’ profitability in comparative 
circumstances are tested by using panel data sampling technique. Because as 
explained from (210) study and by referring to two other authors works (211 and 
212) the benefits derived from the above mentioned sample collection 
methodology refers to:  
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- individual heterogeneity control;  Panel data suggests that individuals, firms, states 
or countries are heterogeneous (213 and 214) while referring to time-series and 
cross-section studies that can’t control this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining 
biased.  
- Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; time-series studies instead 
suffer multicollinearity meanwhile with additional information it can be 
produced a more reliable parameter estimates approach. 
- Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment; statistically stating is 
evidenced that cross-sectional distributions that look relatively stable hide a 
multitude of changes. 
- Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in 
pure cross-section or pure time-series data; 
- Panel data models allow constructing and test more complicated behavioral models than 
purely cross-section or time-series data; correspondingly the technical efficiency is 
better investigated and modeled with panels (215-219).   
- Micro panel data gathered on individuals, firms and households may be more accurately 
measured than similar variables measured at macro level; In proposition to this, (212 
and 220) researches affirmed that biases resulting from aggregation over firms or 
individuals may be reduced or eliminated.  
- Macro panel data on the other hand have a longer time series and unlike raises the 
problem of nonstandard distributions typical of unit roots tests in time-series analysis 11, 
which are further examined by using fixed and random effects regressions.  
 
From the other hand, prominent studies (16, 39, 104, 208-215) have examined the 
determinants of SMEs’ profitability and liquidity on respective performance by 
using regression analysis.  
Meanwhile through the additional interesting methods used are: the Pooled least 
square and General least square with cross section weight models implemented 
from two well-known authors of the field (50) and tested according to 
independent t-test and Bonferroni, Scheffe and Sidak’s tests developed through 
One Way Anova model (228) as well as Pearson’s correlation examined (39 and 
229). Furthermore, cross sectional studies also have been conducted by using 
regression modeling (7).  
 
                                                          
11 The Baltagi (2002) study ascertained that that panel unit root tests have standard 
asymptotic distributions. 
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Concretely, the cross country-multiple regression trend analysis instead widely 
used in literature is explored (30, 101, 103, 118, 134, 135 and 230-235) while opting 
for the satisfaction of all its five assumptions: 
 -Normal distribution; 
- Linearity of each dependent variable from the explanatory ones;   
- Homoschedastic distribution (of data and errors);  
- Random walk errors (demonstrated through Durbin-Watson test statistics (236)); 
 -Lack of multicollinearity (between explanatory variables examined through 
variance inflation factor-VIF) while aiming to explore the variables in/ significant 
impact on the phenomenon under examination.    
 
Comparatively concerning dynamic specification models used to determine 
SMEs’ capital structure attested to panel and not data studies  shows up  the one 
explored during 2005 from Gaud et al. (237) and Martin et al. (238), including 
them with a few SMEs (239) undertaken three years later. Intuitively an adequate 
estimation procedure obtained is the traditional Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(POLS) and the more advanced one the System of Generalized Method of 
Moments /GMM (220). In following an important method that prevails regarding 
the identification of SMEs capital structure differences at a cross-industry level is 
logistic regression model (48).  Moreover, in order to capture the industry 
heterogeneity the inclusion of dummy variables techniques is used (240). And 
counting for the treatment of time-specific factors effect instead for each year the 
(241) study can be taken as example. However should be admitted that “time-
trend” factor can be used as a control variable in all kind of models.  
 
In this regard, it can be understand that concerning the influence of economic 
factors, government policies/tax and business characteristics in risk and financial 
management decision making the reviewed researches suggest that a very little 
progress is done.  
 
Concretely it is used a multivariate probit approach to show the importance of 
individual risk aversion, firm size, household size, household’s head literacy 
among others as factors that increase the likelihood of adopting risk management 
strategies in SMEs (242). Throughout the dependent latent variable is modeled on 
behalf of a linear regression function of explanatory variables which assume that 
error term has a standard normal distribution. Must also be evidenced that probit 
model is typically implemented in these cases and is estimated by the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation as well as in some sporadic cases the binary 
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logistic regression analysis is used. Moreover considering the characteristics of 
data retrieved in order to capture the behavioral aspects randomly the cross-
sectional regressions result the most appropriate technique to be used (243-250). 
Remarkable, general effects of socio-demographic factors on financial risk 
management have been reviewed extensively by Gärling et al. (251) while 
indicating that even through a meta-analysis can be operated (252).  
 
Notwithstanding, a lots remains to be done concerning SMEs’ performance 
behavior investigation according to circumstances, particularities and relevance 
estimation in a business intelligence context by considering it as a fertile practical 
and research area. 
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II. SMEs CLIMATE AND BEHAVIORAL TENDENCY 
 
 
The term “business” represents the most widely used expression in today's 
globalized world. Likewise it is commonly used even without any precise 
definition and subsequently many dilemmas are raised regarding its adequate 
and consistent meaning.  
 
From a certain point of view, it is associated with the corporate structure of large 
multinational business entities, otherwise, it emphasis small business entities, 
ranging from those businesses run at family level (family businesses), to the 
numerous and complex options  performed in various small businesses that are 
realized in the field of trade, services, production and so on. 
 
Intuitively, the question raised is: which are the factors/criteria that define the size 
of a business? Theoretical and practical evidences prove that different criteria 
have been taken into consideration based on which the size of small business is 
defined (i.e: the number of employees, financial assets´ efficiency, business 
activity, sales turnover, etc). However, it should be admitted that all these criteria 
are relevant concerning their behavioral tendency investigation due to different 
businesses peculiarities.  
By using this argumentation line, it can be stated that a business entity, in an 
industry branch may be categorized as "big"  compared to its competitors, on the 
other hand it can be treated as "small" by closely referring to employees number, 
assets value, etc. Accordingly seems reasonable to further discuss the referential 
criteria established and used concerning business size definition in the country 
and not only, especially referring to small and medium businesses size aiming to 
compare them among different sectors of pertinence. Under some constraints here 
it must be highlighted that entrepreneur12 can be considered the person who 
develops a business while facing risk, aiming at gaining profit and increasing 
                                                          
12 With special regard to ‘micro’ activities owners.  
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business, taking advantage of the chances by having the ability to secure and 
manage the invested resources.  
 
Taking into consideration the country circumstances in this part of research will 
be briefly analyzed the peculiarities of SMEs and the existing philosophy that 
makes efforts (while fighting the inequality effects, employment and 
demographic growth contemporaneously with the need for structural change 
reflected in regional administration development as per social cohesion 
strengthening), and creates realities to boost these initiatives toward a sustainable 
performance.  
2.1. SMEs CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK  
For many people, possessing a small business means a total independence and 
satisfactory financial incomes which contemporary results to be incredibly 
enticing. Throughout, many people dream to initially have a small business in 
possession but hesitate to realize that dream because think that do not have the 
education, experience and why not the money needed. Others are not familiar 
with the idea that  by having a business on their own can completely change their 
lives. And properly this acting philosophy is very present in developing countries 
contexts like the Albania’s one.  
While as by the meaning of the term enterprise itself, is reflected the idea of 
undertaking something, thus, the owners of micro and small businesses are also 
called entrepreneurs.  
 
In this light, various definitions are given in the literature for the entrepreneurs, 
even the essence is the same as in following:  
- The entrepreneur can be defined the one that organizes, directs and 
undertakes the risk of a business enterprise (253); 
- The entrepreneur is the one that creates "a powerful business from 
nothing" (254); 
- The entrepreneur is the one that by combining a variety of things - money, 
materials, and work transforms them into a new product, business, 
productive process or into an improved body (255). 
 
In parallel different definitions of SMEs across countries exist and the 
fundamental reasons for this refer to the differences in economic development 
between countries (256). In other words, it means that a firm which is classified as 
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a SME in one country may not be part of the same business category in another 
country and properly this has made difficult the comparison between them. 
Therefore, the differences between SMEs in developed and developing countries 
result to be very interesting.   
 
By this way, a medium firm in developed countries refers to a business with 100-
499 workers, whilst a firm with 20-99 workers is classed as medium in developing 
countries (257). A small firm instead in developed countries represents a firm 
with 99 or less workers, whilst a firm with 5-19 is classed as small in developing 
countries. In addition (258) in practice is argued that schemes that are normally 
targeted at SMEs adopt particular objectives. 
Anyway, the European Commission (EC) attempted to stabilize the definition of 
SME across the European Community Area (European Union/EU) by taking into 
consideration the economic developments that have taken place since 199613.  
 
Table 1. Enterprise classification in EU 
 
Enterprise 
category 
Headcounts Turnover Or Balance Sheet 
Medium-Sized <250 
≤ € 50  
million 
(before was € 
40  million) 
 ≤ € 43 million 
(before was € 27 
million) 
Small <50 
≤ € 10 million 
(before was € 
7  million) 
 ≤ € 10  million 
(before was € 5  
million) 
Micro <10 
≤ € 2  million 
(not 
established) 
 ≤ € 2  million 
(not established) 
 
Source: European Commission (259), Author  elaboration. 
 
Whereas previously, in United Kingdom, Bolton Committee (BC) had formulated 
the definition of a small firm by arguing even under the sectorial context 
regarding employee no and turnover, as in following:  
                                                          
13  The EU definition regarding SMEs excludes agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing companies and it does not vary according to the sector of enterprise.  
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Table 2. Enterprise classification in UK 
 
Enterprise Sector Definition 
Manufacturing 200 employees or less 
Construction and quarrying 25 employees or less 
Retailing, miscellaneous services Turnover of £50.000 or less 
Motor trades  Turnover of £100.000 or less 
Wholesales trades  Turnover of £200.000 or less 
Road transport  Five vehicles or less 
Catering  All types excluding multiplies and 
brewery-managed houses 
 
Source: Bolton Committee (260), Author elaboration  
 
With special regard to European Commission affirmation, Bolton Committee 
definition is treated as the best description of a small firm by neglecting the 
definition of characteristics based in the number of employees, business turnover, 
managerial approach as well as the fact that the small firm sector is treated as 
homogeneous.  In addition, UK Companies Act of 2006 (276) classifies the SMEs 
sector into small and medium. Correspondingly three different criteria are set, but 
at least the firm has to satisfy two of them to be considered as small or medium 
sized. This approach allows the comparison between industries and reserves the 
possibility to alternatively define firms across all industries.  
 
Table 3. Enterprise classification in small and medium size in UK 
  
Medium Small 
A turnover ≤ £ 25.9 million A turnover ≤ £ 6.5 million 
A balance sheet total ≤£ 12.9 million A balance sheet total ≤£ 3.26 million 
≤ 250 employees ≤ 50 employees 
 
Source: Companies Act of 2006 (261), Author elaboration 
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With the intent  to approximate Albanian legislation with that of the EU as well as 
creating premises for SMEs to benefit from donations and EU aid schemes, the 
Parliamentary Committee of Economy adopted in 2009 amendments to the Law 
"On Small and Medium Enterprises” no. 10042 dated 22.12.2008  for some 
changes and additions to Law No. 8957, dated.17.10.2002 (262) by introducing the 
classification as: micro, small and medium enterprise referring to employees no 
and annual turnover as following:  
Table 4. SMEs classification in Albania 
 
Classification Headcounts Annual turnover 
Micro 1-9 <10 million ALL 
Small 10-49 < 50 million ALL 
Medium 50-249 < 250 million ALL 
 
Source: The Law "On Small and Medium Enterprises” (262), Author elaboration 
 
 
Referring to the a/m legislation it can be highlighted that:  
-Micro businesses have up to 5 headcounts (which can be credited in the limit of 2.5 
million ALL);  
-Small businesses have 6-20 headcounts and an annual turnover ≤ 40 million ALL 
(100% of their equity is possessed from small businesses);  
-Medium businesses have 21-80 headcounts and an annual turnover ≤ 80 million 
ALL (25% of their equity can be possessed from businesses not classified as small 
and medium under the a/m law classification).   
And properly this classification still remains in force as per fiscal procedures 
implementation in the country (262).  
 
Comparatively exists another SME classification form deployed from National 
Statistics Institute (INSTAT) consisting in the headcounts no, such as:  
-First business dimension, up to 4 headcounts; 
-Second business dimension, 5-9 headcounts;  
-Third business dimension, 10-49 headcounts; 
-Fourth business dimension, ≥50 headcounts.   
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Apart from the classifications framework implemented, experience based starting 
a micro, small or even a medium-size business and make it successful does not 
always requires a professional or academic education, neither experience in the 
sphere of direction. Because telling the truth, the enterprise itself has proven the 
ability to change the economic outlook of an individual, business, branch, and 
even a national economy. According to many sucessful relalities to effectively run 
a business is quite enough the owner's entrepreneurial spirit, who in some cases 
needs only assistants and not managers. In fact, from certain aspects the latest is a 
wrong view referring to various empirical analysis as the business world 
recognizes many examples when successful businesses have gone to bankruptcy 
just because they have not understood the importance and necessity of managers 
in correspondence of business peculiarities (253-255). In this merit businesses 
behavior reveals crucial under performance management prospect by also 
recognizing the goverment role in their development promotion.  
 
 
 
2.2. ALBANIA vs REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT  
The beginnings of preparations for EU14 funded programs aimed at regional and 
local development referring to the establishment of Regional Development Fund 
in 2009 (292) have played an important role in promoting a balanced and stable 
                                                          
14 During the year 2000 Albania was involved in the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP) together with other five South-Eastern European countries. Precisely, the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the country and European 
Community was signed in 2006 and entered in force during April 2009. Afterwards, the 
country presented its application for membership in the European Union on 28 April 2009 
by achieving the Commission´s negative opinion in November 2010 referring to the 
accomplishment need of 12 key priorities concerning judicial and public administration 
reforms as well as parliament’s procedure review. The same results were achieved also 
during 2012. Meanwhile during 2013 a High Level Dialogue on these Key Priorities was 
launched between Albania and European Union as per a consensual cooperation of 
opposition and independent institutions regarding the integration process acceleration.  
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development through Albanian regions15 considering that as per latest statistics 
GDP per capita as of 2015 was respectively € 2.516  in Northern, € 3.556 in Center 
and € 2.897 in Southern area (significantly differentiated from the EU-28 average 
level which is about 26.500 €).  
 
In order to develop integrated and sustainable regions as well as in compliance 
with EU standards implementation, Albania has adopted a legislation governing 
the nomenclature of regions distribution based on European Nomenclature for 
Territorial Units (ENTU) that is especially used for statistical classification 
purposes. This has led to the definition of three statistical regions which are: (1) 
Durrës and the northern part of the country, (2) Tirana and Elbasan, and (3) the 
Southern area. In different regions, the development has not been generated, due 
to the lack of a clear policy and stimulating incentives for development as can be 
evidenced even from low purchasing power.    
And according to cross-sectional strategies (263) one of the key challenges 
associated with country regional development is the lack of proper use of 
infrastructure and services as a result of population outflow from rural areas and 
growth congestion in urban ones. Moreover this is mostly evidenced on the 
inequality of school services delivery, health centers, roads, drinking water 
supply, aspects of hygiene, water treatment facilities for small and large polluted 
residential areas, waste management and other related services.  
Another underlined challenge relates to the weak governing authorities 
capacities. Including here the facilities related to regional development 
management, current weaknesses in districts personnel competencies, 
weaknesses in relationships and coordination between different levels of 
planning and their strategic implementation at national, regional and local level 
by considering the limited capacity of project management within regional 
administrations. 
 
Actually, Albanian government has launched a clear reform concerning the 
national long-term development policy concerning regional development with 
the aim to create competitive regions by promoting a balanced development of 
the country and increase the competitiveness (264). This reform focuses on a 
                                                          
15 It doesn`t exist any specific national strategy for regional development because 
the issue is addressed in different strategies such as: Cross-Sectorial Strategy for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, 2014-2020, the National Cross- Sectorial Strategy for 
Decentralization and Local Government, 2014-2020 and other Cross-Sectorial, regional-
level strategies (263). 
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comprehensive strategic, legal and institutional framework on behalf of 
national/regional development policy with the main focus its alignment with EU 
cohesion policy as well as to guarantee the preparation for european negotiation 
process. 
 
The main challenges addressed during the planning period 2014-2020 (263-264) 
refer to:  
(1)- the need to address unbalanced development among regions within the 
country as well as in international context;  
(2)-a balanced development between regions within municipalities, between 
urban and rural areas and between coastal and peripheral mountain areas;  
(3)-the need to address aspects related to immigration and migration (inside 
and outside the country);  
(4)-the treatment of aspects related to overcrowding in the most developed 
areas and departures from other areas;  
(5)-the need to address weaknesses in the policy framework and institutional 
capacities. 
 
Correspondingly, with the vision of a balanced development and cooperation 
between the regions/localities of the country (263), aiming to increase its global 
competitiveness three strategic objectives are undertaken:   
I. The increase of competition between regions, by ensuring that 
they achieve sustainable economic and social development 
toward their communities through the use of unique resources, 
thus, deepening the global competitiveness of the country 
through: 
I.1. providing necessary protection for economic development, job creation 
and professional  education in response to labor market needs; 
I.2. the improvement of infrastructure links within and between regions and; 
I.3. the expansion of zone functions including the diversification of rural 
economies. 
 
II. The increase of regional cohesion and reduction of significant 
existing inequalities in the use of resources, production and 
social/environmental standards (264) through: 
II.1. improvements to public infrastructure standards and utility networks; 
II.2. providing integrated regional environmental protection; and 
II.3. ensuring the growth of public investment in less developed regions.  
CHAPTER II: SMEs CLIMATE AND BEHAVIORAL TENDENCY 86 
 
III. The improvement of management efficiency through a 
pragmatic approach to regional development by efficiently 
using limited management resources through :  
      III.1. building of regional development capacity at all levels of government; 
III.2. creation of efficient regional development management mechanisms; 
III.3. strengthening the External Financing and Assistance Capacity (EFAC) as 
the main institution for Regional Development Fund management; 
      III.4. improvement of inter-ministerial cooperation; 
      III.5. improvement of drafting strategies in respect of coordination process 
through the involvement of regional stakeholders aiming to ensure that sectorial 
strategies (vertical coordination) and take into account regional specifics as well 
as regional strategies and programs that integrate sectoral strategy objectives; and 
      III.6. the creation of a monitoring system combined with the implementation 
of regional strategies according to the same standards set by central government. 
Obviously all the a/m premises create a more prosperous reality with special 
regard to SME development within the country (263-264) by contemporaneously 
paying a special attention to social cohesion strengthening.  
2.3. SMES MARKET PECULIARITIES 
Closely referring to INSTAT business data (see Table 5) micro businesses 
represent the highest market share (95% of total SME market) by also marking an 
increase of 28% during 2013-2016 period (265). Then, follow small and medium-
sized businesses that demonstrate a growth rate above 38% while respectively 
representing 4% and 1% of market share. In addition, worth also highlighted that 
above 29.95% of these businesses are good producers and the rest pertain to 
services production category.  
 
Table 5. SMEs active businesses statistics as per 2013-2016 
 
SMEs  businesses trend  2013 2014 2015 2016 
Micro (1-9 employed)      80,727       80,365         99,143       102,965  
Small (10-49 employed)        3,230         3,977           4,360           4,413  
Medium-sized (50-249 
employed) 
          721            733              892              996  
SMEs total no (1-249 employed)      84,678       85,075       104,395       108,373  
 
 
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration   
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As observed, the major part of labor force is employed in micro businesses, then 
follow medium- sized businesses and ultimately the small ones (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. SMEs business employees no trend as per 2013-2016  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration  
 
 
 
Comparatively, with special regard to employees number it can be confirmed that  
in medium-sized businesses it increased with 49% during 2013-2016 period, 
followed from small and micro businesses were the employees number 
respectively increased with 40% and 29%.   
The small business marks a turnover increase as per 21% (even considering that it 
constitutes the highest turnover level during the period in question) meanwhile in 
medium-sized and micro businesses are obtained lower turnover rates 
respectively corresponding to an increase of 16% and 11% (refer to Figure 2).   
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Figure 2. SMEs business turnover trend (in mln ALL) as per 2013-2016  
Source:    INSTAT (265), Author elaboration 
 
 
And concerning the investments instead it should be added that compared with 
large businesses (employees no≥250), the invested amount from SMEs during 
2016 is 3 times higher by also being increased with 85% during 2013-2016 period.  
 
 
In the same way it was verified that the higher investments were done in turns 
from small business, then from medium-sized and micro ones. While the highest 
growth trend (see Figure 3) is evidenced in medium-sized businesses (172%) 
followed from small business (158%) as micro businesses have decreased the 
investments rate with 20% during the a/m period.  
 
 
 
89                                                                                                   ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. SMEs business investment trend as per 2013-2016.  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration  
 
 
 
Seen as a performance measure SMEs businesses valued added for the period 
under consideration result to be 2 times higher than the one created from large 
businesses (refer to Figure 16). Considering that the latest value added increased 
only with 17%. 
 
Under these circumstances results interesting to evidence the fact that 2016 data 
confirm that micro business represents the highest value added created in 
comparison with small and medium-sized businesses.  
 
In controversy the medium-sized businesses show the highest value added 
growth rate (with 27%) followed from small businesses (with 19%) and micro 
ones (with 14%). What in general terms (referring also to other indicators 
analyzed) demonstrates the undisputed importance of this business segment in 
the national economy and why not its growth potential.   
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Figure 4. Business value added trend as per 2013-2016  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration 
 
 
In this merit worth highlighting that SME businesses physiognomy is mainly 
focused in the production of services (see the following Figures 5&6) represented 
from trade activities (52%) and other services in the rest. While the production of 
goods refers to agriculture products, etc (68%), industry (23%) and construction 
(9%). And as previously evidenced in each case micro businesses represent the 
highest number of activities among active SMEs.   
 
Nonetheless should be underlined that above 62.83% of active SMEs is registered 
in physical person status, 17.7% in juridical status and the rest of above 19.5% are 
farmers.  
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Figure 5. SMEs business physiognomy EoY  2016  
Source:    INSTAT (265), Author elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. SMEs activities EoY 2016  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboratio 
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2.4.1. SMEs patterns statistics 
On behalf of regional SMEs allocation chart, in Tirana (32%) and then in Fier 
district (13%) is identified the major frequency of micro businesses. For small 
businesses instead against Tirana and then Durrës district are the most preferred 
areas with 48% and 11% respectively. And concerning the medium-sized 
businesses in Tirana and then Fier district is evidenced their highest presence 
(with 534 and 205 activities respectively).  
In this prospect should be highlighted that in those districts where is observed the 
highest tax burden on districts’ GDP such as: Tirana, Vlora and Durrës then 
followed from Elbasan, Korça and Lezha, the number of SME businesses 
increased only in Korçë (20.87%), Elbasan (15.7%), Lezhë (13.21%) and Durrës 
(1.4%), what in a certain way makes thinking above the fact that taxes impedes 
the a/m businesses development.  
 
Moreover the statistics show that as per end of year 2016, the major part of SMEs 
equity origin is Albanian (96% of cases) and the rest of above 4% are foreign 
equity businesses (refer to Figure 7). Where they are notably present businesses 
with EU originated equity (above 3%) such as: Italian, Greek, German, French 
activities, etc. And through the non-EU originated equity activities can be 
mentioned: Turkish, Serbian, etc. The Albanian SMEs registered during 2016 
represent quite 18.6% of active businesses while foreign businesses in overall 
increased with only 0.75%.  
 
However national business demonstrates a higher annual growth rate (5.93%) in 
comparison with foreign equity businesses which decreased with 1% (by taking 
into consideration that additional non-residents tax burden constitutes above 4% 
of the overall profit amount). With special regard to the latter it can be stated that 
even new mixed-equity businesses are mainly represented from them which 
posses more albanian-equity shares (0.18%) in comparison with the ones which 
posses more foreign-equity shares (0.002%).  
 
The statistics prove that the first ones have increased with 19.8% in the period 
under consideration while the second ones have decreased with 32.3%. And the 
major part of SMEs with EU and non-EU equity origin are principally located in 
Tirana in the quality of the country capital. The rest instead preferred Durrës 
(0.4%), Vlorë (0.2%), Shkodër (0.1%), and Korçë (0.1%) as coastal and bordering 
areas. 
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Figure 7. Regional SMEs allocation as per 2016  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration  
 
 
 
By configuring them according to the structure it can be declared that EU 
originated equity is more frequent under micro businesses (85%) then in small 
(9%) and medium-sized ones (6%).  
 
The same situation persists even for non-EU originated equity businesses which 
are more frequent under micro businesses structure (87%) and in turns in small 
(8%) and 4% in medium-sized ones referring to Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. SMEs equity origin per category as per 2016  
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration  
 
 
 
 
In the sectorial pertinence context should be affirmed that Albanian equity 
businesses are more present in trade and other services with 32% and 17% of the 
overall albanian equity SMEs and the vice versa occurs per foreign equity 
businesses (35% services and trade 28%).  
The same is valid concerning trade and service sectors in SMEs mixed-equity 
businesses possessed from both foreign and albanian shares in compliance with 
the following statistics (see Table 6 data): 
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Table 6. SMEs equity statistics as per EoY 2016 
 
  
 
Albanian  
 
Foreign  
More albanian 
equity 
More 
foreign 
equity 
 Agriculture, Forests 
and Fishing  
           
32,598  
                 
29  
                                  
20  
                          
12  
  Industry  
           
10,293  
               
636  
                                
168  
                          
205  
 Construction  
             
4,171  
               
336  
                                  
54  
                          
63  
 Trade  
           
49,624  
            
1,117  
                                
254  
                          
250  
 Transportation and 
Warehousing  
             
6,431  
                 
75  
                                  
21  
                          
21  
 Accommodation and 
food service  
           
22,546  
               
206  
                                  
23  
                          
10  
 Information and 
Communication  
             
2,251  
               
221  
                                  
34  
                          
24  
 Other services  
           
27,128  
            
1,404  
                                
248  
                          
206  
 
 
 
  
 
Source: INSTAT (265), Author elaboration  
 
 
And the number of SMEs administrated from female gender has increased during 
2016 in comparison with the previous year (Figure 9) considering that in general 
they represent 26% of active SMEs by demonstrating a satisfactory social cohesion 
approach.  
 
Precisely the highest number of SMEs administrated from females pertains to 
Tirana, followed from the ones allocated in Elbasan, Durrës, Vlorë and Fier what 
relies with society emancipation degree. Notwithstanding, during 2013-2016 
period is evidenced a lower increase of SMEs administrated from female gender 
(39.5%) in comparison with the ones administrated from male gender (46.5%) 
while the rest of 14% are administrated from mixed-administration cases.  
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Figure 9. SMEs with female administrators in regions EoY 2016  
Source: INSTAT (266), Author elaboration   
 
 
2.5. SMES FUNDING STRATEGY  
The commercial banks16 have played the role of the only business promoter in the 
country, especially for SMEs, by providing financial support through the 
designation of tailored products.  
But currently, beyond the facilities offered even from monetary policy they have 
pursued a more conservative lending strategy due to stronger requirements 
established aiming a more proactive credit risk management process.  
 
Correspondingly referring to Albanian Association of Banks (AAB) statistics (267) 
as per end of year 2016 (see Table 7): BKT (22.9%) then Credins Bank (16.8%), 
                                                          
16 The other financial institutions represent only 10% of financial sectors’ assets 
mainly related to loan portfolio.  
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Raiffeisen Bank (16.1%), Societè General Bank (8.1%) and Intesa San Paolo (8%) 
have generally maintained the credit business weight.   
Table 7. Banking sectors’ loans outstanding as per EoY 2016 (in thsd  EUR) 
 
BANKS LOANS 
ALPHA BANK ALBANIA 240,802 
AMERICAN BANK OF INVESTMENTS  68,694 
BKT  954,487 
CREDINS BANK 698,213 
CBA 2,299 
FIB 52,129 
ICB 30,590 
INTESA SANPAOLO BANK  334,541 
NBG BANK  215,867 
PROCREDIT BANK 147,111 
RAIFFEISEN BANK 670,425 
SOCIETE GENERALE ALBANIA  336,092 
TIRANA BANK  186,894 
UNION BANK  124,630 
UBA 24,593 
VENETO BANKA  81,010 
BANKS' SECTOR LOANS OUTSTANDING 4,168,377 
 
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration  
 
 
 
With special regard to SMEs it can be affirmed that total amount of loans granted 
has increased with 12% in comparison with the previous year.  
And this, it is especially dedicated to loans granted to small businesses (which 
increased with 50%) followed from the one granted to medium-sized businesses 
(increased only with 1%).  
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In controversy the loans granted to micro businesses have decreased above 13% 
(referring to Figure 10 data).  
 
 
Figure 10. Outstanding loans to SMEs EoY 2016 (in mln ALL)  
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author  elaboration   
 
 
 
In fact, micro businesses have maintained quite the same credit necessity during 
Dec 2015-Jul 2016 period, by marking a reduction from Sept 2016.  
Meanwhile small businesses have increased the credit amount borrowed from 
March 2016 which has against suffered a slight increase during Aug 2016. In 
controversy concerning medium-sized businesses the loans amount granted 
reduced during Dec 15-Apr 16 period and immediately after increased by 
maintaining quite the same trend in the period under consideration.  
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Anyway the loans granted in local currency have marked a higher increase in 
comparison with the ones granted in foreign currency independently from the 
tenor. In particular loans granted for short-term periods in ALL have increased 
with 41%, the ones granted for medium-term periods (1-5 years) increased with 
9.1% and the long-term (over five years) loans increased with 28%.  
 
For them granted in foreign currency instead it can be affirmed that decreased 
with 7% referring to long-term period, and increased with the same rate as per 
medium-term periods by marking the highest increase with 9% in short-term 
period. 
Afterwards it should be emphasized that loans granted in foreign currency result 
to be the most preferred in confront with the ones granted in local currency 
independently from financial products chosen. By this way the 2016 data confirm 
that 56% of loans amount granted to SMEs is in foreign currency and the rest in 
local one.  
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In following (see Figure 11) is demonstrated that medium-size businesses mostly 
prefer short-term loans in local currency as a consequence of their higher growth 
trend (annually increased with 45%). Meanwhile in correspondence of previous 
year the highest short-terms loans trend growth is noted in small businesses (with 
69%). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. SMEs short-term loans trend (in mln ALL)  
Source:   Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration  
 
 
Small businesses during 2016 resulted to be principally focused on medium-term 
loans concerning loans granted in local currency (annually increased with 26% as 
per Figure 12). Then, the second ones which choose to operate through medium-
term loans in local currency are the micro businesses (their annual increase was of 
0.1%).  
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Figure 12. SMEs medium-term loans trend (in mln ALL)  
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration   
 
 
 
Referring to long-term loans instead small and medium-sized businesses seems to 
be the more interested being that their annual growth is respectively 61% and 
32% (Figure 13).  
Comparatively, should be admitted that small businesses have obtained 
significant short-term loans in foreign currency (their annual increase is 65% 
referring to Figure 14). A slight credit increase is marked also concerning 
medium-sized businesses with 0.1% in confront of December 2015 figures. And 
from the other side micro businesses have been less interested in borrowing in 
short-term period in foreign currency.  
While medium-term loans in foreign currency are principally preferred from 
small and micro businesses considering that they marked an annual growth rate 
of 50% and 25% respectively. However, even higher amounts are lent to medium-
size businesses the trend has decreased during last year with 11% (as presented in 
Figure 15). 
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Figure 13. SMEs long-term loans trend (in mln ALL)  
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration 
 
 
 
Figure 14.SMEs short-term loans trend in foreign currency (in mln ALL countervalue) 
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration 
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Figure 15. SMEs medium-term loans trend in foreign currency (in mln ALL countervalue) 
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration 
 
 
Small businesses prefer also long-term loans in foreign currency by 
demonstrating a trend increase as of 36% in correspondence of previous year data 
(see Figure 16). Meanwhile medium-sized and micro businesses have reduced the 
borrowed amount with respectively 18% and 49%. 
 
Statistically based referring to currencies more frequently used from SMEs 
financial products, it can be confirmed that them offered in Euro are the most 
preferred (with 52% of total amount granted), followed from the ones in local 
currency ALL (with 38% of total amount granted), in USD (with 25% of total 
amount granted) and the other currencies with only 0.01% of total amount 
granted.  
 
Particularly, concerning to short-term financial products widely used in all 
currencies must be stated that overdrafts and working capitals are the most 
preferred. While as per medium-term loans products instead the most preferred 
result to be: start-up business loans as well as the one for machineries purchase. 
And ultimately, concerning long-term loans it can be clearly stated that they are 
mainly used for investments in real estate. 
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Figure 16. SMEs long-term loans trend in foreign currency (in mln ALL countervalue) 
Source: Albanian Association of Banks (267), Author elaboration 
 
 
2.5.1. Non-performing loans’ sectors 
Various analytical contexts (265 and 267) converged to three main problems that 
caused the countinous rise of non-performing loans (estimated in 18% during 
2016) in albanian banking sector initiated from 2008:  
 
First reason is addressed to the precedent government accumulated unpaid bills 
regarding public works and tax refund claims for about 500 million euro. 
Correspondingly many companies (mainly subcontractors) financed their work 
through bank loans while waiting for governmental tranch payments. The major 
part of these companies pertains to public road construction sector, and only a 
small part operates in the construction of small hydropower plants. In respect to 
the latest must be added that hydropower builders' non-performing loans  were 
mainly generated as Albanian Power Corporation (APC) did not timely payed-off 
the obligations for the purchases of energy produced by these companies. 
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The second problem is related to the fact that fiscal legal framework penalizes 
banks that would like to classify loans in ‘lost status’,  by charging them with the 
obligation to pay the profit tax for loans that effectively causes losses.  
 
Third, the judicial and administrative system in Albania regarding seizure and 
liquidation of non-performing credit collateral did not work efficiently. As long as 
the owners of such collaterals were able to push the seizures infinitely by 
fabricating lengthy judicial processes. 
 
In respect of the a/m reasons some actions were taken, mainly thanks to specific 
projects undertaken from government and Bank of Albania during 2015 
concerning the clearance of ‘non-performing loans in lost status’, loans 
restructuring, factoring, the orientation toward lending in local currency, etc (268 
and 269). In a cross-sectoral aspect, construction sector remains the most 
problematic for banking sector regarding the outstanding of non-performing 
loans volume (270).  Neither the conclusion of the government's debt repayment 
process seems to have brought the level of non-performing loans to more 
acceptable levels. For this purpose in recent years, also banking sector's exposure 
to construction has declined somewhat.  
 
In parallel the other sector with a high level of non-performing loans is service 
(especially concerning hotels and restaurants loans and further on 
telecommunication services, transport, etc), as the non-performing rate is above 
29.8%. However, this sector has a relatively low share in total credit to the 
economy, by about 2.7%.   
 
In following in processing and extracting industry is noted that debt chain 
reached 1 billion USD, as mainly sector companies are bankrupt and on the other 
hand, banks’ risk is facing a new wave of non-performing loans considering that 
all companies in the industry sector are currently working under cost.  So it’s 
quite impossible for them to go ahead and no longer pay huge loans’ outstanding.  
 
In addition trade is another sector which at the same time has high borrowed 
amounts and poor portfolio quality. Trade credit counts for nearly a quarter of 
overall credit portfolios outstanding to the economy by evidencing a 28.9% non-
performing loan rate.   
More or less all these elements constitutes a panorama of Albanian business 
reality by also reflecting SMEs credit health concerns which are expected to be 
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accurately addressed considering that they have a catalytic role for the country 
economic development itself.  
 
 
 
 2.6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
National statistics confirm that above 95% of active businesses are SMEs which 
operates through 173.070 units where 20% of them are in ‘start-up’ phase and 
females manage only 25.8%.  Is also evidenced that trade sector result to be the 
most dominant among others such as: service, production and construction. From 
the other side, mixed-equity businesses (mainly constituted from Italian, Greek 
and German investments) have maintained a positive trend during the last five 
years by proving foreign investitures concrete interest to operate in the country.  
 
Undisputedly that their progress is partially attributed to business framework 
facilities offered from central and regional government but the major part of 
efforts are internally managed.  As previously demonstrated SMEs have been 
supported from financial institutions to cover daily and investments needs (above 
27.5% of loans portfolios belong to SMEs) considering that liquidity management 
is their most crucial process on behalf of the circumstances. But in the same time 
statistically based should be underlined that the sectors where SMEs operates 
comply with non-performing ones in terms of credit worthiness.  
 
Accordingly results interesting to undertake a deeper research through respective 
qualitative/organizational behaviour patterns (es: ownership gender, equity 
origin, administration gender, administration framework, borrowers’ status, etc) 
and quantitative (concerning liquidity, leverage and profitability) in order to 
predict the ones which while accelerating business growth enhance risk adjusted 
performance regardless their sectorial pertinence.  
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III-THE PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Given the predominant role, efforts and performance of SMEs in domestic market 
what mostly obviously attracts the attention is their degree of birth and survival 
rate. Consequently the latter makes think over the factors that affect their success 
by taking into account the permanent changes of business doing climate.  
 
Hence, this research study  highlights that the predictive content of financial 
ratios (pertaining to: liquidity, operational-efficiency, risk and growth analysis 
areas) in cooperation with non-financial ones (organizational behavioral features) 
becomes a powerful instrument concerning SMEs performance evaluation in a 
multiple endo-exogenous cross-sectoral prospect which simultaneously helps in 
the transformation of risk areas into growth opportunities aiming to develop and 
further expand among them a value culture by considering that it also constitutes 
a fertile research area. 
 
Basically, SMEs dynamism and sectoral pertinence is explored in a context of 
business survival and growth by rationally arguing that only thereafter they can 
potentially transform into future large corporations.  
 
For this purpose different dynamic modeling theory elements (stochastic 
theories/business size; learning theories/managers ability in managing previous 
and current revenues, costs and profits; hazard theories/persistence of high profit 
rates) are aggregated aiming to achieve concrete research results.  
Moreover, the research treats important issues such as: social cohesion, regional 
development, implications of financial behavior on SME sector, openess scale 
toward foreign direct investments, etc which converge with country’s European 
integration proces milestones.   
 
Thereby, the research concept is developed in three different stages as per trade, 
service, production and construction sectors: 
 
1ᵒ - Liquidity management strategies deployment; 
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2ᵒ - Leverage structure choices; 
3ᵒ - Risk-Adjusted Performance outcomes, by integrating consecutive results with 
the intent to capture adequate ‘business intelligence’ signals and prevent business 
failure while forecasting universal performance models.   
 
In this merit, statistics prove that SMEs fragility necessarily requires the 
implementation of a permanent control culture which in parallel can also test the 
validity of above mentioned cross-sectoral predictive ‘business intelligence’ 
performance models.  
 
Foremost, it is ascertained that these SMEs tailored performance models which 
cover a wide spectrum of business activity and life can be able to generate concise 
performance outcomes valid even for various interested parties (mainly practical 
results) by supporting the need to continue the research in this direction.  
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IV– OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
4.1.1. General objectives 
In an aggregated way the current research study treats SMEs entrepreneurship 
trinity: liquidity, leverage and growth under a cross-sectoral prospect concerning 
to the: 
- Implementation of pattern recognition process useful as a liquidity 
management decision making tool; 
- Capital structure approaches deployed as a logic consequence of external 
and internal liquidity risk sources management toward leverage 
reconciliation framework; 
- Development of tailored SMEs’ risk-adjusted behavioral models.  
 
 
 
4.1.2. Specific objectives 
- Exploitation of dynamic modeling theory elements spectrum 
(stochastic/learning and hazard theories), which are aggregated into 
neural network analysis aiming to achieve concrete research results; 
- Identification of hidden layers between behavioral SMEs data and 
respective liquidity, operative-efficiency, risk and growth analysis ratios; 
- Estimation of the correlation between behavioral /financial variables and 
hidden layers; 
- Testing of neural networks analysis (basic radial function) validity in 
predicting SME performance; 
- Demonstration of radial basis  functionalities adaptation into various 
sectoral affiliations;  
- Preservation of warning signals while enhancing correction ability in 
liquidity management-leverage structure-business profitability/growth 
aiming to strengthen  permanent control culture; 
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- Stimulating internal dynamic policies implementation 
(marketing/production/distribution, etc); 
- Promotion of alternative management-techniques in compliance with 
internal needs, external tools and business climate; 
- Promotion of a social responsibility culture between SMEs; 
- The configuration of results validity as an important element as per 
further economic policies implementation studies. 
 
 
4.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
Liquidity management process is analyzed through the following research 
hypotheses:  
 
   H1: The borrowers’ status depends from administrators gender regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
   H2: Equity origin is decisive in business ownership composition regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H3: There is an inverse relationship between administrators and ownership 
gender regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H4: Equity origin doesn’t influence the borrowers’ status regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H5: Equity origins indicate business administration regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
   H6: Borrowers’ status and operative cash flow have a mutual positive impact on 
businesses working capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
   H7: Administrators’ gender and gross profit margin can’t simultaneously 
impact businesses’ working capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
    H8: Equity origin and average payment period contemporaneously negatively 
affect businesses’ working capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
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    H9: Ownerships gender, total liability ratio (TLR), inventory to total assets ratio 
(ITA), firm age (FA) and operative cash flow (OCF) as well as ownerships gender 
and firm’s age don’t impact working capital (WC), receivables accounts turnover 
ratio (RATR) and net profit margin (NPM) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
    H10: Business administration, fixed assets turnover ratio (FATR), long-term 
leverage ratio (LT-LEV), cash ratio (CR) and business size as well as business 
administration and long-term leverage ratio positively impact working capital 
(WC), money conversion cycle (MCC) and net profit (NP) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
    H11: A radial basis function predicts SMEs working capital (WC), receivables 
accounts turnover ratio (RATR), money conversion cycle (MCC) and net profit 
margin (NPM) regardless sectoral affiliation.  
 
 
 
The following research hypotheses instead are explored concerning the prediction 
of capital structure approaches:  
 
   H1: Borrowers’ status negatively impacts total leverage ratio (LEV) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H2: Equity origin influence long-term debt to equity ratio (LTDER) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H3: Business administration framework impacts total liability ratio (TLR) 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H4: Ownerships’ gender influence assets tangibility (TAN) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H5: Administrators’ gender impacts long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV) 
regardless sectoral affiliation;  
 
  H6: Equity origin and gross profit margin (GPM)  contemporaneously 
negatively affect long-term debts (LTD) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
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  H7: Administrators gender and business age can’t simultaneously impact 
businesses’ fixed assets to total assets ratio (FATA) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H8: Borrowers’ status and business size have a mutual positive impact on 
interest coverage ratio (ICR) and total assets turnover ratio (TATR) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H9: Short-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H10: Long-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function 
regardless sectoral affiliation;  
 
  H11: A radial basis function reconciles SMEs leverage structure regardless 
sectoral affiliation. 
 
 
And the prediction of SMEs risk-adjusted performance behavioral models 
considering the a/m functional interactions is explored through the raise of 
following hypotheses:  
 
  H1: Ownerships’ gender increases return on equity (ROE) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H2: Equity origin influence gross operative margin (GOM) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H3: Business administration framework impacts return on assets (ROA) 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H4: Borrowers’ status affects return on equity (ROE) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H5: Administrators gender influence gross operative margin (GOM) regardless 
sectoral affiliation;  
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  H6: Borrowers’ status and long-term debt to equity ratio (LTDER) 
contemporaneously negatively affect gross operative margin (GOM) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H7: Business administration framework and receivables accounts turnover ratio 
(RATR) can’t simultaneously impact return on equity (ROE) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H8: Equity origin, firm age and business size have a simultaneous impact on 
return on assets (ROA) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
  H9: Borrowers’ status, firm age and assets tangibility (TAN) have a multiple 
impact on return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
  H10: Business administration structure, money conversión cycle (MCC) and net 
profit margin (NPM) have a multiple impact on return on equity (ROE) 
regardless sectoral affiliation;  
 
  H11: A radial basis function predicts SMEs risk-adjusted performance regardless 
sectoral affiliation.  
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V – METHODOLOGY 
5.1. THE STUDY DESIGN  
The methodological approach design (refer to Figure 17) in this study intends to 
capture qualitative (organizational behavioral) and quantitative variables features 
while examining the extent of their relationship under a business intelligence 
prospect. Closely referring to the latter various statistical pre-examinations are 
deployed in order to initially test pure qualitative interactions by further focusing 
on mixed and hidden ones (e.g: crosstabs, contingency coefficient, estimated 
marginal means and Levenes’ test in the quality of variance homogeneity analysis 
tests). In addition, univariate and multivariate regressions are implemented as a 
pre-requisite for neural network analysis development at 95% confidence level. 
Then, as robustness checks Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), model training 
time and statistical significance of elements were examined. While the business 
data explored belong to 2015-2016 period.  
 
Concretely, the quantitative variables examined pertain to liquidity, operational 
efficiency, risk and growth analysis ratios as in following:  
 
Table 8. Quantitative variables (financial ratios) explored in the research study 
 
  Quantitative variables Abbreviations 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
 
Current Assets  CA 
Working Capital WC 
Quick Ratio 
QR 
Cash Ratio CR 
Receivables Accounts Turnover Ratio RATR 
Average Collection Period ACP 
Inventory Turnover Ratio ITR 
Inventory Turnover (in days) ITD 
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Payable Account Turnover Ratio PATR 
Average Payment Period  APP 
Money Conversion Cycle MCC 
Inventory INV 
Receivable Accounts  RA 
Fixed Assets  FA 
Short Term Assets  STA 
Short Term Debts STD 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 
Total Assets Turnover Ratio TATR 
Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio FATR 
Gross Profit Margin GPM 
Gross Operative Margin GOM 
Net Profit Margin NPM 
Assets Turnover AT 
Return on Equity ROE 
Assets Tangibility TAN  
Inventory/Total assets ITA 
Fixed assets / Total assets FATA 
Net Profit  NP 
Business Size BoS 
sk
 a
n
al
y
si
sR
i
 
Long Term Debt/Equity Ratio LTDER 
Total Liability Ratio TLR 
Interest Coverage Ratio ICR 
Total Leverage Ratio LEV 
Long Term Leverage LT-LEV 
Long Term Debts LTD 
th
 
an
al
y
si
s
G
ro
w
 
Return on Assets ROA 
Operative Cash Flow OCF 
CHAPTER V: METHODOLOGY 124 
 
Investment Cash Flow ICF 
Financing Cash Flow FCF 
Equity  EQ 
Collateral Value CV 
Owner No  ON 
Firms Age FA 
 
Source: National Registration Center (NRC) and Credit Registry (CR), Author  elaboration 
 
 
 
Comparatively, there is also collected and treated the qualitative information 
concerning Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9. Qualitative variables (organizational behavioral patterns) explored in the 
research study 
 
Qualitative variables Abbreviations 
Administrator Gender AG 
Business Ownership BO 
Equity Origin EO 
Ownership Gender OG 
Borrower Status  BS 
 
Source: NRC, BoA and CR, Author elaboration 
 
 
Worth highlighted that referring to the latest official statistics of service, trade, 
production and ultimately construction sector (respectively constitute 46.65%, 
16.85%, 13% and 9% of GDP) which are mainly represented from SMEs, 
consequently this research study deemed reasonable to collect data from four 
distinctive ‘sectoral-data pools`. 
More precisely in trade sector the elaborated data concern: food, agriculture, 
electronics, medical and cosmetic medicines, building materials, industrial and 
offices products of trade businesses. In the second one, instead, data were 
retrieved from gas, steel, sponge, metal/metal products, concrete and dairy 
production products. While in construction sector the data correspond to 
buildings, roads, bridges and dams construction businesses. The last sector data 
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instead refer to: real estate, funeral, internet, design, greenery, restaurants, call 
centers, financial and accounting counseling, telecommunications, electronics, car 
wash, and tourism services.  
 
 
Figure 17. The methodological approach design 
Source: Author elaboration 
 
 
5.2. THE SAMPLING  
The investigation sample treats a heterogeneous experimental group of 131 SMEs 
mainly operating in cities such as: Tirana, Elbasan, Durrës, Fier, Vlorë, etc., where 
the highest tax burden is paid in correspondence of yearly GDP. By mainly 
considering that in these areas is observed that tax burden is maintained by the 
taxpayer base included in the micro (self-employed) and small businesses 
category, rather than the one where medium and large businesses are included. 
Consequently each ‘sectoral-data pool’ is composed with above 33 pertinence 
businesses and the panel information is retrieved from National Registration 
Centre online registry and Credit Registry of Bank of Albania. Precisely the 
quantitative and qualitative data are respectively provided from businesses profit 
and loss statements, balance sheets, cash-flows, equity prospects and integrative 
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notes. In addition borrowers’ status and collateral values data are accessed 
through Credit Registry of Central Bank of Albania.  
 
The endogenous-variables elaborated are: liquidity, operational efficiency, risk 
and growth analysis ratios (previously explained) as well as all the 
qualitative/behavioral variables excluding borrowers’ status and collateral value 
variables.  
 
According to the ‘sectoral-data pool’ and almost referring to the 
qualitative/behavioral variables it must be underlined that:  
Firm age is above 4-22 year in trade, production and service sectors while 5-22 
years in the construction one.  
Administrators’ gender: in 6 cases the administrator is female, 26 male and 1 
mixed-administration (in trade sector), in 2 cases the administrator is female and 
31 male (in production sector), in 32 cases is male and 1 case is mixed-
administration (in construction sector) meanwhile service maintains the same 
male and female administrator rate with trade sector.  
Business ownership: in 27 cases administrator is the owner and in 6 cases no 
(trade sector), 23 cases the owner is the administrator and 10 cases no (production 
sector), in 27 cases the owner administrates the business and in 6 cases no 
(construction sector) and in 22 cases the owner is the administrator while in 10 
cases no (service sector).  
Equity origin: 22 national, 9 foreign and 2 mixed-partnership businesses (in trade 
sector), 33 national businesses (in production), 13 national, 14 foreign and 6 
mixed-partnership businesses (in construction sector) and 29 national and 3 
mixed-partnership businesses (in service sector).  
Ownerships’ gender: in 7 cases female, 23 male and 3 mixed-ownership 
businesses (trade sector), in 16 cases female, 10 male and 7 mixed-ownership 
businesses (production sector), in 7 cases female, 22-male and 4 mixed-ownership 
businesses (construction sector) and in 4 cases female, 23 cases male and 5 mixed-
ownership businesses (service sector).   
 
 
The exogenous-variables retrieved are:    
Borrowers’ status (which is estimated as a result of financial institutions’ loans 
reimbursement performance as per due date referring to Central Bank criteria, 
daily reported in its Credit Registry) in the examined sample the default rate 
ranges from 9%-24% where the highest pertain to construction and the lower to 
service sector.  
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Meanwhile collateral value is estimated according to a technical evaluation report 
prepared from banks’ external property valuers referring to precise property 
characteristics and market prices reported in Credit Registry, where worth 
mentioned that construction sector maintains the highest collateral values in 
comparison with other sectors under examination (the lowest collateral rate 
accepted in each case is 120% of loan disbursement amount).  
 
 
 
 
5.3. DATA MEASUREMENT  
Several meetings organized with Certified Accountants, Accounting Experts, Tax 
Office, National Registration Centre and Banks colleagues, regarding the research 
study design, helped in the acceleration of data collection process, and also in the 
validation of quantitative and qualitative variables measurement methods which 
are presented in the following matrixes:  
 
Table 10. Quantitative variables (financial ratios) measurement method 
 
  Variable  Measurement  Abbreviations 
L
iq
u
id
it
y
-1
6
 
Current Assets  Short term assets/Short term debts CA 
Working Capital Short term assets-Short term debts WC 
Quick Ratio 
(Cash+trade securities 
portfolio+receivable accounts)/Short 
term debts QR 
Cash Ratio 
(Cash+trade securities 
portfolio)/Short term debts CR 
Receivables 
Accounts 
Turnover Ratio 
Net annual sales/Average 
receivables accounts RATR 
Average 
Collection Period 
365/Receivables accounts turnover 
ratio ACP 
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Inventory 
Turnover Ratio 
Cost of goods sold / Average 
inventory  ITR 
Inventory 
Turnover in days 365 / Inventory turnover ratio ITD 
Payable Account 
Turnover Ratio 
Cost of goods sold / Average 
payable accounts PATR 
Average 
Payment Period 365/Payable account turnover ratio APP 
Money 
Convertion Cycle 
Average collection 
period+Inventory turnover in days-
Average payment period MCC 
Inventory End of year inventory INV 
Receivable 
Accounts  End of year receivable accounts  RA 
Fixed Assets  End of year fixed assets  FA 
Short Term 
Assets  
Cash+trade securities 
portfolio+receivable 
accounts+inventory STA 
Short Term Debts 
Payable accounts, short term loans, 
etc STD 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
-1
2
 
Total Assets 
Turnover Ratio Net sales/Average total assets TATR 
Fixed Assets 
Turnover Ratio Net sales/Average fixed assets FATR 
Gross Profit 
Margin Gross profit/Net sales  GPM 
Gross Operative 
Margin 
Earnings before interest and taxes / 
Net sales GOM 
Net Profit 
Margin Net profit/Net sales NPM 
Assets Turnover 
(Net profit + interest 
expenses)/Average equity AT 
Return on Equity Net profit/Average equity ROE 
Total Assets 
Tangibility Fixed assets/Total assets TAN  
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Inventory/Total 
assets Inventory/Total assets ITA 
Fixed Assets / 
Total Assets 
Fixed assets (without land) / Total 
assets FATA 
Net Profit  End of year profit  NP 
Business Size Ln(total assets) BoS 
R
is
k
 a
n
al
y
si
s-
6
 
Long Lerm 
Debt/Equity 
Ratio Long term debt/equity ratio LTDER 
Total Liability 
Ratio Total debt/Total liability TLR 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 
Earnings before interest and taxes / 
Interest expenses  ICR 
Total Leverage 
Ratio Total debts/Total assets LEV 
Long-Term 
Leverage Long term liabilities/Total Assets LT-LEV 
Long Term Debts End of year long term debts LTD 
G
ro
w
th
 a
n
al
y
si
s-
7
 
Return on Assets Net profit/Average assets ROA 
Operative Cash 
Flow In-out operative monetary flows OCF 
Investment Cash 
Flow 
In-out monetary instruments 
derived from and for fixed assets 
purposes ICF 
Financing Cash 
Flow Equity structure movements results FCF 
Equity  End of year equity EQ 
Collateral Value End of year market collateral value  CV 
Owner No Ownership number  ON 
Firms Age 
Analysis period-Business 
registration period (start-
up/grown/matured)  FA 
 
Source: NRC and CR, Author elaboration 
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Rationally the measurement of quantitative variables (financial variables) 
includes the effect of various economic, fiscal and financial policies implemented 
in the country and absorbed from SMEs business segment.  
 
From the other hand, qualitative variables (organizational behaviour variables 
presented in Table 11) reflect the entire business climate/operational framework.   
 
Table 11. Qualitative variables (organizational behaviour) measurement method 
 
Qualitative 
variables Measurement Abbreviation 
Administrator 
Gender 
Administrators gender (female-0, male-1 
and both genders/mixed-2) AG 
Business 
Ownership Business owner (adminstrator-0 or no-1) BO 
Equity Origin 
Business equity origin (national-0, 
foreign-1 and mixed-partnership-2) EO 
Ownership Gender 
Ownership  gender (female-0, male-1 and 
mixed-ownership-2) OG 
Borrower Status  
Borrower Status (non-performing + 30 due 
days-0 /performing 0-29 due days-1) BS 
 
Source: NRC, BoA and CR, Author elaboration 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.  LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT DECISIONS-A PATTERN 
RECOGNITION PROCESS 
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VI - LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT DECISIONS-A PATTERN 
RECOGNITION PROCESS 
 
 
Considering the current circumstances and not only liquidity management 
process in SMEs constitutes the most important element of making business and 
further on progress.  This is obviously seen under the light of internal and sectoral 
needs in short and long-run prospect. Thereby, this chapter tends to analyze and 
argue on factors predicting liquidity management process in short-run by 
recognizing the importance of SMEs patterns.  
Disputed empirical and theoretical results make more interesting and valuable 
this part of research almost when structured qualitative and quantitative data are 
used to test the raised hypotheses with the main focus the understanding of 
financial management policies implemented for strategic purposes as well as the 
identification of hidden relationships that exists between some categorical 
indicators.  Subsequently, it can also be traced the way how these kinds of 
businesses survive, grow-up and mature by reflecting differentiated sectoral 
peculiarities and by simultaneously revealing performance signals.  
 
 
 
6.1. LIQUIDITY RATIOS ANALYSIS  
The literature has explored different liquidity short-run ratios for analytical 
purposes. However, worth highlighted that in some cases the liquidity ratios 
especially in SME businesses are strongly correlated with other ones and 
consequently they cannot be strictly categorized in a certain area. Hence, it can be 
admitted that sometimes it’s worthy using more than one liquidity ratio for 
analytical purposes and not especially them to predict liquidity management 
process of a certain sector.  
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And by recognizing the multicollinearity17 issues that exists between financial 
ratios a simultaneous exploitation can be performed. In this regard the most 
appropriate ratios representing the evaluation of liquidity management process in 
each sector taken under examination seem to be: WC (working capital), RATR 
(receivable accounts turnover ratio), MCC (money conversion cycle) and NPM 
(net profit margin). The first three ratios are strictly categorized as liquidity ratios 
while the last one is an operative efficiency ratio.  
 
Closely referring to cross-sectoral statistics retrieved it can be understand that 
production, construction and service businesses examined maintain quite the 
same minimum levels of working capital (see Table 12). The exception is 
constituted from trade sector. In average terms instead production reserves the 
lowest level of working capital followed from trade, construction and service.  In 
addition the data confirm that quite the same trend is preserved even in 
maximum level.  
 
Table 12. Working Capital cross-sectoral statistics in ALL  
 
SECTORAL DATA  
(in  ALL) 
MIN AVERAGE MAX 
WC-TRADE     (32,758,730)      47,146,761  
        
456,357,082  
WC-PRODUCTION   (211,035,039)      36,394,630  
        
573,948,960  
WC-CONSTRUCTION   (235,999,204)      62,893,649  
      
1,420,347,085  
WC-SERVICE   (241,395,824)    920,004,974  
    
29,665,916,900  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
It can further be noticed that the most fluctuating data pertaining to working 
capital levels maintained refer to service and construction sector. But from the 
                                                          
17 The correlation that exists between two variables, meaning the financial 
indicators in this case. For example the correlation between CR (short term assets/short 
term debts) and WC (short term assets-short term debts).  
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procedural framework this aspect can be linked with lending products costs and 
amounts borrowed considering the payment history and current borrowers’ 
status.   
From the other hand, RATR in the quality of a working capital element poses 
under liquidity weakness trade sector by logically considering the delayed 
payments offered as a bonus for clients whilst create difficulties not only to SMEs 
themselves  but also to their furnitures. Correspondingly the average return ratio 
in days is 268 (see Table 13 below) which is a weak feature of trade sector that is 
translated not in a random liquidity deficit. The contrary instead is observed for 
service sector where the major part of sales is made on cash-basis. Regarding 
construction and production sector it can be mentioned the fact that net sales 
amounts are high and receivables amounts are low as the construction sector 
typically operates through clearance for the cement, iron furniture, etc or 
anticipated payments versus delivery of order contracts’ for retail buyers while 
production sector implements discounted collection policies for premium clients 
(including here the production of semi-final and final products for export 
activities). The maximum turnover occurs within two and a half years in 
construction sector and with one and half year in production sector.  
 
Table 13. Receivables accounts turnover ratio cross-sectoral statistics (in days) 
 
SECTORAL DATA 
(in days) 
MIN AVERAGE MAX 
RATR-TRADE -18 268 294 
RATR-PRODUCTION - 25 593 
RATR-CONSTRUCTION - 34 912 
RATR-SERVICE - 7 88 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
From the money conversion cycle prospect which is also a derivative of RATR it 
can be marked that due to clearance and sectoral product delivery timeframe, 
construction sector represents the largest money conversion period (refer to Table 
14). Similarly high amounts of inventories are maintained from production sector 
                                                          
18 Stays for 0  
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aiming to ensure business continuity as well as capture market opportunities 
when prices fall and permanent payments are done respectively. 
Correspondingly the average money conversion cycle refers to two and half years 
for construction sector, above two as per production sector, followed from one 
year and eight months for trade and one year and a half for service sector.  
 
Table 14. Money conversion cycle cross-sectoral statistics (in days) 
 
SECTORAL DATA  
(in days) 
MIN AVERAGE MAX 
MCC-TRADE (475) 665 870 
MCC-PRODUCTION (927) 725 1,141 
MCC-CONSTRUCTION 556 829 1,625 
MCC-SERVICE (297) 573 633 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
 
Net profit margin is another key element that creates more possibilities 
concerning an effective liquidity management process as the profit earned can be 
used for buying needs and payment purposes. Intuitively and in full compliance 
with the previously mentioned results but also referring to below statistics (Table 
15) service demonstrates the highest net profit margin, followed from 
construction and production sectors and the last remains trade.  
 
Table 15. Net profit margin cross-sectoral statistics in ALL 
 
SECTORAL DATA 
(in ALL) 
MIN AVERAGE MAX 
NPM-TRADE (354)% 24% 51% 
NPM-PRODUCTION (89)% 6% 88% 
NPM-CONSTRUCTION (170)% 16% 394% 
NPM-SERVICE (53)% 86% 818% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration  
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As evidenced the four ratios analyzed provide different aspects of decision 
making approach under liquidity management process by contemporary casting 
light even through other patterns which in turns affect additional important 
financial processes that should be further examined.  
 
 
6.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
The research hypotheses raised in this chapter tend to aggregate qualitative and 
quantitative data with the intention to foster the prediction of liquidity 
management process which is seen as a complex process into different sectoral 
affiliations. In the first five hypotheses only qualitative data are analyzed aiming 
to capture the effects of managerial aspect on SMEs business management 
process.  
 
In following qualitative and quantitative data are match in order to extend the 
analysis into a more advanced phase and better understand the influence of 
predictive factors (as derivative results of dynamic financial policies implemented 
in SMEs) in liquidity decision making process which in turns is expressed in 
terms of business effectiveness and efficiency: 
 
 
H1: The borrowers’ status depends from administrators gender regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H2: Equity origin is decisive in business ownership composition regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H3: There is an inverse relationship between administrators and ownership gender 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H4: Equity origin doesn’t influence the borrowers’ status regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H5: Equity origins indicate business administration regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H6: Borrowers’ status and OCF have a mutual positive impact on businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H7: Administrators gender and GPM can’t simultaneously impact businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H8: Equity origin and APP contemporaneously negatively affect businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
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H9: Ownerships gender, TLR, ITA, FA and OCF as well as ownerships gender and firm’s 
age don’t impact WC, RATR and NPM regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H10: Business administration, FATR, LT-LEV, CR and business size as well as business 
administration and long-term leverage ratio positively impact WC, MCC and NP 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H11: A radial basis function predicts WC, RATR, MCC and NPM regardless sectoral 
affiliation  
 
6.3. HYPOTHESES EXAMINATION, TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
H1: The borrowers’ status depends from administrators gender regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
The statistical results of H1 hypothesis examination referring to Table 16 
demonstrate that in trade sector the borrowers’ non-performing status is 
evidenced only when the administration gender is male even the total rate is 
lower (15.2%) in confront with the one of borrowers’ performing status (84.8%).   
 
Table 16. Administrator gender and Borrower status statistics in trade sector 
 
   Borrowers Status 
Total    0 1 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 0 6 6 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status .0% 21.4% 18.2% 
1 Count 5 21 26 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 75.0% 78.8% 
2 Count 0 1 1 
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% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status .0% 3.6% 3.0% 
Total Count 5 28 33 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
15.2% 84.8% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Comparatively in production sector H1 hypothesis results (see Table 17) 
concerning borrowers’ status per administrator gender evidence the same default 
probability per males. Saying that it can be affirmed that against as in the 
previous data  5 borrowers’ status result to be in default pertaining to 
administrator gender/male  by representing 16.1% of the total category and only 
18.2% of sectoral data-pool. Meanwhile in female administration category is 
observed a 50% default ratio which constitutes 16.7% of total borrowers’ status.  
 
Table 17. Administrator gender and Borrower status statistics in production sector 
 
   Borrowers Status 
Total    0 1 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 1 1 2 
% within Administrator Gender 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 16.7% 3.7% 6.1% 
1 Count 5 26 31 
% within Administrator Gender 16.1% 83.9% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 83.3% 96.3% 93.9% 
Total Count 6 27 33 
% within Administrator Gender 18.2% 81.8% 100.0% 
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   Borrowers Status 
Total    0 1 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 1 1 2 
% within Administrator Gender 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 16.7% 3.7% 6.1% 
1 Count 5 26 31 
% within Administrator Gender 16.1% 83.9% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 83.3% 96.3% 93.9% 
Total Count 6 27 33 
% within Administrator Gender 18.2% 81.8% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In construction sector (refer to Table 18) are manifested 8 default cases pertaining 
to male business administration gender and there isn’t any evidence of non-
performing borrowers’ status in the cases of mixed business administration. 
Consecutively the total default ratio of 24.2% pertains to male administrator 
gender. 
 
Table 18. Administrator gender and Borrower status statistics in construction sector 
 
   Borrowers Status 
Total    0 1 
Administrator Gender 1 Count 8 24 32 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 96.0% 97.0% 
2 Count 0 1 1 
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% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status .0% 4.0% 3.0% 
Total Count 8 25 33 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
24.2% 75.8% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In service sector (see Table 19) instead it can be affirmed that no one default 
borrower status is evidenced concerning female administration gender, while 
revealed 3 default cases in male business administration category. Accordingly, 
the total default ratio is 9.4%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Administrator gender and Borrower status statistics in service sector 
 
   Borrowers Status 
Total    0 1 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 0 6 6 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status .0% 20.7% 18.8% 
1 Count 3 23 26 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
11.5% 88.5% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 79.3% 81.2% 
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Total Count 3 29 32 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
9.4% 90.6% 100.0% 
% within Borrowers Status 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
  
 
According to the statistical results it can be confirmed the acceptance of H1 
hypothesis, where the higher default probability is attributed to businesses 
administrated from men. This leads to the understanding that female and mixed 
administration categories pay more attention to credit reimbursement which 
directly handles liquidity management decision process.  
 
 
 
H2: Equity origin is decisive in business ownership composition regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
The statistical results pertaining to trade sector demonstrated in Figure 18, 
confirm that Albanian businesses are mainly owned from men (69% of cases), 
then from women with 24.1% meanwhile mix-partnership represents the last 
preference.  
Foreign businesses instead are owned only from men and the same result is 
evidenced also in the mixed-equity cases. In other words it is admitted that in 
trade sector from the data examined generally men own the major part of 
national, foreign and mixed-equity business cases.   
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Figure 18. Business equity origin vs Ownership gender statistics in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
From the other hand H2 hypothesis results confirm that production sector is 
nationally originated (see Figure 19) and mainly owned from women than from 
men and mixed partnership (with respectively 54.5%, 33.3% and 12.1%). And this 
brings contrary results with the one of trade sector previously analyzed. 
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Figure 19. Business equity origin vs Ownership gender statistics in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The results of construction sector instead concerning the equity origin and 
ownership composition undisputedly demonstrate that men are the owners of 
above 65% of Albanian, foreign and mixed-equity businesses (as per Figure 20).  
 
And women are mainly the owners of Albanian businesses (23.1% vs 21.4% and 
16.7% in foreign and mixed equity businesses).  
Meanwhile it can be also added that foreign businesses operating in the country 
reflect mixed-partnership (in 14.3% of total cases) exigencies.   
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Figure 20. Business equity origin vs Ownership gender statistics in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
On behalf of Figure 21, in service sector is demonstrated that Albanian businesses 
in 75% of cases are owned from men, in 9.3% from women and in 6.25% of cases 
are owned from both of them. In the cases of mixed-equity instead businesses 
have also shared a mixed-ownership tendency.  
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Figure 21. Business equity origin vs Ownership gender statistics in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The sectoral analysis rejects H2 hypothesis by concluding that business equity 
origin doesn’t imply restrictive preferences on their ownership structure. 
Nonetheless, a tendency of mixed-equity in delegating the administration to 
mixed-partnership is evidenced in trade, construction and service sector.  
 
 
 
H3: There is an inverse relationship between administrators and ownership gender 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The examinations of H3 hypothesis in trade sector (referring to Table 20 data) are 
very interesting, considering that female ownership delegates administrator 
responsibilities to women in 83.3% of examined cases. From the other hand 
similar results are achieved also from male ownership structures that prefer to 
appoint as administrators men in 84.6% of examined cases. Comparatively also 
mixed-partnership structures highly opt mixed-administration (100%).   
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Table 20. Administrator and ownership gender statistics in trade sector 
 
   
Ownership Gender 
Total 
   
0 1 2 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 5 1 0 6 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
83.3% 16.7% .0% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
71.4% 4.3% .0% 18.2% 
1 Count 2 22 2 26 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
7.7% 84.6% 7.7% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
28.6% 95.7% 66.7% 78.8% 
2 Count 0 0 1 1 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
.0% .0% 33.3% 3.0% 
Total Count 7 23 3 33 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
21.2% 69.7% 9.1% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The contingency coefficient19 (CC) evaluated in these cases demonstrates a 
moderate positive relationship between two variables taken into consideration 
(refer to Table 21).  
 
Table 21. The contingency coefficient between administrator and ownership gender data 
in trade sector  
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .671 .000 
N of Valid Cases 33  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In production sector male administration results the more preferred option 
regardless ownership structure 93.9%. By this way the respective statistics (see 
Table 22) show that even female business ownership structures mostly prefer men 
(54.8%) related to administration issues than women (50%).   
While men and mixed-ownership structures have appointed respectively 33.3% 
men and 12.1% mixed-partnership in the total examined cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 The contingency coefficient (CC) helps in the understanding if variable b is 
‘contingent’ on variable a. However, it is a rough measure and doesn’t quantify the 
dependence exactly.  By this way if : CC is near zero (or equal to zero) it can be concluded 
that there is no association between them.  If CC is close to -1 there is a strong negative 
association between variables and when it is close to 1 a strong positive association 
between variables exists.  
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Table 22. Administrator and ownership gender statistics in production sector 
 
   
Ownership Gender 
Total 
   
0 1 2 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 1 1 0 2 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
50.0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
5.6% 9.1% .0% 6.1% 
1 Count 17 10 4 31 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
54.8% 32.3% 12.9% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
94.4% 90.9% 100.0% 93.9% 
Total Count 18 11 4 33 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
54.5% 33.3% 12.1% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Similar results are handled even while referring to contingency coefficient 
estimated in production sector. Its value is low (0,115 see Table 23 data) which 
means that a weak positive relationship between administrator and ownership 
gender exists.  
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Table 23. The contingency coefficient between administrator and 
ownership gender data in production sector 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .115 .801 
N of Valid Cases 33  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
Statistically based, in construction sector the male ownership structure opts men 
in administrator role (in 65.6% of cases).  In addition they also prefer mixed-
administration cases. Subsequently are preferred women and mixed-partnership 
with 21.9% and 12.5% of cases (Table 24). 
 
Table 24. Administrator and ownership gender statistics in construction sector 
 
   Ownership Gender 
Total    0 1 2 
Administrator Gender 1 Count 7 21 4 32 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
21.9% 65.6% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% 95.5% 100.0% 97.0% 
2 Count 0 1 0 1 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 4.5% .0% 3.0% 
Total Count 7 22 4 33 
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% within Administrator 
Gender 
21.2% 66.7% 12.1% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The a/m results are reconfirmed from contingency coefficient calculated in 
construction sector (CC result=0,124-refer to Table 25). Throughout, a weak 
positive relationship between administrator and ownership gender is revealed in 
this sector. 
 
Table 25. The contingency coefficient between administrator and ownership gender data 
in construction sector 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .124 .773 
N of Valid Cases 33  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In service sector (Table 26), female and mixed-ownership proportionally prefer 
female administrators. Men ownership instead opt for same gender 
administrators (75% of total cases) meanwhile mixed-partnerships evidence men 
administrator preferences (in 7.7% of cases). 
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Table 26. Administrator and ownership gender statistics in service sector 
 
   Ownership Gender 
Total    0 1 2 
Administrator Gender 0 Count 3 0 3 6 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
50.0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% .0% 60.0% 18.8% 
1 Count 0 24 2 26 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 92.3% 7.7% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% 40.0% 81.2% 
Total Count 3 24 5 32 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
9.4% 75.0% 15.6% 100.0% 
% within Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The CC result in this case (see Table 27) confirms the existence of a moderate and 
positive relationship between administrator and ownership gender in service 
sector.  
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Table 27. The contingency coefficient between administrator and ownership gender data 
in service sector  
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .656 .000 
N of Valid Cases 32  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In correspondence of sectoral statistics it can be highlighted that H3 hypothesis 
doesn’t results valid. The contingency test results in each single case confirm a 
positive even weak relationship between administrator and businesses ownership 
gender. Accordingly, in general the most preferred administrator gender is male.  
 
 
 
H4: Equity origin doesn’t influence the borrowers’ status regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The results elaborated in trade sector referring to equity origin influence on 
borrowers’ status confirm that 6.9% of total examined cases pertain to national 
equity businesses; the foreign equity default ratio instead is 50% of examined 
cases while mixed equity is 100%. Alternatively said these results demonstrate 
that equity conglomerate increases business default probability (Figure 22). The 
estimated contingency coefficient is 0,554 (see Table 28) by reaffirming a 
moderate and positive relationship between the a/m variables.  
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Figure 22. Equity origin and borrower’s status statistics in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 28. The contingency coefficient  between equity origin and borrower’s status data in 
trade sector  
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .554 .001 
N of Valid Cases 33  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
From the other side in production sector only national equity businesses 
demonstrate a default status of 18.2% (see Figure 23). For this purpose the 
contingency coefficient can’t be calculated and worth argue only on statistical 
basis.  
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Figure 23. Equity origin and borrower’s status statistics in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Equity origin in construction sector evidences a total impact of 24.2% on default 
status (with 30.8% and 28.6% respectively in national and foreign cases/4 default 
cases per each equity category referring to Figure 24). And the contingency 
coefficient estimated in this case (see Table 29) is weak but positive.  
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Figure 24. Equity origin and borrower’s status statistics in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 29. The contingency coefficient  between equity origin and borrower’s status data in 
construction sector 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .259 .307 
N of Valid Cases 33  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The statistical results (see Figure 25) pertaining to service sector concerning 
equity origin on borrowers’ status impact conclude that the latter impact is 9.3%. 
Comparatively CC estimated result is 0,103 (refer Table 30), which declares a 
weak but positive relationship between two variables taken into consideration. 
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Figure 25. Equity origin and borrower’s status statistics in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 30. The contingency coefficient  between equity origin and borrower’s status data in 
service sector 
 
  Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .103 .558 
N of Valid Cases 32  
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In most cases as discussed the equity origin and borrowers’ status are positively 
correlated (especially in national equity businesses where is marked the higher 
default ratio regardless sectoral affiliations) and obviously these results lead to 
the rejection of H4 hypothesis. Which is further confirmed from contingency 
coefficient results in each sectoral examination. 
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H5: Equity origins indicate business administration regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
On behalf of H5 hypothesis examination, trade sector evidences regarding equity 
origin and business administration delegation process clearly demonstrate that in 
majority of examined cases (in 81.8%), the businesses are managed from the 
administrators. Specifically, foreign equity companies choose to trust the 
management process to estrangers in 100% of examined cases followed from the 
national and mixed-partnership ones with respectively 82.8% and 50% of 
categorical cases (refer to Table 31).  
 
Table 31. Equity origin and business administration statistics in trade sector 
 
   Business Administration 
Total    0 1 
Equity Origin 0 Count 24 5 29 
% within Equity Origin 82.8% 17.2% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
88.9% 83.3% 87.9% 
1 Count 2 0 2 
% within Equity Origin 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
7.4% .0% 6.1% 
2 Count 1 1 2 
% within Equity Origin 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
3.7% 16.7% 6.1% 
Total Count 27 6 33 
% within Equity Origin 81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In production sector, also national equity businesses evidence that they mainly 
prefer to nominate skilled professionals as administrators (see Table 32) in 72.7% 
of examined cases. 
 
Table 32. Equity origin and business administration statistics in production sector 
 
   Business administration 
Total    0 1 
Equity Origin 0 Count 24 9 33 
% within Equity Origin 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Business 
administration 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 24 9 33 
% within Equity Origin 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Business 
administration 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS  
 
 
The estimated statistics in construction sector concerning business administration 
in respect of equity origin  (Table 33) confirm that in 81.8% of examined cases 
business owners delegate the administration to skilled managers/administrators 
(respectively with 76.9%, 85.7% and 83.3% in national, foreign and mixed-
partnership cases). 
 
 Table 33. Equity origin and business administration statistics in construction sector 
 
   Business Administration 
Total    0 1 
Equity Origin 0 Count 10 3 13 
% within Equity Origin 76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
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% within Business 
Administration 
37.0% 50.0% 39.4% 
1 Count 12 2 14 
% within Equity Origin 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
44.4% 33.3% 42.4% 
2 Count 5 1 6 
% within Equity Origin 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
18.5% 16.7% 18.2% 
Total Count 27 6 33 
% within Equity Origin 81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS  
 
In service sector generally the same but categorical contradictory results are 
achieved concerning equity origin and business administration process. So, 
referring to the Table 34 it can be evidenced that in majority of cases national 
equity businesses delegate to the managers the administrators role (in 72.4% of 
examined cases). While mixed-partnership businesses prefer more to self-
administrate respective businesses (in 66.7% of examined cases).  
 
Table 34. Equity origin and business administration statistics in service sector 
 
   Business Administration 
Total    0 1 
Equity Origin 0 Count 21 8 29 
% within Equity Origin 72.4% 27.6% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
95.5% 80.0% 90.6% 
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2 Count 1 2 3 
% within Equity Origin 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
4.5% 20.0% 9.4% 
Total Count 22 10 32 
% within Equity Origin 68.8% 31.2% 100.0% 
% within Business 
Administration 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In general it can be concluded that H5 hypothesis can be rejected as in each 
sectoral affiliation businesses mostly prefer to nominate skilled and valuable 
managers concerning respective businesses administration, which demonstrates 
the owners necessity for trust heading toward a sustainable financial 
management into fragile business rhythms.   
As above the logic brings to the attention implied links between the variables 
examined, thus, aiming to understand and better reflect on the first five 
hypotheses as per liquidity management process the correlated qualitative and 
quantitative data are further examined through the following hypotheses.  
 
 
 
H6: Borrowers’ status and OCF have a mutual positive impact on businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Borrowers’ status and OCF doesn’t impact working capital in trade sector at 95% 
confidence level (refer to Table 35) as the mutual variable significance is higher 
than 0.05. This can be also confirmed from the univariate regression low R 
squared result (1%).  Meanwhile is evidenced that working capital errors’ 
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variance isn’t the same between two borrowers’ status groups (see Levene’s Test20 
results in Appendix A/Table 1).   
 
Table 35. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status and OCF vs WC) in trade 
sector 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.028E15a 2 2.014E15 .145 .866 .010 
Intercept 7.033E16 1 7.033E16 5.056 .032 .144 
Borrowers’ Status * 
GA2OCF 
4.028E15 2 2.014E15 .145 .866 .010 
Error 4.173E17 30 1.391E16    
Total 4.947E17 33     
Corrected Total 4.213E17 32     
a. R Squared = .010 (Adjusted R Squared = -.056)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Alternatively worth highlighting that the mutual impact of borrowers’ status and 
OCF on working capital is positive and statistically significant in production 
sector (see Table 36) at 95% confidence level. Correspondingly working capital 
volatility is predicted in 63.2% from them. From the other hand is evidenced that 
working capital error’s variance isn’t the same between two borrowers’ status 
groups (refer to Table 2 in Appendix A).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Levene’s test significance >0,05. It tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of dependent variable is equal across the groups examined (in this case two borrowers’ 
status groups/performing and non are considered).  
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Table 36. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status and OCF vs WC) in 
production sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2.449E16a 2 1.224E16 6.884 .018 .632 
Intercept 3.209E14 1 3.209E14 .180 .682 .022 
Borrowers’ Status * 
GA2OCF 
2.449E16 2 1.224E16 6.884 .018 .632 
Error 1.423E16 8 1.779E15    
Total 3.876E16 11     
Corrected Total 3.872E16 10     
a. R Squared = .632 (Adjusted R Squared = .541)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Construction sector working capital data testify also that error’s variance isn’t the 
same between two borrowers’ status groups (see Table 3 results in Appendix A), 
but despite this, working capital result to be positively correlated with borrowers’ 
status and OCF (their estimated effect on working capital is 76.2% see Table 37 in 
following). 
 
Table 37. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status and OCF vs WC) in 
construction sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.409E18a 2 7.046E17 14.410 .002 .762 
Intercept 1.709E17 1 1.709E17 3.495 .094 .280 
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Borrowers’ Status * 
GA2OCF 
1.409E18 2 7.046E17 14.410 .00221 .762 
Error 4.401E17 9 4.890E16    
Total 2.050E18 12     
Corrected Total 1.849E18 11     
a. R Squared = .762 (Adjusted R Squared =. 709)       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Borrowers’ status and OCF positively impact working capital corresponding to 
service sector examined data (refer to Table 38 below). Concretely, they have a 
full impact on working capital variability independently from the fact that 
referring to Levenes’ test working capital error’s variance isn’t the same between 
two borrowers’ status (see Table 4 in Appendix A).   
 
Table 38. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status and OCF vs WC) in service 
sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 8.513E20a 2 4.257E20 5.342E4 .000 1.000 
Intercept 9.135E14 1 9.135E14 .115 .737 .004 
Borrowers’ Status * 
GA2OCF 
8.513E20 2 4.257E20 5.342E4 .000 1.000 
Error 2.311E17 29 7.969E15    
Total 8.803E20 32     
Corrected Total 8.515E20 31     
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R Squared = 1.000)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
                                                          
21 Their impact on WC is also statistically significant at 95% confidence level.  
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As evidenced the mutual impact of borrowers’ status and OCF on businesses 
working capital pertaining to production, construction and service sector is 
positive but it doesn’t result the same in trade sector. Thus, merely H6 hypothesis 
doesn’t result valid. Anyway, it should be admitting that a/m results sound true 
under liquidity management process. By this way the credit reimbursement 
capability and positive OCFs may permanently furnish businesses with enough 
liquidity (considering that the latter can be mainly borrowed from banks/financial 
institutions).  
 
 
H7: Administrators gender and GPM can’t simultaneously impact businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Closely referring to Table 39 trade sector data, administrators gender and GPM 
simultaneous impact on working capital (as the statistical significance > 0.05) is 
irrelevant. The same situation persists even individually referring to each of the 
a/m variables. But from the other side, Levenes’ test confirms (see Table 5 in 
Appendix A) that working capital errors’ variance between administrators gender 
groups isn’t equal.  
 
 
Table 39. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender and GPM vs WC) in 
trade sector  
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2.683E16a 4 6.708E15 .476 .753 .064 
Intercept 8.811E15 1 8.811E15 .625 .436 .022 
Administrators  Gender 5.450E15 1 5.450E15 .387 .539 .014 
OE3GPM 1.229E16 1 1.229E16 .872 .358 .030 
Administrators Gender * 
OE3GPM 
1.034E16 1 1.034E16 .734 .399 .026 
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Error 
3.945E17 28 1.409E16 
   
Total 
4.947E17 33 
    
Corrected Total 
4.213E17 32 
    
a. R Squared = .064 (Adjusted R Squared = -.070)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The same situation is replicated in production sector, where the simultaneous 
statistical significance of the GPM and administrators gender concerning working 
capital is higher than 0.05 (see Table 40 below data). Even separately the a/m 
variables don’t represent any significant statistical relationship with working 
capital. Against here the Levenes’ test demonstrates disparity in working capital 
errors’ variance between different administrators gender groups (Table 6 in 
Appendix A).  
Table 40. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators’ gender and GPM vs WC) in 
production sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.592E16a 3 5.307E15 .276 .842 .029 
Intercept 2.572E15 1 2.572E15 .134 .717 .005 
Administrators  Gender 3.996E15 1 3.996E15 .208 .652 .007 
OE3GPM 5.011E15 1 5.011E15 .261 .614 .009 
Administrator Gender * 
OE3GPM 
4.878E15 1 4.878E15 .254 .618 .009 
Error 5.385E17 28 1.923E16    
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Total 5.968E17 32     
Corrected Total 5.544E17 31     
a. R Squared = .029 (Adjusted R Squared = -.075)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Construction sector statistics instead (see Table 41 in following), show 
contradictory results concerning the simultaneous impact of administrators 
gender and GPM on working capital. However they don’t simultaneously impact 
the latter, but separately administrators gender demonstrates a statistical 
significant impact on working capital. While Levenes’ test (Table 7 in Appendix 
A) confirms the errors’ variance disparity in working capital between different 
administrators gender groups. 
Table 41. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators’ gender and GPM vs WC) in 
construction sector 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.900E18a 2 9.501E17 100.965 .000 .871 
Intercept 2.010E18 1 2.010E18 213.593 .000 .877 
Administrators  Gender 1.897E18 1 1.897E18 201.578 .000 .870 
OE3GPM 4.260E12 1 4.260E12 .000 .983 .000 
Administrators Gender 
* OE3GPM 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error 2.823E17 30 9.411E15    
Total 2.313E18 33     
Corrected Total 2.183E18 32     
a. R Squared = .871 (Adjusted R Squared = .862)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In service sector also, the impact of administrators gender and GPM is inexistent 
(see Table 42) on working capital. Levenes’ test (Table 8 in Appendix A) verifies 
the working capital errors’ variance disparity between different administrators 
gender groups.  
 
Table 42. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender and GPM vs WC) in 
service sector 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.451E19a 3 4.835E18 .162 .921 .017 
Intercept 9.401E18 1 9.401E18 .314 .579 .011 
Administrators Gender 9.200E18 1 9.200E18 .308 .583 .011 
OE3GPM 2.215E18 1 2.215E18 .074 .787 .003 
Administrators Gender * 
OE3GPM 
2.185E18 1 2.185E18 .073 .789 .003 
Error 8.370E20 28 2.989E19    
Total 8.803E20 32     
Corrected Total 8.515E20 31     
a. R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -.088)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The results examined highlight the inexistence of a simultaneous impact between 
administrators gender and GPM in working capital. Throughout,  H7 hypothesis 
can be admitted. But it should be also added that merely the individual impact of 
administrators gender and GPM variables on working capital is irrelevant.  
 
 
H8: Equity origin and APP contemporaneously negatively affect businesses working 
capital regardless sectoral affiliation; 
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The multiple effect of equity origin and APP is inexistent in trade sector (see 
Table below). Moreover they even separately don’t impact working capital.  From 
the other hand, Levenes’ test results (see Table 9 in Appendix A) confirm the 
existence of errors’ variance disparity in working capital between different equity 
origin groups.  
 
Table 43. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin and APP vs WC) in trade sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.046E16a 5 8.092E15 .574 .720 .096 
Intercept 4.660E14 1 4.660E14 .033 .857 .001 
Equity Origin 8.876E15 2 4.438E15 .315 .733 .023 
ILR10APP 2.007E13 1 2.007E13 .001 .970 .000 
Equity  Origin * 
ILR10APP 
1.167E15 2 5.834E14 .041 .960 .003 
Error 3.809E17 27 1.411E16    
Total 4.947E17 33     
Corrected Total 4.213E17 32     
a. R Squared = .096 (Adjusted R Squared = -.071)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In production sector also the simultaneous effects of equity origin and APP on 
working capital are inexistent (see Table 44).  Levenes’ test instead (refer to Table 
10 in Appendix A) can’t be estimated by arguing on working capital error 
variance dis/parity as in this sector equity origin is only national.  
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Table 44. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin and APP vs WC) in production 
sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 2.074E15a 1 2.074E15 .109 .744 .004 
Intercept 4.553E16 1 4.553E16 2.396 .133 .076 
Equity Origin .000 0 . . . .000 
ILR10APP 2.074E15 1 2.074E15 .109 .744 .004 
Equity  Origin * 
ILR10APP 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error 5.512E17 29 1.901E16    
Total 5.968E17 31     
Corrected Total 5.533E17 30     
a. R Squared = .004 (Adjusted R Squared = -.031)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Working capital in construction sector reflects a positive simultaneous 
relationship with equity origin and APP (see Table 45 in following). The same 
results persist even considering only APP. Levenes’ test (Table 11 in Appendix A) 
in this case testifies the disparity of errors’ variance in working capital data as per 
different equity origin groups. 
 
Table 45. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin and APP vs WC) in construction 
sector 
 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.815E18a 3 6.050E17 91.357 .000 .961 
Intercept 2.089E15 1 2.089E15 .315 .586 .028 
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Equity Origin 1.012E16 1 1.012E16 1.528 .242 .122 
ILR10APP 1.574E18 1 1.574E18 237.658 .000 .956 
Equity  Origin * 
ILR10APP 
1.602E18 1 1.602E18 241.845 .000 .956 
Error 7.285E16 11 6.622E15    
Total 2.100E18 15     
Corrected Total 1.888E18 14     
a. R Squared = .961 (Adjusted R Squared = .951)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Contrary in service sector, equity origin and APP simultaneously don’t impact 
working capital (see Table 46 data), despite Levenes’ test even in this case argues 
on  errors’ variance disparity in working capital per different equity origin groups 
(refer to Table 12 in Appendix A). 
 
Table 46. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin and APP vs WC) in service 
sector 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.816E18a 3 1.605E18 .053 .984 .006 
Intercept 1.333E18 1 1.333E18 .044 .835 .002 
Equity Origin 1.195E18 1 1.195E18 .040 .844 .001 
ILR10APP 6.468E15 1 6.468E15 .000 .988 .000 
Equity  Origin * 
ILR10APP 
1.712E16 1 1.712E16 .001 .981 .000 
Error 8.467E20 28 3.024E19    
Total 8.803E20 32     
Corrected Total 8.515E20 31     
a. R Squared = .006 (Adjusted R Squared = -.101)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In general the simultaneous effect of equity origin and APP is quite inexistent 
respectively in trade, production and service sector, by this way  H8 hypothesis 
can be rejected. And in a certain way even the negative effect of APP on working 
capital is excluded. And obviously this help in the understanding of the existence 
of additional mechanisms that predict liquidity management decision making 
process.  
H9: Ownerships gender, TLR, ITA, FA and OCF as well as ownerships gender and firm’s 
age don’t impact WC, RATR and NPM regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The ownerships gender, TLR, ITA, FA and OCF as well as the simultaneous effect 
of ownerships gender and firm’s age can’t predict WC, RATR and net NPM 
volatility in trade sector as described in Table 47. Their impact in each multiple 
regression analysis is statistically insignificant22.  
 
 
Table 47. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownerships gender, total liability ratio, 
inventory to total assets ratio, firm age and operative cash flow as well as simultaneously 
ownerships gender and firm’s age vs WC, RATR, NPM) in trade sector 
 
Source 
Dependen
t Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 7.270E16a 8 9.087E15 .626 .748 .173 
ILR-5 
RATR 
2.780E6b 8 347485.255 .380 .921 .112 
OE-5 NPM 7.212c 8 .902 .946 .499 .240 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 2.467E15 1 2.467E15 .170 .684 .007 
ILR-5 
RATR 
57022.412 1 57022.412 .062 .805 .003 
OE-5 NPM .061 1 .061 .064 .803 .003 
Ownership  Gender ILR-2 WC 2.414E16 2 1.207E16 .831 .448 .065 
                                                          
22 Significance level > 0.05.  
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ILR-5 
RATR 
1369639.42
5 
2 684819.712 .748 .484 .059 
OE-5 NPM .832 2 .416 .437 .651 .035 
RA2TLR ILR-2 WC 2.915E13 1 2.915E13 .002 .965 .000 
ILR-5 
RATR 
97753.053 1 97753.053 .107 .747 .004 
OE-5 NPM .027 1 .027 .028 .868 .001 
OE9ITA ILR-2 WC 1.524E16 1 1.524E16 1.049 .316 .042 
ILR-5 
RATR 
875215.278 1 875215.278 .956 .338 .038 
OE-5 NPM 1.173 1 1.173 1.230 .278 .049 
Firm Age ILR-2 WC 2.491E14 1 2.491E14 .017 .897 .001 
ILR-5 
RATR 
64778.339 1 64778.339 .071 .793 .003 
OE-5 NPM .014 1 .014 .015 .904 .001 
GA2OCF ILR-2 WC 1.216E15 1 1.216E15 .084 .775 .003 
ILR-5 
RATR 
271.864 1 271.864 .000 .986 .000 
OE-5 NPM .025 1 .025 .026 .874 .001 
Ownerships’ Gender 
* Firm Age 
ILR-2 WC 3.205E16 2 1.603E16 1.103 .348 .084 
ILR-5 
RATR 
969022.490 2 484511.245 .529 .596 .042 
OE-5 NPM .436 2 .218 .229 .797 .019 
Error ILR-2 WC 3.486E17 24 1.453E16    
ILR-5 
RATR 
2.197E7 24 915425.939 
   
OE-5 NPM 22.883 24 .953    
Total ILR-2 WC 4.947E17 33     
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ILR-5 
RATR 
2.713E7 33 
    
OE-5 NPM 32.042 33     
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 4.213E17 32     
ILR-5 
RATR 
2.475E7 32 
    
OE-5 NPM 30.095 32     
a. R Squared = .173 (Adjusted R Squared = -.103)      
b. R Squared = .112 (Adjusted R Squared = -.184)      
c. R Squared = .240 (Adjusted R Squared = -.014)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Comparatively the Estimated marginal means23 of WC, RATR and NPM 
concerning ownership gender typology vary from each other by however 
confirming a certain (hidden) relationship between dependent variables and this 
covariate (see Figure 1 in Appendix A) as can be captured from the examination.  
Referring to the below examination results (see Table 48), in production sector it 
can be identified the  impact of ownerships gender and firms’ age on NPM, as 
well as their simultaneous effect on the latter by respectively affecting its 
volatility with 95.9%, 95.8%  and 98.3%.  
 
 
Table 48. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownerships gender, total liability ratio, 
inventory to total assets ratio, firm age and operative cash flow as well as simultaneously 
ownerships gender and firm’s age vs WC, RATR, NPM) in production sector 
 
Source 
Dependen
t Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
                                                          
23 Estimated marginal means in this case explain if there is any difference between 
ownerships gender typology through and versus different dependent variables in 
question. And the differentiated significance is expressed with a p_value <0.05.  
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Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 
2.562E16a 8 3.202E15 .489 .808 .662 
ILR-5 
RATR 
234599.371b 8 29324.921 .751 .683 .750 
OE-5 
NPM 
1724.886c 8 215.611 53.714 .018 .995 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 
1.231E16 1 1.231E16 1.879 .304 .484 
ILR-5 
RATR 
5650.308 1 5650.308 .145 .740 .067 
OE-5 
NPM 
46.854 1 46.854 11.673 .076 .854 
Ownerships’  Gender ILR-2 WC 
1.205E16 2 6.026E15 .920 .521 .479 
ILR-5 
RATR 
9537.179 2 4768.590 .122 .891 .109 
OE-5 
NPM 
186.954 2 93.477 23.287 .041 .959 
OE9ITA ILR-2 WC 
9.258E15 1 9.258E15 1.413 .357 .414 
ILR-5 
RATR 
34510.396 1 34510.396 .883 .447 .306 
OE-5 
NPM 
4.340 1 4.340 1.081 .408 .351 
RA2TLR ILR-2 WC 
1.066E16 1 1.066E16 1.627 .330 .449 
ILR-5 
RATR 
161040.252 1 161040.252 4.122 .179 .673 
OE-5 
NPM 
7.677 1 7.677 1.913 .301 .489 
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Firm Age ILR-2 WC 
5.389E15 1 5.389E15 .823 .460 .291 
ILR-5 
RATR 
14.488 1 14.488 .000 .986 .000 
OE-5 
NPM 
182.484 1 182.484 45.461 .021 .958 
GA2OCF ILR-2 WC 
5.184E13 1 5.184E13 .008 .937 .004 
ILR-5 
RATR 
71191.752 1 71191.752 1.822 .310 .477 
OE-5 
NPM 
10.820 1 10.820 2.696 .242 .574 
Ownerships’ Gender 
* Firm Age 
ILR-2 WC 
1.046E16 2 5.232E15 .799 .556 .444 
ILR-5 
RATR 
1598.067 2 799.034 .020 .980 .020 
OE-5 
NPM 
465.368 2 232.684 57.967 .017 .983 
Error ILR-2 WC 
1.310E16 2 6.552E15 
   
ILR-5 
RATR 
78136.193 2 39068.096 
   
OE-5 
NPM 
8.028 2 4.014 
   
Total ILR-2 WC 
3.876E16 11 
    
ILR-5 
RATR 
353738.575 11 
    
OE-5 
NPM 
2077.616 11 
    
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 
3.872E16 10 
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ILR-5 
RATR 
312735.564 10 
    
OE-5 
NPM 
1732.914 10 
    
a. R Squared = .662 (Adjusted R Squared = -.692)      
b. R Squared = .750 (Adjusted R Squared = -.249)      
c. R Squared = .995 (Adjusted R Squared = .977)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
In the meantime it can be affirmed that a contradictory result is evidenced while 
examining the estimated marginal means of WC and RATR related to ownerships 
gender typology (Figure 2 in Appendix A). Intuitively, even here the relationship 
between the latter and WC, RATR and NPM cannot be excluded.    
 
As statistically proved (in the Table 49) the operative cash flow positively impacts 
WC in 89.9% of its volatility, meanwhile all the other variables considered in the 
construction sector analysis don’t have any impact on the dependent variables 
examined.  
With special regard to estimated marginal means WC demonstrates a different 
approach through ownerships gender compared with the one maintained from 
RATR and NPM (as described in Figure 3/Appendix A) which leads to the 
understanding that also in this sector a (hidden) relationship between variables 
taken into consideration exists. 
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Table 49. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownerships gender, total liability ratio, 
inventory to total assets ratio, firm age and operative cash flow as well as simultaneously 
ownerships gender and firm’s age vs WC, RATR, NPM) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependen
t Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 1.673E18a 6 2.788E17 7.223 .038 .916 
ILR-5 
RATR 
238909.181
b 
6 39818.197 .320 .897 .324 
OE-5 NPM 6.329c 6 1.055 .278 .921 .294 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 2.776E17 1 2.776E17 7.192 .055 .643 
ILR-5 
RATR 
18902.929 1 18902.929 .152 .717 .037 
OE-5 NPM .251 1 .251 .066 .810 .016 
Ownerships’ Gender ILR-2 WC 8.020E16 1 8.020E16 2.078 .223 .342 
ILR-5 
RATR 
12465.904 1 12465.904 .100 .768 .024 
OE-5 NPM .335 1 .335 .088 .781 .022 
OE9ITA ILR-2 WC 7.488E15 1 7.488E15 .194 .682 .046 
ILR-5 
RATR 
177807.202 1 177807.202 1.427 .298 .263 
OE-5 NPM 4.312 1 4.312 1.135 .347 .221 
RA2TLR ILR-2 WC 3.765E15 1 3.765E15 .098 .770 .024 
ILR-5 
RATR 
93250.645 1 93250.645 .748 .436 .158 
OE-5 NPM 2.502 1 2.502 .659 .463 .141 
Firm Age ILR-2 WC 1.668E17 1 1.668E17 4.322 .106 .519 
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ILR-5 
RATR 
14971.154 1 14971.154 .120 .746 .029 
OE-5 NPM .627 1 .627 .165 .705 .040 
GA2OCF ILR-2 WC 1.380E18 1 1.380E18 35.736 .004 .899 
ILR-5 
RATR 
70386.094 1 70386.094 .565 .494 .124 
OE-5 NPM 1.927 1 1.927 .507 .516 .113 
Ownerships’  Gender 
* Firm Age 
ILR-2 WC 5.454E16 1 5.454E16 1.413 .300 .261 
ILR-5 
RATR 
1976.063 1 1976.063 .016 .906 .004 
OE-5 NPM .063 1 .063 .016 .904 .004 
Error ILR-2 WC 1.544E17 4 3.860E16    
ILR-5 
RATR 
498452.433 4 124613.108 
   
OE-5 NPM 15.195 4 3.799    
Total ILR-2 WC 2.050E18 11     
ILR-5 
RATR 
838371.226 11 
    
OE-5 NPM 24.166 11     
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 1.827E18 10     
ILR-5 
RATR 
737361.614 10 
    
OE-5 NPM 21.524 10     
a. R Squared = .916 (Adjusted R Squared = .789)      
b. R Squared = .324 (Adjusted R Squared = -.690)      
c. R Squared = .294 (Adjusted R Squared = -.765)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Service sector statistics reconfirm the positive relationship and statistically 
significant (see Table 50 below) between WC and OCF by additionally evidencing 
another positive relationship between NPM  and TLR. Respectively they express 
31.7% and 99.9% of the volatility studied. And worth mentioned that dependent 
variables estimated marginal means differently behave with ownerships gender 
by preserving in any case a certain relationship (refer to Figure 4 in Appendix A). 
 
Table 50. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownerships gender, total liability ratio, 
inventory to total assets ratio, firm age and operative cash flow as well as simultaneously 
ownerships gender and firm’s age vs WC, RATR, NPM) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependen
t Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 8.511E20a 8 1.064E20 5.464E3 .000 .999 
ILR-5 
RATR 
651.664b 8 81.458 .242 .978 .078 
OE-5 
NPM 
1430.383c 8 178.798 3.227 .013 .529 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 6.139E15 1 6.139E15 .315 .580 .014 
ILR-5 
RATR 
3.912 1 3.912 .012 .915 .001 
OE-5 
NPM 
2.428 1 2.428 .044 .836 .002 
Ownerships’ Gender ILR-2 WC 6.917E15 2 3.459E15 .178 .838 .015 
ILR-5 
RATR 
5.915 2 2.957 .009 .991 .001 
OE-5 
NPM 
52.172 2 26.086 .471 .630 .039 
OE9ITA ILR-2 WC 8.601E15 1 8.601E15 .442 .513 .019 
ILR-5 
RATR 
313.674 1 313.674 .932 .344 .039 
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OE-5 
NPM 
2.539 1 2.539 .046 .832 .002 
RA2TLR ILR-2 WC 
4.320E14 1 4.320E14 .022 .883 .001 
ILR-5 
RATR 
112.209 1 112.209 .333 .569 .014 
OE-5 
NPM 
590.636 1 590.636 10.661 .003 .317 
Firm Age ILR-2 WC 
4.851E15 1 4.851E15 .249 .622 .011 
ILR-5 
RATR 
.148 1 .148 .000 .983 .000 
OE-5 
NPM 
8.456 1 8.456 .153 .700 .007 
GA2OCF ILR-2 WC 
8.080E20 1 8.080E20 4.150E4 .000 .999 
ILR-5 
RATR 
76.012 1 76.012 .226 .639 .010 
OE-5 
NPM 
12.555 1 12.555 .227 .639 .010 
Ownerships’ Gender 
* Firm Age 
ILR-2 WC 
5.816E15 2 2.908E15 .149 .862 .013 
ILR-5 
RATR 
4.311 2 2.155 .006 .994 .001 
OE-5 
NPM 
123.471 2 61.735 1.114 .345 .088 
Error ILR-2 WC 
4.478E17 23 1.947E16 
   
ILR-5 
RATR 
7739.956 23 336.520 
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OE-5 
NPM 
1274.220 23 55.401 
   
Total ILR-2 WC 
8.803E20 32 
    
ILR-5 
RATR 
9825.033 32 
    
OE-5 
NPM 
3360.058 32 
    
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 
8.515E20 31 
    
ILR-5 
RATR 
8391.620 31 
    
OE-5 
NPM 
2704.603 31 
    
a. R Squared = .999 (Adjusted R Squared = .999)      
b. R Squared = .078 (Adjusted R Squared = -.243)      
c. R Squared = .529 (Adjusted R Squared = .365)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
As far as can be understand the H9 hypothesis doesn’t result valid for production, 
construction and service sector while the contrary can be affirmed for trade 
sector. Intuitively here aren’t taken into consideration the hidden/relationships 
that exist between the independent variables (which can be treated also as 
multicollinearity issues especially referring to data typology).  
 
H10: Business administration, FATR, LT-LEV, CR and business size as well as business 
administration and long-term leverage ratio positively impact WC, MCC and NP 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The LT-LEV, business size and business administration in trade sector (see Table 
51) positively impact WC and NP by conducting respectively 23.6%, 26.2% and 
19.9%, of dependent variables volatility. In addition, the estimated marginal 
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means concerning business administration variable maintain quite the same 
function form for WC and NP. Money conversion cycle instead behaves in 
contradiction with first two (refer to Figure 5 in Appendix A).  
 
 
 
Table 51. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration, fixed assets turnover 
ratio (FATR) and long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV), cash ratio (CR) and business size as 
well as simultaneously business administration and long-term leverage ratio vs WC, 
MCC, WC and NP) in trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 2.349E17a 6 3.915E16 5.460 .001 .558 
ILR-11-
MCC 
7.762E7b 6 1.294E7 .875 .527 .168 
NP 2.102E15c 6 3.504E14 2.079 .091 .324 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 7.259E16 1 7.259E16 10.124 .004 .280 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3621591.115 1 
3621591.11
5 
.245 .625 .009 
NP 1.251E14 1 1.251E14 .742 .397 .028 
Business 
administration 
ILR-2 WC 3.835E15 1 3.835E15 .535 .471 .020 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.443E7 1 1.443E7 .976 .332 .036 
NP 1.092E15 1 1.092E15 6.479 .017 .199 
OE2FATR ILR-2 WC 1.256E14 1 1.256E14 .018 .896 .001 
ILR-11-
MCC 
53568.564 1 53568.564 .004 .952 .000 
NP 6.108E12 1 6.108E12 .036 .851 .001 
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RA5LTLEV ILR-2 WC 5.765E16 1 5.765E16 8.039 .009 .236 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.340E7 1 1.340E7 .906 .350 .034 
NP 7.881E14 1 7.881E14 4.675 .040 .152 
ILR4CR ILR-2 WC 7.698E15 1 7.698E15 1.074 .310 .040 
ILR-11-
MCC 
133544.294 1 133544.294 .009 .925 .000 
NP 3.041E13 1 3.041E13 .180 .675 .007 
BoS ILR-2 WC 6.634E16 1 6.634E16 9.252 .005 .262 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1530457.102 1 
1530457.10
2 
.103 .750 .004 
NP 2.943E13 1 2.943E13 .175 .680 .007 
Business 
administration * 
RA5LTLEV 
ILR-2 WC 3.633E14 1 3.633E14 .051 .824 .002 
ILR-11-
MCC 
5724910.720 1 
5724910.72
0 
.387 .539 .015 
NP 1.844E14 1 1.844E14 1.094 .305 .040 
Error ILR-2 WC 1.864E17 26 7.170E15 
   
ILR-11-
MCC 
3.845E8 26 1.479E7 
   
NP 4.383E15 26 1.686E14    
Total ILR-2 WC 4.947E17 33 
    
ILR-11-
MCC 
4.929E8 33 
    
NP 6.485E15 33     
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 4.213E17 32 
    
ILR-11-
MCC 
4.622E8 32 
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NP 6.485E15 32     
a. R Squared = .558 (Adjusted R Squared = .455) 
     
b. R Squared = .168 (Adjusted R Squared = -.024) 
     
c. R Squared = .324 (Adjusted R Squared = .168) 
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The below statistics pertaining to production sector (see Table 52) don’t show any 
significant statistical correlation between examined independent variables and 
WC, MCC and NP. Beyond this, from estimated marginal means configuration it 
can captured the effect of business administration on WC and MCC which differs 
from the one of NP by reconfirming anyway a certain relationship (refer to Table 
6 in Appendix A). 
 
Table 52. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration, fixed assets turnover 
ratio (FATR) and long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV), cash ratio (CR) and business size as 
well as simultaneously business administration and long-term leverage ratio vs WC, 
MCC, WC and NP) in production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 1.516E17a 6 2.527E16 1.452 .239 .275 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.789E8b 6 2.982E7 .476 .819 .110 
NP 2.035E15c 6 3.392E14 1.213 .335 .240 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 4.176E16 1 4.176E16 2.399 .135 .094 
ILR-11-
MCC 
2990530.270 1 
2990530.27
0 
.048 .829 .002 
NP 3.514E14 1 3.514E14 1.257 .274 .052 
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Business 
administration 
ILR-2 WC 8.579E15 1 8.579E15 .493 .490 .021 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3.296E7 1 3.296E7 .525 .476 .022 
NP 1.980E14 1 1.980E14 .708 .409 .030 
OE2FATR ILR-2 WC 1.892E16 1 1.892E16 1.087 .308 .045 
ILR-11-
MCC 
4.004E7 1 4.004E7 .638 .432 .027 
NP 2.337E13 1 2.337E13 .084 .775 .004 
RA5LTLEV ILR-2 WC 
1.800E16 1 1.800E16 1.034 .320 .043 
ILR-11-
MCC 
7889931.095 1 
7889931.09
5 
.126 .726 .005 
NP 2.815E11 1 2.815E11 .001 .975 .000 
ILR4CR ILR-2 WC 
1.962E15 1 1.962E15 .113 .740 .005 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.102E8 1 1.102E8 1.757 .198 .071 
NP 1.905E12 1 1.905E12 .007 .935 .000 
BoS ILR-2 WC 
4.010E16 1 4.010E16 2.304 .143 .091 
ILR-11-
MCC 
4997322.398 1 
4997322.39
8 
.080 .780 .003 
NP 4.920E14 1 4.920E14 1.760 .198 .071 
Business 
administration * 
ILR-2 WC 
5.239E15 1 5.239E15 .301 .589 .013 
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RA5LTLEV ILR-11-
MCC 
1.970E7 1 1.970E7 .314 .581 .013 
NP 6.623E13 1 6.623E13 .237 .631 .010 
Error ILR-2 WC 
4.003E17 23 1.741E16 
   
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.443E9 23 6.272E7 
   
NP 6.431E15 23 2.796E14 
   
Total ILR-2 WC 
5.968E17 30 
    
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.744E9 30 
    
NP 1.005E16 30 
    
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 
5.519E17 29 
    
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.622E9 29 
    
NP 8.466E15 29 
    
a. R Squared = .275 (Adjusted R Squared = .085)      
b. R Squared = .110 (Adjusted R Squared = .122)      
c. R Squared = .240 (Adjusted R Squared = .042)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Meanwhile the only independent variable with a positive impact on WC and net 
NP in construction sector is business size. According to Table 53 statistics it 
predicts the volatility two dependent variables taken into consideration with 
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15.6% and 21.6% respectively. In the same way behave the estimated marginal 
means of WC and NP versus business administration variable, while the contrary 
is evidenced in the case of MCC (Table 7 in Appendix A).  
 
 
 
Table 53. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration, fixed assets turnover 
ratio (FATR) and long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV), cash ratio (CR) and business size as 
well as simultaneously business administration and long-term leverage ratio vs WC, 
MCC, WC and NP) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 5.041E17a 6 8.401E16 1.209 .336 .232 
ILR-11-
MCC 
7.731E8b 6 1.288E8 1.921 .118 .324 
NP 4.099E15c 6 6.831E14 1.651 .177 .292 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 2.675E17 1 2.675E17 3.849 .061 .138 
ILR-11-
MCC 
9837153.746 1 
9837153.
746 
.147 .705 .006 
NP 2.112E15 1 2.112E15 5.105 .033 .175 
Business 
administration 
ILR-2 WC 2.031E16 1 2.031E16 .292 .594 .012 
ILR-11-
MCC 
839197.812 1 
839197.8
12 
.013 .912 .001 
NP 7.909E12 1 7.909E12 .019 .891 .001 
OE2FATR ILR-2 WC 1.205E17 1 1.205E17 1.733 .200 .067 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.019E8 1 1.019E8 1.519 .230 .060 
NP 4.869E14 1 4.869E14 1.177 .289 .047 
RA5TLLEV ILR-2 WC 2.414E14 1 2.414E14 .003 .953 .000 
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ILR-11-
MCC 
5.432E7 1 5.432E7 .810 .377 .033 
NP 6.601E13 1 6.601E13 .160 .693 .007 
ILR4CR ILR-2 WC 6.886E15 1 6.886E15 .099 .756 .004 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3276599.320 1 
3276599.
320 
.049 .827 .002 
NP 1.337E14 1 1.337E14 .323 .575 .013 
BoS ILR-2 WC 3.091E17 1 3.091E17 4.447 .046 .156 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.145E7 1 1.145E7 .171 .683 .007 
NP 2.735E15 1 2.735E15 6.610 .017 .216 
Business 
administration * 
RA5TLLEV 
ILR-2 WC 1.999E13 1 1.999E13 .000 .987 .000 
ILR-11-
MCC 
32839.290 1 
32839.29
0 
.000 .983 .000 
NP 6.713E13 1 6.713E13 .162 .691 .007 
Error ILR-2 WC 1.668E18 24 6.951E16 
   
ILR-11-
MCC 
1.609E9 24 6.706E7 
   
NP 9.930E15 24 4.138E14    
Total ILR-2 WC 2.313E18 31     
ILR-11-
MCC 
2.662E9 31 
    
NP 1.684E16 31     
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 2.172E18 30 
    
ILR-11-
MCC 
2.382E9 30 
    
NP 1.403E16 30     
a. R Squared = .232 (Adjusted R Squared = .040)      
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b. R Squared = .324 (Adjusted R Squared = .156)      
c. R Squared = .292 (Adjusted R Squared = .115)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In service sector it can be evidenced (Table 54) that no one of the independent 
variables impact WC neither MCC nor NP. Furthermore the estimated marginal 
means of MCC and NP demonstrate the same functional form against business 
administration by defining a certain correlation between (see Table 8 in Appendix 
A) while contrary results are achieved in respect of WC. 
 
Table 54. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration, fixed assets turnover 
ratio (FATR) and long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV), cash ratio (CR) and business size as 
well as simultaneously business administration and long-term leverage ratio vs WC, 
MCC, WC and NP) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta Sq 
Corrected Model ILR-2 WC 5.002E16a 6 8.336E15 .941 .484 .190 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3.136E7b 6 5227166.849 3.620 .011 .475 
NP 7.331E19c 6 1.222E19 1.205 .337 .232 
Intercept ILR-2 WC 1.091E16 1 1.091E16 1.231 .278 .049 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3886348.506 1 3886348.506 2.692 .114 .101 
NP 3.062E19 1 3.062E19 3.021 .095 .112 
Business 
administration 
ILR-2 WC 2.926E16 1 2.926E16 3.303 .082 .121 
ILR-11-
MCC 
3565340.892 1 3565340.892 2.469 .129 .093 
NP 2.583E19 1 2.583E19 2.548 .124 .096 
OE2FATR ILR-2 WC 1.242E14 1 1.242E14 .014 .907 .001 
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ILR-11-
MCC 
1491926.145 1 1491926.145 1.033 .320 .041 
NP 1.044E17 1 1.044E17 .010 .920 .000 
RA5LTLEV ILR-2 WC 2.278E15 1 2.278E15 .257 .617 .011 
ILR-11-
MCC 
780.618 1 780.618 .001 .982 .000 
NP 8.142E18 1 8.142E18 .803 .379 .032 
ILR4CR ILR-2 WC 1.738E14 1 1.738E14 .020 .890 .001 
ILR-11-
MCC 
1032593.550 1 1032593.550 .715 .406 .029 
NP 4.958E17 1 4.958E17 .049 .827 .002 
BoS ILR-2 WC 1.537E16 1 1.537E16 1.736 .200 .067 
ILR-11-
MCC 
2947713.626 1 2947713.626 2.042 .166 .078 
NP 3.835E19 1 3.835E19 3.784 .064 .136 
Business 
administration * 
RA5LTLEV 
ILR-2 WC 2.354E15 1 2.354E15 .266 .611 .011 
ILR-11-
MCC 
8976.408 1 8976.408 .006 .938 .000 
NP 8.292E18 1 8.292E18 .818 .375 .033 
Error ILR-2 WC 2.126E17 24 8.858E15    
ILR-11-
MCC 
3.465E7 24 1443777.705 
   
NP 2.433E20 24 1.014E19    
Total ILR-2 WC 2.782E17 31     
ILR-11-
MCC 
7.619E7 31 
    
NP 3.267E20 31     
Corrected Total ILR-2 WC 2.626E17 30     
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ILR-11-
MCC 
6.601E7 30 
    
NP 3.166E20 30     
a. R Squared = .190 (Adjusted R Squared = .012)      
b. R Squared = .475 (Adjusted R Squared = .344)      
c. R Squared = .232 (Adjusted R Squared = .039)      
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
  
The empirical sectoral analysis confirms that H10 hypothesis can be generally 
rejected despite the fact that its supportive tests confirm the existence of a certain 
(hidden) relationship between the variables examined.  Nevertheless additional 
steps need to be undertaken in order to capture the effects of different financial 
policies implemented on liquidity decision making process.  
Thus, more complex functions should be explored in order to be capable to 
contemporaneously capture the effect of additional qualitative and quantitative 
data on the variables selected as representatives of liquidity decision making 
process within examined SMEs.  
 
H11: A radial basis function predicts WC, RATR, MCC and NPM regardless sectoral 
affiliation  
 
The  radial basis function implemented in trade sector reveals 2 hidden layers24 
(refer to Table 55 below) which predict WC, RATR, MCC and NPM variables 
volatility (see Table 56). The statistical significant independent variables that 
adequately predict  dependent variables volatility (at 95% confidence level) are: 
TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, ITA, LTDER, Equity origin, Borrowers’ status, LT-LEV, 
ICR, ROA, Firm age and CV (Table 57). Concerning the layers impact on 
dependent variables it can be observed that they both have positive and negative 
impact on the variables analyzed (refer to Table 9, in Appendix A).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 The abbreviation  is H.  
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Table 55. Network Information/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-1 TATR 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 OE-4 GOM 
4 OE-7 ROE 
5 OE-9 ITA 
6 RA-1 LTDER 
7 Administrator Gender 
8 Equity Origin 
9 Borrowers Status 
Covariates 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 RA-5 LT-LEV 
3 GA-1 ROA 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 STD 
9 CV 
10 NP 
11 BoS 
12 Business 
Administration 
13 Ownership Gender 
Number of Units 172 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
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Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
ILR-2 WC 
2 ILR-5 RATR 
3 ILR-11-MCC 
4 OE-5 NPM 
Number of Units 4 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Table 56. Model Summary/RBF-in trade sector  
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 45.605 
Average Overall Relative Error .877 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
ILR-2 WC .620 
ILR-5 RATR .935 
ILR-11-MCC .960 
OE-5 NPM .993 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) -1148.477a 
Training Time 00:00:00.078 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 57. Independent variable importance/RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
OE-1 TATR .004 2.8% 
ILR-9 PATR .004 2.8% 
OE-4 GOM .007 5.6% 
OE-7 ROE .005 4.2% 
OE-9 ITA .004 2.8% 
RA-1 LTDER .011 8.5% 
Administrator Gender .014 11.1% 
Equity Origin .006 4.5% 
Borrowers Status .006 4.5% 
RA-3 ICR .025 19.3% 
RA-5 LT-LEV .081 62.8% 
GA-1 ROA .024 18.8% 
GA-2 OCF .091 70.6% 
Firm Age .019 14.9% 
INV .129 100.0% 
STA .120 93.3% 
STD .082 63.5% 
CV .021 16.0% 
NP .120 93.3% 
BoS .118 92.0% 
Business Administration .055 42.9% 
Ownership Gender .055 42.7% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In production sector the number of hidden layers generated from radial basis 
function estimation are nine (as in following Table 58), which predict WC, RATR, 
MCC and NPM volatility (refer to Table 59). And the statistical significant 
variables result to be: TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, ITA, LTDER, Administrator 
gender, Borrowers status, ICR, Firm age, OCF, INV, CV and NP (in Table 60). The 
statistical data confirm (Table 10 in Appendix A) that only the first layer has 
merely a positive impact on the dependent variables in question, while the sixth, 
seventh and ninth layers have positive and negative impact on them the rest of 
hidden layers instead configure merely a negative impact.   
 
Table 58. Network Information/RBF-in production sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-1 TATR 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 OE-4 GOM 
4 OE-7 ROE 
5 OE-9 ITA 
6 RA-1 LTDER 
7 Administrator Gender 
8 Borrowers Status 
Covariates 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 RA-5 LT-LEV  
3 GA-1 ROA 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 STD 
9 CV 
10 NP 
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11 BoS 
12 Business administration 
13 Ownership Gender 
Number of Units 68 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
9a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
ILR-2 WC 
2 ILR-5 RATR 
3 ILR-11-MCC 
4 OE-5 NPM 
Number of Units 4 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 59. Model Summary/RBF-in production sector 
 
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 30.83 
Average Overall Relative Error .927 
Relative Error for Scale ILR-2 WC .889 
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Dependents ILR-5 RATR .997 
ILR-11-MCC .445 
OE-5 NPM .377 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 130.484a 
Training Time 00:00:00.015 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 60. Independent variable importance/RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
OE-1 TATR .040 33.4% 
ILR-9 PATR .040 33.4% 
OE-4 GOM .037 30.9% 
OE-7 ROE .040 33.4% 
OE-9 ITA .040 33.4% 
RA-1 LTDER .040 33.4% 
Administrator Gender .022 18.9% 
Borrowers Status .027 22.8% 
RA-3 ICR .030 25.5% 
RA-5 LT-LEV  .119 100.0% 
GA-1 ROA .070 58.7% 
GA-2 OCF .049 41.5% 
Firm Age .048 40.5% 
INV .048 40.2% 
STA .059 49.9% 
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STD .050 41.8% 
CV .035 29.1% 
NP .046 38.9% 
BoS .050 42.0% 
Business administration .058 48.6% 
Ownership Gender .052 43.7% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Comparatively, the radial basis function implemented in construction sector 
identifies 5 hidden layers (see Table 61 & 62 below) as per the four dependent 
variables volatility prediction. By this way, the statistical significant independent 
variables that adequately predict their volatility are: TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, 
ITA, LTDER, Equity origin, Borrowers status, INV, STA, STD, NP, BoS, and 
Business Administration referring to Table 63. Furthermore it can be statistically 
proven that the fifth, first and second layers have generally a pronounced 
negative impact on the dependent variables in  question when from the other side 
the third and fourth layer demonstrate contemporaneously a positive and 
negative incidence on them (on behalf of Table 11 data in Appendix A).  
 
Table 61. Network Information/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-1 TATR 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 OE-4 GOM 
4 OE-7 ROE 
5 OE-9 ITA  
6 RA-1 LTDER 
7 Equity Origin 
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8 Borrowers Status 
Covariates 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 RA-5 TL-LEV 
3 GA-1 ROA 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 STD 
9 NP 
10 BoS 
11 Business 
Administration 
12 Ownership Gender 
13 CV 
Number of Units 46 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
5a 
Activation Function Softmax 
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Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
ILR-2 WC 
2 ILR-5 RATR 
3 ILR-11-MCC 
4 OE-5 NPM 
Number of Units 4 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Table 62. Model Summary/RBF-in construction sector 
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 34.71 
Average Overall Relative Error .338 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
ILR-2 WC .542 
ILR-5 RATR .156 
ILR-11-MCC .695 
OE-5 NPM .560 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) -325.930a 
Training Time 00:00:00.019 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 63. Independent variable importance/RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
OE-1 TATR .037 37.8% 
ILR-9 PATR .033 32.9% 
OE-4 GOM .037 37.8% 
OE-7 ROE .037 37.8% 
OE-9 ITA  .037 37.8% 
RA-1 LTDER .037 37.8% 
Equity Origin .039 39.7% 
Borrowers Status .019 19.5% 
RA-3 ICR .061 61.6% 
RA-5 TL-LEV .073 74.1% 
GA-1 ROA .085 85.9% 
GA-2 OCF .064 65.1% 
Firm Age .052 52.7% 
INV .031 31.3% 
STA .036 36.7% 
STD .037 37.2% 
NP .047 47.9% 
BoS .049 49.5% 
Business Administration .037 37.7% 
Ownership Gender .051 51.9% 
CV .099 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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While in service sector the radial basis function employed revealed two hidden 
layers concerning the prediction of WC, RATR, MCC and NPM (see Table 64 & 
65). Throughout the variables that statistically impact the previously mentioned 
dependent variables volatility are: TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, ITA, LTDER, 
Administrator gender, Equity origin, Borrowers status, and Business 
Administration (as per Table 66). Both hidden layers impact on dependent 
variables is contemporary negative and positive (refer to Table 12 in Appendix 
A). 
 
Table 64. Network Information/RBF-in service sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-1 TATR 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 OE-4 GOM 
4 OE-7 ROE 
5 OE-9 ITA 
6 RA-1 LTDER 
7 Administrator Gender 
8 Equity Origin 
9 Borrowers Status 
Covariates 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 RA-5 LT-LEV 
3 GA-1 ROA 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 STD 
9 CV 
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10 NP 
11 BoS 
12 Business Administration 
13 Ownership Gender 
Number of Units 143 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 ILR-2 WC 
2 ILR-5 RATR 
3 ILR-11-MCC 
4 OE-5 NPM 
Number of Units 4 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 65. Model Summary/RBF-in service sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 40.10 
Average Overall Relative Error .911 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
ILR-2 WC .997 
ILR-5 RATR .946 
ILR-11-MCC .923 
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OE-5 NPM .779 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) -915.483a 
Training Time 00:00:00.047 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 66. Independent variable importance /RBF-in service sector 
 
 Importance Normalized Importance 
OE-1 TATR .004 4.7% 
ILR-9 PATR .004 4.7% 
OE-4 GOM .005 6.2% 
OE-7 ROE .008 9.4% 
OE-9 ITA .004 4.7% 
RA-1 LTDER .017 19.1% 
Administrator Gender .003 3.8% 
Equity Origin .002 2.3% 
Borrowers Status .011 13.2% 
RA-3 ICR .069 80.3% 
RA-5 LT-LEV .076 87.6% 
GA-1 ROA .081 93.6% 
GA-2 OCF .075 86.7% 
Firm Age .071 82.5% 
INV .077 89.0% 
STA .071 82.2% 
STD .078 89.9% 
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CV .077 89.1% 
NP .076 88.0% 
BoS .064 73.8% 
Business Administration .040 45.8% 
Ownership Gender .086 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The statistics generated from each of radial basis functions implemented in the 
four sectoral affiliations mark a good model fit (referring to BIC, model 
prossesing time and statistical significance) on predicting WC, RATR, MCC and 
NPM by contemporary affirming the H11 hypothesis acceptance. The algorithm 
fitted with 9 hidden layers in production, with 5 in construction and with 2 in 
service and trade sectors. Consecutively, the main factors predicting SMEs 
liquidity result to be: TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, ITA, LTDER, Equity origin and 
Borrowers status. As far as can be understand referring to model patterns 
recognition process, these factors impact on hidden layers is consistent whilst 
differentiated results are achieved concerning covariate factors with hidden layers 
which have demonstrated positive and negative associations with dependent 
variables in question. Anyway, the main covariates result to be: ICR, Firm age, 
CV, NP, INV and Business Administration.  
6.4 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
In correspondence of the statistical framework examined concerning the eleven 
hypotheses raised aiming to argue and better understand liquidity decision 
making process on behalf of qualitative and quantitative data retrieved from four 
SMEs most representative sectors in the country such as: trade, production, 
construction and service, revealed:  
-Female and mixed-administration perform better in credit reimbursement 
process, considering that the latest is the key indicator of credit accessibility and 
pricing option; 
-Equity origin doesn’t imply concrete preferences regarding ownership status. 
But however men display to be the more proactive toward business ownership; 
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-The ownership gender has a positive correlation with administrators one. Male 
administrators result to be the most preferred, despite the fact that the major part 
of businesses administrated from men result to be in non-performing borrowers’ 
status as previously evidenced; 
-The national businesses demonstrate the highest default ratio, by leading to the 
understanding that somehow equity origin implies borrowers’ status; 
-Anyway is declared that equity origin doesn’t influence business administration 
decisions because mainly skilled persons are nominated as administrators. And 
only in some sporadic cases the owner covers administrators responsibilities; 
-Borrowers’ status and OCF have a simultaneous and positive impact on working 
capital in all the examined sectors except of trade.  
-Administration gender (female/ male /mixed-administration) and GPM don’t 
have a simultaneous impacto n working capital; 
-Equity origin and APP don’t simultaneously impact working capital. Statistically 
based even the negative impact of APP on working capital is excluded; 
-Ownerships gender, TLR, ITA, FA and OCF as well as ownerships gender and 
firm’s age sporadically impact WC, RATR and NPM. But suspected relations 
between liquidity representative variables and ownerships gender exist even why 
they aren't measurable; 
-Business administration, LT-LEV and business size positively impact WC and 
NP only in trade and construction sector.  While  hidden relations between 
business administration and NP, WC and MCC are pronounced.  
 
The  deeper examinations performed through the aid of neural network analysis 
affirm that: 
 
 
The radial basis function in trade sector demonstrates that the quantitative 
predictive factors which mainly reflect relationship with the first hidden layer are: 
TATR, PATR, GOM, ROE, ITA. Comparatively the covariates which have 
correlation with the first layer are: ICR and CV. The qualitative predictive factors 
instead such as Equity origin confirm that national businesses have a greater 
correlation with the second layer in comparison with the first one. While foreign 
and mixed-equity businesses both correlate only with the first layer. From the 
other hand, non-performing borrowers status marks a strong correlation with the 
first layer in contradiction with performing status which results to be more 
correlated with the second layer than with the first one. Concerning the second 
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layer it can be remarked the correlation with: LT-LEV, ROA and Firm Age. 
Meanwhile the covariates which are negatively correlated with first and second 
layer respectively are: LT-LEV, ROA, Firm Age (H1) and ICR and CV (H2). 
Especially referring to the layers it should be mentioned that the first one has a 
lower impact on WC and MCC and a higher on RATR and NPM dependent 
variables. The contrary occurs concerning the second layer; 
Closely referring to production sector radial basis function deployment, the 
predictive quantitative and qualitative significant variables correlated with WC, 
RATR, MCC and NPM  mark strong or even inexistence of any relationship 
within the nine hidden layers revealed while implementing the a/m function. 
Respectively strong correlations are evidenced for TATR within ninth and fifth 
layers, PATR confirm relationship within first, second, fourth and fifth layers. 
Worth also highlighted the fact that GOM represents associations with all the 
layers. From the other hand different relations are confirmed from ROE, which 
for negative values express a strong relationship with eighth layer, for positive 
values instead lower than 10% results strongly correlated with second, fifth and 
seventh layers and for higher values is correlated with first, third, sixth and ninth 
layers. ITA from the other side for negative values result correlated only with the 
first layer while for values greater than 42% with all other layers. LTDER for 
values lower than 1 is correlated with seventh, eight, fifth and fourth layers, for 
values lower than ten only with the first layer and in controversy is correlated 
with first, third, sixth and ninth layers.  The female administration is correlated 
only with seventh and ninth layers, meanwhile male administration with the rest 
of layers. Quite the same behavior presents also the other qualitative variable 
such as borrowers’ status. By this way non-performing borrowers’ status is 
strongly correlated with seventh and eighth layer and with the rest of layers the 
performing borrowers’ status. Moreover the covariates which are simultaneously 
positively correlated with different layers are: INV (with H3, H4, H6, H7 layers), 
Firm age (with H1, H3, H7 and H8 layers), CV (with H3, H6 and H7 layers), NP 
(with H3 and H6 layers), and OCF (with H5 and H6 layers). Each of them is 
negatively correlated with the rest of layers. In controversy ICR is positively 
correlated with fifth layer and negatively with the rest.  Concerning the layers 
impact on liquidity variables it must be added that the layers contemporaneously 
correlated with two or more variables in question are: the first (with WC, MCC 
and NPM), the seventh (with WC and MCC) and the ninth layer (with MCC and 
NPM). The layers correlated only with MCC dependent variable are: the fifth and 
eighth. While the layers correlated only with one of the dependent variables are: 
the second (with RATR), third (with NPM) and fourth (with WC); 
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In construction sector radial basis function statistics confirm that the predictive 
factors such as TATR, PATR, GOM and ROE (with mean 0) are respectively 
closely related to fourth, first, and third layers. For mean values higher than 0, 
these variables result to be strongly associated to fifth and fourth layers.  
ITA predictor which results in any case lower than 0 demonstrates a relationship 
with first, second, third, fourth and fifth layers. While LTDER predictor conserves 
a correlation with second and fourth layers for values lower than 2 and the same 
occurs for the rest of layers in case of higher values than 2. In respect of 
qualitative predictors instead it should be mentioned that national equity 
businesses are correlated with the first layer, the foreign equity businesses with 
second, third, and fourth layers and the mixed-equity ones  with fifth layer. Non-
performing borrowers’ status is associated with second layer and performing one 
with the rest of layers. The covariates instead are positively or negatively 
correlated with the a/m layers. Concretely, the covariates positively correlated 
with third or other layers are respectively: INV, STA (even with H1), STD, 
Business Administration, NP (even with H4) and Business size (with H1 and H4). 
Under this context it can be added that the layers strongly correlated with two or 
less dependent variables are respectively: H3 and H4 (with WC and NPM) and 
H1 and H2 with RATR and MCC as H5 is negatively correlated with all 
dependent variables examined; 
In service sector the radial basis function analysis evidence that TATR and PATR 
predictors are mainly correlated to the second layer. Meanwhile GOM for values 
lower than 0 is correlated to both first and second layers, for values equal to 0 is 
correlated to the second layer and for values higher than 0 is more correlated with 
second layer. From the other hand ROE for values up to 20% is correlated to both 
layers while for values higher than 20% to the second layer only. In controversy 
ITA and LTDER predictors are more correlated to the first layer. With special 
regard to qualitative predictors administrators gender and borrowers’ status for 
values equal to 0 result more correlated to the first layer while for values equal to 
1 are more correlated with second layer. In addition equity origin predictor for 
values equal to 0 results is more correlated to second layer while for values equal 
to 2 the correlation is stronger with the first layer. Comparatively business 
administrator predictor is simultaneously correlated with both layers even it can 
be evidenced a higher correlation with the first layer. Subsequently it can can be 
affirmed that the first layer is more correlated to MCC dependent variable and 
less with the others. While the second layer is more correlated to WC and RATR 
variables and less with the rest of liquidity ratios analyzed. 
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Statistically based among other it is clearly stated that LTDER in every sectoral 
analysis reveals a predictive factor concerning liquidity decision making process 
and this sounds true considering that SMEs operating in the country mainly use 
leverage as a key instrument for operational efficiency management issues. 
Foremost simultaneously with other ratios (pertaining to liquidity, operational 
efficiency, risk and growth analysis area, etc) it influences on the entire process in 
question by making it an aggregate result of business prospective management 
which is deeper elaborated in the following chapter 
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VII - CAPITAL STRUCTURE APPROACHES – DEBT 
RECONCILIATION FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The SMEs operating in domestic market are conscious that while trying to 
manage liquidity issues mainly with the help of external funds in order to 
promote growth they should maintain a certain ‘trade-off’ related to capital 
structure leverage effect.   
By this way, its widely accepted that SMEs have different optimal capital 
structures and limited debt instruments offered by various sources at different 
stages of their organizational lives, however, pecking order theory prevails 
concerning their financing needs almost referring to a sound risk management 
context. From the other hand, results interesting to investigate which behavioral 
specific attributes (sectoral-affiliation, business size, fixed assets, etc) impact the 
funding structure of firms operations. Therefore, in following is treated SMEs 
debt structure, initially trying to separately capture the determinant elements of 
short-run debt structure and further on the long-run ones in order to eventually 
find out any reconciliation approach.  
 
 
 
7.1. SHORT-RUN DEBTS RATIOS ANALYSIS 
From a practical point of view, business nature is the main feature reflecting 
financial needs under a growth prospective. In parallel its true that, also risk 
management process plays an important role in debt-structure decision making 
process which produces growth through leverage effect. This argumentation line 
mainly brings to the conclusion that short-term debt (referring to financing 
requirements and asymmetry issues) is mostly preferred but contemporaneously 
the evidences demonstrate contradictory results almost when SMEs have 
experienced a certain financial history and proactively act in a given market.  
Turning to the first element, the literature in general displays contradictory 
results even in this point but undisputedly admits that the classic short-run debt 
indicator is short-term debts. Thus, deemed reasonable to initially analyze its 
trend and not only in cross-sectoral context under examination. Referring to 
sample statistics (see Table 67) short-term debts maximal values pertains to 
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service, and then to construction, production and trade sectors. Rationally, this 
sound true considering that production and construction in compliance with 
business nature mainly operate with long-run debts. Service instead makes 
exclusively charge to short-term debts due to its business cycle completion 
frequency.  But more interesting results are achieved while referring to minimal 
amounts of short-term debts, where only service sector maintains short-term 
debts. In a certain way these results confirm the sectors role on short-term debts 
management by also leading to a better integration of liquidity risk management 
process too (es. furniture, banks payments, etc).   
 
Table 67. Short-term debt ratio cross-sectoral statistics (in thsd ALL) 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in thsd ALL) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
STD-TRADE - 17,170 105,698 
STD-PRODUCTION - 105,910.70 974,363 
STD-CONSTRUCTION - 112,216.70 1,063,062 
STD-SERVICE 194,262 1,351,323 41,063,464 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration  
 
 
Moreover interest coverage ratio is used as another key indicator of short-term 
debts structure. Nonetheless, independently from their debts structure businesses 
are obligated to pay their interests generally in a monthly basis, which obviously 
constitutes a short-term debt and the same logic is valid after the loans grace-
period. So, interest coverage ratio represents another important element treated in 
this study.  
 
On a statistical context (refer to Table 68) it can be proven that construction sector 
is in an uncomfortable circumstance concerning interest coverage ratio. And this 
is obviouly translated in the practical context referring to the fact that long-term 
debts (loans) conduct to a monthly interest payment while the incomes in this 
sector are recognized only after project completion phase as sales are 
concluded/accounted when the major part of the project is ready.  Referring to 
high return rate they mark the second highest interest coverage ratio after trade. 
Meanwhile referring to the latest it can be stated that the maintenance of low 
short-term debts levels is the main reason of a consistent interest coverage ratio. 
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From the other side, must be added that even service sector represents a 
consistent coverage ratio considering the ‘trade-off’ process between short-term 
debts and incomes generated accordingly. And ultimately production sector 
which mainly operates with long-term debts marks a low interest coverage ratio 
caused from the spreading of interest expenses.  
 
Table 68. Interest coverage ratio cross-sectoral statistics (in ALL) 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in ALL) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
ICR-TRADE (59) 2,056 34,696 
ICR-PRODUCTION (10) 1 48 
ICR-CONSTRUCTION (59,241) (1,626) 5,426 
ICR-SERVICE 0 14 177 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
Even in this analysis the sectoral pertinence seems to be a relevant element as per 
short-term debts structure. Despite the fact that other factors may be predictors of 
the latter such as: appropriate financial management practices as the major part of 
SMEs seek to meet the cash demand.  Precisely, due to these reasons while 
targeting growth, business owners/managers should carefully select debt 
management strategies. Considering that asymmetry issues are more acute in 
SMEs and a limited lending offer exists, long-term lending result to be very 
important for them. Consequently they tend to be dependent to 
commercial/institutional lenders which somehow orient their cash management 
strategy.  
 
 
7.2. LONG-RUN DEBTS RATIOS ANALYSIS 
The contingency theory25 assumes that organizations efficiency dependents on its 
ability to diagnose and understand particular situational factors like environment, 
while adopting processes and structures that can enhance its performance (271). 
                                                          
25 The contingency theory of leadership was initially introduced in 1964 by an 
Austrian psychologist, Fred Edward Fiedler.  
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Systems theory26 from the other side, supports the idea that each system is 
organized through independent components but interrelated.  Furthermore the 
latter sounds meaningful for SMEs recognizing that individuals, working groups 
or departments operate as a singular unit (272). Obviously this coordination 
ensures a better information asymmetry management so as to effectively act 
according to their finances. Contemporaneously it also help owners/managers to 
better understand and cover internal business needs (here it can be also 
underlined the role of leadership), therefore they in general prefer to appeal 
concerning long-term debts in order to ensure business prosperity through profit 
maximization and smooth operability (referring to Stewardship theory27/273).   
Based on long-term leverage statistics (Table 69) retrieved in the research ‘data-
pools’ it can be highlighted that production sector quotes the highest ratio, 
followed from construction, service and trade with respectively 753%, 441%, 97% 
and 94%. This can be explained by the fact that service and trade maintain low 
assets level. Meanwhile the production result complies with the fact that long-
term debts are the main financing source of machineries and production vehicles 
(mainly financial leasing products), thus, they exceed assets values.  The same 
argumentation line can be pursued concerning construction sector which uses 
long-term debts in order to produce assets, therefore, long-term leverage ratio is 
generally higher than 100%. Furthermore under this light, it can be added that 
trade sector instead maintains an equilibrated long-term leverage ratio 
considering its operational flexibility.  
 
Table 69. Long-term leverage ratio cross-sectoral statistics (in %) 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in %) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
LT-LEV-TRADE - 25% 94% 
LT-LEV-PRODUCTION - 68% 753% 
LT-LEV-CONSTRUCTION - 70% 441% 
LT-LEV-SERVICE - 84% 97% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
                                                          
26  The systems theory was initially proposed by Van Bertalanffy (1950).  
27 Stewardship theory is a theory of management initially proposed by David and 
Donaldson (1993).  
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Transforming these figures from an equity amount prospective it can be 
evidenced same results.  By this way, construction, production and trade 
followed by service sector quote the highest ratio with respectively 920%, 760% 
489%, and 343% (as per Table 70 data).  Simultaneously referring to  minimal 
ratios it can be understand that production maintains it around 547% level and 
quite half of it is maintained in trade sector. While construction sector in order to 
better manage cash management process may proceed even with ‘bridge-loans 
agreements’ in cooperation with commercial Banks by avoiding long-term debts. 
Correspondingly, in average terms is displayed that construction followed from 
production, trade and service maintain high rates of long-term debts to equity 
ratio by rationally explaining the reality. Turning to the maximal long-term debts 
to equity ratio and concerning the latest element it can be confirmed that, low 
equity levels are maintained from construction, trade, production and service 
sectors in comparison with long-term debts amounts used. And in general terms 
all this emphasizes the sectoral tendency role in approaching long-term debts 
structures.   
 
Table 70. Long-term debt to equity ratio cross-sectoral statistics (in %) 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in %) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
LTDER-TRADE 216% 326% 489% 
LTDER-PRODUCTION 547% 515% 760% 
LTDER-CONSTRUCTION 0% 648% 920% 
LTDER-SERVICE 0% 131% 343% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
 
Under a managerial metrics the above panorama helps in the understanding of 
businesses risk management strategy which leverages long-term debts externally 
financed. Concretely, referring to Table 71 data it can be affirmed that the sector 
ranking by maximal long-term debts is: production, construction, trade and 
service. In  conformity with this logic it can be said that production sector 
requires, investments in new technologies, and machineries which help in the 
entire business profitability and further on competitiveness by giving effective 
growth signals. Construction sector instead requires long-term debts renovation 
after project completion. Trade operates with long-term debts structures almost 
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when acts for ‘sale-exclusivity’, mainly referring to logistic investments. And 
service sector mainly prefer short-term debts structures, considering that the 
major part of its operations are handled in ‘cash-basis’ or through a quick money 
conversion cycle.  
 
Table 71. Long-term debt value cross-sectoral statistics (in thsd ALL) 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in thsd 
ALL) 
MIN AVERAGE MAX 
LTD-TRADE - 40,694 424,526 
LTD-PRODUCTION - 166,780.70 3,260,503 
LTD-CONSTRUCTION - 89,124.60 445,543 
LTD-SERVICE - 28,170 319,995 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration  
 
 
Referring to debts pilasters (short and long-term debts structures) as previously 
underlined is reconfirmed that sectors maintain a persistent behavior. Therefore, 
high short-term debts strategy is mostly preferred from: service, construction, 
production and ultimately trade sector. While  long-term strategy is mostly 
preferred from: production, construction, trade and ultimately from service 
sector. And in a certain way it can be revealed that only service sector seems to 
maintain a different ranking concerning short and long-term debts structures. 
Meanwhile all the other indicators analyzed in confront with sectoral pertinence 
show quite the same behavior. Accordingly, the main reason may be financial risk 
management practices used, or managerial role in managing short-long term risks 
while handling liquidity issues consisting in in/out cash inflows and not only.  
Anyway considering that choices primarily influence SMEs ability to provide 
external funding.  
 
Thus, the role of leadership among them in a particular aspect becomes relevant 
in decision making process with special regard to risk management practices and 
permanent control culture, as per following reasons: 
- right business orientation; 
- target/s coordination; 
- good business performance can enhance financial management guidance by 
ensuring growth perspective (271).  
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From the other hand, equity ownership, administrators and ownerships gender, 
borrowers’ status, business size and age, etc role should be analyzed in order to 
capture and understand the behavioral factors which may be predictive to SMEs 
debts structures. By having as final goal the understanding of those predictive 
factors (financial and non-financial ones) that reconcile debts structures 
regardless sectoral- affiliations.   
 
Likewise, the chances toward a sustainable growth may be increased  considering 
that SMEs segment is less advised almost referring to the inadequate financial 
book keeping methods implemented, which prevent the understanding and 
designation of  more appropriate business policies.  
 
 
 
7.3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Being interested to understand more concerning SMEs debt structures, various 
hypotheses are raised in following.  The first group of hypotheses tends to reveal 
the effect of contingency system, leadership and stewardship theories elements 
(es: borrowers’ status, equity origin, business administration framework, 
ownership and administrators gender) and other covariates on debt structure 
factors (es: total leverage ratio, assets tangibility, fixed assets to total assets ratio, 
etc).  Unlike the second group of hypotheses raised attempt in the prediction of 
short and long-term debts structures. While the examinations performed under 
both contexts are used to test the eventual reconciliation approaches implemented 
from SMEs into a general debt structure.  A process this which is technically and 
practically based on risk management decisions on behalf of business running 
routine in one hand and from the other one to its performance enhancement.  
 
H1: Borrowers’ status negatively impacts total leverage ratio (LEV) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H2: Equity origin influence long-term debt to equity ratio (LTDER) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H3: Business administration framework impacts total liability ratio (TLR) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
H4: Ownerships gender influence assets tangibility (TAN) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
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H5: Administrators gender impacts long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV) regardless sectoral 
affiliation;  
H6: Equity origin and gross profit margin (GPM) contemporaneously negatively affect 
long-term debts (LTD) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H7: Administrators gender and business age can’t simultaneously impact businesses fixed 
assets to total assets ratio (FATA) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H8: Borrowers’ status and business size have a mutual positive impact on interest 
coverage ratio (ICR)  and total assets turnover ratio (TATR) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H9: Short-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
H10: Long-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function regardless sectoral 
affiliation;  
H11: A radial basis function reconciles SMEs leverage structure regardless sectoral 
affiliation. 
7.4. HYPOTHESES EXAMINATION, TESTS AND RESULTS 
H1: Borrowers’ status negatively impacts total leverage ratio (LEV) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
Borrowers’ status doesn’t impact LEV in trade sector at 95% confidence level 
(refer to Table 72) as its statistical significance is higher than 0.05. And the same 
can be confirmed from the univariate regression low R squared result (4.7%). But 
while analyzing LEVs errors variance it isn’t ascertained the same variance 
between two borrowers’ status groups (see Levene’s Test/Table 1 results in 
Appendix B).  
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Table 72. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 TOTAL LEV     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .266a 1 .266 1.521 .227 .047 
Intercept 9.180 1 9.180 52.415 .000 .628 
Borrowers’ Status .266 1 .266 1.521 .227 .047 
Error 5.430 31 .175    
Total 19.561 33     
Corrected Total 5.696 32     
a. R Squared = .047 (Adjusted R Squared = .016)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In addition the estimated marginal means elaborated from borrowers’ status in 
relation with LEV (in Figure 26) demonstrate that non-performing borrowers’ 
group present a higher total leverage ratio and the vice versa occurs for 
performing borrowers’ status group.  
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Figure 26. Estimated marginal means of total leverage ratio TLR/LEV concerning 
borrowers’ status in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Production sector statistics also affirm that borrowers’ status doesn’t impact LEV 
at 95% confidence level (refer to Table 73) as its significance is higher than 0.05. 
And correspondingly low R squared result (1.2%) are achieved from the 
univariate regression estimation. But the analysis of LEVs errors variance 
observes differences between two borrowers’ status groups (see Levene’s 
Test/Table 2 results in Appendix B).  
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Table 73. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) in 
production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 Total LEV      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .636a 1 .636 .377 .544 .012 
Intercept 17.209 1 17.209 10.204 .003 .248 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
.636 1 .636 .377 .544 .012 
Error 52.281 31 1.686    
Total 89.347 33     
Corrected Total 52.917 32     
a. R Squared = .012 (Adjusted R Squared = -.020)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The estimated marginal means results in following clearly evidence that non-
performing borrowers’ status demonstrates a lower LEV and the vice versa occurs 
for performing borrowers’ status.  
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Figure 27. Estimated marginal means of total leverage ratio TLR/LEV concerning 
borrowers’ status in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The same results are achieved in construction sector considering that borrowers’ 
status statistical significance is higher than 0.05 (see Table 74) and throughout it 
can’t impact LEV. Furthermore the latest errors variance is the same for two 
borrowers’ status (refer to Table 3 in Appendix B). But beyond this, from 
estimated marginal means (see Figure 28) it can be observed that non-performing 
status coincides with a higher LEV while the contrary can be affirmed for 
borrowers’ performing status.  
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Table 74. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV       
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 17.909a 1 17.909 2.115 .156 .064 
Intercept 91.928 1 91.928 10.859 .002 .259 
Borrowers’ Status 17.909 1 17.909 2.115 .156 .064 
Error 262.442 31 8.466    
Total 355.051 33     
Corrected Total 280.351 32     
a. R Squared = .064 (Adjusted R Squared = .034)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Estimated marginal means of total leverage ratio TLR/LEV concerning 
borrowers’ status in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Borrowers’ status in service sector instead impacts total leverage ratio at 95% 
confidence level (Table 75). The Levenes’ test results (see Table 4 in Appendix B) 
confirm also that LEV errors variance between two borrowers’ group is the same. 
Despite these,  estimated marginal means statistics demonstrate that non-
performing borrowers’ status maintains a higher LEV while the vice versa occurs 
for performing borrowers’ status (in Figure 29).  
 
Table 75. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) in service 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 255.616a 1 255.616 12.999 .001 .302 
Intercept 325.625 1 325.625 16.559 .000 .356 
Borrowers’ Status 255.616 1 255.616 12.999 .001 .302 
Error 589.931 30 19.664    
Total 920.733 32     
Corrected Total 845.547 31     
a. R Squared = .302 (Adjusted R Squared = .279)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 29. Estimated marginal means of total leverage ratio TLR/LEV concerning 
borrowers’ status in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The a/m sectoral analysis in general verifies that borrowers’ status don’t impact 
LEV mainly referring to trade, production and construction statistical data, while 
a positive impact was found in service sector. By this way, H1 hypothesis can be 
rejected even when interesting results are achieved while dealing with estimated 
marginal means which persistently show a certain relationship between 
borrowers’ status and LEV where in the majority of cases non-performing 
borrowers’ status coincide with a higher LEV in comparison with performing 
borrowers’ status.  
 
H2: Equity origin influence long-term debt to equity ratio (LTDER) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
Referring to the following statistics it can be underlined that equity origin doesn’t 
influence LTDER (see Table 76) in trade sector. From the other hand, Levenes’ test 
(see Table 5 in Appendix B) confirms that the latest errors variance in three equity 
origin groups isn’t the same. Meanwhile regarding estimated marginal means 
(Figure 30) is demonstrated that national businesses make more use of long-term 
debts followed in turns by foreign and mix-equity businesses.  
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Table 76. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTDER) in trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-1 LTDER      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 41.900a 2 20.950 .216 .807 .014 
Intercept 16.641 1 16.641 .171 .682 .006 
Equity Origin 41.900 2 20.950 .216 .807 .014 
Error 2911.459 30 97.049    
Total 3305.388 33     
Corrected Total 2953.359 32     
a. R Squared = .014 (Adjusted R Squared = -.052)    
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 30. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt to equity ratio LTDER concerning 
equity origin in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Comparatively same results with the one of trade sector are achieved even in 
production sector where equity origin doesn’t affect LTDER (refer to Table 77). 
Being that the sectoral data belong only to national businesses Levenes’ test isn’t 
estimable. And the analysis is alternatively elaborated and confirmed by using 
estimated marginal means (see Figure 31) results.  
 
Table 77. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTDER) in production sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-1 
LTDER 
     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .000a 0 . . . .000 
Intercept 2834892.510 1 2834892.510 8.658 .006 .213 
Equity Origin .000 0 . . . .000 
Error 1.048E7 32 327429.647    
Total 1.331E7 33     
Corrected Total 1.048E7 32     
a. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = .000)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 31. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt to equity ratio LTDER concerning 
equity origin in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The equity origin doesn’t impact long-term debt equity ratio even in construction 
sector (refer to Table 78). Interpreting LTDER errors variance it can be added that 
it isn’t the same between three equity origin groups (see Levenes’ test results in 
Table 6 / Appendix B). Contemporaneously estimated marginal means (in Figure 
32) highlight that national businesses opt for higher LTDER followed by foreign 
and mixed-equity businesses.  
Table 78. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTDER) in construction 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-1 LTDER      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 142.380a 2 71.190 .303 .741 .020 
Intercept 1066.133 1 1066.133 4.533 .042 .131 
Equity Origin 142.380 2 71.190 .303 .741 .020 
Error 7055.660 30 235.189    
Total 8582.790 33     
Corrected Total 7198.039 32     
a. R Squared = .020 (Adjusted R Squared = -.046)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 32. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt to equity ratio LTDER concerning 
equity origin in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The same situation persists in service sector too as equity origin doesn’t impact 
LTDER (Table 79). Even Levenes’ test results confirm differences in the latter 
errors variance between equity groups (Table 7/Appendix C). And against 
estimated marginal means in following mark the exigencies of national businesses 
in maintaining higher LTDER in contradiction with mixed-equity ones.   
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Table 79. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTDER) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.559a 1 4.559 .163 .690 .005 
Intercept 11.022 1 11.022 .393 .535 .013 
Equity Origin 4.559 1 4.559 .163 .690 .005 
Error 840.988 30 28.033    
Total 920.733 32     
Corrected Total 845.547 31     
a. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = -.028)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 33. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt to equity ratio LTDER concerning 
equity origin in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Under these circumstances it can be highlighted that equity origin doesn’t impact 
LTDER in none of the sectors examined. Thus, H2 hypothesis can be rejected. In 
the same time worth mentioned that estimated marginal means data confirm a 
certain relation between equity origin and LTDER by generally concluding that 
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national businesses maintain a higher level followed by foreign and mixed-equity 
businesses.  
 
H3: Business administration framework impacts total liability ratio (TLR) regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
 
Business administration can’t impact TLR based on the following results (see 
Table 80) in trade sector. But differences exist between TLR errors variance in two 
business administration groups (refer to Table 8 in Appendix B). Hereinafter, the 
sector evidences show that administrators prefer lower TLR and the contrary 
reveals for  owners (as per Figure 34).   
 
Table 80. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs TLR) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 11.632a 1 11.632 .022 .882 
Intercept 1251.601 1 1251.601 2.420 .130 
Business administration 11.632 1 11.632 .022 .882 
Error 16033.703 31 517.216   
Total 17898.557 33    
Corrected Total 16045.336 32    
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.032)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 34. Estimated marginal means of total liability ratio TLR concerning business 
administration in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Business administration framework doesn’t represent any impact on TLR in 
production sector (refer to Table 81). Also Levenes’ test (see Table 9 in Appendix 
B) doesn’t confirm differences TLR errors variance between two business 
administration groups. While it can be marked the tendency of administrators to 
maintain low TLR meanwhile concerning owners the contrary is evidenced (in 
Figure 35).  
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Table 81. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs TLR) in 
production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 143765.587a 1 143765.587 2.669 .112 
Intercept 310816.127 1 310816.127 5.770 .022 
Business administration 143765.587 1 143765.587 2.669 .112 
Error 1669957.631 31 53869.601   
Total 2000705.189 33    
Corrected Total 1813723.218 32    
a. R Squared = .079 (Adjusted R Squared = .050)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Estimated marginal means of total liability ratio TLR concerning business 
administration in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The business administration framework doesn’t impact total liability ratio in 
construction sector (see the Table 82 in following). In compliance with Levenes’ 
test (refer to Table 10 in Appendix B) is demonstrated that TLR errors variance 
result to be different as per two business administration groups. Furthermore 
even in construction sector it can be affirmed (see Figure 36) that administrators 
prefer to act with lower TLR in comparison with the ones maintained from 
owners.  
 
 
 
 
Table 82. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs TLR) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .463a 1 .463 .001 .973 
Intercept 846.329 1 846.329 2.135 .154 
Business administration .463 1 .463 .001 .973 
Error 11891.997 30 396.400   
Total 13241.017 32    
Corrected Total 11892.460 31    
a. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.033)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 36. Estimated marginal means of total liability ratio TLR concerning business 
administration in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The above results evidence that business administration framework doesn’t 
impact TLR in service sector (see Table 83). Levenes’ test results (Table 11 in 
Appendix B) ascertain that TLR errors variance isn’t the same between two 
business administration groups. And referring to the estimated marginal means is 
stated that businesses that delegate the management responsibilities to 
administrators opt for higher TLR while owners who manage the businesses 
prefer to maintain lower liability ratios (Figure 37).  
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Table 83. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs TLR) in service 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR      
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 7.137a 1 7.137 .253 .619 .008 
Intercept 35.635 1 35.635 1.262 .270 .040 
Business 
administration 
7.137 1 7.137 .253 .619 .008 
Error 847.084 30 28.236    
Total 910.772 32     
Corrected Total 854.221 31     
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.025)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 37. Estimated marginal means of total liability ratio TLR concerning business 
administration in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The results elaborated from sectoral analysis demonstrate that business 
administration framework doesn’t impact TLR , correspondingly H3, hypothesis 
can be rejected.  Despite this, it can be mentioned that in major part statistical 
evidences confirm that business owners maintain higher TLR then the one 
preferred to be maintained from administrators.  
 
 
H4: Ownerships gender influence assets tangibility (TAN) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Ownerships gender isn’t a determinant factor as per TAN (refer to Table 84) in 
trade sector. Levenes’ test results demonstrate that TAN errors variance is the 
same between three ownership genders groups (refer to Table 12 in Appendix B). 
But interesting data are revealed from TAN, by implying that it’s higher in case of 
mixed-partnership and decreases respectively for male and female ownership 
structures (refer to Figure 38). 
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Table 84. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownerships gender vs TAN) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .416a 2 .208 2.613 .090 
Intercept 1.308 1 1.308 16.417 .000 
Ownerships  Gender .416 2 .208 2.613 .090 
Error 2.389 30 .080 
  
Total 5.602 33    
Corrected Total 2.806 32    
a. R Squared = .148 (Adjusted R Squared = .092)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 38. Estimated marginal means of asset tangibility ratio TAN concerning business 
ownerships gender in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The examinations referring to ownership structure influence on TAN remains 
under the same context also in production sector (Table 85). In addition reveals 
that TAN errors variance is differentiated in three ownership groups (see 
Levenes’ test results in Appendix B/Table 13). Meanwhile estimated marginal 
means (in Figure 39) confirm again that mixed-partnership maintains higher TAN  
in comparison with the ones respectively owned from male and females.  
 
Table 85. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs TAN) in production 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .477a 2 .239 2.862 .073 
Intercept 6.507 1 6.507 78.062 .000 
Ownerships Gender .477 2 .239 2.862 .073 
Error 2.501 30 .083   
Total 9.792 33    
Corrected Total 2.978 32    
a. R Squared = .160 (Adjusted R Squared = .104)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 39. Estimated marginal means of asset tangibility ratio TAN concerning business 
ownerships gender in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The ownership gender statistics confirm that they don’t have any impact on TAN 
even in construction sector (Table 86). The latest errors variance differences 
persist into three ownership groups (see Levenes’ test results in Table 14/ 
Appendix B). While estimated marginal means (refer to Figure 40) clearly state 
that mixed-partnership prefer higher TAN respectively followed from those of 
female and male ownership structures.  
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Table 86. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs TAN) in construction 
sector  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .342a 2 .171 1.459 .248 
Intercept 3.656 1 3.656 31.199 .000 
Ownerships  Gender .342 2 .171 1.459 .248 
Error 3.515 30 .117   
Total 7.915 33    
Corrected Total 3.857 32    
a. R Squared = .089 (Adjusted R Squared = .028)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 40. Estimated marginal means of asset tangibility ratio TAN concerning business 
ownerships gender in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Ownership gender doesn’t influence TAN in service sector (see Table 87 below).  
The dependent variable errors variance is different as per three ownership groups 
(see Table 15 in Appendix B). Beyond this, estimated marginal means results 
reveal a higher TAN from female ownership followed respectively by the ones of 
male and mixed-partnership (see Figure 41).  
 
 
Table 87. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs TAN) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3315.864a 2 1657.932 2.023 .150 
Intercept 25610.160 1 25610.160 31.251 .000 
Ownerships  Gender 3315.864 2 1657.932 2.023 .150 
Error 23765.106 29 819.486   
Total 60232.527 32    
Corrected Total 27080.970 31    
a. R Squared = .122 (Adjusted R Squared = .062)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 41. Estimated marginal means of asset tangibility ratio TAN concerning business 
ownerships gender in service sector 
 Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The sectoral elaborations show that ownership gender doesn’t influence TAN 
which lead to the rejection of H4 hypothesis. However, Levene’s errors variance 
test reveals some alterations which were further explored within the aid of 
estimated marginal means. Throughout it can be stated that mainly mixed-
partnership and then female ownership opt for higher TAN.  
 
 
H5: Administrators gender impacts long-term leverage ratio (LT-LEV) regardless sectoral 
affiliation;  
 
As statistically displayed administrators gender doesn’t influences LT-LEV ratio 
in trade sector (Table 88) but differences pertaining to the latter errors variance 
persist (see Levenes’ test results in Appendix B/Table 16). Meanwhile estimated 
marginal means (Figure 42) confirm that male administrators prefer to act 
through high LT-LEV rates but in any case lower than the one maintained from 
female administrators which in turn result to be lower tan the one of mixed-
administration.  
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Table 88. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs LT-LEV) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.009E-5a 2 4.505E-5 .001 .999 
Intercept .477 1 .477 5.643 .024 
Administrators  Gender 9.009E-5 2 4.505E-5 .001 .999 
Error 2.538 30 .085   
Total 4.614 33    
Corrected Total 2.538 32    
a. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = -.067)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Estimated marginal means of long-term leverage ratio LT-LEV concerning 
business administrators gender in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The production sector data confirm that administrators gender doesn’t impact 
LT-LEV ratio (refer to Table 89). Contradictory results instead are generated from 
Levenes’ test (Table 17 in Appendix B) which argues on consistent differences 
between administrator gender groups in LT-LEV ratios preferences.  
Hereinafter estimated marginal means (see Figure 43) declares that male 
administrators opt for higher LT-LEV ratios than female administrators.  
 
 
Table 89. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs LT-LEV) in 
production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .367a 1 .367 .214 .647 
Intercept 1.786 1 1.786 1.043 .315 
Administrators  Gender .367 1 .367 .214 .647 
Error 53.101 31 1.713   
Total 68.808 33    
Corrected Total 53.468 32    
a. R Squared = .007 (Adjusted R Squared = -.025)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 43. Estimated marginal means of long-term leverage ratio LT-LEV concerning 
business administrators gender in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
In construction sector as can be evidenced (see Table 90), administrators gender 
hasn’t any impact on LT-LEV ratio even though Levenes’ test results implies 
additional links (Table18/Appendix B). Moreover, estimated marginal means 
(Figure 44) show that male administrators maintain higher LT-LEV ratios than 
mixed-administration.  
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Table 90. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs LT-LEV) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 TL-LEV     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .301a 1 .301 .251 .620 
Intercept .742 1 .742 .618 .438 
Administrators Gender .301 1 .301 .251 .620 
Error 37.174 31 1.199   
Total 53.599 33    
Corrected Total 37.475 32    
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.024)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Estimated marginal means of long-term leverage ratio LT-LEV concerning 
business administrators gender in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The same results are valid for service sector by recognizing the missing impact of 
administrators gender on LT-LEV ratio. But almost referring to the latter errors 
variance (Table 19 in Appendix B) results it can be concluded over differences 
between administrators gender groups. Stating that it can be further added (see 
Figure 45) that male administrators quote higher long-term leverage ratios then 
female administrators.  
 
Table 91. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs LT-LEV) in service 
sector  
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 6.930a 1 6.930 .242 .626 
Intercept 8.751 1 8.751 .306 .584 
Administrators  Gender 6.930 1 6.930 .242 .626 
Error 858.011 30 28.600   
Total 899.719 32    
Corrected Total 864.941 31    
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.025)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 45. Estimated marginal means of long-term leverage ratio LT-LEV concerning 
business administrators gender in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
On a statistical context administrators gender doesn’t impact LT-LEV, thus, H5 
hypothesis can be rejected. From the other hand, considering the estimated 
marginal means it can be said that in some cases contradictory results are 
achieved as per different LT-LEV ratios in sectoral affiliations. Notwithstanding it 
can be concluded that male administration quotes higher LT-LEV ratios followed 
from the ones maintained from mixed and female administration.  
 
 
H6: Equity origin and gross profit margin (GPM) contemporaneously negatively affect 
long-term debts (LTD) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The simultaneous impact of equity origin and GPM on LTD is inexistent in trade 
sector (see Table 92). Anyway other results can be achieved while referring to 
LTD errors variance in different equity origin groups (Table 20/Appendix B). A 
further examination (refer to Figure 46) determines that national equity 
businesses maintain higher LTD levels compared with foreign and mixed-equity 
ones.  
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Table 92. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTD) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:LTD     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4.406E15a 3 1.469E15 .144 .933 
Intercept 5.730E16 1 5.730E16 5.623 .025 
Equity Origin * OE3GPM 4.406E15 3 1.469E15 .144 .933 
Error 2.955E17 29 1.019E16   
bbTotal 3.546E17 33    
Corrected Total 2.999E17 32    
a. R Squared = .015 (Adjusted R Squared = -.087)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Figure 46. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt LTD concerning equity origin in 
trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Equity origin is reflected in only one category in production sector (see Figure 47) 
which is national businesses one. For this purpose  Levenes’ test can’t be 
calculated while statistics show that even in this case the variable in question 
together with GPM don’t have any statistical significant impact on LTD (refer to 
the below Table).  
  
Table 93.Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTD) in production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LTD     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7.711E16a 1 7.711E16 .237 .630 
Intercept 9.677E17 1 9.677E17 2.978 .094 
Equity Origin * OE3GPM 7.711E16 1 7.711E16 .237 .630 
Error 1.007E19 31 3.250E17   
Total 1.107E19 33    
Corrected Total 1.015E19 32    
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.024)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 47. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt LTD concerning equity origin in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Statistically based the mutual impact of equity origin and GPM in LTD is 
insignificant (see Table 94) in construction sector. Levenes’ test rumors (Table 21 
in Appendix B) confirm differences in LTD errors variance for different equity 
origin groups. While estimated marginal means (in Figure 48) configure higher 
LTD  preferences for mixed-equity businesses than for foreign and national ones.  
 
Table 94. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTD) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:LTD     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4.257E15a 3 1.419E15 .077 .972 
Intercept 2.219E17 1 2.219E17 11.993 .002 
Equity Origin * OE3GPM 4.257E15 3 1.419E15 .077 .972 
Error 5.366E17 29 1.850E16   
Total 8.030E17 33    
Corrected Total 5.408E17 32    
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.095)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 48. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt LTD concerning equity origin in 
construction sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The same situation persists  also in service sector while considering that the 
multiple impact of equity origin and GPM on LTD  is inexistent (refer to Table 
95). Differences are also found in LTD errors variance between existing equity 
groups (Table 22/Appendix B). Under these circumstances national businesses 
maintain higher LTD than mixed equity ones as displayed in Figure 49.   
 
 
Table 95. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs LTD) in service sector 
  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: LTD     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.716E15a 2 8.578E14 .195 .824 
Intercept 1.410E16 1 1.410E16 3.209 .084 
Equity Origin * OE3GPM 1.716E15 2 8.578E14 .195 .824 
Error 1.275E17 29 4.396E15   
Total 1.546E17 32    
Corrected Total 1.292E17 31    
a. R Squared = .013 (Adjusted R Squared = -.055)   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 49. Estimated marginal means of long-term debt LTD concerning equity origin in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The multiple effects of equity origin and GPM on LTD aren’t identified in no one 
of sectoral affiliations and correspondingly, H6 hypothesis is rejected. Despite 
these, the further data elaborations have found out that trade and construction 
sectors prove contradictory results pertaining to national, foreign and mixed 
equity businesses preferences in respect of LTD. Obviously, these together with 
other sectoral evidences confirm the existence of a certain relationship between 
different equity origin groups and the variable in question.  
 
 
 
H7: Administrators gender and business age can’t simultaneously impact businesses fixed 
assets to total assets ratio (FATA) regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
The mutual effect of administrators gender and firm age isn’t statistically 
significant on FATA ratio  (see Table 96). Nevertheless Levenes’ test evidences 
demonstrate significant differences in FATA ratio errors variance between  
administrators gender groups (Table 23/Appendix B). Comparatively the 
additional examinations contribute in the understanding of administrators gender 
preferences concerning FATA ratio. Thus, in trade sector male administrators 
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prefer to maintain more fixed assets than in female and mixed-administrator 
cases (see Figure 50).  
 
Table 96. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs FATA) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .190a 3 .063 .702 .559 
Intercept .054 1 .054 .594 .447 
Administrator Gender * Firm  
Age 
.190 3 .063 .702 .559 
Error 2.616 29 .090   
Total 5.602 33    
Corrected Total 2.806 32    
a. R Squared = .068 (Adjusted R Squared = -.029)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 50. Estimated marginal means of fixed assets to total assets FATA ratio concerning 
administrators gender in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Referring to production sector statistics the administrators gender and firm age 
mutual impact on FATA ratio is inexistent (see Table 97). Levenes’ test results (in 
Table 24 / Appendix B) from the other side confirm differences between the latest 
errors variance and three administrators gender groups. Foremost the estimated 
marginal means (see Figure 51) confirm higher fixed assets preferences in female 
administrators cases compared with male ones. 
 
Table 97. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs FATA) in 
production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .466a 2 .233 2.780 .078 
Intercept .012 1 .012 .145 .706 
Administrator Gender * Firm 
Age 
.466 2 .233 2.780 .078 
Error 2.512 30 .084   
Total 9.792 33    
Corrected Total 2.978 32    
a. R Squared = .156 (Adjusted R Squared = .100)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 51. Estimated marginal means of fixed assets to total assets FATA ratio concerning 
administrators gender in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The same context is evidenced in construction sector where mutually 
administrators gender and firm age don’t impact fixed assets to total assets FATA 
ratio. The Levenes’ tests examinations comply with estimated marginal means 
(see Figure 52 below) that clearly declare that male administrators opt for higher 
FATA ratios than the ones administrated from mixed cases.  
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Table 98. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs FATA) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .248a 2 .124 1.031 .369 
Intercept .087 1 .087 .726 .401 
Administrator Gender * 
Firm Age 
.248 2 .124 1.031 .369 
Error 3.609 30 .120   
Total 7.915 33    
Corrected Total 3.857 32    
a. R Squared = .064 (Adjusted R Squared = .002)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 52. Estimated marginal means of fixed assets to total assets FATA ratio concerning 
administrators gender in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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And same results are achieved in service sector concerning the lack of mutual 
effects of administrators gender and firm age on FATA ratio (Table 99 below). 
Levenes’ test results (Table 26/Appendix B) on FATA errors variance between 
three administrators gender group, prove that female administrators maintain 
higher FATA ratio compared with the ones administrated from male (see Figure 
53). 
 
 
Table 99. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs FATA) in service 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2747.417a 2 1373.709 1.637 .212 
Intercept 3838.520 1 3838.520 4.575 .041 
Administrator Gender * 
Firm Age 
2747.417 2 1373.709 1.637 .212 
Error 24333.553 29 839.088   
Total 60232.527 32    
Corrected Total 27080.970 31    
a. R Squared = .101 (Adjusted R Squared = .039)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 53. Estimated marginal means of fixed assets to total assets FATA ratio concerning 
administrators gender in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The statistical results elaborated in the a/m sectoral affiliations highlighted that  
mutual impact of administrators gender and firm age on FATA ratio is inexistent. 
Nonetheless, indirectly  deeper examinations revealed that female administrators 
maintain higher FATA ratios in comparison with male and mixed administration 
cases.  
 
H8: Borrowers’ status and business size have a mutual positive impact on interest 
coverage ratio (ICR)  and total assets turnover ratio (TATR) regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
 
On a multivariate analysis context as can be clearly described in trade sector the 
mutual effect of borrowers’ status and business size respectively on ICR and 
TATR is statistically insignificant (Table 100). From the other hand, the additional 
multivariate tests 28 performed demonstrate that no differences between groups’ 
means exist concerning examined variables impact on two  dependent variables 
in question (see Table 27 in Appendix B).  
                                                          
28 According to Wilks’ lamdda, Pillai’s trace, Hotelling's trace, Roy's largest root 
tests estimated in Appendix B.    
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But in controversy Levenes’ test results (Table 28 in Appendix B) argue on 
differences between errors variance groups between two borrowers’ status in 
each case. Further the estimated marginal means results confirm that in each 
single case borrowers’ performing status deals with higher ICR and TATR than 
the one of non-performing status (Figure 54).  
 
Table 100. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and Business size vs ICR 
and TATR) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model RA-3 ICR 2.627E7a 3 8755916.312 .161 .922 
OE-1 TATR 13.483b 3 4.494 .361 .781 
Intercept RA-3 ICR 683150.838 1 683150.838 .013 .912 
OE-1 TATR .102 1 .102 .008 .928 
Borrowers’  Status * 
BoS 
RA-3 ICR 68201.841 1 68201.841 .001 .972 
OE-1 TATR .016 1 .016 .001 .972 
BoS RA-3 ICR 142732.936 1 142732.936 .003 .960 
OE-1 TATR .003 1 .003 .000 .988 
Borrowers’ Status RA-3 ICR 517073.045 1 517073.045 .009 .923 
OE-1 TATR .213 1 .213 .017 .897 
Error RA-3 ICR 1.580E9 29 5.449E7   
OE-1 TATR 360.713 29 12.438   
Total RA-3 ICR 1.746E9 33    
OE-1 TATR 459.777 33    
Corrected Total RA-3 ICR 1.607E9 32    
OE-1 TATR 374.196 32    
a. R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = -.085)     
b. R Squared = .036 (Adjusted R Squared = -.064)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 54. Estimated marginal means of ICR and TATR concerning Borrowers’ status 
impact in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In production sector also the simultaneous impact of borrowers’ status and 
business size on ICR and TATR is inexistent (refer to Table 101). The same 
statistical confirmation is given even through multivariate tests statistics (Table 29 
in Appendix B). Exception does only Levenes’ statistics (see Table 30 in Appendix 
B) which prove differences between dependent variables errors variance in two 
borrowers’ status groups. This led to the estimation of marginal means which 
demonstrates that non-performing borrowers’ status maintain higher levels of 
ICR and lower TATR while the vice versa occurs for performing borrowers’ status 
(Figure 55).  
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Table 101. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and Business size vs ICR 
and TATR) in production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model RA-3 ICR 9996.263a 3 3332.088 .240 .868 
OE-1 TATR 1.785b 3 .595 .382 .767 
Intercept RA-3 ICR 7930.666 1 7930.666 .571 .456 
OE-1 TATR .093 1 .093 .060 .809 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS RA-3 ICR 9894.188 1 9894.188 .713 .405 
OE-1 TATR .268 1 .268 .172 .682 
Borrowers’ Status RA-3 ICR 9936.398 1 9936.398 .716 .404 
OE-1 TATR .175 1 .175 .112 .740 
BoS RA-3 ICR 6357.259 1 6357.259 .458 .504 
OE-1 TATR .015 1 .015 .010 .921 
Error RA-3 ICR 402450.383 29 13877.599   
OE-1 TATR 45.197 29 1.559   
Total RA-3 ICR 432605.807 33    
OE-1 TATR 61.385 33    
Corrected Total RA-3 ICR 412446.646 32    
OE-1 TATR 46.983 32    
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.077)     
b. R Squared = .038 (Adjusted R Squared = -.062)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 55. Estimated marginal means of ICR and TATR concerning Borrowers’ status 
impact in production sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The inexistence of borrowers’ status and business size mutual impact on ICR and 
TATR is persistent even in construction sector (refer to Table 102 statistics). This is 
comparatively supported from the examined multivariate tests statistics (see 
Table 31 in Appendix B) because Levenes’ test (ibid, Table 32) results confirm 
above the differences that exists between two borrowers’ status groups and 
TATR.  
Meanwhile estimated marginal means confirm that non-performing borrowers’ 
status opt for  lower ICR and TATR (Figure 56) in comparison with borrowers’ 
performing status. 
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Table 102. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and Business size vs ICR 
and TATR) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model RA-3 ICR 3.158E8a 3 1.053E8 .974 .419 
OE-1 TATR 29.397b 3 9.799 1.149 .346 
Intercept RA-3 ICR 8462323.921 1 8462323.921 .078 .782 
OE-1 TATR 7.549 1 7.549 .886 .354 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS RA-3 ICR 2.732E7 1 2.732E7 .253 .619 
OE-1 TATR 8.002 1 8.002 .939 .341 
Borrowers’ Status RA-3 ICR 8585406.627 1 8585406.627 .079 .780 
OE-1 TATR 7.250 1 7.250 .850 .364 
BoS RA-3 ICR 2.707E7 1 2.707E7 .250 .621 
OE-1 TATR 8.956 1 8.956 1.051 .314 
Error RA-3 ICR 3.136E9 29 1.081E8   
OE-1 TATR 247.227 29 8.525   
Total RA-3 ICR 3.539E9 33    
OE-1 TATR 298.629 33    
Corrected Total RA-3 ICR 3.452E9 32    
OE-1 TATR 276.624 32    
a. R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002)     
b. R Squared = .106 (Adjusted R Squared = .014)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 56. Estimated marginal means of ICR and TATR concerning Borrowers’ status 
impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Even in service sector the statistical diagnosis performed (see Table 103) argue on 
the lack of any mutual impact of borrowers’ status and business size on ICR and 
TATR. The multivariate tests also produced same results (Table 33/ Appendix B) 
concerning the relationships examined. While Levenes’ test results defend the 
errors variance differences that exist between two dependent variables analyzed 
and two borrowers’ status groups (Table 34/Appendix B).  
And ultimately the estimated marginal means confirm that borrowers’ 
performing status maintains higher ICR and TATR in confront with borrowers’ 
non-performing status (in Figure 57).  
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Table 103. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and Business size vs ICR 
and TATR) in service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model OE-1 TATR 1.794a 3 .598 1.070 .378 
RA-3 ICR 667.666b 3 222.555 .164 .919 
Intercept OE-1 TATR 1.026 1 1.026 1.835 .186 
RA-3 ICR 4.189 1 4.189 .003 .956 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS OE-1 TATR 1.152 1 1.152 2.061 .162 
RA-3 ICR 1.958 1 1.958 .001 .970 
BoS OE-1 TATR 1.755 1 1.755 3.138 .087 
RA-3 ICR 1.365 1 1.365 .001 .975 
Borrowers’ Status OE-1 TATR 1.181 1 1.181 2.112 .157 
RA-3 ICR 3.162 1 3.162 .002 .962 
Error OE-1 TATR 15.655 28 .559 
  
RA-3 ICR 37894.204 28 1353.364   
Total OE-1 TATR 36.996 32 
   
RA-3 ICR 44960.607 32    
Corrected Total OE-1 TATR 17.449 31 
   
RA-3 ICR 38561.870 31    
a. R Squared = .103 (Adjusted R Squared = .007)     
b. R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -.088)     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 57. Estimated marginal means of ICR and TATR concerning Borrowers’ status 
impact in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The cumulative results prove that don’t exist any mutual impact concerning 
borrowers’ status and business size on ICR and TATR, by this way, the H8 
hypothesis can be rejected. Notwithstanding there is noted a general tendency of 
the performing borrowers’ status in preferring higher ICR and TATR in trade, 
construction and service sectors.  
The only exception is the one of production sector where is partially performed 
concerning TATR and where the vice versa happens as per ICR in case of 
performing borrowers’ in contradiction with non-performing ones.  
H9: Short-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function regardless sectoral 
affiliation; 
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The predictors of ICR and STD on behalf of radial basis function implemented 
within 2 hidden layers in trade sector (at 95% confidence level29,  see 104 & 105 
Tables) are: ROA, ROE, Firm age, CV, GPM, NP, EQ, FA, RA, Borrowers’ Status, 
Equity Origin, Business Administration, PATR and AT (refer to Table 106). 
Properly, the first layer has a lower impact on ICR and a higher one on STD, 
while the vice versa is evidenced according to second layer examinations (refer to 
Table 35/Appendix B).  
 
Table 104. Network Information/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 Firm Age 
4 CV 
5 OE-3 GPM 
6 NP 
7 EQ 
8 FA 
9 RA 
10 Borrowers’ Status 
11 Equity Origin 
12 Business 
Administration 
13 ILR-9 PATR 
Covariates 1 OE-6 AT 
2 Ownership Gender 
3 Administrator 
Gender 
4 GA-2 OCF 
                                                          
29 The same confidence level as previously is used even in the following examinations of 
this chapter.  
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5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-4 CR 
8 ILR-7 ITR 
9 BoS 
Number of Units 289 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
Number of Units 2 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 105. Model Summary/RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 26.993 
Average Overall Relative Error .900 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .931 
STD .868 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1996.868a 
Training Time 00:00:00.127 
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Training Sum of Squares Error 26.993 
Average Overall Relative Error .900 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .931 
STD .868 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1996.868a 
Training Time 00:00:00.127 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 106. Independent variable importance /RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
OE-7 ROE .005 3.6% 
GA-1 ROA .005 3.6% 
Firm Age 
.021 13.6% 
CV 
.017 11.4% 
OE-3 GPM 
.008 5.0% 
NP 
.008 5.0% 
EQ 
.008 5.0% 
FA 
.017 11.4% 
RA 
.005 3.6% 
Borrowers’ Status 
.020 12.9% 
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Equity Origin 
.020 12.9% 
Business Administration 
.018 11.6% 
ILR-9 PATR 
.005 3.6% 
OE-6 AT 
.026 17.3% 
Ownership Gender 
.091 59.9% 
Administrator Gender 
.109 71.4% 
GA-2 OCF 
.087 57.2% 
INV 
.125 81.9% 
ILR-2 WC 
.128 83.7% 
ILR-4 CR 
.064 41.6% 
ILR-7 ITR 
.059 38.9% 
BoS 
.153 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The ICR and STD prediction (see Table 107) through radial basis function 
deployment in production sector revealed again 2 hidden layers which are 
correlated with: ROA, ROE, Firm age, CV, GPM, NP, EQ, FA, RA, Borrowers’ 
Status,  PATR, Ownership gender, WC, CR and Business size (refer to Table 108 
and 109). As noted (Table 36 in Appendix B) the first layer is more correlated to 
ICR and less to STD while the vice versa occurs in correspondence of second 
layer.  
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Table 107. Network Information/RBF-in production sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 Firm Age 
4 CV 
5 OE-3 GPM 
6 NP 
7 EQ 
8 FA 
9 RA 
10 Borrowers’ Status 
11 Business 
administration 
12 ILR-9 PATR 
Covariates 1 OE-6 AT 
2 Ownership Gender 
3 Administrator Gender 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-7 ITR 
8 ILR-4 CR 
9 BoS 
Number of Units 98 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
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Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
Number of Units 2 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
Table 108. Model Summary/RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 77.83 
Average Overall Relative Error .973 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .946 
STD 1.000 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 441.225a 
Training Time 00:00:00.009 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  VII: CAPITAL STRUCTURE APPROACHES                                    279 
 
Table 109. Independent variable importance /RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
OE-7 ROE .023 13.4% 
GA-1 ROA .031 18.4% 
Firm Age .046 27.1% 
CV .023 13.4% 
OE-3 GPM .031 18.4% 
NP .023 13.4% 
EQ .023 13.4% 
FA .023 13.4% 
RA .023 13.4% 
Borrowers’ Status .004 2.4% 
Business administration .055 32.5% 
ILR-9 PATR .031 18.3% 
OE-6 AT .050 29.3% 
Ownership Gender .029 17.0% 
Administrator Gender .127 74.7% 
GA-2 OCF .170 100.0% 
INV .074 43.8% 
ILR-2 WC .039 22.9% 
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ILR-7 ITR .128 75.2% 
ILR-4 CR .034 20.0% 
BoS .016 9.2% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
The implementation of radial basis function in construction sector with two 
hidden layers found as predictors of ICR and STD: ROA, ROE, Firm age, CV, 
GPM, NP, Equity Origin, EQ, FA, RA, Borrowers’ Status, Business 
Administration, PATR,  WC and ITR (refer to Tables 110-112). Also it must be 
added that the first layer is more related to ICR than to STD, in controversy the 
second layer is negatively correlated to both of them (refer to Table 37/Appendix 
B). 
 
 
Table 110. Network Information/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 
OE-7 ROE 
2 
GA-1 ROA 
3 
Firm Age 
4 
CV 
5 
OE-3 GPM 
6 
NP 
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7 
Equity Origin 
8 
FA 
9 
RA 
10 
Borrowers’ Status 
11 
EQ 
12 
Business Administration 
13 
ILR-9 PATR 
Covariates 1 
OE-6 AT 
2 
Ownership Gender 
3 
GA-2 OCF 
4 
INV 
5 
ILR-2 WC 
6 
ILR-7 ITR 
7 
ILR-4 CR 
8 
BoS 
Number of Units 
69 
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Rescaling Method for Covariates 
Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function 
Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
RA-3 ICR 
2 
STD 
Number of Units 
2 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents 
Standardized 
Activation Function 
Identity 
Error Function 
Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is 
the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 111. Model Summary/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 36.89 
Average Overall Relative Error .738 
Relative Error for Scale Dependents RA-3 ICR .715 
STD .760 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 252.177a 
Training Time 00:00:00.005 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 112. Independent variable importance /RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
OE-7 ROE 
.013 5.9% 
GA-1 ROA 
.029 13.4% 
Firm Age 
.016 7.6% 
CV 
.013 5.9% 
OE-3 GPM 
.010 4.8% 
NP 
.013 5.9% 
Equity Origin 
.009 4.3% 
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FA 
.013 5.9% 
RA 
.013 5.9% 
Borrowers’ Status 
.046 21.7% 
EQ 
.013 5.9% 
Business Administration 
.015 7.1% 
ILR-9 PATR 
.012 5.8% 
OE-6 AT 
.214 100.0% 
Ownership Gender 
.080 37.5% 
GA-2 OCF 
.149 69.4% 
INV 
.122 56.9% 
ILR-2 WC 
.018 8.4% 
ILR-7 ITR 
.018 8.2% 
ILR-4 CR 
.074 34.7% 
BoS 
.110 51.4% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The radial basis function pertaining to service sector also revealed two hidden 
layers concerning the prediction of ICR and STD (see Tables 113-115). 
Consequently the variables that can statistically predict the previously mentioned 
dependent variables volatility are: ROA, ROE, FA, Firm age, CV, GPM, NP, EQ, 
Equity origin and PATR (refer to Table 115). In conformity with the a/m results 
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the first layer is positively correlated with both depend variables while the second 
one is negative correlated with them (Table 38/Appendix B). 
 
Table 113. Network Information/RBF-in service sector 
 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 FA 
4 Firm Age 
5 CV 
6 OE-3 GPM 
7 NP 
8 EQ 
9 Equity Origin 
10 Business 
Administration 
11 ILR-9 PATR 
Covariates 1 OE-6 AT 
2 Ownership Gender 
3 Administrator 
Gender 
4 GA-2 OCF 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-7 ITR 
8 ILR-4 CR 
9 BoS 
Number of Units 265 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
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Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
Number of Units 2 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 114. Model Summary/RBF-in service sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 29.880 
Average Overall Relative Error .964 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .960 
STD .968 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1853.248a 
Training Time 00:00:00.120 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 115. Independent variable importance /RBF-in service sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
OE-7 ROE .032 32.0% 
GA-1 ROA .032 32.1% 
FA .006 6.4% 
Firm Age .020 20.3% 
CV .006 6.4% 
OE-3 GPM .006 6.4% 
NP .011 11.1% 
EQ 
.011 11.1% 
Equity Origin 
.043 43.0% 
Business Administration 
.058 58.8% 
ILR-9 PATR 
.006 6.4% 
OE-6 AT 
.074 74.2% 
Ownership Gender 
.070 70.7% 
Administrator Gender 
.081 81.6% 
GA-2 OCF 
.088 88.5% 
INV 
.088 88.3% 
ILR-2 WC 
.088 88.5% 
ILR-7 ITR 
.090 90.8% 
ILR-4 CR 
.089 89.4% 
BoS 
.099 100.0% 
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Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The statistics elaborated from each of radial basis functions implemented in the 
four sectoral affiliations mark a good model fit on predicting short-term debts 
structure estimated through ICR and STD, by contemporary affirming H9 
hypothesis acceptance. The algorithmic estimations in each single case produced 
2 hidden layers correlated with main predictive variables (financial and non-
financial ones) such as: ROA, ROE, Firm age, CV, GPM, NP, EQ, FA, RA, 
Borrowers’ Status, Business Administration and PATR. While statistically 
significant covariate variables concerning ICR and STD prediction are: WC and 
CR. In this merit worth mentioned that generally the first layers are more 
correlated to ICR while the second result to be less correlated to STD.  
H10: Long-term debts structure is predicted from radial basis function regardless sectoral 
affiliation;  
 
The forecasting of LT-LEV, LTDER and LTD through radial basis function in 
trade sector was made possible within the aid of two hidden layers to which are 
correlated to: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, TAN, EQ, Ownership gender, 
Equity origin, Borrowers’ status, CV, Total LEV and Business size (refer to the 
below 116-118 Tables). The second layer is more correlated with each of three 
dependent variables in question then the first one (Table 39/Appendix B).  
 
Table 116. Network Information/RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 GA1-ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 Ownership Gender 
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10 Equity Origin 
11 Borrowers’ Status 
12 CV 
13 RA-4 TOTAL LEV 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA 
2 Administrator Gender 
3 Owners No 
4 Firm Age 
5 Business 
Administration 
6 INV 
7 ILR-2 WC 
8 ILR-4 CR 
9 OE-2 FATR 
10 BoS 
Number of Units 310 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-5 LT-LEV 
2 RA-1 LTDER 
3 LTD 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 117. Model Summary/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 36.661 
Average Overall Relative Error .815 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-5 LT-LEV .842 
RA-1 LTDER .873 
LTD .729 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 2134.434a 
Training Time 00:00:00.171 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 118. Independent variable importance /RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .010 7.1% 
ILR-9 PATR .006 4.6% 
ILR-10 APP .006 4.6% 
OE-5 NPM .015 11.1% 
GA1-ROE .009 6.6% 
GA-1 ROA .006 4.6% 
OE-8 TAN .019 14.3% 
EQ .009 6.6% 
Ownership Gender .005 3.5% 
Equity Origin .023 17.1% 
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Borrowers’ Status .023 17.0% 
CV .019 14.3% 
RA-4 TOTAL LEV .009 6.6% 
OE-10 FATA .124 91.6% 
Administrator Gender .072 53.3% 
Owners No .135 100.0% 
Firm Age .094 69.9% 
Business Administration .054 40.4% 
INV .064 47.2% 
ILR-2 WC .089 65.9% 
ILR-4 CR .062 46.3% 
OE-2 FATR .134 99.4% 
BoS .012 9.2% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The radial basis function analysis deployed in production sector reveals that the 
prediction of LT-LEV, LTDER and LTD is developed through two hidden layers 
and where ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, TAN, EQ, Ownership gender, 
Borrowers’ status, CV, Total LEV, Business size and Business administration have 
a statistical significant impact (see Tables 119-121). In this context, it must be 
admitted that the impact of the first layer is higher in each of dependent variables 
predicted in confront with the second one (see Table 40/Appendix B).  
 
 
Table 119. Network Information/RBF-in production sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
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6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 Total LEV  
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Borrowers’ Status 
13 CV 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA 
2 Administrator Gender 
3 Owners No 
4 Firm Age 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-4 CR 
8 OE-2 FATR 
9 Business 
administration 
Number of Units 249 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
RA-5 LT-LEV  
2 RA-1 LTDER 
3 LTD 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
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Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 120. Model Summary/RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 32.183 
Average Overall Relative Error .933 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-5 LT-LEV  .978 
RA-1 LTDER .862 
LTD .958 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1600.025a 
Training Time 00:00:00.067 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 121. Independent variable importance /RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .008 5.9% 
ILR-9 PATR .019 15.0% 
ILR-10 APP .019 14.4% 
OE-5 NPM .009 6.9% 
OE-7 ROE .012 9.5% 
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GA-1 ROA .009 6.9% 
OE-8 TAN .006 4.7% 
EQ .006 4.7% 
RA-4 Total LEV  .006 4.7% 
BoS .006 4.7% 
Ownership Gender .015 11.5% 
Borrowers’ Status .031 23.9% 
CV .006 4.7% 
OE-10 FATA .105 80.5% 
Administrator Gender .094 72.3% 
Owners No .097 74.8% 
Firm Age .041 31.6% 
INV .130 100.0% 
ILR-2 WC .111 85.6% 
ILR-4 CR .101 77.4% 
OE-2 FATR .126 96.9% 
Business administration .043 32.8% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The forecasting process of LT-LEV, LTDER and LTD in construction sector 
developed with the aid of radial basis function has again generated two hidden 
layers to which the predictors such as: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, TAN, 
EQ, Ownership gender, Borrowers’ status, CV, Total LEV, Business size and 
Equity origin, Firm age, WC, CR, result to be correlated (refer to Tables 122-124).  
In this sector only the first layer results to be closely correlated to each of three 
predicted variables (Table 41/Appendix B). 
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Table 122. Network Information/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN  
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 LEV  
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Equity Origin 
13 Borrowers’ Status 
14 CV 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA  
2 Owners No 
3 Firm Age 
4 Business 
Administration 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-4 CR 
8 OE-2 FATR 
Number of Units 119 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
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Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-5 TL-LEV 
2 RA-1 LTDER 
3 LTD 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 123. Model Summary/RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 125.77 
Average Overall Relative Error .838 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-5 TL-LEV .908 
RA-1 LTDER .847 
LTD .760 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 580.922a 
Training Time 00:00:00.012 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 124. Independent variable importance /RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .013 10.2% 
ILR-9 PATR .038 29.9% 
ILR-10 APP .031 24.6% 
OE-5 NPM .020 15.6% 
OE-7 ROE .013 10.1% 
GA-1 ROA .020 15.6% 
OE-8 TAN  .013 10.2% 
EQ .013 10.2% 
RA-4 LEV  .013 10.2% 
BoS .013 10.2% 
Ownership Gender .033 25.6% 
Equity Origin .038 29.9% 
Borrowers’ Status .036 28.3% 
CV .013 10.2% 
OE-10 FATA  .128 100.0% 
Owners No .117 91.1% 
Firm Age .041 31.7% 
Business Administration .086 66.8% 
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INV .124 96.9% 
ILR-2 WC .048 37.5% 
ILR-4 CR .026 20.2% 
OE-2 FATR .122 95.4% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The predictive factors instead in service sector concerning LT-LEV, LTDER and 
LTD explored through radial basis function are: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, 
ROE,  TAN, EQ, Total LEV, CV, Ownership gender, Equity origin, Borrowers’ 
status and Business size (as per Tables 125-127). The two existing hidden layers 
here demonstrate contrary impact on dependent variables in question. For 
instance the first layer impacts more LT-LEV while the second one the rest of 
dependent variables (Table 42/Appendix B).  
Table 125. Network Information/RBF-in service sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 LEV 
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
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12 Equity Origin 
13 Borrowers’ Status 
14 CV 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA 
2 Administrator Gender 
3 Business Administration 
4 Owners No 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 ILR-2 WC 
8 ILR-4 CR 
9 OE-2 FATR 
Number of Units 346 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-5 LT-LEV 
2 RA-1 LTDER 
3 LTD 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 126. Model Summary/RBF-in service sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 46.239 
Average Overall Relative Error .994 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-5 LT-LEV .997 
RA-1 LTDER .999 
LTD .987 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 2422.426a 
Training Time 00:00:00.150 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 127. Independent variable importance /RBF-in service sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .008 8.9% 
ILR-9 PATR .005 5.3% 
ILR-10 APP .005 5.3% 
OE-5 NPM .010 10.6% 
OE-7 ROE .019 19.8% 
GA-1 ROA .019 19.8% 
OE-8 TAN .005 5.3% 
EQ .008 8.9% 
RA-4 LEV .005 5.3% 
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BoS .005 5.3% 
Ownership Gender .041 42.7% 
Equity Origin .032 33.8% 
Borrowers’ Status .033 34.3% 
CV .005 5.3% 
OE-10 FATA .066 68.9% 
Administrator Gender .082 86.1% 
Business Administration .084 88.5% 
Owners No .094 98.9% 
Firm Age .093 97.8% 
INV .094 98.9% 
ILR-2 WC .094 99.0% 
ILR-4 CR .095 100.0% 
OE-2 FATR .095 99.8% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The sectoral forecasting analysis developed through radial basis function 
concerning long-term debt structure confirms the relevance of ACP, PATR, APP, 
NPM,  ROA, ROE, TAN, EQ, Total LEV, CV,  Ownership gender, Equity origin, 
Borrowers’ status, and Business size in exploring SMEs debt structure decision 
making process. By this way, the H10 hypothesis validity is confirmed. 
Furthermore it must be underlined that two hidden layers generated in each 
sector differently behave in respect of long-term debt structure indicators. 
However, it must be stated that the first layer impact is positive in each of 
dependent variables in question in production and construction sectors while 
quite the same behavior is replicated from the second layer in trade and service 
sectors.  
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H11: A radial basis function reconciles SMEs leverage structure regardless sectoral 
affiliation 
The leverage structure prediction (ICR, STD, LT-LEV, LTDER and LTD) achieved 
through radial basis function in trade sector highlights the correlation of: ACP,  
PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, TAN, EQ, Total LEV, CV,  Ownership gender, 
Equity origin, Borrowers’ status, Business size, GPM, NP, FA, RA, Business 
administration, Administrators gender, Firm age and OCF with two hidden 
layers (see Tables 128-130). Respectively they have a negative and positive impact 
on the dependent variables in question (Table 43/ Appendix B).  
 
Table 128. Network Information/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 TOTAL LEV 
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Equity Origin 
13 Borrowers’ Status 
14 CV 
15 OE-3 GPM 
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16 NP 
17 FA 
18 RA 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA 
2 Business 
Administration 
3 Administrator 
Gender 
4 Owners No 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 ILR-2 WC 
8 ILR-4 CR 
9 OE-2 FATR 
10 GA-2 OCF 
11 OE-6 AT 
12 ILR-7 ITR 
Number of Units 457 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
3 RA-5 LT-LEV 
4 RA-1 LTDER 
5 LTD 
Number of Units 5 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
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Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 129. Model Summary/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 61.670 
Average Overall Relative Error .822 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .999 
STD .924 
RA-5 LT-LEV .605 
RA-1 LTDER .918 
LTD .666 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 3144.458a 
Training Time 00:00:00.196 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 130. Independent variable importance /RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .006 5.2% 
ILR-9 PATR .004 3.3% 
ILR-10 APP .004 3.3% 
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OE-5 NPM .010 8.5% 
OE-7 ROE .006 4.8% 
GA-1 ROA .006 4.8% 
OE-8 TAN .008 7.1% 
EQ .006 4.8% 
RA-4 TOTAL LEV .006 4.8% 
BoS .006 4.8% 
Ownership Gender .008 6.9% 
Equity Origin .015 13.2% 
Borrowers’ Status .015 13.2% 
CV .008 7.1% 
OE-3 GPM .006 4.8% 
NP .006 4.8% 
FA .008 7.1% 
RA .004 3.7% 
OE-10 FATA .066 55.9% 
Business Administration .006 5.4% 
Administrator Gender .044 37.5% 
Owners No .106 90.8% 
Firm Age .018 15.5% 
INV .075 63.8% 
ILR-2 WC .086 73.6% 
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ILR-4 CR .109 93.0% 
OE-2 FATR 
.103 87.5% 
GA-2 OCF .032 27.3% 
OE-6 AT .107 91.0% 
ILR-7 ITR .117 100.0% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The forecasting of leverage structure (ICR, STD, LT-LEV, LTDER, LTD) through 
radial basis function in production sector generated two hidden layers which 
impact: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, TAN, EQ, Total LEV, CV, 
Ownership gender, Borrowers’ status, Business size, GPM, NP, FA, RA, 
Administrator gender and Owner no (refer to Tables 131-133). With special 
regard to first layer worth evidencing that in comparison with second one it has a 
higher impact (and positive) on all dependent variables in question (Table 44 in 
Appendix B).   
 
Table 131. Network Information/RBF-in production sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 Total LEV  
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10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Borrowers’ Status 
13 CV 
14 OE-3 GPM 
15 NP 
16 FA 
17 RA 
Covariates 1 Administrator Gender 
2 Business 
administration 
3 Owners No 
4 Firm Age 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-4 CR 
8 OE-2 FATR 
9 OE-6 AT 
10 ILR-7 ITR 
Number of Units 304 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
3 RA-5 LT-LEV  
4 RA-1 LTDER 
5 LTD 
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Number of Units 5 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 132. Model Summary/RBF-in production sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 47.019 
Average Overall Relative Error .940 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .937 
STD .955 
RA-5 LT-LEV  .963 
RA-1 LTDER .867 
LTD .980 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1876.026a 
Training Time 00:00:00.062 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 133. Independent variable importance /RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .012 10.3% 
ILR-9 PATR .030 26.8% 
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ILR-10 APP .027 24.0% 
OE-5 NPM .015 13.1% 
OE-7 ROE .015 13.1% 
GA-1 ROA .018 15.7% 
OE-8 TAN .009 7.8% 
EQ .009 7.8% 
RA-4 Total LEV  .009 7.8% 
BoS .009 7.8% 
Ownership Gender .029 25.7% 
Borrowers’ Status .003 2.3% 
CV .009 7.8% 
OE-3 GPM .021 18.4% 
NP .015 13.1% 
FA .009 7.8% 
RA .009 7.8% 
Administrator Gender .023 20.2% 
Business administration .090 80.0% 
Owners No .021 19.0% 
Firm Age .092 81.1% 
INV .113 100.0% 
ILR-2 WC .063 55.8% 
ILR-4 CR .106 93.6% 
OE-2 FATR .090 79.6% 
OE-6 AT .055 48.8% 
ILR-7 ITR .101 89.3% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The prediction of ICR, STD, LT-LEV, LTDER and LTD in construction sector (see 
Tables 134 & 136) through radial basis function on behalf of two hidden layers 
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reveals that the statistical significant variables are: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, 
ROE, TAN, EQ, Total LEV, Business size, Equity origin, Borrowers’ status, CV, 
GPM, NP, FA, RA,FATA, Business administration, Firm age, WC, CR and ITR. 
Concretely, the first layer has a positive impact on all dependent variables in 
question except of LT-LEV and the vice versa occurs for second layer (refer to 
Table 45/Appendix B).  
Table 134. Network Information/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN  
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 LEV  
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Equity Origin 
13 Borrowers’ Status 
14 CV 
15 OE-3 GPM 
16 NP 
17 FA 
18 RA 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA  
2 Business 
Administration 
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3 Owners No 
4 Firm Age 
5 INV 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-4 CR 
8 OE-2 FATR 
9 OE-6 AT 
10 ILR-7 ITR 
Number of Units 162 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
3 RA-5 TL-LEV 
4 RA-1 LTDER 
5 LTD 
Number of Units 5 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 135. Model Summary/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 21.215 
Average Overall Relative Error .849 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .967 
STD .659 
RA-5 TL-LEV .924 
RA-1 LTDER .850 
LTD .844 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 791.422a 
Training Time 00:00:00.016 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 136. Independent variable importance /RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .012 7.0% 
ILR-9 PATR .038 23.0% 
ILR-10 APP .037 22.0% 
OE-5 NPM .022 12.9% 
OE-7 ROE .016 9.9% 
GA-1 ROA .022 12.9% 
OE-8 TAN  .012 7.0% 
EQ .012 7.0% 
RA-4 LEV  .012 7.0% 
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BoS .012 7.0% 
Ownership Gender .057 34.0% 
Equity Origin .001 .8% 
Borrowers’ Status .032 19.0% 
CV .012 7.0% 
OE-3 GPM .016 9.8% 
NP .016 9.9% 
FA .012 7.0% 
RA .012 7.0% 
OE-10 FATA  .044 26.7% 
Business Administration .006 3.5% 
Owners No .167 100.0% 
Firm Age .010 6.1% 
INV .069 41.2% 
ILR-2 WC .023 13.9% 
ILR-4 CR .018 10.7% 
OE-2 FATR .157 94.3% 
OE-6 AT .142 85.4% 
ILR-7 ITR .014 8.6% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The radial basis function deployed in service sector for the forecasting of leverage 
structure (ICR, STD, LT-LEV, LTDER, LTD), operated again with two hidden layers 
(Tables 137 & 138) which result to be correlated with : ACP, PATR,  APP, NPM,  ROA, 
ROE, TAN, EQ, Total LEV, Business size, Equity origin, Ownership gender, Borrowers’ 
status, CV, GPM, NP, FA, RA and Business administration (Table 139). The first layer 
has a stronger impact on dependent variables analyzed except of LTD, meanwhile the 
contrary is evidenced for the second one (refer to Table 46/Appendix B).  
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Table 137. Network Information/RBF-in service sector 
Input Layer Factors 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 ILR-10 APP 
4 OE-5 NPM 
5 OE-7 ROE 
6 GA-1 ROA 
7 OE-8 TAN 
8 EQ 
9 RA-4 LEV 
10 BoS 
11 Ownership Gender 
12 Equity Origin 
13 Borrowers’ Status 
14 CV 
15 OE-3 GPM 
16 NP 
17 FA 
18 RA 
Covariates 1 OE-10 FATA 
2 Administrator Gender 
3 Business 
Administration 
4 Owners No 
5 Firm Age 
6 INV 
7 ILR-2 WC 
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8 ILR-4 CR 
9 OE-2 FATR 
10 OE-6 AT 
11 ILR-7 ITR 
Number of Units 472 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 RA-3 ICR 
2 STD 
3 RA-5 LT-LEV 
4 RA-1 LTDER 
5 LTD 
Number of Units 5 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 138. Model Summary/RBF-in service sector 
Training Sum of Squares Error 76.326 
Average Overall Relative Error .985 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
RA-3 ICR .987 
STD .956 
RA-5 LT-LEV .999 
RA-1 LTDER .984 
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LTD .999 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 3305.721a 
Training Time 00:00:00.187 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 139. Independent variable importance /RBF-in service sector 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
ILR-6 ACP .006 7.2% 
ILR-9 PATR .004 4.3% 
ILR-10 APP .004 4.3% 
OE-5 NPM .006 7.2% 
OE-7 ROE .013 14.3% 
GA-1 ROA .013 14.4% 
OE-8 TAN .004 4.3% 
EQ .006 7.2% 
RA-4 LEV .004 4.3% 
BoS .004 4.3% 
Ownership Gender .031 34.9% 
Equity Origin .024 27.0% 
Borrowers’ Status .024 27.3% 
CV .004 4.3% 
OE-3 GPM .004 4.3% 
NP .006 7.2% 
FA .004 4.3% 
RA .006 7.2% 
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OE-10 FATA .062 70.0% 
Administrator Gender .067 76.6% 
Business Administration .043 48.9% 
Owners No .087 99.0% 
Firm Age .068 77.2% 
INV .086 97.9% 
ILR-2 WC .086 98.1% 
ILR-4 CR .087 98.8% 
OE-2 FATR .084 95.2% 
OE-6 AT .076 86.2% 
ILR-7 ITR .088 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The prediction of SMEs leverage structure reconciliation at 95% confidence level 
handled through the implementation of radial basis function (tested through BIC, 
and model processing time) in each sectoral analysis generated two hidden layers 
which result to be mainly correlated with: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, 
TAN, EQ, Total LEV, CV, Ownership gender, Equity origin, Borrowers’ status, 
Business size, GPM, NP, FA, RA, Business administration, and  Firm age. 
Foremost the model fits well in each case and by this way H11 hypothesis is valid. 
In addition, is also noted that first layer is mainly positively correlated with all 
dependent variables in question in production, construction and service sectors 
and the vice versa occurs for the second layer in trade sector.  
7.5. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The statistical examinations performed on univariate, multivariate and radial 
basis functions concerning SMEs debt structure management on behalf of 
financial and non-financial predictors implemented confirm that: 
-It can be affirmed that borrowers’ non-performing status coincide with a higher 
LEV by highlighting the fact that if debts grow at faster rates than those of their 
conversion into assets it makes difficult for assets themselves to generate 
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consistent cash-flows. And all this not only creates problems with loans 
repayment plan but also doesn’t contribute in efficient assets exploitation;  
-In general terms equity origin isn’t a business determinant factor concerning 
LTDER maintenance. Apart from the statistical evaluations which prove that 
national business can maintain higher LTDER, obviously mainly referring to 
long-debts insured through collaterals located within the country. And 
apparently the lack of the latter prevents other businesses (foreign and mixed-
equity) from approaching the a/m debt structure; 
-Even why business administration framework doesn’t influence TLR is clearly 
noted that mainly businesses administrated from owners appeal for higher debts 
rates than the one managed from administrators. In fact, this coincide with their 
own as well as respective businesses exigencies to cover the risks undertaken 
with higher and possible faster returns by exploring all possible market 
opportunities. In controversy administrators are presented as more conservative 
while undertaking debts (independently from their structure) by realizing the 
responsibilities in case of default and why not with stronger capabilities they 
prefer to manage the business and achieve expected results with lower debt costs; 
-Ownership gender is another non-determinant pattern related to TAN. 
Notwithstanding, the consideration of additional statistics brings to the attention 
the fact that female and mixed ownership operate with a higher security margin. 
Accordingly, they quote for higher fixed assets and this especially results to be a 
female–decision making pattern; 
-Congruent results are achieved while examining business administration gender 
and respective effects on LT-LEV structure. Therefore, at first sign it was 
statistically proven that administration gender can’t affect the latter. But 
comparatively sectorial analysis confirm that male administration is eager to 
grow-up through long-term leverage option by hedging the costs for a certain 
period of time and hereinafter by giving more priority to business run. In this 
regard mixed and female ownership prefer less long-term leverage structures by 
differently arguing under a given risk context; 
-The multiple effects of equity origin and GPM on LTD structure are statistically 
insignificant. Despite this, in general terms it can be reconfirmed the persistence 
of national businesses preferences in LTD, followed from foreign and mixed-
partnership ones.  In a certain light this leads to the understanding of financing 
accessibility within the country which is more accomodative to national 
businesses considering the asymmetrical circumstances under which is operated 
in case of foreign and mixed-equity businesses; 
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-The simultaneous impact of administrators gender and business age on FATA 
ratio results to be inexistent. This remains in line with H4 hypothesis indirect 
results where female administration opts for higher fixed assets as male and 
mixed-administration maintains lower levels. Therefore, independently from 
business age the relevance of fixed assets is preserved only from women who 
believe in business continuity and then growth by permanently investing on 
them. Without forgetting that assets may be further used as collaterals to ensure 
short-long term financing opportunities; 
-The contemporaneous impact of borrowers’ status and business size on ICR and 
TATR isn’t statistically significant. But further statistical evidences suggest that 
merely borrowers’ performing status quotes for higher ICR as well as TATR. 
Properly the credit performance demonstrates that businesses can support 
interest coverage expenses and adequately operate by ensuring sales growth 
which can be further converted in fixed and other assets due to exigencies which 
in turn help in boosting entire business performance. 
 
Short-term debt structure (ICR and STD) prediction in each sectoral affiliation fits 
well with the aid of radial basis function which operates respectively with two 
hidden layers. While in respect of statistically significant variables predicting ICR 
and STD it should be highlighted that: 
ROA and PATR ratios are consistently related to first layer, the same behavior is 
reflected also from ROE which is more correlated with first layer and less with 
second one.  From the other side, even firm age variable results to be more 
frequently correlated with first layer considering here that the correlation with the 
second one is stronger and the same situation persists as per collateral value, 
GPM, NP, EQ, FA, RA variables. Non-performing borrowers’ status results are 
contradictory while performing status is more correlated to the first layer. 
Business administration instead is more correlated to the second layer and vice 
versa occurs with the first one. While WC and CR covariates have a higher impact 
on the first layer without forgetting that the first layers are more correlated to ICR 
while the seconds are less correlated to STD.  
 
The validity of long-term debt structure (LT-LEV, LTDER, LTD) prediction 
through the implementation of radial basis function which acts on behalf of two 
hidden layers reveals as determinant factors: ACP, PATR, APP, NPM, ROA, ROE, 
TAN, EQ,  Total LEV, CV, Ownership gender, Equity origin, Borrowers’ status 
and Business size. Respectively: 
ACP, TAN and Equity origin are more frequently correlated to the first layer but 
a stronger correlation exists with second one. ROE, CV and business size 
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variables instead are more frequently correlated to the second layer but stronger 
with first one. Meanwhile ROA, APP, LEV and Borrowers’ status are equally 
correlated with both layers. 
In addition in the case of NPM, PATR and EQ prevails the correlation with the 
first layer and the vice versa happens for ownership gender in respect of second 
layer. As previously mentioned should be further considered the positive impact 
of first layer in each of dependent variables in question in production and 
construction sectors while quite the same situation is evidenced in trade and 
service sectors concerning second layer.  
 
The radial basis function reconciles SMEs leverage structure through two hidden 
layers by reflecting the predictors behavior as following:  
ACP less than 50 days is more frequently correlated to the first layer and stronger 
correlated with  second one. Meanwhile when is higher than 50 days it is more 
frequently correlated to the second layer but stronger with the first one one and 
the same is observed for APP, NPM, ROA, EQ, CV, GPM, NP, FA, RA, and 
business size predictors. A mixed correlation with both layers is reflected from 
PATR which is partially more correlated to the first layer and strongly correlated 
with the second one and from the other side more frequently and strongly 
correlated only with the first layer. ROE instead in certain circumstances is more 
correlated to the first layer and stronger with the second one as well as more and 
strongly correlated only to the second layer in other circumstances and properly 
the last behavior coincides with the one of TAN and LEV predictors.  
Meanwhile closely referring to qualitative predictors, worth highlighted that: 
female ownership results to be more correlated to the first layer, the vice versa 
occurs for male ownership while mixed ownership is equally correlated to both 
layers. In addition, national businesses are frequently and strongly correlated to 
the second layer, foreign businesses instead are correlated only to the first layer 
meanwhile mixed–equity businesses are more correlated to the latest. In 
contradiction, non-performing borrowers’ status reveals to be more correlated 
with the second layer and the performing status is partially correlated with both 
layers. Beyond this, business administration predictor has a higher impact on the 
second layer and the same can be confirmed for firm age variable. As far as can be 
understand the results of short-term debt structure prediction through radial 
basis function comply with the one of total leverage structure. And the same can 
be affirmed for long-term debt structure prediction, despite the existence of one 
exception concerning business size and CV predictors which as previously 
demonstrated have a more frequent correlation with the second layer but stronger 
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with the first one.  Under these circumstances it can be clearly stated that radial 
basis function is capable to reconcile SMEs short-long term debt structure 
prediction regardless sectoral affiliation.  
 
Hereto, the a/m results lead to a better understanding of SMEs interactive 
liquidity and leverage risk management processes by providing the potential to 
exploit business performance dimension prediction almost when particular 
elements of contingency-systems-stewardship theories prevail.  
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VIII- SMEs BEHAVIORAL RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MODEL 
 
It’s widely accepted that in respect of small businesses role in a healthy 
developing economy, smart working capital management practices enhance the 
chances for value creation. By pursuing this phylosophy and taking into 
consideration the balance between liquidity and profitability/performance the 
business should run its daily operations under a certain efficiency rate. 
Accordingly, an asset-liability mismatch may occur which increases firm 
performance in short runs by contemporaneously exposing it at insolvency risk 
while admitting that the major part of liquidity management practices are 
supported from external funding such as lending.  
And this obviously brings into the attention the undisputed capital structure 
effect on firms financial performance. Throughout orients the managers in the 
designation of optimal debts structure strategies aiming the maximization of 
firms performance by taking care even of working capital necessities because in 
some cases the high gearing may be positively related to asset and negatively to 
profit margins.  
 
Thus, in order to survive and further progress, SMEs are encouraged to 
implement an entrepreneurial mindset focused in threats recognition while 
attempting to capture environmental opportunities by assuming smart behaviors.  
Due to the a/m context, businesses key differences (e.s: age and sectoral-
affiliation) and other organizational patterns (such as: ownership gender, 
business administration framework, borrowers’ status, equity origin, etc) 
concerning entrepreneurial strategic orientation are explored in order to predict 
behavioral risk-adjusted performance models.  
 
 
 
8.1. BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANALYSIS 
Due to globalization turbulences and not only, SMEs continuously face pressure 
into their growth path and properly this causes difficulty in maintaining and 
improving performance targets set. The most frequent turbulences are the 
environmental ones and due to them managers are invited to understand and 
effectively manage the circumstances in compliance with the adequate 
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environmental orientation. The latest is developed in accordance with decision-
making styles, practices, processes and behaviors that constitute ‘the business 
entry as well as maturity’ into new or existing markets. Correspondently the 
additional environmental business dimensions explored pertain to: 
innovativeness30, proactiveness31 and risk-taking capacity32 which vary according 
to business age, sectoral-affiliation etc by providing different effects on businesses 
performance almost considering their organizational patterns.  
 
For this purpose, in following sections are analyzed qualitative and quantitative 
behavioral elements under the sectoral– affiliation logic, trying to capture and 
better understand businesses orientation on behalf of risk-adjusted performance 
measures.   
Assuming that even innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking capacity 
increases in respect of business experience/age [start-up (0-5 years), growth (5-15 
years), and matured businesses >15 years], the latter is used as a control measure 
as per such businesses organizational patterns identification (such as: 
administrators gender, business administration framework, equity origin, 
ownership gender and borrowers’ status) with a clear focus: performance 
prediction.  
 
Correspondently:  
Trade sector statistics (see Table 140) confirm that female administrators are more 
present in grown businesses than in maturity ones meanwhile male 
administrators are equally present in these businesses. The only mixed-
administration case is present in start-up businesses but worth also added that 
grown size businesses represent the highest share in the examined sample. The 
association between the a/m variables is moderate (0.710 referring to Table 141 
data) even prevail male gender as administrator. 
 
                                                          
30 Innovativeness consists in pursuing and giving support to novelty, creative 
processes and ideas through experimentation (274).  
31 Proactiveness means ‘‘seeking new opportunities which may be or not related to 
the present line of operations, introduction of new products and strategically eliminating 
operations which are in the mature or declining stages of processes life cycle’’ (275).  
32 Risk-taking is often used to describe the uncertainty that follows from business 
behavior and the focus is on moderated and calculated risk-taking instead of extreme and 
uncontrolled risk-taking projects (276). And precisely the value of the risk-taking 
dimension is that which orients the firm towards the absorption of uncertainty.  
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Table 140. Administrators gender and firm age statistics in trade sector 
 
Administrator Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Administrator Gender female Count 0 4 2 6 
Expected Count .2 3.1 2.7 6.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% 23.5% 13.3% 18.2% 
% of Total .0% 12.1% 6.1% 18.2% 
male Count 0 13 13 26 
Expected Count .8 13.4 11.8 26.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% 76.5% 86.7% 78.8% 
% of Total .0% 39.4% 39.4% 78.8% 
Male & female Count 1 0 0 1 
Expected Count .0 .5 .5 1.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
100.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% .0% .0% 3.0% 
% of Total 3.0% .0% .0% 3.0% 
Total Count 1 17 15 33 
Expected Count 1.0 17.0 15.0 33.0 
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% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
  
 
Table 141. Trade sector contingency coefficient data between administrators gender and 
firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .710   .000 
Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma -.055 .423 -.127 .899 
Spearman Correlation -.030 .207 -.167 .868c 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.111 .231 -.621 .539c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Female administration is equally present in grown sized and maturity businesses 
in production sector (see Table 142). Male administrators instead are present 
respectively in: grown, maturity and start-up businesses. As well as they 
represent the highest administration share in comparison with females, especially 
in grown sized businesses. However, their is very weak (0.069 refer to Table 143). 
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Table 142. Administrators gender and firm age statistics in production sector 
 
Administrator Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Administrator Gender female Count 0 1 1 2 
Expected Count .1 1.0 .8 2.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% 5.9% 7.1% 6.1% 
% of Total .0% 3.0% 3.0% 6.1% 
male Count 2 16 13 31 
Expected Count 1.9 16.0 13.2 31.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
6.5% 51.6% 41.9% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 94.1% 92.9% 93.9% 
% of Total 6.1% 48.5% 39.4% 93.9% 
Total Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected Count 2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
  
 
 
 
330                                                                                                        ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
Table 143. Production sector contingency coefficient data between administrators gender 
and firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .069   .924 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.058 .149 -.325 .747c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.053 .161 -.293 .771c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Construction sector examinations evidence that male administration is typical, 
but male administrators are more frequent in maturity than in grown and start-up 
businesses (see Table 144 data). Whereas the association between these variables 
in the a/m sector is weak (0.228, according to Table 145). 
 
Table 144. Administrators gender and firm age statistics in construction sector 
 
Administrator Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Administrator Gender male Count 2 11 19 32 
Expected Count 1.9 11.6 18.4 32.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
6.2% 34.4% 59.4% 100.0% 
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% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 91.7% 100.0% 97.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 33.3% 57.6% 97.0% 
Male & female Count 0 1 0 1 
Expected Count .1 .4 .6 1.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
.0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 8.3% .0% 3.0% 
% of Total .0% 3.0% .0% 3.0% 
Total Count 2 12 19 33 
Expected Count 2.0 12.0 19.0 33.0 
% within 
Administrator 
Gender 
6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 145. Construction sector contingency coefficient data between administrators 
gender and firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora Approx. Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .228   .406 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.150 .084 -.842 .406c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.181 .096 -1.024 .314c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
In service sector it can also be noted that more male than females administrate the 
examined businesses (Table 146). But more female administrators are present in 
grown businesses than in maturity ones. While the contrary is valid in male 
administrator cases and the association between these variables is weak 0.247 (as 
per Table 147 data).  
 
Thus, in general it can be affirmed that prevail male administration in maturity 
businesses followed from them in growth phase. Even why CC in each sectoral 
examination confirms that the association between administrators gender and 
firm age is weak.  
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Table 146. Administrators gender and firm age statistics in service sector 
 
Administrator Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    growth maturity 
Administrator Gender female Count 4 2 6 
Expected Count 2.4 3.6 6.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 30.8% 10.5% 18.8% 
% of Total 12.5% 6.2% 18.8% 
male Count 9 17 26 
Expected Count 10.6 15.4 26.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
34.6% 65.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 69.2% 89.5% 81.2% 
% of Total 28.1% 53.1% 81.2% 
Total Count 
13 19 32 
Expected Count 13.0 19.0 32.0 
% within Administrator 
Gender 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 147. Service sector contingency coefficient data between administrators gender and 
firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .247   .150 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .255 .174 1.443 .159c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .255 .174 1.443 .159c 
N of Valid Cases 32    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Business administration statistics (see Table 148 below) in trade sector 
demonstrate that the major part of businesses delegate the administration to 
skilled professionals (27 administrators/ 6 owners).  Concretely administrators 
manage principally grown and then maturity businesses (55.6% and 40.7%). And 
the contrary occurs when businesses are managed from owners themselves 
(33.3% vs 66.7%). In any case the association between two variables is weak 
(0.203) referring to Table 149 statistics.  
 
Table 148. Business administration and firm age statistics in trade sector 
Business administration (No admin/Yes admin) * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Business administration 
(No admin/Yes admin) 
administrator Count 1 15 11 27 
Expected 
Count 
.8 13.9 12.3 27.0 
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% within 
Business 
administration 
(No admin/Yes 
admin) 
3.7% 55.6% 40.7% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 88.2% 73.3% 81.8% 
% of Total 3.0% 45.5% 33.3% 81.8% 
owner Count 0 2 4 6 
Expected 
Count 
.2 3.1 2.7 6.0 
% within 
Business 
administration 
(No admin/Yes 
admin) 
.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 11.8% 26.7% 18.2% 
% of Total .0% 6.1% 12.1% 18.2% 
Total Count 1 17 15 33 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 17.0 15.0 33.0 
% within 
Business 
administration 
(No admin/Yes 
admin) 
3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSSS 
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Table 149. Trade contingency coefficient data between business administration 
framework and firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .203   .492 
Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma .500 .348 1.216 .224 
Spearman Correlation .207 .162 1.177 .248c 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .207 .154 1.178 .248c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Production sector examinations also confirm that in major part of them business 
management processes are delegated to administrators respectively in grown, 
maturity and start-up cases (Table 150). And the contrary is noted when owners 
themselves manage the businesses, mainly in maturity and growth phases (55.6% 
vs 44.4% see below Table). In overall the association between these variables is 
weak (0.2) referring to Table 151 data.  
 
Table 150. Business administration and firm age statistics in production sector 
 
Business administration * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Business 
administration 
administrator Count 2 13 9 24 
Expected Count 1.5 12.4 10.2 24.0 
% within Business 
administration 
8.3% 54.2% 37.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 76.5% 64.3% 72.7% 
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% of Total 6.1% 39.4% 27.3% 72.7% 
owner Count 0 4 5 9 
Expected Count .5 4.6 3.8 9.0 
% within Business 
administration 
.0% 44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% 23.5% 35.7% 27.3% 
% of Total .0% 12.1% 15.2% 27.3% 
Total Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected Count 2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within Business 
administration 
6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 151. Production contingency coefficient data between business administration 
framework and firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb Approx. Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .200   .503 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .198 .150 1.124 .270c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .189 .162 1.073 .292c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The statistics in following pertaining to construction sector (Table 152) 
demonstrate that even here the major part of businesses is managed from 
administrators. They are more frequently present in maturity, then in grown and 
start-up businesses with respectively 51.9%, 40.7%v and 7.4%. Also businesses 
managed from owners demonstrate that owners management is concentrated in 
maturity businesses (83.3%) and then in growth ones (16.7%). Despite this, CC 
confirms a weak (0.243) association between these variables (refer to Table 153).   
 
 
Table 152. Business administration and firm age statistics in construction sector 
 
Business administration * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   
Firm age 
Total 
   
start-up growth maturity 
Business administration administrator Count 2 11 14 27 
Expected 
Count 
1.6 9.8 15.5 27.0 
% within 
Business 
administratio
n 
7.4% 40.7% 51.9% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 91.7% 73.7% 81.8% 
% of Total 6.1% 33.3% 42.4% 81.8% 
owner Count 0 1 5 6 
Expected 
Count 
.4 2.2 3.5 6.0 
% within 
Business 
administratio
n 
.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
.0% 8.3% 26.3% 18.2% 
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% of Total .0% 3.0% 15.2% 18.2% 
Total Count 2 12 19 33 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 12.0 19.0 33.0 
% within 
Business 
administratio
n 
6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 153. Construction contingency coefficient data between business administration 
framework and firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb Approx. Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .243   .355 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .246 .121 1.415 .167c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .251 .135 1.441 .160c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Again in service sector (Table 154) is statistically confirmed that businesses 
administrated from skilled professionals mainly pertain to maturity phase (63.6% 
vs 36.4 in grown phase). While the ones managed from owners are equally 
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concentrated in growth and maturity businesses.  The CC even here is weak 
(0.128 in Table 155).  
Anyway it can be confirmed that merely administrators and owners are focused 
on grown and matured businesses regardless sectoral-affiliation. 
 
Table 154. Business administration and firm age statistics in service sector 
 
Business administration * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    growth maturity 
Business administration administrator Count 8 14 22 
Expected Count 8.9 13.1 22.0 
% within Business 
administration 
36.4% 63.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 61.5% 73.7% 68.8% 
% of Total 25.0% 43.8% 68.8% 
owner Count 5 5 10 
Expected Count 4.1 5.9 10.0 
% within Business 
administration 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 38.5% 26.3% 31.2% 
% of Total 15.6% 15.6% 31.2% 
Total Count 13 19 32 
Expected Count 13.0 19.0 32.0 
% within Business 
administration 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 155. Service contingency coefficient data between business administration 
framework and firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .128   .467 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.129 .178 -.711 .483c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.129 .178 -.711 .483c 
N of Valid Cases 32    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
According to equity origin instead in trade sector (Table 156) is evidenced that 
national equity businesses are mainly grown, followed from the one in maturity 
phase and then from start-up ones (respectively with 55.2%, 41.4% and 3.4%). 
Foreign businesses are equally concentrated in maturity and growth phases. 
Meanwhile mixed-equity ones pertain only to maturity businesses. But referring 
to CC (see Table 157) the association of two variables is weak (0. 274).  
 
Table 156. Equity origin and firm age statistics in trade sector 
 
Equity Origin * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   
Firm age 
Total 
   
start-up growth maturity 
Equity Origin national Count 1 16 12 29 
Expected Count .9 14.9 13.2 29.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
3.4% 55.2% 41.4% 100.0% 
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% within Firm age 100.0% 94.1% 80.0% 87.9% 
% of Total 3.0% 48.5% 36.4% 87.9% 
foreign Count 0 1 1 2 
Expected Count .1 1.0 .9 2.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% 5.9% 6.7% 6.1% 
% of Total .0% 3.0% 3.0% 6.1% 
mixed-equity Count 0 0 2 2 
Expected Count .1 1.0 .9 2.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
.0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age .0% .0% 13.3% 6.1% 
% of Total .0% .0% 6.1% 6.1% 
Total Count 1 17 15 33 
Expected Count 1.0 17.0 15.0 33.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Firmage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 157. Trade contingency coefficient data between equity origin and firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .274   .615 
Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma .636 .346 1.344 .179 
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Spearman Correlation .233 .151 1.331 .193c 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .259 .118 1.495 .145c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Production sector sample is composed only from national businesses (refer to 
Table 158) which in turns are concentrated in growth, maturity and start-up 
businesses (with respectively 51.5%, 42.4% and 6.1%).  Under these circumstances 
the CC can’t be estimated.   
 
Table 158. Equity origin and firm age statistics in production sector 
 
Equity Origin * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Equity Origin national Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected Count 2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within Equity Origin 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected Count 2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within Equity Origin 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In construction sector (Table 159), national businesses are equally concentrated in 
grown and maturity businesses, and less present in start-up ones (respectively 
with 46.2%, 46.2% and 7.7%).  Foreign businesses are mainly represented in 
maturity businesses, and then in growth and start-up phases (with respectively 
57.1%, 35.7% and 7.1%). The same logic is pursued also from mixed-equity 
businesses (with respectively 83.3%, 16.7% and 0%).  But again the correlation 
between two variables is weak (0.261 see Table 160).  
 
Table 159. Equity origin and firm age statistics in construction sector 
 
 
 
Equity Origin * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up Growth maturity 
Equity Origin national Count 1 6 6 13 
Expected Count .8 4.7 7.5 13.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
7.7% 46.2% 46.2% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 50.0% 50.0% 31.6% 39.4% 
% of Total 3.0% 18.2% 18.2% 39.4% 
foreign Count 1 5 8 14 
Expected Count .8 5.1 8.1 14.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
7.1% 35.7% 57.1% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 50.0% 41.7% 42.1% 42.4% 
% of Total 3.0% 15.2% 24.2% 42.4% 
mixed equity Count 0 1 5 6 
Expected Count .4 2.2 3.5 6.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
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% within Firm age .0% 8.3% 26.3% 18.2% 
% of Total .0% 3.0% 15.2% 18.2% 
Total Count 2 12 19 33 
Expected Count 2.0 12.0 19.0 33.0 
% within Equity 
Origin 
6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 160. Construction sector contingency coefficient data between equity origin and 
firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .261   .659 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .246 .147 1.415 .167c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .246 .158 1.416 .167c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Service sector data confirm that national  businesses pertain (respectively with 
58.6% and 41.1%) to maturity and growth businesses (refer to Table 161). The 
same is valid also for mixed-equity ones (with respectively 66.7% and 33.3%). But 
the CC result (Table 162) confirms that the relationship between these variables is 
very weak (0.048). Closely referring to the statistics retrieved it can be affirmed 
that equity origin and firm age variables correlation is weak regardless sectoral-
affiliation.  
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Table 161. Equity origin and firm age statistics in service sector 
Equity Origin * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    Growth maturity 
Equity Origin national Count 12 17 29 
Expected 
Count 
11.8 17.2 29.0 
% within 
Equity 
Origin 
41.4% 58.6% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
92.3% 89.5% 90.6% 
% of Total 37.5% 53.1% 90.6% 
mixed equity Count 1 2 3 
Expected 
Count 
1.2 1.8 3.0 
% within 
Equity 
Origin 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
7.7% 10.5% 9.4% 
% of Total 3.1% 6.2% 9.4% 
Total Count 13 19 32 
Expected 
Count 
13.0 19.0 32.0 
% within 
Equity 
Origin 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
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Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 162. Service sector contingency coefficient data between equity origin and firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .048   .787 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .048 .171 .262 .795c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .048 .171 .262 .795c 
N of Valid Cases 32    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
And in respect of ownership gender behavior context referring to the below trade 
statistics it can be stated that female gender is more present in grown businesses, 
followed from the maturity ones (85.7% vs 14.3%). Meanwhile concerning male 
gender the contrary is valid as they are more present in maturity businesses than 
in grown phase ones (52.2% vs 47.8%). Mixed-partnership cases are primarily 
concentrated in maturity businesses and then in start-up ones (66.7% vs 33.3%, in 
Table 163). Anyway the correlation between these variables is moderate referring 
to contingency coefficient data (see Table 164).  
 
Table 163. Ownership gender and firm age statistics in trade sector 
Ownership Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Ownership Gender female Count 0 6 1 7 
Expected Count .2 3.6 3.2 7.0 
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% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 35.3% 6.7% 21.2% 
% of Total .0% 18.2% 3.0% 21.2% 
male Count 0 11 12 23 
Expected Count .7 11.8 10.5 23.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 47.8% 52.2% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 64.7% 80.0% 69.7% 
% of Total .0% 33.3% 36.4% 69.7% 
mixed partnership Count 1 0 2 3 
Expected Count .1 1.5 1.4 3.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
33.3% .0% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% .0% 13.3% 9.1% 
% of Total 3.0% .0% 6.1% 9.1% 
Total Count 1 17 15 33 
Expected Count 1.0 17.0 15.0 33.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
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Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 164. Trade sector contingency coefficient data between ownership gender and firm 
age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .562   .004 
Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma .442 .352 1.320 .187 
Spearman Correlation .246 .194 1.412 .168c 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .173 .228 .981 .334c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
In production sector (see Table 165) also female ownership is more present in 
grown businesses than in maturity ones (50% vs 44.4%) and for male gender the 
same situation persists (54.5% vs 36.4%). Mixed-partnership businesses instead 
are equally concentrated in grown and maturity businesses. Nonetheless the 
correlation between these variables is weak, 0.135 (see Table 166).  
 
Table 165. Ownership gender and firm age statistics in production sector 
 
Ownership Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Ownership Gender female Count 1 9 8 18 
Expected 
Count 
1.1 9.3 7.6 18.0 
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% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
5.6% 50.0% 44.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
50.0% 52.9% 57.1% 54.5% 
% of Total 3.0% 27.3% 24.2% 54.5% 
male Count 1 6 4 11 
Expected 
Count 
.7 5.7 4.7 11.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
9.1% 54.5% 36.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
50.0% 35.3% 28.6% 33.3% 
% of Total 3.0% 18.2% 12.1% 33.3% 
mixed partnership Count 0 2 2 4 
Expected 
Count 
.2 2.1 1.7 4.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 11.8% 14.3% 12.1% 
% of Total .0% 6.1% 6.1% 12.1% 
Total Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
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% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 166. Production sector contingency coefficient data between ownership gender and 
firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .135   .962 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .007 .164 .037 .971c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.018 .172 -.098 .923c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Female gender ownership again in construction sector is more present in grown 
businesses than in maturity ones (57.1% vs 42.9% as per Table 167 data). Male 
gender in controversy is more present in maturity businesses than in grown ones 
(59.1% vs 31.8%) and the same worth for mixed-partnership businesses (with 
respectively 75% vs 25%).  But the correlation between two variables is weak, 
0.269 (refer to Table 168).  
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Table 167. Ownership gender and firm age statistics in construction sector 
 
Ownership Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Ownership Gender female Count 0 4 3 7 
Expected 
Count 
.4 2.5 4.0 7.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
.0% 33.3% 15.8% 21.2% 
% of Total .0% 12.1% 9.1% 21.2% 
male Count 2 7 13 22 
Expected 
Count 
1.3 8.0 12.7 22.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
9.1% 31.8% 59.1% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 58.3% 68.4% 66.7% 
% of Total 6.1% 21.2% 39.4% 66.7% 
mixed partnership Count 0 1 3 4 
Expected 
Count 
.2 1.5 2.3 4.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
.0% 8.3% 15.8% 12.1% 
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% of Total .0% 3.0% 9.1% 12.1% 
Total Count 2 12 19 33 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 12.0 19.0 33.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 168. Construction sector contingency coefficient data between ownership gender 
and firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency 
Coefficient 
.269 
  
.630 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .135 .141 .758 .454c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .161 .157 .911 .369c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The service sector statistics (Table 169) display that female gender ownership is 
totally focused in grown businesses. Male ownership instead is focused both in 
maturity and grown businesses (66.7% and 33.3%) and the same can be confirmed 
for mixed-partnership cases (60% vs 40%). And the correlation between two a/m 
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variables results to be quite moderate (see Table 170).  Consequently, in general it 
must be admitted that the correlation between these two variables is consistent.  
 
 
 
Table 169. Ownership gender and firm age statistics in service sector 
 
Ownership Gender * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    growth maturity 
Ownership Gender female Count 3 0 3 
Expected 
Count 
1.2 1.8 3.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
23.1% .0% 9.4% 
% of Total 9.4% .0% 9.4% 
male Count 8 16 24 
Expected 
Count 
9.8 14.2 24.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
61.5% 84.2% 75.0% 
% of Total 25.0% 50.0% 75.0% 
mixed partnership Count 2 3 5 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 3.0 5.0 
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% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
15.4% 15.8% 15.6% 
% of Total 6.2% 9.4% 15.6% 
Total Count 13 19 32 
Expected 
Count 
13.0 19.0 32.0 
% within 
Ownership 
Gender 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within 
Firm age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 170. Service sector contingency coefficient data between ownership gender and firm 
age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .365   .086 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .232 .174 1.309 .200c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .223 .183 1.252 .220c 
N of Valid Cases 32    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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With special regard to trade sector as per borrowers’ status (Table 171), it can be 
highlighted that the major part of non-performing borrowers pertains to maturity 
phase businesses (80%) in comparison with the ones in grown phase (20%). 
Performing borrowers from the other side are mainly concentrated in growth 
phase than in maturity and start-up ones (with respectively 57.1%, 39.3% and 
3.6%). Moreover is demonstrated that the relationship between these variables is 
weak, 0.282 (refer to Table 172 data).  
 
Table 171. Borrowers’ status and firm age statistics in trade sector 
 
Borrowers Status * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Borrowers Status non-performing Count 0 1 4 5 
Expected 
Count 
.2 2.6 2.3 5.0 
% within 
Borrowers 
Status 
.0% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 5.9% 26.7% 15.2% 
% of Total .0% 3.0% 12.1% 15.2% 
performing Count 1 16 11 28 
Expected 
Count 
.8 14.4 12.7 28.0 
% within 
Borrowers 
Status 
3.6% 57.1% 39.3% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 94.1% 73.3% 84.8% 
% of Total 3.0% 48.5% 33.3% 84.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  VIII: SMEs BEHAVIORAL RISK-ADJ PERFORMANCE MODEL              357 
 
Total Count 1 17 15 33 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 17.0 15.0 33.0 
% within 
Borrowers 
Status 
3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 51.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Table 172. Trade sector contingency coefficient data between borrowers’ status and firm 
age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .282   .239 
Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma -.725 .277 -1.718 .086 
Spearman Correlation -.293 .147 -1.708 .098c 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.288 .140 -1.672 .105c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Against the production sector statistics pertaining to borrowers’ status (Table 172) 
demonstrate that non-performing borrowers mainly consists in maturity 
businesses and less are businesses in growth phase (66.7% vs 33.3%). And the 
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same occurs for performing borrowers’ status in comparison with trade sector, as 
the major part of them are businesses in growth phase (55.6%), followed from the 
one in maturity (37%) and start-up phases (7.4%). Even here the correlation 
between two variables is weak, 0.235 as resulted in trade sector too (refer to Table 
173). 
 
Table 173. Borrowers’ status and firm age statistics in production sector 
 
Borrowers Status * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Borrowers Status non-performing Count 0 2 4 6 
Expected Count .4 3.1 2.5 6.0 
% within 
Borrowers ‘ 
Status 
.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
.0% 11.8% 28.6% 18.2% 
% of Total .0% 6.1% 12.1% 18.2% 
performing Count 2 15 10 27 
Expected Count 1.6 13.9 11.5 27.0 
% within 
Borrowers ‘ 
Status 
7.4% 55.6% 37.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 88.2% 71.4% 81.8% 
% of Total 6.1% 45.5% 30.3% 81.8% 
Total Count 2 17 14 33 
Expected Count 2.0 17.0 14.0 33.0 
% within 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
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% within Firm 
age 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 51.5% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 174. Production sector contingency coefficient data between borrowers’ status and 
firm age 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .235   .381 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.241 .145 -1.380 .177c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.242 .156 -1.387 .175c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Quite the same situation with trade and production sectors is evidenced even in 
construction one (refer to Table 174).  As the major parts of non-performing 
borrowers are businesses in maturity phase and the same is valid concerning 
performing businesses. The correlation between two variables also here is weak, 
0.183 (see Table 175).  
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Table 175. Borrowers’ status and firm age statistics in construction sector 
 
Borrowers Status * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    start-up growth maturity 
Borrowers Status non-performing Count 1 2 5 8 
Expected Count .5 2.9 4.6 8.0 
% within 
Borrowers’ Status 
12.5% 25.0% 62.5% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 50.0% 16.7% 26.3% 24.2% 
% of Total 3.0% 6.1% 15.2% 24.2% 
performing Count 1 10 14 25 
Expected Count 1.5 9.1 14.4 25.0 
% within 
Borrowers’ Status 
4.0% 40.0% 56.0% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 50.0% 83.3% 73.7% 75.8% 
% of Total 3.0% 30.3% 42.4% 75.8% 
Total Count 2 12 19 33 
Expected Count 2.0 12.0 19.0 33.0 
% within 
Borrowers’ Status 
6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.1% 36.4% 57.6% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 176. Construction sector contingency coefficient data between borrowers’ status 
and firm age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .183   .565 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .014 .193 .078 .938c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.021 .183 -.118 .906c 
N of Valid Cases 33    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The service sector data (Table 176) from the other side confirm that non-
performing as well as performing borrowers’ statuses are businesses in maturity 
phase (with respectively 66.7% and 58.6%). But the correlation of a/m variables is 
still very weak (0.048 in Table 177).   
And in a general prospect statistically based it can be affirmed that the relation 
between these two variables even is weak is present regardless sectoral-affiliation.    
 
 
Table 177. Borrowers’ status and firm age statistics in service sector 
 
Borrowers Status * Firm age Cross tabulation 
   Firm age 
Total    growth maturity 
Borrowers Status non-performing Count 1 2 3 
Expected Count 1.2 1.8 3.0 
% within Borrowers’ 
Status 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
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% within Firm age 7.7% 10.5% 9.4% 
% of Total 3.1% 6.2% 9.4% 
performing Count 12 17 29 
Expected Count 11.8 17.2 29.0 
% within Borrowers’ 
Status 
41.4% 58.6% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 92.3% 89.5% 90.6% 
% of Total 37.5% 53.1% 90.6% 
Total Count 13 19 32 
Expected Count 13.0 19.0 32.0 
% within Borrowers’ 
Status 
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
% within Firm age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 178. Service sector contingency coefficient data between borrowers’ status and firm 
age 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig.a 
Nominal by Nominal Contingency Coefficient .048   .787 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -.048 .171 -.262 .795c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -.048 .171 -.262 .795c 
N of Valid Cases 32    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.     
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.   
     
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Rationally the examinations performed introduce some important signs 
concerning businesses environmental behavior which should be further explored 
in order to predict the aspired risk-adjusted performance models.  
Comparatively even considering various disputed theoretical and practical 
measures concerning risk-taking capacity and returns in quality of business 
performance hereinafter are explored gross operative margin (GOM, as an 
uncertainty measure), and return on assets and equity (ROA and ROE) as the 
most appropriate ones referring to sectoral-pertinence and business strategic 
perspective.  
This logic complies with the fact that a successful uncertainty management 
produces profit and then the latter is used to increase assets value in order to 
accelerate business profitability and further on its equity by ensuring the ongoing 
performance progress.  
Concretely, the ‘sectoral data-pool’ statistics referring to GOM demonstrate (see 
Table 178) that in general service activity is the most risky one, followed from 
trade. In controversy construction and production activities result to be less risky 
on behalf of the assumption ‘high risk-high return’.   
 
Table 179. Gross operative margin GOM cross-sectoral statistics in % 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in %) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
GOM-TRADE -36% -24% 66% 
GOM-PRODUCTION 0% 15% 110% 
GOM-CONSTRUCTION -170% 24% 499% 
GOM-SERVICE -40% -15.2% 40% 
 
 Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Under this context, in a ‘stress-scenario’ case must be added that due to business 
cycle construction (which marks the lowest GOM)  represents the most risky 
activity, thus, worth mentioned that here sales and costs are accounted only when 
the major part of project is concluded and that’s why partially results aren’t 
considered. Meanwhile seasonality may be the issue concerning trade sector. And 
foremost service activities may operate even under cost in a start-up phase in 
order to compete with experienced businesses that charge even higher service 
prices. Comparatively, the results in ‘best-case scenario’ are fully compliant with 
‘return margins’ managed under ‘uncertainty conditions’.  
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Taking clue to return on assets evidences (in Table 179) reveal that in general 
businesses pertaining to service, trade and construction invest less in assets. And 
this sound true in conformity with business nature. Excluding the last one which 
constructs for sale purposes, the other two sectors are focused in a short-business 
cycle, in the meaning that no huge amounts of assets are required to run their 
daily activities and perform well with a futuristic target. Production sector instead 
may require a continuous investment in assets almost related to innovation and 
business proactivity by reducing ‘human labor cost’ while increasing profitability. 
But referring to the context they operate for a long-time with same productive 
mechanisms closely referring to financial leasing costs.  
 
 
Table 180. Return on assets ROA cross-sectoral statistics in % 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in %) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
ROA-TRADE -78% 4% 47% 
ROA-PRODUCTION -102% 31% 174% 
ROA-CONSTRUCTION -1% 6% 34% 
ROA-SERVICE -138% -19% 122% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration  
 
 
Additionally considering their experience it must be said, that they also tend to 
exploit the assets remained value, which obviously increases profitability. As well 
as productive mechanism may be sold out to be substituted with new equipments 
and machineries, and this leads to the understand that why its ROA vary.  
 
Quite same logic is valid also concerning return on equity statistics (refer to Table 
180), as trade, service and production sectors in general don’t require huge 
amounts of equity considering business cycle flexibility and precisely the activity 
undertaken. In controversy construction sector needs enough equity to 
accomplish the projects undertaken before being available for sale, even some 
expenses are mainly supported from clearing activities. Thus, its ROE is the 
lowest in a ‘best-case scenario’. Meanwhile trade, production and service sectors 
continuously generate profits which cover the equity (and the latest vary 
according to the strategic goals set from businesses in compliance with their 
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age/market experience, as some of them may account the profits as equity 
increase or distribute them  to owners).  
 
Table 181. Return on equity ROE cross-sectoral statistics in % 
 
SECTORAL DATA (in %) MIN AVERAGE MAX 
ROE-TRADE -22% 71% 128% 
ROE-PRODUCTION -8% 22% 127% 
ROE-CONSTRUCTION -5% 13% 77% 
ROE-SERVICE -28% 8% 144% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration 
 
Subsequently, in a more complex and why not realistic overview deemed 
necessary to deploy deeper examinations concerning businesses differences and 
respective organizational patterns trying to successfully capture environmental 
turbulences from one side and predict risk-adjusted performance models in the 
other one. What helps in lessons learning as well as in the establishment and 
development of value culture dimensions within the organizations.  
 
 
8.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
For the a/m reasons and almost closely referring to ‘sectoral data-pools’, the 
behavioral and organizational qualitative patterns examined in following are: 
ownership gender, equity origin, business administration framework, borrowers’ 
status and firm age. Meanwhile as predictive factors are implemented the one of 
liquidity management decision making process (such as: MCC, NPM, RATR and 
WC) contemporaneously with the ones of debt reconciliation structure (such as: 
LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD, ICR and STD) and TAN considering the circumstances.  By 
especially assuming the exploitation of environmental opportunities supported 
even from the existence of  indirect relations of ACP, PATR, CV, FA, ITA, INV, 
STA and owners number toward risk-adjusted performance indicators such as: 
ROE, ROA and GOM.  
 
 
Correspondingly, in following are presented the hypotheses examined aiming the 
prediction of SMEs risk-adjusted performance models.  
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H1: Ownerships gender positively impacts ROE regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H2: Equity origin influence GOM regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H3: Business administration framework impacts ROA regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H4: Borrowers’ status affects ROE regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H5: Administrators gender influence GOM regardless sectoral affiliation;  
H6: Borrowers’ status and LTDER contemporaneously negatively affect GOM regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
H7: Business administration framework and RATR can’t simultaneously impact ROE 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H8: Equity origin, firm age and business size have a simultaneous impact on ROA 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H9: Borrowers’ status, firm age and TAN have a multiple impact on ROA and ROE 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
H10: Business administration framework, MCC and NPM have a multiple impact on 
ROE regardless sectoral affiliation;  
H11: A radial basis function predicts SMEs risk-adjusted performance regardless sectoral 
affiliation.  
 
 
 
8.3. HYPOTHESES EXAMINATION, TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
H1: Ownerships gender positively impacts ROE regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Trade sector evidences confirm that ownerships gender doesn’t impacts ROE (see 
Table 181). In contradiction Levenes’ test (Table 1/ Appendix C) demonstrates that 
ROE errors variance isn’t the same between three ownership gender groups.  
 
Foremost estimated marginal means (see Figure 58) show that ROE is higher in 
female ownership gender cases then pursued from mixed-partnership and male 
gender ones.  
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Table 182. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs ROE) in trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA1-ROE      
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.512a 2 2.256 .224 .800 .015 
Intercept .413 1 .413 .041 .841 .001 
Ownerships Gender 4.512 2 2.256 .224 .800 .015 
Error 301.787 30 10.060    
Total 312.160 33     
Corrected Total 306.299 32     
a. R Squared = .015 (Adjusted R Squared = -.051)    
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Figure 58. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning ownership gender in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Ownerships gender statistics doesn’t confirm any impact on ROE even in 
production sector (Table 182 data). Despite Levenes’ test again shows inequality 
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(refer to Table 2 in Appendix C) in ROE errors variance between three ownership 
groups. While in estimated marginal means (Figure 59) is noted a higher ROE 
concerning male ownership gender and lower ROE levels for female and mixed-
partnership cases.  
 
 
Table 183. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs ROE) in production 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta Sq. 
Noncent. 
Param. 
Obs 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 469.627a 2 234.814 .531 .594 .034 1.061 .129 
Intercept 1873.743 1 1873.743 4.233 .048 .124 4.233 .513 
Ownerships 
Gender 
469.627 2 234.814 .531 .594 .034 1.061 .129 
Error 13278.672 30 442.622      
Total 17204.894 33       
Corrected Total 13748.299 32       
a. R Squared = .034 (Adjusted R Squared = -.030)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 59. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning ownership gender in production 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The same context is presented even in construction sector concerning the impact 
of ownerships gender in ROE (see Table 183) and its errors variance inequality 
(refer to Levenes’ test Table 3 in Appendix C). Meanwhile estimated marginal 
means data (Figure 60) demonstrate that mixed-partnership quotes higher ROEs 
in comparison with male and female gender cases.  
 
Table 184. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs ROE) in construction 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramet
er 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model .002a 2 .001 .032 .968 .002 .064 .054 
Intercept .416 1 .416 12.183 .002 .303 12.183 .921 
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Ownerships 
Gender 
.002 2 .001 .032 .968 .002 .064 .054 
Error .956 28 .034      
Total 1.558 31       
Corrected Total .958 30       
a. R Squared = .002 (Adjusted R Squared = .069)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 60. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning ownership gender in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Ownerships gender isn’t a determinant factor for ROE even in service sector (refer 
to below Table data). Levenes’ test results confirm inequality data in ROEs errors 
variance concerning three ownership gender groups (Table 4/Appendix C). And 
estimated marginal means data (Figure 61) comply with the ones of construction 
sector.  
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Table 185. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Ownership gender vs ROE) in service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta Sq. 
Noncent. 
Param. 
Obsr. 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 839.531a 2 419.765 .570 .572 .038 1.139 .135 
Intercept 1682.689 1 1682.689 2.283 .142 .073 2.283 .309 
Ownerships 
Gender 
839.531 2 419.765 .570 .572 .038 1.139 .135 
Error 21371.527 29 736.949      
Total 26037.870 32       
Corrected Total 22211.058 31       
a. R Squared = .038 (Adjusted R Squared = -.029)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 61. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning ownership gender in service 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Whereas the statistics demonstrate that ownerships gender doesn’t impact ROE, 
Levenes’ test results confirm some rumors but despite this, H1 hypothesis can be 
rejected. From the other hand, contradictory results reveal through estimated 
marginal means in trade and production sectors considering that female owners 
opt for higher ROE, and the vice-versa occurs in construction and service sectors 
where first mixed-partnership and then male and female gender opts for high 
ROE levels.  
 
H2: Equity origin influence GOM regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Equity origin statistically based reveals a determinant factor in trade sectors GOM 
(Table 185). Levenes’ test argues that no differences exist in GOMs errors variance 
between three equity origin groups (refer to Table 5 in Appendix C). Through 
estimated marginal means (Figure 62) data instead it can be confirmed that in 
turns national, then foreign and mixed equity cases opt for higher GOM.  
 
Table 186. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs GOM) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 
GOM 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
9.348a 2 4.674 6.386 .005 .299 12.773 .870 
Intercept 11.027 1 11.027 15.067 .001 .334 15.067 .964 
Equity Origin 9.348 2 4.674 6.386 .005 .299 12.773 .870 
Error 21.957 30 .732      
Total 33.263 33       
Corrected Total 31.305 32       
a. R Squared = .299 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.252) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 62. Marginal means of GOM concerning equity origin in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Production sector data clearly demonstrate that equity origin doesn’t influence 
GOM (Table 186 data). Levenes’ test can’t be estimated as production sector is 
composed only from national equity businesses and under this circumstances 
even estimated marginal means can’t show more information (refer to Figure 63).  
 
 
Table 187. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs GOM) in production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 
GOM 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
.000a 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Intercept 7183.988 1 7183.988 10.989 .002 .256 10.989 .895 
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Equity Origin .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error 20919.662 32 653.739      
Total 28103.650 33       
Corrected 
Total 
20919.662 32 
      
a. R Squared = .000 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.000) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning equity origin in production 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Referring to the below construction sector statistics (Table 187) equity origin 
doesn’t influence GOM. Levenes’ test data evidence GOM errors variance 
differences in the equity groups (Table 6 in Appendix C). And furthermore 
estimated marginal means (Figure 64) demonstrate that foreign equity businesses 
prefer to maintain higher GOM followed from mixed and then national equity 
ones.  
 
Table 188. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs GOM) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 
GOM 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
1319.682a 2 659.841 .524 .597 .034 1.049 .128 
Intercept 
1497.412 1 
1497.41
2 
1.190 .284 .038 1.190 .184 
Equity Origin 1319.682 2 659.841 .524 .597 .034 1.049 .128 
Error 
37746.211 30 
1258.20
7 
     
Total 41026.532 33       
Corrected Total 39065.894 32       
a. R Squared = .034 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.031) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 64. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning equity origin in construction 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Equity origin doesn’t influence GOM in service sector (refer to below table) and 
the same can be confirmed from Levenes’ test results (Table 7 in Appendix C) as 
the GOMs errors variance is the same in three equity groups. But from estimated 
marginal means (Figure 65) it can be evidenced that mixed-equity cases prefer to 
maintain higher GOM and the vice versa occurs as per national business capital 
preferences.  
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Table 189. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin vs GOM) in service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 
GOM 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
335.316a 1 335.316 3.393 .078 .129 3.393 .423 
Intercept 637.426 1 637.426 6.449 .018 .219 6.449 .682 
Equity Origin 335.316 1 335.316 3.393 .078 .129 3.393 .423 
Error 2273.212 23 98.835      
Total 2912.456 25       
Corrected Total 2608.528 24       
a. R Squared = .129 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.091) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 65. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning equity origin in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
  
 
 
 
378                                                                                                        ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
Excluding trade sector, equity origin isn’t a determinant factor as per GOM, so H2 
can be rejected. In the major part of cases also Levenes’ tests confirm the 
inexistence of errors variance differences between equity origin groups. But 
however, estimated marginal means produce contradictory results in trade and 
construction sector.  
 
H3: Business administration framework impacts ROA regardless sectoral affiliation; 
Trade sector statistical evidences demonstrate that business administration 
framework impacts ROA (Table 189). But differences between two business 
administration groups are quite inexistent (refer to Table 8 in Appendix C). 
Estimated marginal means data from the other hand, explain that administrators 
opt for higher ROA levels than the ones quoted from owners (see Figure 66).   
 
 
Table 190. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs ROA) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramete
r 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model .245a 1 .245 7.685 .009 .199 7.685 .766 
Intercept .025 1 .025 .790 .381 .025 .790 .138 
Business 
administration 
.245 1 .245 7.685 .009 .199 7.685 .766 
Error .989 31 .032      
Total 1.275 33       
Corrected Total 1.234 32       
a. R Squared = .199 (Adjusted R Squared = .173)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 66. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning business administration 
framework in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The exact contrary with trade sector reveals in the production sector as business 
administration framework doesn’t impact ROA (Table 190 data).  Differences 
even here don’t exist concerning ROAs errors variance between two business 
administration groups (Table 9/ Appendix C). In controversy, estimated marginal 
means data confirm that owners who administrate businesses by themselves opt 
for higher ROA levels than the ones managed from administrators (Figure 77).  
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Table 191. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs ROA) in 
production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramete
r 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model 8.676a 1 8.676 3.187 .084 .093 3.187 .409 
Intercept 8.447 1 8.447 3.102 .088 .091 3.102 .400 
Business 
administration 
8.676 1 8.676 3.187 .084 .093 3.187 .409 
Error 84.407 31 2.723      
Total 96.180 33       
Corrected Total 93.083 32       
a. R Squared = .093 (Adjusted R Squared = .064)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 67. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning business administration 
framework in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Business administration results in construction sector confirm that they don’t 
impact ROA (Table 191). Levenes’ test reveals some rumors concerning 
differences in ROA errors variance between two administrators groups (see data 
in Table 10/Appendix C). Despite this, estimated marginal means show (Figure 
68) that administrators prefer to maintain higher ROA levels in comparison with 
those cases when owners themselves administrate the business.  
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Table 192. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs ROA) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model .006a 1 .006 .816 .374 .026 .816 .141 
Intercept .040 1 .040 5.353 .028 .151 5.353 .610 
Business 
administration 
.006 1 .006 .816 .374 .026 .816 .141 
Error .222 30 .007      
Total .329 32       
Corrected Total .228 31       
a. R Squared = .026 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.006) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Figure 68. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning business administration 
framework in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Business administration isn’t a determinant factor of ROA in service sector (see 
the following data) almost when there are no identified differences in ROAs 
errors variance between two business administration groups (refer to Appendix 
C/Table 11). While estimated marginal means (see Figure 69) demonstrate that 
administrators perform better by reaching higher ROA levels in comparison with 
businesses that are administrated from owners themselves.  
 
 
Table 193. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration vs ROA) in service 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model .217a 1 .217 .023 .879 .001 .023 .053 
Intercept 1.427 1 1.427 .154 .697 .005 .154 .067 
Business 
administration 
.217 1 .217 .023 .879 .001 .023 .053 
Error 277.610 30 9.254      
Total 279.037 32       
Corrected Total 277.827 31       
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.033)      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 69. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning business administration 
framework in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
According to the a/m statistics it can be affirmed that business administration 
framework isn’t a determinant factor as per ROA (excluding trade sector), by this 
way H3 hypothesis can be rejected. Contemporaneously worth highlighted also 
that Levenes’ test doesn’t demonstrate differences in ROAs errors variance 
between business administration groups. But the sectoral tendence (excluding 
production for which the contrary is valid) is that businesses administrated from 
skilled managers opt for higher ROA levels in comparison with them managed 
from owners themselves.  
 
H4: Borrowers’ status affects ROE regardless sectoral affiliation; 
Borrowers’ status doesn’t affect ROE in trade sector according to the a/m statistics 
(Table 193). Hereinafter Levenes’ test confirms differences in ROE errors variance 
between two different borrowers’ groups (Table 12/Appendix C). Which are 
further examined from estimated marginal means (refer to Figure 70) by 
confirming that performing businesses generate higher ROE levels in comparison 
with non-performing ones.  
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Table 194. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 
ROE 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
6965.025a 1 6965.025 .164 .688 .005 .164 .068 
Intercept 9007.981 1 9007.981 .212 .648 .007 .212 .073 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
6965.025 1 6965.025 .164 .688 .005 .164 .068 
Error 
1315768.889 31 
42444.15
8 
     
Total 1368302.003 33       
Corrected Total 1322733.914 32       
a. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.027) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 70. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning borrowers’ status in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The production sector statistics show (Table 194) that borrowers’ status doesn’t 
affect ROE and Levenes’ test results confirm the absence of differences between 
ROE errors variance in two borrowers’ status (see Table 13 in Appendix C). 
Notwithstanding here estimated marginal means (Figure 71) confirm that 
performing status businesses opt for higher ROE levels than non-performing 
ones.  
 
 
Table 195. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in production 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 
ROE 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
979.050a 1 979.050 2.377 .133 .071 2.377 .321 
Intercept 647.217 1 647.217 1.571 .219 .048 1.571 .229 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
979.050 1 979.050 2.377 .133 .071 2.377 .321 
Error 12769.249 31 411.911      
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Total 17204.894 33       
Corrected Total 13748.299 32       
a. R Squared = .071 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.041) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Figure 71. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning borrowers’ status in production 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Borrowers’ status in construction sector doesn’t impact ROE (see Table 195 data). 
But Levenes’ test confirms the existence of differences in ROE errors variance 
between two borrowers’ groups (Table 14 in Appendix C). And estimated 
marginal means (in Figure 72) show that even here as in the previously examined 
sectors performing businesses quote higher ROE levels than non-performing 
ones. 
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Table 196. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in construction 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
.086a 1 .086 2.871 .101 .090 2.871 .374 
Intercept .237 1 .237 7.879 .009 .214 7.879 .774 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
.086 1 .086 2.871 .101 .090 2.871 .374 
Error .872 29 .030      
Total 1.558 31       
Corrected Total .958 30       
a. R Squared = .090 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.059) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 72. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning borrowers’ status in construction 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Service sector statistics also confirm that borrowers’ status doesn’t affect business 
ROE (see Table below). But differences exist in the latest errors variance 
concerning two different borrowers’ groups (Appendix C–Table 15). 
Simultaneously estimated marginal means (Figure 73) clearly state that 
performing businesses mark higher ROE values.  
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Table 197. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 
ROE 
       
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observ. 
Powerb 
Corrected 
Model 
380.961a 1 380.961 .524 .475 .017 .524 .108 
Intercept 408.208 1 408.208 .561 .460 .018 .561 .112 
Borrowers’ 
Status 
380.961 1 380.961 .524 .475 .017 .524 .108 
Error 21830.097 30 727.670      
Total 26037.870 32       
Corrected Total 22211.058 31       
a. R Squared = .017 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.016) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  VIII: SMEs BEHAVIORAL RISK-ADJ PERFORMANCE MODEL              391 
 
 
Figure 73. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning borrowers’ status in service 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Substantially, the H4 hypothesis, can be rejected as in none of the examined 
sectors borrowers’ status doesn’t affect ROE.  But correspondingly Levenes’ test 
argued on the existence of differences in ROE errors variance between borrowers’ 
groups. And furthermore in each of the examined sectors performing businesses 
quoted higher ROE levels than non-performing ones.  
 
 
H5: Administrators gender influence GOM regardless sectoral affiliation;  
The statistics elaborated in trade sector (Table 197) revealed that administrators 
gender doesn’t impact GOM. While Levenes’ test confirms differences in GOM 
errors variance between administrators gender groups (Table 16/Appendix C). In 
addition from estimated marginal means (in Figure 74) is confirmed that mixed 
administration maintains higher ROE levels, than pursue female cases and 
ultimately male administrators.  
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Table 198. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs GOM) in trade 
sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model .858a 2 .429 .423 .659 .027 .845 .112 
Intercept .020 1 .020 .020 .888 .001 .020 .052 
Administrators 
Gender 
.858 2 .429 .423 .659 .027 .845 .112 
Error 30.448 30 1.015      
Total 33.263 33       
Corrected Total 31.305 32       
a. R Squared = .027 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.037) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 74. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning administrators gender in trade 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Production sector data also confirm that administrators gender doesn’t influence 
GOM (Table 198). However, Levenes’ test argues on differences on GOM errors 
variance between administrators groups (see Table 17 in Appendix C). Estimated 
marginal means from the other side demonstrate that female administrators opt 
for higher GOM than male administrators (Figure 75).  
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Table 199. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs GOM) in production 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 20.400a 1 20.400 .030 .863 .001 .030 .053 
Intercept 1972.865 1 1972.865 2.926 .097 .086 2.926 .381 
Administrators 
Gender 
20.400 1 20.400 .030 .863 .001 .030 .053 
Error 20899.262 31 674.170      
Total 28103.650 33       
Corrected Total 20919.662 32       
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.031) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 75. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning administrators gender in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Administrators gender doesn’t influence GOM referring to construction sector 
data (see Table 199). And Levenes’ test confirms differences in GOM error 
variance between administrators’ gender groups (Table 18 in Appendix C). The 
accordingly estimated marginal means identified (as per Figure 76) that male 
administrators maintain higher GOM than mixed-administrators cases.   
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Table 200. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs GOM) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 61.270a 1 61.270 .049 .827 .002 .049 .055 
Intercept 61.270 1 61.270 .049 .827 .002 .049 .055 
Administrators 
Gender 
61.270 1 61.270 .049 .827 .002 .049 .055 
Error 
39004.624 31 
1258.21
4 
     
Total 41026.532 33       
Corrected Total 39065.894 32       
a. R Squared = .002 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.031) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 76. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning administrators gender in 
construction sector. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Administrators gender even in service sector doesn’t influence GOM (see Table 
200). In addition Levenes’ test (Table 19 in Appendix C) demonstrates the 
inexistence of GOM errors variance differences between different administrators 
gender groups. But estimated marginal means (Figure 77) confirm that male 
administrators operate with higher GOM  than female administrators.  
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Table 201. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Administrators gender vs GOM) in service 
sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model 69.393a 1 69.393 .629 .436 .027 .629 .118 
Intercept 80.079 1 80.079 .725 .403 .031 .725 .129 
Administrators 
Gender 
69.393 1 69.393 .629 .436 .027 .629 .118 
Error 2539.135 23 110.397      
Total 2912.456 25       
Corrected Total 2608.528 24       
a. R Squared = .027 (Adjusted R Squared = -
.016) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 77. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning administrators gender in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Closely referring to the examinations performed it can be underlined that merely 
administrators gender doesn’t influence GOM, thus, H5 hypothesis can be 
rejected. Levenes’ test demonstrated differences in the major part of examinations 
concerning GOM errors variance differences between administrators gender 
groups. While estimated marginal means instead generated contradictory results 
(trade vs construction and service vs production) regarding administrators 
gender preferences on GOM.  
 
 
H6: Borrowers’ status and LTDER contemporaneously negatively affect GOM regardless 
sectoral affiliation; 
Borrowers’ status and LTDER don’t simultaneously affect GOM in trade sector 
closely referring to the below statistics (Table 201). Separately instead only 
LTDER affects GOM. And Levenes’ test demonstrates that differences exist in 
GOM errors variance between borrowers’ groups (Table 20 in Appendix C). 
According to estimated marginal means (Figure 78) it should be added that 
performing borrowers’ status quotes for higher GOM in comparison with non-
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performing status. The LTDER instead marks the highest GOM of 0.7% as per its 
1.5%, the lowest instead of  -3.8% at 4% by averagely fluctuating at 0%.  
 
 
Table 202. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs GOM) in 
trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Squar
e F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta Sq. 
Noncent. 
Param. 
Observ 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 31.056a 26 1.194 28.692 .000 .992 746.004 1.000 
Intercept 5.501 1 5.501 132.153 .000 .957 132.153 1.000 
RA1LTDER * 
Borrowers’ Status 
.002 1 .002 .046 .837 .008 .046 .054 
RA1LTDER 13.397 24 .558 13.409 .002 .982 321.821 .998 
Borrowers’ Status .003 1 .003 .070 .800 .012 .070 .056 
Error .250 6 .042      
Total 33.263 33       
Corrected Total 31.305 32       
a. R Squared = .992 (Adjusted R Squared 
= .957) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 78. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning Borrowers’ status  and LTDER 
impact in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Production sector evidences reveals that LTDER and borrowers’ status don’t 
simultaneously affect GOM (Table 202). Neither of a/m variables doesn’t even 
separately affect GOM. Comparatively, Levenes’ test confirms significant 
differences in GOM errors variance between borrowers’ status groups (Appendix 
21/Table X). While estimated marginal means affirm (see Figure 79) the contrary 
of relationship between borrowers’ status and GOM with the one of trade sector.  
 
And for LTDER and GOM relationship it is confirmed that the first fluctuates 
above 30% on GOM level, and the highest GOM of 120% is marked at 346% 
LTDER level.   
 
Table 203. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs GOM) in 
production sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 20919.662a 32 653.739 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept 
6520.811 1 
6520.81
1 
. . 1.000 . . 
RA1LTDER 20552.194 31 662.974 . . 1.000 . . 
Borrowers’ Status .000 0 . . . . . . 
RA1LTDER * 
Borrowers’ Status 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 28103.650 33       
Corrected Total 20919.662 32       
a. R Squared = 1.000        
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  VIII: SMEs BEHAVIORAL RISK-ADJ PERFORMANCE MODEL              403 
 
 
 
 
Figure 79. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning Borrowers ‘status and LTDER 
impact in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Even in construction sector borrowers’ status and LTDER don’t have a 
simultaneous impact on GOM (Table 203). Any significant relation doesn’t exist 
even by separately treating the examined variables. In controversy the differences 
existence in GOM errors variance between borrowers’ status groups is confirmed 
through Levenes’ test data (Table 22 in Appendix C). Estimated marginal means 
also confirm (see Figure 80) that performing status businesses maintain higher 
GOM in comparison with non-performing ones. LTDER instead shows that 
averagely it is maintained a low GOM within the sector. 
 
 
Table 204. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs GOM) in 
construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 
39065.894a 32 
1220.80
9 
. . 1.000 . . 
Intercept 759.084 1 759.084 . . 1.000 . . 
RA1LTDER 
38403.608 31 
1238.82
6 
. . 1.000 . . 
Borrowers’ Status .000 0 . . . . . . 
RA1LTDER * 
Borrowers’ Status 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 41026.532 33       
Corrected Total 39065.894 32       
a. R Squared = 1.000        
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 80. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning Borrowers’ status and LTDER 
impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Under the same context remain also service sector statistics concerning borrowers’ 
status and LTDER simultaneous impact on GOM. Furthermore it doesn’t exist any 
individual relationship between variables taken into consideration (Table 204) 
and GOM. However Levenes’ test confirms differences in GOM errors variance 
between borrowers’ groups (refer to Table 23 in Appendix C). And in following 
the estimated marginal means data (see Figure 81) confirm that performing 
borrowers’ status maintains higher GOM levels than non-performing one, for 
GOM instead it confirms that its average level according to LTDER values is 7%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 205. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs GOM) in 
service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 1069.910a 16 66.869 .348 .966 .410 5.563 .107 
Intercept 5.623 1 5.623 .029 .868 .004 .029 .053 
Borrowers’ Status .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
RA1LTDER 809.317 15 53.954 .281 .984 .345 4.208 .095 
Borrowers’ Status * 
RA1LTDER 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error 1538.618 8 192.327      
Total 2912.456 25       
Corrected Total 2608.528 24       
a. R Squared = .410 (Adjusted R Squared 
= -.770) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 81. Estimated marginal means of GOM concerning Borrowers’ status and LTDER 
impact in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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In general it should be confirmed that borrowers’ status and LTDER don’t have a 
simultaneous significant impact on GOM in each of sector-affiliations examined, 
throughout, H6 hypothesis can be rejected. Nonetheless, Levenes’ test statistics 
confirm the existence of differences in GOM errors variance between borrowers’ 
groups. As well as in the major part of estimated marginal means data revealed 
that performing borrowers’ status opt for higher GOM levels (excluding 
production sector where the contrary occurs). Meanwhile in respect of LTDER 
estimated marginal means data confirmed that in trade and construction sectors 
the average GOM level is above 0%, and increases in service sector (with an 
average of 7%) followed from the one of production sector (averagely 30%).  
 
 
H7: Business administration framework and RATR can’t simultaneously impact ROE 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
Business administration framework and RATR can’t simultaneously impact ROE 
in trade sector. Different circumstances reveals while examining independently 
each of these variables relationship (Table 205 data). Accordingly Levenes’ test 
results (Table 24 in Appendix C) prove the differences in ROE errors variance 
between business administration groups. In addition estimated marginal means 
data (Figure 82) show that businesses administrated from owners realize higher 
ROE values and the contrary worth for them administrated from delegated 
persons. In addition concerning RATR and its relation with ROE the data confirm 
that in average ROE is above 0%.   
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Table 206. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration and RATR vs ROE) 
in trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA1-ROE        
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model 306.297a 31 9.881 4.429E3 .012 1.000 137283.917 1.000 
Intercept 2.522 1 2.522 1.131E3 .019 .999 1130.508 .992 
ILR5RATR 305.598 30 10.187 4.566E3 .012 1.000 136970.837 1.000 
Business 
administration 
.057 1 .057 25.407 .125 .962 25.407 .308 
ILR5RATR * 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error .002 1 .002      
Total 312.160 33       
Corrected Total 306.299 32       
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R Squared = 
1.000) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 82. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework and RATR impact in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Production sector data reveal that business administration framework and RATR 
can’t impact ROE (Table 206) but individual relations exist. Simultaneously 
Levenes’ test data show the existence of differences in ROE errors variance 
between business administration groups as per Table 25 in Appendix C. Through, 
as evidenced even in trade sector estimated marginal means is confirmed that 
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businesses administrated from owners generate higher ROE levels than the one 
managed from administrators (Figure 83). Higher ROE levels instead are 
averagely evaluated (above 20%) concerning RATR relationship with the latter.  
 
Table 207. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration and RATR vs ROE) 
in production sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model 13174.535a 23 572.806 8.985 .001 .958 206.654 .999 
Intercept 
4055.021 1 
4055.02
1 
63.607 .000 .876 63.607 1.000 
ILR5RATR 13154.438 22 597.929 9.379 .001 .958 206.339 .999 
Business 
administration 
4.909 1 4.909 .077 .788 .008 .077 .057 
ILR5RATR * 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error 573.764 9 63.752      
Total 17204.894 33       
Corrected Total 13748.299 32       
a. R Squared = .958 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .852) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 83. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework and RATR impact in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The simultaneous impact of business administration framework and RATR on 
construction sector ROE is statistically insignificant. The same is valid even 
considering the individual variables relations (refer to Table below). From the 
other side rumors are evidenced referring to Levenes’ test data as per the 
existence of differences in ROE errors variance between two business 
administration groups (Appendix C/Table 26).  
 
Here the estimated marginal means confirm that businesses administrated from 
professionals perform better in term of ROE than the one managed from owners 
themselves. While RATR results affirm that average ROE level is above 25% (as 
per Figure 84).  
 
Table 208. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration and RATR vs ROE) 
in construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model .363a 19 .019 .353 .977 .379 6.716 .125 
Intercept .240 1 .240 4.432 .059 .287 4.432 .484 
ILR5RATR .350 18 .019 .360 .974 .371 6.479 .126 
Business 
administration 
.027 1 .027 .493 .497 .043 .493 .099 
ILR5RATR * 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error .595 11 .054      
Total 1.558 31       
Corrected Total .958 30       
a. R Squared = .379 (Adjusted R 
Squared = -.693) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 84. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework and RATR impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Statistically based business administration framework and RATR can’t 
simultaneously affect ROE in service sector (below Table). The same is valid for 
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the a/m variables individual relationships. But Levenes’ test argues on significant 
differences between ROE errors variance between business administration groups 
(Table 27 in Appendix C). Comparatively estimated marginal means (Figure 85) 
data confirm that businesses administrated from skilled professionals opt for 
higher ROE levels in controversy with them managed from owners themselves. 
With special regard to RATR data, here it can be demonstrated that average ROE 
level maintained is above 20%.  
 
 
Table 209. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration and RATR vs ROE) 
in service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 22150.558a 30 738.352 12.204 .223 .997 366.125 .182 
Intercept 
3348.696 1 
3348.69
6 
55.350 .085 .982 55.350 .441 
ILR5RATR 22137.990 29 763.379 12.618 .220 .997 365.917 .184 
Business 
administration 
235.126 1 235.126 3.886 .299 .795 3.886 .124 
ILR5RATR * 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error 60.500 1 60.500      
Total 26037.870 32       
Corrected Total 22211.058 31       
a. R Squared = .997 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .916) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 85. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework and RATR impact in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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According to the statistical evaluations it can be affirmed that, in each sectoral 
examination the simultaneous effect of business administration framework and 
RATR on ROE is statistically insignificant at 95% confidence level. By this way, 
H7 hypothesis results valid.  In addition RATR had a statistical significant impact 
at the same confidence level on ROE in production sector. As well as worth 
mentioned that Levenes’ test results affirm the existence of differences in ROE 
errors variance between business administration groups.  Estimated marginal 
means from the other side confirmed contradictory results concerning ROE 
performance on behalf of different business administration phylosophies. Thus, in 
trade and production sector the owners management provides higher ROE levels 
than the one generated from administrators and vice versa occurs as per 
construction and service sectors. Meanwhile averagely, in production, 
construction and service sector RATR data correspond to 20%-25% ROE level (the 
lowest average ROE level is marked in trade sector with above 0%).  
H8: Equity origin, firm age and business size have a simultaneous impact on ROA 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
 
Neither simultaneously nor independently equity origin, business size and firm 
age can’t impact ROA in trade sector (refer to below Table). The differences 
instead in ROA errors variance are confirmed through Levenes’ test result (Table 
28 in Appendix C).  The estimated marginal means results demonstrate that 
foreign, than national and mixed equity businesses prefer to maintain high ROA 
levels (Figure 86). 
The business size and firm age results instead confirm that respectively maintain 
ROA at 17% and 20% levels.  
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Table 210. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin, business size and firm age vs 
ROA) in trade sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 1.234a 32 .039 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept .005 1 .005 . . 1.000 . . 
Equity Origin 
2.592E-5 1 
2.592E-
5 
. . 1.000 . . 
BoS .269 20 .013 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm Age .000 0 . . . . . . 
Equity Origin * BoS * 
Firm Age 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 1.275 33       
Corrected Total 1.234 32       
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 86. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning Equity origin, Firm age and Size 
impact in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The same situation persists even in production sector regarding the simultaneous 
statistically insignificant impact of equity origin, business size and age on ROA  
(Table 210). Levenes’ test doesn’t produce results as only national equity 
businesses pertain to production sector (Table 29/Appendix C). But from the 
estimated marginal means results (in Figure 87) it can be concluded that 
averagely ROA concerning firm age and business size respectively captures 13% 
and 0% levels. 
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Table 211. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin, business size and firm age vs 
ROA) in production sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 93.083a 32 2.909 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept .836 1 .836 . . 1.000 . . 
Equity Origin .000 0 . . . . . . 
Firm Age .000 0 . . . . . . 
BoS 79.151 19 4.166 . . 1.000 . . 
Equity Origin * Firm 
Age * BoS 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 96.180 33       
Corrected Total 93.083 32       
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 87. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning Equity origin, Firm age and Size 
impact in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
According to the following statistics it can be highlighted the fact that the 
simultaneous impact on ROA of equity origin, business size and age in 
construction sector is insignificant (see Table 211).  Levenes’ test result confirms 
that differences in ROA errors variance exist between equity origin groups 
referring to Table 30 in Appendix C. Furthermore on behalf of estimated marginal 
means (in Figure 88) mixed-equity businesses generate higher ROA than foreign 
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and national ones. Whereas business size and age relation with ROA 
demonstrates that in average the latter is above 10% and 15% respectively.  
 
 
Table 212. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin, business size and firm age vs 
ROA) in construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model .228a 31 .007 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept .081 1 .081 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm Age .000 0 . . . . . . 
Equity Origin .000 0 . . . . . . 
BoS .148 17 .009 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm Age * Equity 
Origin * BoS 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total .329 32       
Corrected Total .228 31       
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 88. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning Equity origin, Firm age and Size 
impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
On a statistical context (see Table 212) it can be highlighted that firm age, size and 
equity origin can’t simultaneously impact ROA in service sector. Levenes’ test 
confirms the differences that exist between ROA errors variance and equity origin 
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groups (as can be evidenced in Table 31/Appendix C). Almost referring to the 
latter, the estimated marginal means (Figure 89) demonstrated that mixed equity 
businesses generate a higher ROA than national ones. While business size and age 
relation in confront of ROA respectively confirms that its average level is 
maintained in 3-4%.  
 
Table 213. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Equity origin, business size and firm age vs 
ROA) in service sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 277.827a 31 8.962 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept 3.583 1 3.583 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm Age .000 0 . . . . . . 
Equity Origin .000 0 . . . . . . 
BoS 56.827 19 2.991 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm Age * Equity 
Origin * BoS 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 279.037 32       
Corrected Total 277.827 31       
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 89. Estimated marginal means of ROA concerning Equity origin, Firm age and Size 
impact in service sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
As per above mentioned statistics, the H8 hypothesis can be rejected. Despite the 
fact that rumors concerning ROA errors variance between equity origin groups 
are evidenced in each of the sectoral examinations as well as estimated marginal 
means contradictory results revealed in trade and construction sector concerning 
highest ROA level generation. By the same way, referring to business size and age 
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concerning ROA it can be affirmed that the highest levels are identified in trade 
sector (with 17% and 20% respectively), followed from the ones of construction 
sector (with 10% and 15% respectively), production sector (with 0% and 13% 
respectively) and ultimately service sector (with 3-4% respectively).  
 
 
 
H9: Borrowers’ status, firm age and TAN have a multiple impact on ROA and ROE 
regardless sectoral affiliation; 
 
In a deeper examination framework trying to capture the exact impact of business 
age on performance measures such as ROA and ROE, the business size 
classification in start-up, growth and maturity phase was implemented.  
 
Accordingly:  
Trade sector examined statistics demonstrate that doesn’t exist the multiple 
impact of borrowers’ status, firm age and TAN on ROA and ROE (see Table 213 
data). TAN is statistically significant to ROE and the same can be confirmed for 
borrowers’ status as per both dependent variables. Contemporaneously, Levenes’ 
test argues on the existence of differences in ROA and ROEs errors variance 
between borrowers’ groups and firm age (see Table 32 in Appendix C). In 
reference to the borrowers’ status estimated marginal means it can be affirmed 
that performing borrowers generate higher ROAs and ROEs and the vice versa 
occurs as per non-performing ones. Meanwhile the highest ROA is respectively 
noted in grown, start-up and maturity businesses. For ROE instead the highest is 
marked in start-up, grown and maturity businesses. According to TAN statistics it 
can be said that the average ROA and ROE respectively remain at 18% and 3% 
levels (see Figure 90).  
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Table 214. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status, Assets tangibility and 
Firm age vs ROA and ROE) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Depe
ndent 
Varia
ble 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramete
r 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model GA-1 
ROA 
1.118a 29 .039 .994 .596 .906 28.814 .126 
GA1-
ROE 
306.108c 29 10.555 
165.7
19 
.001 .999 4805.843 1.000 
Intercept GA-1 
ROA 
.117 1 .117 3.008 .181 .501 3.008 .232 
GA1-
ROE 
42.239 1 42.239 
663.1
45 
.000 .995 663.145 1.000 
OE8TAN GA-1 
ROA 
.620 26 .024 .614 .793 .842 15.972 .096 
GA1-
ROE 
234.892 26 9.034 
141.8
37 
.001 .999 3687.763 1.000 
Firm  age_A GA-1 
ROA 
.015 1 .015 .381 .581 .113 .381 .073 
GA1-
ROE 
.244 1 .244 3.831 .145 .561 3.831 .279 
Borrowers’ Status GA-1 
ROA 
.716 1 .716 
18.46
7 
.023 .860 18.467 .807 
GA1-
ROE 
1.008 1 1.008 
15.83
2 
.028 .841 15.832 .751 
OE8TAN * Firm 
age_A * Borrowers’ 
Status 
GA-1 
ROA 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA1-
ROE 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
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Error GA-1 
ROA 
.116 3 .039 
     
GA1-
ROE 
.191 3 .064 
     
Total GA-1 
ROA 
1.275 33 
      
GA1-
ROE 
312.160 33 
      
Corrected Total GA-1 
ROA 
1.234 32 
      
GA1-
ROE 
306.299 32 
      
a. R Squared = .906 (Adjusted R Squared 
= -.006) 
       
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
        
c. R Squared = .999 (Adjusted R Squared 
= .993) 
       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 90. Estimated marginal means of ROA and ROE concerning Borrowers’ status, 
Firm age and TAN impact in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
As per statistical examinations performed in production sector it can be 
highlighted that the multiple impact of firm age, borrowers’ status and TAN on 
ROA and ROE doesn’t exist (excluding the statistically significant impact of TAN 
on ROA as per Table 214). Moreover accordingly, Levenes’ test confirmed rumors  
concerning borrowers’ status and firm age relationship with ROA and ROE (Table 
33 in Appendix C). And estimated marginal means revealed that performing 
borrowers’ status generates higher ROAs and ROEs than non-performing ones. 
Foremost, start-up, grown and then maturity businesses maintain the highest 
ROE levels and the contrary is valid for ROA (refer to Figure 91).  While the 
results pertaining to TAN relationship with ROA and ROE confirm that they are 
above 4% and 12% levels.  
 
Table 215. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status, Assets tangibility and Firm 
age vs ROA and ROE) in production sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Sq F Sig. 
Part Eta 
Sq 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Ob. 
Powerb 
Corrected Model OE-7 ROE 13547.298a 31 437.010 2.174 .497 .985 67.399 .089 
GA-1 ROA 93.081c 31 3.003 1.379E3 .021 1.000 42736.962 .981 
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Intercept OE-7 ROE 2987.953 1 2987.953 14.865 .162 .937 14.865 .238 
GA-1 ROA .080 1 .080 36.652 .104 .973 36.652 .365 
OE8TAN OE-7 ROE 9642.217 28 344.365 1.713 .549 .980 47.971 .083 
GA-1 ROA 87.359 28 3.120 1.432E3 .021 1.000 40109.543 .983 
Firm age_A OE-7 ROE .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA-1 ROA .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Borrowers’ Status OE-7 ROE .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA-1 ROA .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
OE8TAN * Firm 
age_A * Borrowers’ 
Status 
OE-7 ROE .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA-1 ROA 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error OE-7 ROE 201.001 1 201.001 
     
GA-1 ROA .002 1 .002 
     
Total OE-7 ROE 17204.894 33 
      
GA-1 ROA 96.180 33 
      
Corrected Total 
 
 
 
 
OE-7 ROE 13748.299 32 
      
GA-1 ROA 
93.083 32 
      
 
a. R Squared = .985 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.532) 
       
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
        
c. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.999) 
       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 91. Estimated marginal means of ROA and ROE concerning Borrowers’ status, 
Firm age and TAN impact in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The below statistics (see Table 215) pertaining to construction sector also confirm 
that the multiple impact of borrowers’ status, TAN and  firm age on ROA and 
ROE is insignificant. However, Levenes’ test argues on a potential relation 
between borrowers’ status, and firm age with ROA and ROE (refer to Table 34 in 
Appendix C). Moreover estimated marginal means (Figure 92) confirm that 
borrowers’ performing status generates higher ROA and ROE levels in 
controversy with non-performing ones. In addition estimated marginal means 
data as per firm age confirm that the highest ROE is maintained from start-up 
businesses, followed from maturity and grown ones.  
And as per ROA, the highest is maintained from grown, followed from maturity 
and start-up businesses. Comparatively, TAN data confirm that generally ROA 
and ROE are maintained at 17% and 16% levels.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
434                                                                                                        ARDITA TODRI 
 
Table 216. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status, Assets tangibility and 
Firm age vs ROA and ROE) in construction sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III 
Sum Sq df 
Mean 
Sq F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta Sq 
Noncent. 
Param 
Observ 
Powerb 
Corrected Model OE-7 ROE .882a 29 .030 .400 .875 .921 11.597 .059 
GA-1 ROA .186c 29 .006 .164 .980 .826 4.746 .054 
Intercept OE-7 ROE .298 1 .298 3.912 .298 .796 3.912 .124 
GA-1 ROA .014 1 .014 .367 .653 .268 .367 .059 
OE8TAN OE-7 ROE .610 26 .023 .308 .917 .889 8.021 .057 
GA-1 ROA .168 26 .006 .165 .979 .811 4.291 .054 
Firm age_A OE-7 ROE .031 1 .031 .405 .639 .288 .405 .060 
GA-1 ROA .021 1 .021 .539 .597 .350 .539 .063 
Borrowers’ Status OE-7 ROE .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA-1 ROA .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
OE8TAN * Firm 
age_A * Borrowers’ 
Status 
OE-7 ROE .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
GA-1 ROA 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error OE-7 ROE .076 1 .076      
GA-1 ROA .039 1 .039      
Total OE-7 ROE 1.558 31       
GA-1 ROA .329 31       
Corrected Total OE-7 ROE .958 30       
GA-1 ROA .225 30       
a. R Squared = .921 (Adjusted R Squared = -
1.381) 
       
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
        
c. R Squared = .826 (Adjusted R Squared = -
4.221) 
       
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 92. Estimated marginal means of ROA and ROE concerning Borrowers’ status, 
Firm age and TAN impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Borrowers’ status, TAN and firm age don’t have a simultaneous impact on ROA 
and ROE in service sector (see the following data). The contrary is evidenced in 
Levenes’ test results concerning ROA and ROE differences in errors variance 
between borrowers’ status and firm age (see Table 35 in Appendix C).  
 
Precisely estimated marginal means (in Figure 93) show that performing 
businesses generate higher ROA and ROE than non-performing ones. As well as 
maturity and then grown businesses maintain highest ROE and ROA levels. 
Comparatively, TAN in general is maintained at 5% and 15% of ROA and ROE 
levels.  
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Table 217. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Borrowers’ status, Assets tangibility and 
Firm age vs ROA and ROE) in service sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Depend
Variabl 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe
d Powerb 
Corrected Model OE-7 
ROE 
22211.05
8a 
31 716.486 . . 1.000 . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
277.827a 31 8.962 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept OE-7 
ROE 
456.123 1 456.123 . . 1.000 . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
65.881 1 65.881 . . 1.000 . . 
OE8TAN OE-7 
ROE 
19022.03
1 
29 655.932 . . 1.000 . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
171.828 29 5.925 . . 1.000 . . 
Firm age_A OE-7 
ROE 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Borrowers’ Status OE-7 
ROE 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
OE8TAN * Firm 
age_A * Borrowers’ 
Status 
OE-7 
ROE 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
GA-1 
ROA 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
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Error OE-7 
ROE 
.000 0 . 
     
GA-1 
ROA 
.000 0 . 
     
Total OE-7 
ROE 
26037.87
0 
32 
      
GA-1 
ROA 
279.037 32 
      
Corrected Total OE-7 
ROE 
22211.05
8 
31 
      
GA-1 
ROA 
277.827 31 
      
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
       
b. Computed using alpha = 
.05 
        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 93. Estimated marginal means of ROA and ROE concerning Borrowers’ status, 
Firm age and TAN impact in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The H9 hypothesis on behalf to the a/m examinations can be rejected. But worth 
underlining that in each sector is evidenced that performing borrowers’ status 
generates higher ROAs and ROEs than non-performing ones. And according to 
firm age can be added that grown and in following start-up businesses mainly 
maintain the highest ROAs and ROEs levels. TAN instead maintains ROE and 
ROAs levels around 15%.  
 
 
 
H10: Business administration framework, MCC and NPM have a multiple impact on 
ROE regardless sectoral affiliation;  
 
 
The multiple impact of business administration framework, MCC and NPM on 
ROE in trade sector referring to the a/m statistics (Table 217) is statistically 
insignificant Independently Levenes’ test data confirm differences in ROE errors 
variance between business administration groups (Table 36 in Appendix C).  And 
the estimated marginal means data precisely determine that businesses managed 
from delegated professionals such as administrators generate higher ROE levels 
in comparison with the one managed from owners themselves (Figure 94). The 
same data pertaining to MCC and NPM relationship with ROE confirm that 
respectively the average ROE levels maintained are: 5% and 3%. 
 
 
 
Table 218. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration framework, MCC 
and NPM vs ROE) in trade sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 1.323E6
a 
32 
41335.4
35 
. . 1.000 . . 
Intercept 20513.6
29 
1 
20513.6
29 
. . 1.000 . . 
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Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
ILR11MCC .859 4 .215 . . 1.000 . . 
OE5NPM .000 0 . . . . . . 
Business 
administration * 
ILR11MCC * 
OE5NPM 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 1368302
.003 
33 
      
Corrected Total 1322733
.914 
32 
      
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .) 
      
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 94. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM impact in trade sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Production sector examination statistics reveal that don’t exist any multiple 
impact of business administration, MCC and NPM on ROE (see Table 218), 
considering here that only MCC effect on ROE is statistically significant. Levenes’ 
test also identifies differences on ROE errors variance between business 
administration groups (Appendix C/Table 37). Further examined from estimated 
marginal means data (see Figure 95) it was observed that businesses managed 
from owners themselves opt for higher ROE levels in comparison with them 
managed from administrators. In terms of MCC and NPM relationships with ROE 
it can be concluded that they respectively quote 20% and 10% levels.  
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Table 219. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration framework, MCC 
and NPM vs ROE) in production sector 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 13653.56
5a 
29 470.813 
7.434
E5 
.000 1.000 2.156E7 1.000 
Intercept 
3836.135 1 
3836.13
5 
6.057
E6 
.000 1.000 
6057055.3
82 
1.000 
ILR11MCC 
5.314 3 1.771 
2.797
E3 
.000 1.000 8390.855 1.000 
OE5NPM .000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Business 
administration 
.000 1 .000 .645 .506 .244 .645 .079 
ILR11MCC * 
OE5NPM * Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error .001 2 .001      
Total 17204.47
2 
32 
      
Corrected Total 13653.56
6 
31 
      
a. R Squared = 1.000 (Adjusted R Squared = 
1.000) 
     
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 95. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM impact in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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The multiple effect of business administration, MCC and NPM on ROE in 
construction sector is inexistent (Table 219). However, the Levenes’ test data 
confirm a certain relationship between business administration framework and 
ROE (Table 38 in Appendix C). For this purpose the examination performed on 
estimated marginal means terms (Figure 96) demonstrated that administrators 
can generate higher ROE than owners while managing respective businesses. 
And with special regard to MCC and NPM relationships with ROE is evidenced 
that they quote averagely 18% and 24% ROE level 
 
Table 220. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration framework, MCC 
and NPM vs ROE) in construction sector 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Sq F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Sq 
Noncent. 
Param 
Observ 
Powerb 
Corrected Model .495a 24 .021 .268 .991 .517 6.421 .085 
Intercept .224 1 .224 2.910 .139 .327 2.910 .302 
OE5NPM .114 3 .038 .491 .701 .197 1.472 .104 
ILR11MCC .181 6 .030 .392 .860 .282 2.353 .097 
Business 
administration 
.057 1 .057 .742 .422 .110 .742 .113 
OE5NPM * 
ILR11MCC * 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . .000 .000 . 
Error .463 6 .077      
Total 1.558 31       
Corrected Total .958 30       
a. R Squared = .517 (Adjusted R Squared = -1.415) 
     
ccbb. Computed using alpha = .05 
       
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 96. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM impact in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The statistical results elaborated in service sector prove (below Table 220) that 
even here the multiple impact of business administration, MCC and NPM on 
ROE is inexistent.  But this again is in contradiction with Levenes’ test data which 
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argue on a potential relationship of ROE and business administration (Table 
39/Appendix C). Under these circumstances estimated marginal means (in Figure 
97) confirm that administrators perform better than owners in terms of business 
ROE generation. In respect of MCC and NPM relationships with ROE in general 
context they respectively mark the 20% and 25% levels.  
 
Table 221. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Business administration framework, MCC 
and NPM vs ROE) in service sector 
 
 Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE        
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 22208.930
a 
30 740.298 . . 1.000 . . 
Intercept 
3301.132 1 
3301.13
2 
. . 1.000 . . 
ILR11MCC 1215.245 2 607.623 . . 1.000 . . 
OE5NPM 11.045 1 11.045 . . 1.000 . . 
Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
ILR11MCC * 
OE5NPM * Business 
administration 
.000 0 . . . . . . 
Error .000 0 .      
Total 25947.620 31       
Corrected Total 22208.930 30       
a. R Squared = 1.000        
b. Computed using alpha = .05        
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Figure 97. Estimated marginal means of ROE concerning Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM impact in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Referring to the examinations, it can be concluded that H10 hypothesis can be 
rejected. Even in each sectorial examination Levenes’ test argue on potential 
relationships between ROE and business administration groups. Considering that 
the major part of results support the evidence that businesses administrated from 
skilled professionals opt for higher ROEs in comparison with them managed from 
owners themselves (excluding the production sector results). Then, a consistent 
relationship between ROE and MCC and NPM is verified in service (20% and 
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25%), followed from construction (18% and 24%), production (20% and 10%) and 
ultimately trade sector (5% and 3%).   
 
 
H11: A radial basis function predicts SMEs risk-adjusted performance regardless sectoral 
affiliation 
 
The radial basis function implemented in trade sector for the prediction of risk 
adjusted performance (ROE, ROA, GOM), operated with two hidden layers (see 
Table 230) which result to be correlated with: LTDER,  LT-LEV, LTD, ICR, STD,  
WC, RATR, MCC, NPM, TAN, BoS, Ownership Gender, Equity Origin, 
Borrowers Status, Business administration, Administrator Gender, Firm age and 
STA (Tables 221-223). The first layer has a stronger impact on ROE meanwhile the 
contrary is evidenced for the second one in correspondence of the rest of 
dependent variables (as per Table 40 in Appendix C).  
 
Table 222. Network Information/RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 RA-1 LTDER 
2 RA-5 LT-LEV 
3 LTD 
4 RA-3 ICR 
5 STD 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-5 RATR 
8 ILR-11-MCC 
9 OE-5 NPM 
10 OE-8 TAN 
11 BoS 
12 Ownership Gender 
13 Equity Origin 
14 Borrowers’ Status 
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15 Business administration 
(No admin/Yes admin) 
16 Administrator Gender 
17 Firm age 
Covariates 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 CV 
4 FA 
5 OE-9 ITA 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 Owners No 
 
 
 
 
cc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Units 309 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 2a 
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Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 OE-4 GOM 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one that 
yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
 
Table 223. Model Summary/RBF-in trade sector 
 
Training Sum of Squares Error 41.734 
Average Overall Relative Error .927 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
OE-7 ROE .971 
GA-1 ROA .987 
OE-4 GOM .824 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 2139.619a 
Training Time 00:00:00.131 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 224. Independent variable importance /RBF-in trade sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
RA-1 LTDER .024 15.6% 
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RA-5 LT-LEV .036 23.6% 
LTD .036 23.6% 
RA-3 ICR .009 6.0% 
STD .009 5.8% 
ILR-2 WC .012 7.8% 
ILR-5 RATR .006 3.9% 
ILR-11-MCC .006 3.9% 
OE-5 NPM .015 9.8% 
OE-8 TAN .009 5.8% 
BoS .009 5.8% 
Ownership Gender .012 7.8% 
Equity Origin .027 17.5% 
Borrowers’ Status .027 17.4% 
Business administration  
.027 17.5% 
Administrator Gender .005 3.6% 
Firm age .018 11.6% 
ILR-6 ACP .102 66.9% 
ILR-9 PATR .128 83.9% 
CV .076 50.1% 
FA .076 50.1% 
OE-9 ITA .054 35.7% 
INV .079 52.1% 
STA .047 31.1% 
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Owners No .152 100.0% 
 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
The radial basis function implemented in production sector as per  risk adjusted 
performance prediction (ROE, ROA, GOM), used two hidden layers which result 
to be correlated with: LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD, ICR, STD, WC, RATR, MCC, NPM, 
TAN, Firm age, BoS, Ownership Gender,  Borrowers’ Status, Administrator 
Gender, Business administration and ACP (Tables 224-226). Here also the first 
layer has a stronger impact on ROE meanwhile the second one is more correlated 
to ROA and GOM dependent variables (refer to Table 41/Appendix C).  
 
 
Table 225. Network Information/RBF-in production sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 RA-1 LTDER 
2 RA-5 LT-LEV  
3 LTD 
4 RA-3 ICR 
5 STD 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-5 RATR 
8 ILR-11-MCC 
9 OE-5 NPM 
10 OE-8 TAN 
11 Firm age 
12 BoS 
13 Ownership Gender 
14 Borrowers’ Status 
15 Administrator Gender 
16 Business administration 
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Covariates 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 CV 
4 FA 
5 OE-9 ITA 
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 Owners No 
Number of Units 241 
Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 OE-4 GOM 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 226. Model Summary/RBF-in production sector 
 
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 27.978 
Average Overall Relative Error .888 
Relative Error for Scale Dependents OE-7 ROE .928 
GA-1 ROA .942 
OE-4 GOM .795 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1503.716a 
Training Time 00:00:00.058 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 227. Independent variable importance /RBF-in production sector 
 
 
Importance 
Normalized 
Importance 
RA-1 LTDER .008 5.6% 
RA-5 LT-LEV  .008 5.6% 
LTD .008 5.6% 
RA-3 ICR .013 8.7% 
STD .014 9.6% 
ILR-2 WC .008 5.6% 
ILR-5 RATR .029 20.2% 
ILR-11-MCC .008 5.6% 
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OE-5 NPM .013 9.1% 
OE-8 TAN .008 5.6% 
Firm age .049 33.9% 
BoS .008 5.6% 
Ownership Gender .023 16.1% 
Borrowers’ Status .017 12.0% 
Administrator Gender .019 12.9% 
Business administration .020 13.6% 
ILR-6 ACP .049 33.9% 
ILR-9 PATR .145 100.0% 
CV .073 50.2% 
FA .073 50.2% 
OE-9 ITA .140 96.2% 
INV .131 90.4% 
STA .053 36.3% 
Owners No .082 56.4% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The construction sector radial basis function statistics reveal that with the support 
of two hidden layers the risk adjusted performance prediction (ROE, ROA and 
GOM) was correlated with: LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD, ICR, STD, WC, RATR, MCC, 
NPM, TAN, Firm age, BoS, Equity Origin, Borrowers’ Status, Business 
administration and Owners no (see Tables 227-229). The first layer is negatively 
correlated with dependent variables under examination while the vice versa 
occurs with second one (Table 42/Appendix C). 
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Table 228. Network Information/RBF-in construction sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 
RA-1 LTDER 
2 RA-5 TL-LEV 
3 LTD 
4 RA-3 ICR 
5 STD 
6 ILR-2 WC 
7 ILR-5 RATR 
8 ILR-11-MCC 
9 OE-5 NPM 
10 OE-8 TAN  
11 Firmage 
12 BoS 
13 Ownership Gender 
14 Equity Origin 
15 Borrowers’ Status 
16 Business administration 
Covariates 1 ILR-6 ACP 
2 ILR-9 PATR 
3 CV 
4 FA 
5 OE-9 ITA  
6 INV 
7 STA 
8 Owners No 
Number of Units 184 
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Rescaling Method for Covariates Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
OE-7 ROE 
2 GA-1 ROA 
3 OE-4 GOM 
Number of Units 3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents Standardized 
Activation Function Identity 
Error Function Sum of Squares 
a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is the one 
that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Table 229. Model Summary/RBF-in construction sector 
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 21.163 
Average Overall Relative Error .941 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
OE-7 ROE .970 
GA-1 ROA .912 
OE-4 GOM .940 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1036.455a 
Training Time 00:00:00.028 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Table 230. Independent variable importance /RBF-in construction sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
RA-1 LTDER .011 8.6% 
RA-5 TL-LEV .011 8.6% 
LTD .011 8.6% 
RA-3 ICR .019 14.4% 
STD .011 8.6% 
ILR-2 WC .011 8.6% 
ILR-5 RATR .011 8.6% 
ILR-11-MCC .011 8.6% 
OE-5 NPM .012 9.2% 
OE-8 TAN  .011 8.6% 
Firm age .017 13.6% 
BoS .011 8.6% 
Ownership Gender .060 46.8% 
Equity Origin .023 18.3% 
Borrowers’ Status .018 14.3% 
Business administration .041 32.2% 
ILR-6 ACP .108 84.2% 
ILR-9 PATR .128 100.0% 
CV .111 86.3% 
FA .111 86.4% 
OE-9 ITA  .053 41.3% 
INV .068 52.9% 
STA .096 74.7% 
Owners No .034 26.8% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
The prediction of risk adjusted performance in service sector was made possible 
through the implementation of radial basis function with the support of two 
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hidden layers  correlated with: LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD, ICR, STD, WC, RATR, 
MCC, NPM, TAN, Firm age, BoS, Equity Origin, Borrowers’ Status, Business 
administration, Administrator Gender, ACP, INV (refer to Tables 230-232). 
Accordingly the first layer results to be strongly correlated with all risk adjusted 
performance indicators while the contrary stays for the second one (in Table 
43/Appendix C).  
 
Table 231. Network Information/RBF-in service sector 
 
Input Layer Factors 1 
RA-1 LTDER 
2 
RA-5 LT-LEV 
3 
LTD 
4 
RA-3 ICR 
5 
STD 
6 
ILR-2 WC 
7 
ILR-5 RATR 
8 
ILR-11-MCC 
9 
OE-5 NPM 
10 
OE-8 TAN 
11 
Firm age 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  VIII: SMEs BEHAVIORAL RISK-ADJ PERFORMANCE MODEL              461 
 
12 
Ownership Gender 
13 
Equity Origin 
14 
Borrowers’ Status 
15 
Business administration 
16 
Administrator Gender 
17 
BoS 
Covariates 1 
ILR-6 ACP 
2 
ILR-9 PATR 
3 
CV 
4 
FA 
5 
OE-9 ITA 
6 
INV 
7 
STA 
8 
Owners No 
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Number of Units 
248 
Rescaling Method for Covariates 
Standardized 
Hidden Layer Number of Units 
2a 
Activation Function 
Softmax 
Output Layer Dependent Variables 1 
OE-7 ROE 
2 
GA-1 ROA 
3 
OE-4 GOM 
Number of Units 
3 
Rescaling Method for Scale Dependents 
Standardized 
Activation Function 
Identity 
Error Function 
Sum of Squares 
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a. Determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" number of hidden units is 
the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Table 232. Model Summary/RBF-in service sector  
 
Model Summary 
Training Sum of Squares Error 33.693 
Average Overall Relative Error .977 
Relative Error for Scale 
Dependents 
OE-7 ROE .953 
GA-1 ROA .993 
OE-4 GOM .983 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 1596.970a 
Training Time 00:00:00.070 
a. The number of hidden units is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion: The "best" 
number of hidden units is the one that yields the smallest BIC in the training data. 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPS 
 
 
Table 233. Independent variable importance /RBF-in service sector 
 
 
Importance Normalized Importance 
RA-1 LTDER .006 4.2% 
RA-5 LT-LEV .006 4.2% 
LTD .006 4.2% 
RA-3 ICR .011 7.2% 
STD .006 4.2% 
ILR-2 WC .006 4.2% 
ILR-5 RATR .006 4.2% 
ILR-11-MCC .006 4.2% 
OE-5 NPM .006 4.2% 
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OE-8 TAN .006 4.2% 
Firm age .030 20.3% 
Ownership Gender .052 35.5% 
Equity Origin .031 21.3% 
Borrowers’ Status .007 5.0% 
Business administration .023 15.6% 
Administrator Gender .045 30.8% 
BoS .006 4.2% 
ILR-6 ACP .036 25.1% 
ILR-9 PATR .139 95.5% 
CV .125 86.0% 
FA .125 86.0% 
OE-9 ITA .058 39.8% 
INV .046 31.6% 
STA .066 45.2% 
Owners No .146 100.0% 
 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
The radial basis function implemented for the prediction of SMEs risk adjusted 
performance fits well (referring to BIC, model processing time and statistical 
significance test)  in each sectoral-affiliation, thus, H11 hypothesis can be 
accepted. Correspondingly, the evidences prove that it operates with two hidden 
layers which result to be mainly correlated with: LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD, ICR, STD, 
WC, RATR, MCC, NPM, TAN, Firm age, BS, Borrowers’ Status and Business 
administration. The relationship of layers instead with risk adjusted performance 
variables examined in trade and production sector complies. While contrary 
results are achieved in the comparison between construction and service sectors.  
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 8.4. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The statistical references of the univariate and multivariate functions 
implemented in this chapter throw light concerning the following facts: 
-Ownerships gender isn’t a business performance predictive pattern considering 
its statistical significance. Nevertheless it can be observed that female ownership 
gender strictly opts for higher ROE levels, by being further followed from male 
and mixed-partnership cases. Under a sociological aspect it can be admitted that 
female gender being more prudent to risk nature becomes more aware of 
business performance than male gender. And this can be assumed as a signal of 
business prospective and almost an enhanced performance progress under a 
dynamic environment may be achieved; 
-Equity origin can’t influence businesses gross operative margin. But indirectly is 
noted that national and foreign businesses tend to maintain higher GOM levels. 
Taking care of sales amounts and cost of goods sold/produced they seem to be 
eager to grow.  And by using the same logic even mixed-equity businesses inherit 
the awareness culture which acts not only in a market share philosophy but 
boosts the performance aiming to reach realistic results; 
-Business administration framework results to be predictive for ROA only in 
trade sector. In parallel the statistics show that businesses managed from skilled 
professionals such as administrators prevail in performance level in comparison 
with the one managed from business owners themselves. Obviously this gives the 
idea of business delegation to professionals which in the same time reserve the 
necessary spaces for the owners to be more aware in high level issues concerning 
performance such as implementing an accurate permanent control culture; 
-Borrowers’ status doesn’t influence businesses ROE at the determined confidence 
level. Anyway is every case examined is noted that performing borrowers 
generate higher ROE than non-performing ones. Also, in practice this affirmation 
sounds true regarding credit risk management approaches. That’s why bankers 
pay attention to the borrowers’ status before funding business needs or even 
promoting their future projects. Furthermore the latter is a decisive element in 
SMEs borrowing activity which manages internal needs while anchoring business 
growth as target; 
-Administrators gender can’t affect businesses GOM in the given inferential 
context. From the other side disputed results are achieved while separately 
examining sectoral affiliations even why male and female administrator genders 
separately result to be more proactive to businesses GOM management while 
undertaking risk management decisions in compliance with given circumstances; 
-The simultaneous impact of LTDER and borrowers’ status on businesses GOM 
also result to be statistically insignificant. In a separate way, borrowers’ status 
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impact on GOM merely confirmed that it’s correlated with businesses performing 
status presuming that sales growths generate profit which can cover tax and 
interest expenses and proactively manage risks. Contemporaneously, it can be 
assumed that LTDER  opts for low GOM. And this can be explained from the lack 
of long-term debt immediate impact on profit especially in construction and 
production sectors;  
-Business administration framework and RATR simultaneous impact on ROE 
doesn’t exist. The additional statistical results bring to the attention disputed 
elements concerning business administration framework and RATR relation with 
ROE. As concretely,  businesses pertaining to trade and production sectors 
managed from owners themselves result to be eager to growth by marking an 
average ROE of 20%. From the other side, seems that business management 
delegation (construction and service sectors) to skilled professionals generate 
higher ROEs, by averagely marking 23%. Seen under an operational risk context 
these results conduct to a value preservation process (exclusively required in 
trade and production due to market knowledge and public relations strictly 
related to sales growth) from one side and to a value chain (responsibilities 
delegation  in construction and service projects which may require a 
multidimensional managerial culture) from the other one; 
-Equity origin, firm age and business size don’t simultaneously affect businesses 
ROA. On a deeper statistical context instead reveals that mixed-equity and 
foreign businesses tend to maintain higher ROA levels. Somehow this leads to the 
understanding that a/m businesses are clearly focused on profit which may also 
be used for the acquisition of assets, that in turn produce profits. Supported from 
business size, ROA tend to be higher in trade sector due to a consistent flexibility.  
In addition firm age results to be another important element reflecting businesses 
assets durability and efficiency in producing permanent profits.  Rationally these 
results highlight the importance of these key elements on business performance 
under a risk management aspect;  
-Borrowers’ status, firm age and TAN don’t have a simultaneous impact on 
businesses ROA and ROE. Unconditionally the examinations reveal that 
performing status businesses generate higher ROAs by explaining that the profit 
generated is spend even in asset development. With special interest to firm age it 
can be said that grown and start-up businesses generate higher ROA and ROE 
rates. And regarding TAN relationships with businesses ROA it can be mentioned 
that trade and construction sectors provide the highest results and quite the same 
situation persists as per ROE. Consequently in this point, it can be affirmed that 
accurate approaches in respect of credit risk management from one side as well as 
growth prospective from the other one provide significant advances in  business 
performance; 
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-Business administration framework, MCC and NPM multiple impact on 
businesses ROE is inexistent. However should be admitted again that businesses 
managed from skilled professionals provide higher ROE levels than the ones 
managed from owners themselves.  Simultaneously it can be said that merely 
MCC and NPM relationships with ROE are consistent. At a larger prospective this 
explains the fact that businesses which strategically act under a managerial 
context influence the MCC and NPM by creating potentialities for the 
enhancement of risk adjusted performance culture within organizations.  
 
And the radial basis functions implemented for the prediction of SMEs risk-
adjusted performance regardless sectoral affiliation fits well  by remarking that: 
when LTDER ≤110% it’s more frequently correlated with the second layer but 
strongly with the first one,  for higher values instead it is equally correlated with 
both layers and strongly with the first one referring to trade and service sectors 
statistics.  In production sector LTDER ≤110%  is more frequently and strongly 
correlated with the second layer while for higher values than 110% its more 
frequently correlated with the first layer even the relationship is stronger with the 
second one. In construction sector instead it’s equally related to both layers. 
While, LT-LEV≤50% is strongly correlated with the first layer but more frequently 
with the second one and the same is also valid for the rest referring to trade sector 
data. Production sector statistics comparatively reveal that for LT-LEV≤50% the 
relationship is more frequent with the first layer but stronger with the second one 
meanwhile for LT-LEV>50% the relationship is more frequent and stronger with 
the second one.  Construction data from the other hand confirm that the relation 
power of LT-LEV is the same in both layers but the frequency differs. Concretely, 
for LT-LEV≤50% the correlation frequency is higher with the first layer and the 
contrary occurs for LT-LEV >50%.  And ultimately the service sector results 
confirm that LT-LEV≤50% is more frequently correlated to the first layer but the 
relation is stronger with the second one and for the rest the only existent relation 
is the one with the first layer.  
In addition, trade sector data demonstrate that LTD ≤11.755.000 ALL is strongly 
correlated with the first layer but more frequently with the second one and the 
same is valid for LTD>11.755.000 ALL. The contrary instead is evidenced in 
production sector concerning LTD variable relationship with both layers. In 
construction sector the relation power with the layers is the same but concerning 
the first value range the frequency is higher with the first layer and the contrary 
occurs in the second range values. And service sector results confirm that for 
LTD≤ 11.755.000 ALL the correlation exists only with the first layer and for the 
rest the correlation is more frequent with the first layer but stronger with the 
second one. The ICR ≤0 is more frequently and strongly correlated with the first 
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layer and for ICR≤216% it results to be strongly correlated with the first layer but 
more frequently with the second one while for ICR>216% it’s again strongly and 
more frequently correlated with the first layer in trade sector.  Its relationship 
with layers in production sector demonstrates that for values lower then 0, it is 
correlated only with the first layer as well as for higher values than 216%, for 
intermediary values instead its correlated to both layers but the relation is 
stronger with the second one. Referring to construction data for ICR≤0 it can be 
confirmed that’s correlated to both layers but stronger with the second one. For 
ICR values≤ 216% it’s correlated only with the first layer while for higher values 
only with the second one and quite the same results are obtained for service 
sector. Furthermore, STD ≤ 25.435.000 ALL in trade sector results more frequently 
and strongly correlated with the first layer and for higher values even they are 
more frequently correlated with the second layer the relation is stronger with the 
first one. Meanwhile the statistics retrieved from production sector evidence the 
contrary in respect of a/m STD ranges. In construction sector from the other side 
is noted that STD is correlated with both layers but for STD≤25.435.000 ALL the 
correlation frequency is higher with the first layer and the vice versa occurs for 
the rest. In service sector instead is noted that for STD ≤25.435.000 ALL the 
correlation is stronger  and more frequent with the second layer while for the rest 
the correlation is more frequent with the first layer but stronger with the second 
one.  Trade sector WC ≤ 0 data results more frequently and strongly correlated 
with the first layer and for higher values than 0 even it is more frequently 
correlated with the second layer while the relation is stronger with the first one. 
Meanwhile WC≤0 is correlated to both layers but stronger with the second one 
and the contrary of trade sector is valid for WC>0 in production sector.  In 
construction sector instead the WC correlation with both layers is equal but for 
WC≤0 the correlation frequency is higher in the second layer and the contrary is 
valid for WC>0.  And the service sector data confirm that for WC≤0 the 
correlation exists only with the first layer and for the rest the correlation is more 
frequent with the first layer but stronger with the second one.  
Trade sector data pertaining to RATR ≤ 10,5 (times) results more frequently and 
strongly correlated with the first layer and for higher values than 10,5 even is 
more frequently correlated with the second layer the relation is stronger with the 
first one. The statistics concerning the relation with layers in production sector 
demonstrate that RATR in general even its more frequently correlated to the first 
layer the relationship is stronger with the second one and the same is valid also in 
service sector. While in construction sector RATR is equally correlated to both 
layers with the same relation power.  In trade sector the MCC ≤0 is strongly 
correlated with the first layer, for the rest instead even it’s more frequently 
correlated with the second layer the relationship is stronger with the first one. In 
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production and service sector MCC statistics confirm that merely the correlation 
is more frequent with the first layer but stronger with the second one. And in 
construction sector from the other side is proved that with same relation power 
MCC≤0 are more correlated to the first layer and the rest to the second one.   
Concerning trade sector  NPM≤0 data it can be affirmed that its more frequently 
and strongly correlated with the first layer and the correlation frequency with the 
second layer prevails when NPM>0 but its stronger with the first one. For NPM≤0 
in production sector is noticed the existence of correlation with both layers even 
its stronger with the second one, for higher values than 0 instead the correlation is 
more frequent with the first layer but stronger with second one. In construction 
sector NPM has the same relation potentiality with both layers only the frequency 
differs. Precisely for NPM>0 the correlation frequency is higher with the second 
layer. While service data concerning NPM reveal that even the correlation is more 
frequent with the first layer it’s stronger with the second one. The TAN ≤50% is 
more frequently correlated with the second layer but strongly with the first one 
meanwhile TAN>50% is strongly correlated with the first layer in trade sector. In 
production sector data is confirmed that TAN =0 is more correlated with the first 
layer and for values higher than zero its correlated only to second layer. 
Construction sector  TAN statistics confirm the same correlation power with 
layers, but for TAN≤50% the correlation frequency is higher with the first layer 
while for the rest its higher with the second one. And in service sector is observed 
that TAN in general is more frequently correlated to the first layer but strongly to 
the second one.  
 
Trade sector business size data reveal that for values lower and equal to 20 times 
it’s more frequently correlated with the second layer but strongly with the first 
one, and for the rest it’s again correlated only with the first layer. Production 
sector evidences concerning business size relation with layers instead 
demonstrates that in general it’s more frequently correlated to first layer even its 
stronger with the second one. And in construction sector the correlation power is 
the same for both layers while the frequency differs. Thus, for businesses size≤0 
the correlation frequency is higher with the first layer and the vice versa occurs 
for the rest. While in service sector for businesses sizes ≤0 the correlation 
frequency is higher with the first layer and stronger with the second one, for the 
rest instead the correlation frequency is higher and stronger only with the second 
layer.   
With special regard to ownership gender in trade and production sectors it can be 
added that female ownership is strongly correlated with the second layer while 
for male and mixed-partnership the contrary is valid. Equity origin statistics 
demonstrate that national businesses are strongly correlated with the second 
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layer while for foreign and mixed-equity businesses the contrary is valid in trade 
sector.  In construction sector the first are correlated to both layers but stronger to 
the first one, foreign businesses instead are equally correlated to both layers 
meanwhile mixed-equity businesses are correlated only to second layer. And in 
service sector national businesses are correlated to both layers but the correlation 
is stronger with the first one and the contrary is valid for mixed-equity 
businesses.  
Borrowers’ status data from the other hand argue that: non-performing 
borrowers’ status is correlated only to the first layer; while borrowers’ performing 
status is correlated to both layers even the relationship is stronger with the second 
one in trade sector. Contradictory results are achieved concerning borrowers’ 
status in production sector, being correlated with both layers non-performing 
status is strongly related with the second one and the vice versa is observed from 
the performing borrowers’ status.  Additionally, non-performing borrowers’ 
status in construction and service sectors is correlated to both layers but it’s 
stronger with the first one and the contrary is valid for performing borrowers’ 
status.  
Moreover, in cases when business administration is done from skilled 
professionals (administrators) the correlation is stronger with the second layer 
and the vice-versa occurs when owners themselves manage the business in trade 
and construction sectors. The contrary instead in evidenced in production and 
service sectors.  
On behalf of administrators gender worth highlighted that female administration 
is more correlated to the second layer, while male and mixed-administrations are 
more correlated to the first layer in trade sector. In production sector, female 
administration results to be correlated only to the first layer while male 
administration being correlated to both layers is strongly related to the second 
one.  Service sector statistics confirm that again female administration is 
correlated only to the first layer and male administration gender is correlated to 
both layers but the correlation is stronger with the first one.  
Under a larger context it was also examined that ACP and PATR are positively 
correlated to the first layers and negatively to the second one meanwhile the 
contrary is valid for STA in trade sector. As well as, INV instead in service sector 
reveals to be positively correlated to the first layer and negatively to the second. 
While ACP data in production sector confirm that’s negatively correlated to the 
first layer and positively with the second one and the contrary is valid concerning 
service sector. As per owners number instead in construction sector it was 
evidenced that it’s positively correlated to the first layer and the exact contrary is 
noted in their relation with second layer.  
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Whereas firm age results conclude that start-up, growth and maturity businesses 
are more correlated to the second layer in trade sector.  And in production sector 
start-up businesses are correlated only to the first layer (the vice versa occurs 
respectively in service sector), growth businesses instead are correlated to both 
layers but strongly with the first layer meanwhile for maturity businesses the 
existence of correlation with both layers is consistent even is stronger with the 
second one, the contrary instead is valid in the service sector. Ultimately, in 
construction sector start-up businesses are correlated only to the first layer, the 
grown businesses with both layers but the relation is stronger with the second 
layer and for maturity ones the relation is stronger with the second layer.  
 
Stating that in trade and production sectors the first layer is strongly correlated 
with ROE meanwhile the second layer is strongly correlated to ROA and GOM as 
well as, in construction sector the first layer is negatively correlated with all the 
a/m variables and the vice versa occurs concerning the second layer and 
furthermore the contrary is valid for service sector it can be clearly understand, 
explained and predicted SMEs behavior toward risk-adjusted performance 
models. 
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9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
By closely referring to SMEs risk awareness  culture enhancement estimations in 
an exhausted reality in terms of supportive resources and instruments regardless 
the sectoral-affiliation (trade/production/construction and service), the study 
orients into a better exploitation of circumstances through which can be provided 
the required outcome.   
Hence, initially by the implementation of a pattern recognition process there were 
captured the endo-exogenous factors concerning a sound integrative liquidity 
management process, as the most fragile and crucial aspect which simultaneously 
boosts SMEs survival efforts into a future growth prospective through outsourced 
funding. 
Accordingly, the multi-dimensional liquidity management process deployed by 
various indicators such as: WC, RATR, MCC (pertaining to liquidity area) and 
NPM (operative-efficiency area) provided as feedback a corrective ‘trade-off’ 
package which serves as feature/warning signals necessary to understand and act 
in an equilibrated manner versus the target through an integrative logic between 
‘control-areas’ and business patterns.  
Substantially  in this regard there were implemented as predictive features 
(through 5 non-financial/business patterns and 17 financial indicators): 9 factors (3 
pertaining to business patterns and the rest to liquidity, operative-efficiency and 
risk analysis with respectively 1, 4 and 1 ratios) and 13 covariates (2 business 
patterns and 11 remaining indicators respectively pertaining to: liquidity (3), 
operative-efficiency (2), risk (2) and growth analysis (4)).  
At 95% confidence level only 14 indicators (6 covariates and the rest of 8 factors) 
resulted to be statistically significant, they pertain to: liquidity (2), operative-
efficiency (5), risk analysis (2), growth analysis area (2) while the 3 remaining ones 
belong to business patterns in trade, production, construction and service sectors.  
Concretely, the empirical research confirmed33 as predictive factors: PATR and 
INV (liquidity area/the latter covariate), TATR, GOM, ROE, ITA and NP 
(operative-efficiency area/the latter covariate), LTDER and ICR (risk analysis 
area/1 covariate), collateral value and firm age (growth analysis area-covariates), 
business ownership, equity origin and borrowers’ status (business patterns/the 
latter covariate).  
                                                          
33  The implemented radial basis functions robustness test considers the average of 
overall relative errors (which here is above =0.763), training time (above 40 seconds) and 
to the low Bayesian Information Criterion/BIC referring to  56, 59, 62 and 65 Tables  in 
Chapter VI.   
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Consequently, is noted a contemporaneous impact of various variables pertaining 
to different ‘control-areas’ within liquidity management process indicators. More 
precisely: TATR, GOM, ROE and NP indicators (pertaining to operative–
efficiency area) as well as INV (liquidity area) and CV (growth analysis area) 
negatively impact MCC and the contrary is evidenced for WC, RATR and NPM.  
Obviously the argumentation is closely correlated to the fact that net sales 
increase and subsequently net profit increase reduces receivables by increasing 
inventory process getting ready to accelerate the profitability in certain given 
circumstances even by postponing the payments from one side and using 
inventory and other collaterals as supplementary instruments to get funds to 
foster liquidity with the intent to explore as much as possible all the market 
opportunities. 
Albeit from another liquidity management prospect PATR indicator negatively 
impacts MCC, RATR and NPM while providing WC increase. As an increase in 
the cost of goods sold, causes delay in payments which decreases MCC and 
reduces receivables which is further translated into a higher WC in a transactional 
basis but generally reduces net profit margins.  
 
From an extended operative-efficiency logistic view, instead, it can be added that 
on a market expansion prospect, ITA positively impacts WC, MCC and RATR and 
the vice-versa occurs as per NPM, considering that inventory increase has a direct 
impact on short-term assets as inventory turnover increases and then WC while 
receivables decrease to finance the inventory process and generate a positive 
effect on MCC. But as an immediate result the net profit margins decreases.  
 
Advancing into a risk analysis focus, contradictory results are achieved on behalf 
of long /LTDER and short/ ICR debts indicators concerning liquidity management 
efficiency. By this way, the first positively impacts WC and MCC and the contrary 
stays for RATR and NPM. This leads to the understanding that long debts 
increase liquidity as well as reduce delayed payments by increasing MCC, and 
contemporary provide to the clients  ‘loyalty bonus’ which  also reduces the 
expectations for quick receivables conversion processes: this in real terms means 
reduction of net profit margins. 
 
Meanwhile, ICR negatively impacts WC and MCC and the vice-versa is proven 
for RATR and NPM.  From one  side, it can be underlined that the increase of 
interest expenses  negatively affects WC and MCC as an immediate consequence 
of long term debt increase (in the quality of a payable account). From the other  
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one instead the increase of earnings before of interests impacts net sales which 
generate profit.  
 
Firm’s age is another important element pertaining to growth analysis, which 
demonstrates a positive relationship with WC, MCC and NPM, by 
contemporaneously negatively interacting with RATR. In other words, it explains 
that businesses over the years pursue liberal policies towards receivables 
collection that increases MCC, even have enough WC as generate profit.   
Likewise, business patterns explored produced contradictory results in the case of 
equity origin and borrowers’ status.  Correspondingly, national businesses quote 
for higher WC and MCC levels while mark lower RATR and NPM levels, 
comparatively the foreign and mixed equity businesses opt for the contrary.  
 
Conversely, non-performing businesses maintain higher MCC and lower 
receivables which in turns generate lower working capital levels and net profit 
margins, whereas performing businesses reduce receivables collection period and 
MCC by increasing WC and net profit margins.  Comparatively, business 
administration context instead evidence to be a feature which positively interacts 
with all liquidity management indicators examined.  
 
Hereinafter, liquidity management seen in a more concise approach is leveraged 
and controlled through these ‘trade-off’ features/warning signals: INV (due to its 
close relations with PATR, ITA and indirect links with TATR and GOM, ROE), 
LTDER, ICR and borrowers’ status handled under the auspices of business 
administration framework (grey-colored in Figure 98).  
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Figure 98. Liquidity management outcomes 
Source: Summary results of Radial Basis Functions parameters estimates in sectoral-
affiliations (Appendix A/ Tables 9-12)), Author elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IX: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE PREMISES                                                       479 
 
 
Seemingly, emerge the relevance of short and long term indicators effect in 
investigating liquidity management process by reconfirming outsourced funding 
instrument as previously mentioned.  
 
 
 
Therefore, the indicators concerning leverage reconciliation framework 
(measured through ICR, STD, LTDER, LT-LEV and LTD) were tested in the 
second stage of research independently from firm age and business patterns 
presented, seeking to touch various theoretical assumptions of pertinence (such 
as: asymmetry issues/pecking order/ contingency-system-stewardship theories) 
hoping to understand as much as possible from the a/m process dynamicity.  
 
The robustness of radial basis functions34 deployed over 30 predictive factors from 
which 12 covariates, generally related to: liquidity (9), operative-efficiency (9), risk 
analysis (1), growth analysis (6) and business patterns (5) ‘control-areas’, 
estimated as statistically significant at 95% confidence level: ACP, PATR, APP, RA 
(liquidity area), GPM, NPM, ROE, NP, BoS (operative-efficiency area), LEV (risk 
analysis),  ROA, EQ, CV, FA (growth analysis/the latter covariate), borrowers’ 
status and business ownership framework (business patterns/ the latter 
covariate).  
Even in this examined aspect, what draws the attention is the similar effect of 
various variables pertaining to different ‘control-areas’ in leverage framework. 
Thus ACP, APP, RA indicators (pertaining to liquidity area), GPM, NPM, NP 
(operative-efficiency area), ROA, EQ, CV, FA (growth analysis area) negatively 
impact ICR, STD and LTDER and the vice versa is evidenced for LT-LEV and 
LTD.  
 
Comprehensively, receivables and profit derivates accurate management 
supported from firm age enable the liquidation of interest expenses, short debts 
expressed in term of rate amounts payments (principals and interests) and the 
same worth for long-term debts reimbursement. Alternatively this creates 
opportunities in borrowing long-term debts as per equity investments which 
replenish the survival of the circuit described above. And obviously these 
circumstances seem to comply with the ones of pecking order theory, so firms 
                                                          
34 Related to the average of overall relative errors which is 0.899, training time (in average) 
116 seconds and to the low BIC (referring to 129, 132, 135 and 138 Tables  in Chapter VII).  
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explore all the internal opportunities before making leverage of 
additional/external debts in compliance even with contingency theory context.   
Another indicator pertaining to liquidity ‘control-area’ such as PATR, through the 
increases of payable accounts opts for higher long-term debts which initially helps 
in the payment of interest expenses and other operative debts reimbursement by 
living little space to investments in fixed assets. In this regard, it is demonstrated 
that special attention should be given to this indicator in order to control and  
 
better exploit leverage opportunities. Because considering the asymmetry issues 
the financial institutions may be conservative in further financing.  
Beyond this, even in an operative-efficiency and risk analysis context the same 
results are achieved respectively per ROE, TAN and LEV.  And the corresponding 
argumentation is that net profit, fixed assets and total debts boost toward a long-
term funding which in turns provide the effect explained before.  
 
Business behavioral patterns such as ownership structure ascertain that females 
are more aware to long term debts which cause general liabilities by mainly 
affirming the necessity to operate with short-term debts or long-term debts only 
for equity purposes. Male ownership prefers the vice-versa while boosting the 
investment in fixed assets.  In a complementary way instead acts mixed 
ownership structure which uses long-term debts for equity purposes to reduce 
short-term debts as assets can generate cash-flows to support randomly activities 
without being indispensable to appeal on pure short and long-term debts.  
Hereby, the role of leadership is put to the fore by bringing into the attention 
outlines of the stewardship theory, where the latter projects the strategy and 
makes support to leverage effect.  
 
National equity businesses opt also for long-term debts used to invest in fixed 
assets which can also through the generated cash-flow reduce short-term debts 
and almost pay interest expenses. From the other side, foreign and mixed equity 
businesses uses long-term debts converted in equity which produce more interest 
expenses and short-term debts but anyway control the other type of long-term 
debts (such as them for assets, etc.).  
Throughout it can be affirmed that initially SMEs are able to identify which 
management style (liberal vs conservative) will help to achieve the organization's 
goals in a particular situation as explained by systems theory and then act 
accordingly in reference of business contingency theory concepts by also 
confirming hazard theory attitude.  
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In this context, non-performing borrowers’ status searches long-term debts in 
order to create more opportunities to explore the market by generating enough 
profit to pay on-time also the short-term debts and other interest expenses. While 
performing status is more proactively concentrated in increasing long-term debts 
convertible in equity aiming to foster business profitability.  
 
 
 
 
Unlike business administration opts for long-term debts implemented in fixed 
assets investment by pursuing a very traditional strategy. Whereas business size 
is eager to mainly explore short-term debts for immediate necessities and long-
term debts convertible in equity into a subsequent growth prospective on behalf 
of system theory where business segments may be independent but interrelated 
and this is valid almost for SMEs that operate as a unit.  
 
Into a deeper examination direction the clue features/warning signals concerning 
SMEs leverage reconciliation framework in respect of capital structure approaches 
such as: RA, PATR, ROA, ROE, business ownership framework, and then 
ownership gender and firm age contemporaneously support the ‘trade-off’ 
package toward business growth acceleration process (refer to Figure 99).  
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Figure 99. Leverage reconciliation framework outcomes 
Source: Summary results of Radial Basis Functions parameters estimates in sectoral-
affiliations (Appendix B/ Tables 43-46), Author elaboration 
As far as can be understood, the inspection on receivables, payable accounts and 
profit (even as a derivate process on behalf of liquidity management process 
identified patterns) has an indispensable role in enhancing business orientation 
toward growth. And not without purpose, net profit generated from sales and its 
further conversion in assets and equity constitute the main SMEs pole.  
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Rationally, in cohesion with liquidity management and corresponding leverage 
reconciliation outcomes retrieved it was ultimately developed an integrative risk-
adjusted performance behavior approach valuable for the achievement of SMEs 
goals.  
 
The radial basis functions implemented over 25 predictive factors from which 8 
covariates pertaining to liquidity (9), operative-efficiency (4), risk analysis (4), 
growth analysis (3) and business patterns (5) ‘control-areas’, provides risk-
adjusted performance outcomes35 (measured through ROE, ROA and GOM) by 
confirming as statistically significant at 95% confidence level: WC, RATR, MCC, 
STD, ACP, PATR,  INV and STA (liquidity area/the last 4 are covariates), NPM, 
TAN and BoS (operative-efficiency area),  ICR, LTDER, LT-LEV, LTD (risk 
analysis),  firm age and owner no (growth analysis /the latter is a covariate), 
administrators gender, business ownership framework, equity origin, ownership 
gender and borrowers’ status (business patterns).   
Moreover, by this way is reconfirmed the supplementary role of additional 
business financial ratios and patterns in predicting SMEs risk-adjusted 
performance.  
 
Concretely the results affirm that the increase of inventory (INV) and short term 
debts (STD) orients working capital (WC) which fosters sales (RATR) that in turns 
generate profit (NPM) by providing the necessary circumstances to make leverage 
in long-terms with the intent to increase equity turnover (LTDER) and by this 
circuit are obtained higher ROE, ROA and GOM.  
Simultaneously the reduction of assets and equity proportions used accordingly 
(which also increases LT-LEV and TAN) positively impacts assets and equity 
turnover but reduces earnings. Despite this, reveals also true that the continuous 
increase of long-term debt (which increases interest expenses), money conversion 
cycle, assets and owners number negatively affects ROE, ROA and GOM. As well 
as the increase of receivable accounts and then of short-term assets reduces assets 
profitability what influences earnings and profit (so is negatively impacted ROE 
and GOM) by increasing assets turnover (ROA).  
 
Additionally, the increase of cost sold, reduces sales but increases net profit as a 
deductive logic of price increase. Afterwards, this positively impacts ROE and  
 
                                                          
35 The robustness check is confirmed as average of overall relative errors: 0.933, 
training time: 72 seconds and to the low BIC referring to the 222, 225, 228 and 231 Tables  
in Chapter VIII.  
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GOM, but the cost increase may affect the payable accounts including here them 
used for investment in assets which simultaneously reduces assets turnover.  
 
By configuring the above mentioned outcomes into businesses patterns approach, 
it can be highlighted that the most effective framework results are the one 
managed from owners themselves as all risk-adjusted measures reveal to be 
positively influenced.  Meanwhile, as statistically depicted, only female 
administration can provide the same results. And not unintentionally, female 
gender ownership opts more for higher earnings and net profits, with the aim to 
be converted in assets from each generated cash-flow, which can be further used 
even as equity increase concerning the implementation of a proactive–risk taking 
approach. With regard to the latter, maybe national businesses more related to 
roots and with a long-term vision adequately perform in term of risk-adjusted 
performance (positively impact ROE, ROA and GOM), followed from them with 
mixed-equity (positively impact only ROE and ROA), by reflecting still the 
political exigencies to open up toward direct foreign investments from one hand 
and improve other aspects as per national ones. As comparatively foreigners have 
a dedicated focus on pure profitability by seeking to speculate more than invest in 
the long-term (they opt only for higher ROE) which is interpreted as a proactive 
behavior.  
 
Simultaneously, the latter can be confirmed by further considering business 
age/life spectrum in relation to risk-adjusted performance. It turns out that start-
up businesses are eager to access the market and strongly compete by leaving 
apart immediate risk-adjusted performance results (without considering the 
amount invested), in their focus is the sale increase (their impact on risk-adjusted 
performance measures is negative). The grown ones instead result to be focused 
in a continuous process of equity increase, this one translated also in terms of 
assets by boosting the net profit (positively affect ROA and GOM) and vice versa 
(negatively ROE). And when it comes to maturity ones the risk-adjusted 
performance is carefully preserved (they opt for high ROE, ROA and GOM 
ratios).  
 
In parallel with a visionary aspect, credit performing status is an additional 
feature through which businesses access to the necessary credit amount needed to 
implement their ambitious business plans concerning results achievement as well 
as the vice versa becomes a barrier for further business expansion considering 
Albanian market circumstances (see Figure 100).  
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Figure 100. Risk-adjusted performance outcomes 
Source: Summary results of Radial Basis Functions parameters estimates in sectoral-
affiliations (see Tables 40-43 in Appendix C), Author  elaboration 
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9.2 FINDINGS  
In an integrative manner, clearly comes out the role of SMEs clue features 
/warning signals such as: INV, PATR, LTDER, ICR, business administration 
framework, ownership gender, borrowers’ status, equity origin, firm age/life 
spectrum; they assure an accurate liquidity management process handled even 
through a consolidated leverage mechanism and quite rewarded in terms of risk-
adjusted performance.  
 
As it can be realized (see Figure 100/ colored in grey), INV, PATR and LTDER 
positively affect liquidity by providing the same effect on risk-adjusted 
performance; contemporaneously the increase of ICR negatively affect the latter. 
Foremost, firms’ life spectrum and other organizational patterns behaviors in the 
quality of business as well as political economies strategic perspective elements 
(handled through social cohesion and regional development awareness) influence 
and align their ongoing performance. 
 
Thus, it should be outlined that matured and national businesses (administrated 
from owners /potentially from female owners with performing borrowers’ status) 
represent the ones mainly oriented versus a sustainable growth by pursuing a 
proportional risk-adjusted performance model. Especially where the latter is 
emphasized as a continuous support to creative processes and ideas, while 
seeking for market opportunities and rationally considering risk-taking capacity 
expressed in terms of uncertainty absorption, in full compliance with 
environment effect of business contingency theory and in cohesion with self-
adaption on behalf of system theory. Undisputedly, with regard to the latter 
prevails the leadership role who while projecting the strategy makes support to 
leverage effect as well as to innovativeness theory.  
 
By this way, the evidence of facts brings to the SMEs attention the relevance of a 
proactive permanent control culture implementation which, even being less costly 
(than the internal adaption of a pure risk management sector), is more effective 
according to their reality (SMEs merely act as unit in compliance with features 
role according to system theory) and properly this assists in the appropriate 
designation of intelligence performance philosophy.  
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9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
With special regard to SMEs, clue ratios in correspondence of business 
intelligence models established the ongoing monitoring process initially invites 
the owners/administrators to control inventories and payable accounts, and then 
make use of all internal resources before exploring outsourced funding expressed 
in terms of long-term debts on equity and interest coverage (in correspondence of 
pecking order as well as asymmetry issues funding costs approaches). Rationally 
this is valid even for start-up and grown businesses which should replicate as 
much as possible the strategy of the matured ones in order to achieve short-term 
goals and then accurately plan long-term ones.  
 
Intuitively on a macro context, the a/m permanent control feedback later on 
enables even the establishment of dedicated procedures according to business 
exigencies in support of performance results, meaning the coordination of 
alternative production/ immediate distribution and potential mixed marketing 
practices in coherence with market prespective from one side. As well as validates 
some existing procedures through random key risk indicators elaboration in the 
areas revealed as less defective from the other one aiming to reduce the 
unnecessary business costs.  
 
In the same time, permanent control function provides all the necessary 
information to build risk mitigation instruments toward initiatives that precede 
important legal and economic amendments aiming a sustainable growth process 
(such as: eco-friendly programs while promoting business social beliefs, practices 
and profits that keep in safe people and planet including here also bank practices 
amendments in terms of specific requirements on behalf of futuristic lending 
policies).  
 
Undoubtedly, the most significant and dynamic business patterns behaviors can 
be promoted and further strengthened through apposite economic policies 
developed while exploiting additional performance sources with main focus 
employment increase (which further helps even in making these businesses 
competitive in the European market as well).  
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9.4. LIMITS 
The underlined logic of radial basis function isn’t so familiar to SMEs 
administrator/owners. For this purpose the interpretation of results becomes 
difficult, beyond the fact that even administrators with basic econometrical skills 
can be employed to solve the issue (except of the paid consultancy).   
Then, particularly referring to radial basis functions results in a convergent way 
was found that each sectoral–affiliation outcome its usually interpolative and has 
a well-behaved limit (zero) as functions themselves become increasingly flat 
(that’s why in each case are considered only the predictive factors with strongest 
correlation in correspondence of hidden layers).  But as per our close practical 
interest this is the most important feature explored which makes it a plausible 
approach into different sectoral-realities while meaning that under a technical 
context instead this constitutes a limit which merely depends from input data. 
And due to the latter, previously the radial basis functions were seen suitable 
only to corporate businesses.  
 
 
 
 
    9.5. OPEN ISSUES 
The next research target may be focused on the contemplation of dynamic SME 
behavioral theories, with special regard to additional intelligence models 
elaboration dedicated to weaker life-spectrum businesses regardless equity origin: 
this can simultaneously support even the strategic regional development plan 
within the country. 
 
The further exploitation of radial basis function aiming the enhancement of SMEs 
credit worthiness models considering their relevant behavioral patterns 
accordingly to liquidity and leverage risk management processes (customized to 
credit-cards, mortgage and other SME lending products) is another aspired goal.  
 
In the same way, radial basis functions can be implemented with the purpose to 
identify SMEs domain-specific relations needed for internal financial policies 
establishment as well as for forex-portfolios volatility risk forecasting.  
Subsequently, the development and implementation of the a/m proposed 
approaches by SMEs operating in the country constitutes a step forward not only  
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in terms of spreading a value culture among a business intelligence prospect but 
simultaneously enables to them even the necessary defensive mechanisms 
activation in case of market turbulences.  
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APPENDIX A -Liquidity management approaches estimations 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.206 1 31 .653 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * GA2OCF 
Table  1. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ Status and Operative 
cash flow vs WC) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.245 1 9 .632 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * GA2OCF 
Table  2. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Borrowers’ Status and Operative 
cash flow vs WC) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.286 1 10 .162 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * GA2OCF 
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Table  3. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Borrowers’ Status and Operative 
cash flow vs WC) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.595 1 30 .446 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * GA2OCF 
 
Table  4. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Borrowers’ Status and Operative 
cash flow vs WC) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.401 2 30 .673 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender + OE3GPM + Administrators Gender * OE3GPM 
 
Table  5. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Administrators gender and Gross 
profit margin vs WC) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.992 1 30 .327 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.992 1 30 .327 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators  Gender + OE3GPM + Administrators Gender * OE3GPM 
Table  6. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Administrators gender and Gross 
profit margin vs WC) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.492 1 31 .488 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender + OE3GPM + Administrators Gender * OE3GPM 
 
Table  7. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Administrators gender and Gross 
profit margin vs WC) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.971 1 30 .332 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender + OE3GPM + Administrators  Gender * OE3GPM 
 
Table  8. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Administrators gender and Gross 
profit margin vs WC) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.669 2 30 .206 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin + ILR10APP + Equity Origin * ILR10APP 
Table 9. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Equity origin and Average payment 
period vs WC) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
Equity Origin 0 national 31 
 
Table  10. Equality of Error Variances (Equity origin and Average payment period vs WC) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.858 1 13 .371 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin + ILR10APP + Equity Origin * ILR10APP 
Table 11. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Equity origin and Average 
payment period vs WC) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:ILR-2 WC  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.423 1 30 .521 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin + ILR10APP + Equity Origin * ILR10APP 
 
Table 12. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances (Equity origin and Average payment period 
vs WC) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
514                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Estimated marginal means of WC, RATR and NPM concerning ownership 
gender typology in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 2. .Estimated marginal means of WC, RATR and NPM concerning ownership 
gender typology in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 3. Estimated marginal means of WC, RATR and NPM concerning ownership 
gender typology in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 4. Estimated marginal means of WC, RATR and NPM concerning ownership 
gender typology in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPS
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Figure 5. Estimated marginal means of WC, MCC and NP concerning business 
administration typology in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS
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Figure 6. Estimated marginal means of WC, MCC and NP concerning business 
administration typology in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 7. Estimated marginal means of WC, MCC and NP concerning business 
administration typology in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Figure 8. Estimated marginal means of WC, MCC and NP concerning business 
administration typology in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) ILR2WC ILR5RATR ILR11MCC OE5NPM 
Input Layer [OE1TATR=.04] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.05] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.14] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.16] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.18] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.28] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.34] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.41] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.48] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.50] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.68] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.71] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.81] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=.91] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.99] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.12] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.20] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.23] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.37] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.41] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.70] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.98] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=2.87] .067 .000     
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[OE1TATR=3.54] .067 .000     
[OE1TATR=4.53] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=19.67] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.17] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.19] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.28] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.35] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.43] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.64] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.77] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=2.88] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=2.97] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=3.13] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=4.23] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=4.71] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.36] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.77] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=6.79] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=7.51] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=8.19] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=8.66] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=9.96] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=19.07] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=19.75] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=21.45] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=23.38] .067 .000     
[ILR9PATR=75.65] .000 .083     
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[ILR9PATR=145.00] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=293.40] .067 .000     
[OE4GOM=-3.6] .133 .000     
[OE4GOM=-.4] .067 .000     
[OE4GOM=-.1] .067 .000     
[OE4GOM=.0] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=.1] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=.7] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=-.20] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=-.19] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.00] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.01] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.02] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.03] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.06] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.07] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.10] .133 .000     
[OE7ROE=.13] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.16] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.18] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.26] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.27] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.29] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.37] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.54] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=.55] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.90] .067 .000     
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[OE7ROE=2.27] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=12.80] .067 .000     
[OE7ROE=34.50] .000 .083     
[OE9ITA=.00406797
3678] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.03159430
5077] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.03342469
4122] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.03506230
7445] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.05117718
4442] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.05472401
7512] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.06227300
7659] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.06633849
8178] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.10033959
2031] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.15807899
5565] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.17001235
6371] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.17519759
9433] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.20575293
7389] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.21331008
3260] 
.000 .083 
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[OE9ITA=.21596307
2004] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.23393677
3819] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.39779361
3340] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.46296576
0738] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.50639481
3834] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.59148764
6688] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.63007716
7792] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.67116873
2585] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.67771142
5489] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.69719082
1117] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.70964814
6044] 
.067 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.71676518
3668] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=.90751919
1570] 
.000 .083 
    
[RA1LTDER=.0] .067 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.1] .067 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.3] .067 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.4] .133 .000     
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[RA1LTDER=.5] .000 .167     
[RA1LTDER=.6] .067 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.7] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=.8] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=.9] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=2.0] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=2.1] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=3.5] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=22.2] .067 .000     
[RA1LTDER=47.9] .000 .083     
[Administrators 
Gender=0] 
.067 .333 
    
[Administrators 
Gender=1] 
.867 .667 
    
[Administrators 
Gender=2] 
.067 .000 
    
[Equity Origin=0] .733 1.000     
[Equity Origin=1] .133 .000     
[Equity Origin=2] .133 .000     
[Borrowers’  
Status=0] 
.200 .000 
    
[Borrowers’ 
Status=1] 
.800 1.000 
    
RA3ICR .257 -.321     
RA5LTLEV -.383 .478     
GA1ROA -.013 .017     
GA2OCF .143 -.179     
Firm Age -.115 .144     
INV -.394 .492     
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STA -.491 .613     
STD -.261 .327     
CV .021 -.027     
NP -.360 .450     
BoS -.533 .666     
Business 
administration 
-.299 .374 
    
Ownerships Gender .308 -.385     
Hidden Unit Width 1.318 1.455     
Hidden Layer H(1)   -1.002 .416 -.325 .133 
H(2)   .851 -.353 .276 -.113 
a. Displays the center vector for each 
hidden unit. 
     
 
Table  9. Parameters estimates/RBF-in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) H(3) H(4) H(5) H(6) H(7) H(8) H(9) 
ILR2 
WC 
ILR5 
RATR 
ILR11 
MCC 
OE5 
NPM 
Input 
Layer 
[OE1TATR=0] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
[OE1TATR=1] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[ILR9PATR=-1] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[ILR9PATR=0] .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[ILR9PATR=3] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[ILR9PATR=4] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE4GOM=4] .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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[OE4GOM=5] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE4GOM=9] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
[OE4GOM=27] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
    
[OE4GOM=44] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE4GOM=91] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=-.02] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=.02] .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=.08] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=.10] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=5.00
] 
.000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE=10.0
0] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
[OE7ROE=13.0
0] 
1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE7ROE= 
14.00] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.00] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.05] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
[OE9ITA=.07] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.14] .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.20] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.21] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.24] .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.31] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.42] .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=-
.39] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
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[RA1LTDER=-
.22] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=.5
6] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=.6
5] 
.000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=4.
90] 
.000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=4
3.00] 
1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=6
6.00] 
.000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=1
27.00] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=3
46.00] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
[Administrators 
Gender=0] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 1.000 
    
[Administrators 
Gender=1] 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[Borrowers’ 
Status=0] 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 1.000 .000 
    
[Borrowers’ 
Status=1] 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000 .000 1.000 
    
RA3ICR -.278 -.140 -.219 -.279 2.609 -.278 -.859 -.278 -.278 
    
RA5LTLEV 1.894 1.437 -.281 -.483 -.296 -.558 -.625 -1.117 .030 
    
GA1ROA 2.652 -.294 -.291 -.298 -.289 -.282 -.609 -.297 -.294 
    
GA2OCF -.473 -.024 -.519 -.580 -.495 2.443 .663 -.496 -.518 
    
Firm Age 1.290 -.029 .762 -.557 -1.349 -1.349 .235 1.290 -.293 
    
INV -.810 -.390 .147 .674 -.708 2.296 .131 -.546 -.794 
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STA -.942 -.652 .166 1.037 -.848 1.648 1.038 -.608 -.839 
    
STD -.709 -.378 .443 .439 -.710 2.355 -.710 -.096 -.634 
    
CV -.660 -.635 .414 -.410 -.671 1.688 1.617 -.629 -.715 
    
NP -.253 -.364 .093 -.266 -.313 2.601 -.373 -.775 -.348 
    
BoS 
-1.054 -.461 .816 .575 -.896 1.325 1.263 -.399 
-
1.169 
    
Business 
administration 
1.054 -.843 1.054 -.843 -.843 1.054 -.843 1.054 -.843 
    
Ownership 
Gender 
1.421 .142 .142 .142 1.421 -1.137 
-
1.137 
-1.137 .142 
    
Hidden Unit Width 
2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 2.793 
    
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1) 
         
.207 -.314 .190 4.489 
H(2) 
         
-1.162 8.533 -.833 -1.494 
H(3) 
         
-1.938 -1.994 -6.084 .147 
H(4) 
         
4.576 -2.140 -.356 -.725 
H(5) 
         
-.124 -.482 .228 -.733 
H(6) 
         
-2.196 .720 .236 -.062 
H(7) 
         
2.581 -.646 2.555 -.580 
H(8) 
         
-1.869 -1.242 4.585 -1.081 
H(9) 
         
-.113 -2.957 .571 .569 
a. Displays the center vector for each 
hidden unit. 
           
 
Table  10. Parameters estimates/RBF-in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) H(3) H(4) H(5) 
ILR 
2WC 
ILR5 
RATR 
ILR11 
MCC 
OE5 
NPM 
Input 
Layer 
[OE1TATR=0] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
    
[OE1TATR=1] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000     
[ILR9PATR=0] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
[ILR9PATR=2] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000     
[OE4GOM=0] .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000     
[OE4GOM=1] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000     
[OE7ROE=0] .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000     
[OE9ITA=.01] .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000     
[OE9ITA=.19] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000     
[OE9ITA=.23] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000     
[OE9ITA=.27] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
[OE9ITA=.70] .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.13] .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000     
[RA1LTDER=.23] .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000     
[RA1LTDER=2.30] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000     
[RA1LTDER=5.71] .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000     
[RA1LTDER=6.30] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
[Equity Origin=0] 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
[Equity Origin=1] .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .000     
[Equity Origin=2] .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000     
[Borrowers’ 
Status=0] 
.000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
    
CHAPTER XI: ANNEXES 533 
 
[Borrowers’ 
Status=1] 
1.000 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    
RA3ICR -.450 1.789 -.437 -.451 -.451     
RA5TLLEV -.173 -.594 .093 -.963 1.637     
GA1ROA -.478 -.520 -.380 1.786 -.408     
GA2OCF 
-.430 1.057 -.102 
-
1.392 
.867 
    
Firm  Age -.856 .729 -.380 -.856 1.363     
INV .123 -.680 1.694 -.520 -.617     
STA .460 -.867 1.482 -.173 -.901     
STD -.022 -.814 1.671 -.731 -.104     
NP -.039 -1.026 1.567 .176 -.678     
BoS .881 -1.394 .968 .118 -.573     
Business 
administration 
-.447 -.447 1.789 -.447 -.447 
    
Ownership Gender -.730 1.095 1.095 -.730 -.730     
CV 1.600 -.766 .305 -.804 -.336     
Hidden Unit Width 2.366 2.366 2.366 2.366 2.366 
    
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1)      -1.026 2.272 -.632 -.344 
H(2)      -.187 -.528 2.075 -1.205 
H(3)      1.328 -.462 -.250 .378 
H(4)      1.149 -.673 -.587 1.842 
H(5)      -1.242 -.634 -.591 -.665 
a. Displays the center vector for each 
hidden unit. 
       
 
Table  11. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) ILR2WC 
ILR5 
RATR ILR11MCC OE5NPM 
Input 
 Layer 
[OE1TATR=.02] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.09] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.11] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.13] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.20] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.24] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.26] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.31] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.39] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.47] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.54] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.68] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.71] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.76] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.82] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.87] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.01] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.27] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.40] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.62] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.63] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.72] .000 .083     
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[OE1TATR=3.42] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=-16.80] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.05] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.13] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.34] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.51] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.59] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.61] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.69] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.75] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.95] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=1.04] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=1.37] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=1.60] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=1.62] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=2.08] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=4.65] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=4.88] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.30] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.38] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=29.37] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=45.11] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=1557.00] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=-15%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=-1%] .091 .000     
[OE4GOM=0%] .000 .083     
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[OE4GOM=5%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=18%] .091 .000     
[OE4GOM=19%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=40%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=-13.28%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=-.10%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.02%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.06%] .000 .167     
[OE7ROE=.12%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.14%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.16%] .182 .000     
[OE7ROE=.20%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.36%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.39%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.48%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.79%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=4.70%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=9.44%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=11.00%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=12.60%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=20.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=35.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=59.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=131.00%] .091 .000     
[OE9ITA=.000000000
000%] 
.182 .250 
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[OE9ITA=.105613149
158%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.326337850
149%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.569692513
645%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=1.34201033
1839%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=1.38465993
5241%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=1.67180790
8139%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=3.13925930
5956%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=4.28531899
9059%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=7.01963018
0557%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=8.16253935
9832%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=10.3283740
35806%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=18.5427086
90201%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=23.7544886
11438%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=26.1107434
96900%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=29.2229998
82260%] 
.000 .083 
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[OE9ITA=58.2722871
50656%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=79.3534959
06406%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=81.4480109
44658%] 
.091 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=0] .182 .000     
[RA1LTDER=1] .091 .000     
[RA1LTDER=2] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=6] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=13] .091 .000     
[Administrator 
Gender=0] 
.273 .167 
    
[Administrator 
Gender=1] 
.727 .833 
    
[Equity Origin=0] .727 1.000     
[Equity Origin=2] .273 .000     
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .091 .083     
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .909 .917     
RA3ICR -.021 .019     
RA5LTLEV -.623 .571     
GA1ROA .302 -.277     
GA2OCF .375 -.344     
Firm Age .222 -.203     
INV -.421 .386     
STA -.403 .369     
STD -.395 .362     
CV -.263 .241     
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NP .210 -.193     
BoS -.453 .415     
Business 
administration 
.491 -.450 
    
Ownerships Gender .591 -.542     
Hidden Unit Width 1.124 1.559     
Hidden Layer H(1)   -.163 -.715 .853 1.447 
H(2)   .045 .199 -.238 -.403 
a. Displays the center vector for each 
hidden unit. 
     
 
 
Table  11. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) ILR2WC ILR5RATR ILR11MCC OE5NPM 
Input Layer [OE1TATR=.02] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.09] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.11] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.13] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.20] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.24] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.26] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.31] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.39] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.47] .000 .083     
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[OE1TATR=.54] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.68] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.71] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.76] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=.82] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=.87] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.01] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.27] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.40] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.62] .091 .000     
[OE1TATR=1.63] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=1.72] .000 .083     
[OE1TATR=3.42] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=-16.80] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.05] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.13] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.34] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.51] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.59] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.61] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.69] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=.75] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=.95] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=1.04] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=1.37] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=1.60] .091 .000     
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[ILR9PATR=1.62] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=2.08] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=4.65] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=4.88] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.30] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=5.38] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=29.37] .000 .083     
[ILR9PATR=45.11] .091 .000     
[ILR9PATR=1557.0
0] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE4GOM=-15%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=-1%] .091 .000     
[OE4GOM=0%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=5%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=18%] .091 .000     
[OE4GOM=19%] .000 .083     
[OE4GOM=40%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=-
13.28%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE7ROE=-.10%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.02%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.06%] .000 .167     
[OE7ROE=.12%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.14%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=.16%] .182 .000     
[OE7ROE=.20%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.36%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.39%] .000 .083     
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[OE7ROE=.48%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=.79%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=4.70%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=9.44%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=11.00%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=12.60%] .000 .083     
[OE7ROE=20.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=35.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=59.00%] .091 .000     
[OE7ROE=131.00
%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.0000000
00000%] 
.182 .250 
    
[OE9ITA=.1056131
49158%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.3263378
50149%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=.5696925
13645%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=1.342010
331839%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=1.384659
935241%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=1.671807
908139%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=3.139259
305956%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=4.285318
999059%] 
.091 .000 
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[OE9ITA=7.019630
180557%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=8.162539
359832%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=10.32837
4035806%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=18.54270
8690201%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=23.75448
8611438%] 
.091 .000 
    
[OE9ITA=26.11074
3496900%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=29.22299
9882260%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=58.27228
7150656%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=79.35349
5906406%] 
.000 .083 
    
[OE9ITA=81.44801
0944658%] 
.091 .000 
    
[RA1LTDER=0] .182 .000     
[RA1LTDER=1] .091 .000     
[RA1LTDER=2] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=6] .000 .083     
[RA1LTDER=13] .091 .000     
[Administrator 
Gender=0] 
.273 .167 
    
[Administrator 
Gender=1] 
.727 .833 
    
[Equity Origin=0] .727 1.000     
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[Equity Origin=2] .273 .000     
[Borrowers’ 
Status=0] 
.091 .083 
    
[Borrowers’ 
Status=1] 
.909 .917 
    
RA3ICR -.021 .019     
RA5LTLEV -.623 .571     
GA1ROA .302 -.277     
GA2OCF .375 -.344     
Firm Age .222 -.203     
INV -.421 .386     
STA -.403 .369     
STD -.395 .362     
CV -.263 .241     
NP .210 -.193     
BoS -.453 .415     
Business 
administration 
.491 -.450 
    
Ownerships Gender .591 -.542     
Hidden Unit Width 1.124 1.559     
Hidden Layer H(1)   -.163 -.715 .853 1.447 
H(2)   .045 .199 -.238 -.403 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden 
unit. 
     
 
Table  12. Parameters estimates/RBF-in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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APPENDIX B- Leverage structure approaches estimations 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 TOTAL LEV 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.033 1 31 .164 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
 
Table  1. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) 
in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 Total LEV  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.439 1 31 .513 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
 
Table  2. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Table  3. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) 
in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV   
F df1 df2 Sig. 
11.676 1 31 .002 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
192.788 1 30 .000 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
 
Table  4. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ Status vs Total LEV) 
in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-1 LTDER 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.775 2 30 .470 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin 
 
Table  5. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTDER) in trade 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-1 LTDER 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.994 2 30 .382 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin 
 
Table  6. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTDER) in 
construction sector 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-4 LEV  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.376 1 30 .544 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + EquityOrigin 
 
Table  7. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTDER) in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.070 1 31 .793 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
 
Table  8. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs LTR) 
in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
10.945 1 31 .002 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
 
Table  9. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs LTR) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.003 1 30 .958 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
Table  10. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs LTR) 
in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-2 TLR  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.587 1 30 .217 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
Table  11. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs LTR) 
in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
4.438 2 30 .020 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships  Gender 
 
Table  12 . Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownership gender vs TAN) in 
trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.090 2 30 .141 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships  Gender 
Table  13. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownership gender vs TAN) in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN   
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.201 2 30 .819 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships  Gender 
Table  14. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownership gender vs TAN) in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-8 TAN  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.485 2 29 .621 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships  Gender 
 
Table  15. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownership gender vs TAN) in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.089 2 30 .142 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender 
Table  16. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs LT-
LEV) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.339 1 31 .565 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators  Gender 
Table  17. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs LT-
LEV) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 TL-LEV 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.070 1 31 .309 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender 
Table  18. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs LT-
LEV) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:RA-5 LT-LEV 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.886 1 30 .354 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender 
Table  19. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs LT-
LEV) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:LTD  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.479 2 30 .624 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin * OE3GPM 
Table  20. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTD) in trade 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:LTD  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.522 2 30 .235 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin * OE3GPM 
 
Table  21. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTD) in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:LTD  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.911 1 30 .348 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin * OE3GPM 
Table  22. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs LTD) in service 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.359 2 30 .112 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrator Gender * Firm Age 
Table  23. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs FATA) 
in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.798 1 31 .190 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrator Gender * Firm Age 
Table  24. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs FATA) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA   
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.431 1 31 .129 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrator Gender * Firm Age 
Table  25. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs FATA) 
in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-10 FATA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.548 1 30 .121 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrator Gender * Firm Age 
Table  26. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs FATA) 
in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's 
Trace 
.001 .011a 2.000 28.000 .989 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.999 .011a 2.000 28.000 .989 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.001 .011a 2.000 28.000 .989 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
.001 .011a 2.000 28.000 .989 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS Pillai's 
Trace 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
1.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
BoS Pillai's 
Trace 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
1.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
.000 .001a 2.000 28.000 .999 
Borrowers’ Status Pillai's 
Trace 
.001 .015a 2.000 28.000 .985 
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Wilks' 
Lambda 
.999 .015a 2.000 28.000 .985 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.001 .015a 2.000 28.000 .985 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
.001 .015a 2.000 28.000 .985 
a. Exact statistic       
b. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + BoS + Borrowers’ Status   
Table  27. Multivariate tests36 (Borrowers’ status and business size vs ICR and TATR) in 
trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Wilks’ lamdda test in discriminate analysis shows how well each level 
of independent variable contributes to the model. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 
means total discrimination and 1 means no discrimination.  
Pillai’s trace test is a positive valued statistic ranging from 0 to 1, increasing values 
means that effects are contributing more to the model. It is the 
most powerful and robust statistic for general use when assumption of homogeneity of 
variance-covariance is violated, worthy also in small samples cases.  
Hotelling's trace test instead is the sum of the eigenvalues of the test matrix  
Hotelling's trace is always larger than Pillai's trace, but when the eigenvalues of the test 
matrix are small, these two statistics will be nearly equal. This indicates that the effect 
examined probably doesn’t contribute much to the model. 
In addition Roy's largest root is the largest eigenvalue of the test matrix. It is a 
positive-valued statistic for which increasing values indicate effects that contribute more 
to the model and is always less than or equal to Hotelling's trace. When these two 
statistics are equal, the effect is predominantly associated with just one of the dependent 
variables, there is a strong correlation between the dependent variables, or the effect does 
not contribute much to the model. 
556                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
RA-3 ICR 2.290 1 31 .140 
OE-1 TATR 1.000 1 31 .325 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + BoS + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  28. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and business 
size vs ICR and TATR) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .024 .342a 2.000 28.000 .713 
Wilks' Lambda .976 .342a 2.000 28.000 .713 
Hotelling's Trace .024 .342a 2.000 28.000 .713 
Roy's Largest Root .024 .342a 2.000 28.000 .713 
Borrowers’ Status * 
BoS 
Pillai's Trace .034 .495a 2.000 28.000 .615 
Wilks' Lambda .966 .495a 2.000 28.000 .615 
Hotelling's Trace .035 .495a 2.000 28.000 .615 
Roy's Largest Root .035 .495a 2.000 28.000 .615 
Borrowers’ Status Pillai's Trace .032 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Wilks' Lambda .968 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Hotelling's Trace .033 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Roy's Largest Root .033 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
BoS Pillai's Trace .017 .243a 2.000 28.000 .786 
Wilks' Lambda .983 .243a 2.000 28.000 .786 
Hotelling's Trace .017 .243a 2.000 28.000 .786 
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Roy's Largest Root .017 .243a 2.000 28.000 .786 
a. Exact statistic       
b. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + Borrowers’ Status + BoS   
 
Table  29. Multivariate tests (Borrowers’ status and business size vs ICR and TATR) in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
RA-3 ICR .011 1 31 .915 
OE-1 TATR 1.685 1 31 .204 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + Borrowers’ Status + BoS 
Table  30. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and business 
size vs ICR and TATR) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .032 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Wilks' Lambda .968 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Hotelling's Trace .033 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.033 .456a 2.000 28.000 .638 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS Pillai's Trace .041 .595a 2.000 28.000 .559 
Wilks' Lambda .959 .595a 2.000 28.000 .559 
Hotelling's Trace .042 .595a 2.000 28.000 .559 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.042 .595a 2.000 28.000 .559 
Borrowers’ Status Pillai's Trace .032 .460a 2.000 28.000 .636 
Wilks' Lambda .968 .460a 2.000 28.000 .636 
Hotelling's Trace .033 .460a 2.000 28.000 .636 
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Roy's Largest 
Root 
.033 .460a 2.000 28.000 .636 
BoS Pillai's Trace .042 .609a 2.000 28.000 .551 
Wilks' Lambda .958 .609a 2.000 28.000 .551 
Hotelling's Trace .044 .609a 2.000 28.000 .551 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.044 .609a 2.000 28.000 .551 
a. Exact statistic       
b. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + Borrowers’ Status + BoS   
Table  31. Multivariate tests (Borrowers’ status and business size vs ICR and TATR) in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
RA-3 ICR 17.623 1 31 .000 
OE-1 TATR 1.642 1 31 .210 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + Borrowers’ Status + BoS 
 
Table  32. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and business 
size vs ICR and TATR) in construction sector 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .062 .891a 2.000 27.000 .422 
Wilks' Lambda .938 .891a 2.000 27.000 .422 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.066 .891a 2.000 27.000 .422 
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Roy's Largest 
Root 
.066 .891a 2.000 27.000 .422 
Borrowers’ Status * BoS Pillai's Trace .069 1.003a 2.000 27.000 .380 
Wilks' Lambda .931 1.003a 2.000 27.000 .380 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.074 1.003a 2.000 27.000 .380 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.074 1.003a 2.000 27.000 .380 
BoS Pillai's Trace .103 1.544a 2.000 27.000 .232 
Wilks' Lambda .897 1.544a 2.000 27.000 .232 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.114 1.544a 2.000 27.000 .232 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.114 1.544a 2.000 27.000 .232 
Borrowers’ Status Pillai's Trace .072 1.044a 2.000 27.000 .366 
Wilks' Lambda .928 1.044a 2.000 27.000 .366 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.077 1.044a 2.000 27.000 .366 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.077 1.044a 2.000 27.000 .366 
a. Exact statistic       
b. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + BoS + Borrowers’ Status   
Table  33. Multivariate tests (Borrowers’ status and business size vs ICR and TATR) in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
OE-1 TATR 2.601 1 30 .117 
RA-3 ICR 1.362 1 30 .252 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status * BoS + BoS + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  34. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and business 
size vs ICR and TATR) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA3ICR STD 
Input Layer [OE7ROE=-.20] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=-.19] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.00] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.01] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.02] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.03] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.06] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.07] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.10] .059 .071   
[OE7ROE=.13] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.16] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.18] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.26] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.27] .059 .000   
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[OE7ROE=.29] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=.37] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.54] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.55] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.90] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=.94] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=1.36] .000 .071   
[OE7ROE=2.27] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=12.80] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=34.50] .059 .000   
[OE7ROE=1169.16] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=-.16] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=-.15] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=.01] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=.02] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.03] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.05] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=.06] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.10] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.11] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.12] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=.14] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.15] .000 .071   
[GA1ROA=.17] .059 .071   
[GA1ROA=.25] .059 .000   
[GA1ROA=.41] .059 .000   
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[GA1ROA=.47] .000 .071   
[Firm Age=4] .000 .071   
[Firm Age=13] .294 .286   
[Firm Age=14] .294 .000   
[Firm Age=15] .059 .071   
[Firm Age=16] .000 .071   
[Firm Age=17] .000 .214   
[Firm Age=19] .000 .071   
[Firm Age=20] .176 .071   
[Firm Age=21] .176 .000   
[Firm Age=22] .000 .143   
[CV=0] .000 .286   
[CV=46838] .000 .071   
[CV=92711] .059 .000   
[CV=216842] .059 .000   
[CV=605517] .059 .000   
[CV=722963] .059 .000   
[CV=2261907] .059 .000   
[CV=4782338] .059 .000   
[CV=5105346] .059 .000   
[CV=5687812] .000 .071   
[CV=6744167] .000 .071   
[CV=6753492] .000 .071   
[CV=6770984] .000 .071   
[CV=7043938] .000 .071   
[CV=7262232] .000 .071   
[CV=9241276] .000 .071   
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[CV=10175907] .059 .000   
[CV=13734049] .059 .000   
[CV=17227252] .059 .000   
[CV=27071778] .059 .000   
[CV=42945185] .059 .000   
[CV=43606691] .000 .071   
[CV=54789832] .059 .000   
[CV=59208450] .059 .000   
[CV=71537245] .000 .071   
[CV=121324500] .059 .000   
[CV=247476467] .118 .000   
[OE3GPM=-2.5] .118 .000   
[OE3GPM=-.4] .000 .071   
[OE3GPM=.0] .000 .071   
[OE3GPM=.1] .059 .000   
[OE3GPM=.2] .059 .071   
[OE3GPM=.3] .000 .071   
[OE3GPM=.9] .059 .000   
[NP=-33221424] .118 .000   
[NP=-2827447] .059 .000   
[NP=1568] .000 .071   
[NP=5774] .059 .000   
[NP=7792] .000 .071   
[NP=87336] .000 .071   
[NP=90194] .000 .071   
[NP=100675] .000 .071   
[NP=138916] .059 .000   
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[NP=150740] .059 .000   
[NP=203493] .000 .071   
[NP=261094] .000 .071   
[NP=360687] .000 .071   
[NP=431861] .000 .071   
[NP=469568] .000 .071   
[NP=680071] .059 .000   
[NP=1000389] .000 .071   
[NP=1082388] .000 .071   
[NP=1425367] .059 .000   
[NP=1430406] .000 .071   
[NP=2070659] .059 .000   
[NP=2302155] .059 .000   
[NP=2671479] .059 .000   
[NP=3319238] .000 .071   
[NP=3510380] .059 .000   
[NP=4166189] .059 .000   
[NP=6325381] .059 .000   
[NP=6839527] .059 .000   
[NP=18476291] .059 .000   
[NP=47459018] .059 .000   
[@EQ=-160797] .059 .000   
[@EQ=110938] .000 .071   
[@EQ=281917] .059 .000   
[@EQ=783046] .000 .071   
[@EQ=1510106] .000 .071   
[@EQ=1522161] .059 .000   
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[@EQ=1570359] .000 .071   
[@EQ=2916965] .000 .071   
[@EQ=4210001] .000 .071   
[@EQ=4220378] .000 .071   
[@EQ=5500242] .059 .000   
[@EQ=5510892] .000 .071   
[@EQ=5784375] .000 .071   
[@EQ=6030400] .000 .071   
[@EQ=8477306] .059 .000   
[@EQ=9376621] .059 .000   
[@EQ=9771901] .000 .071   
[@EQ=10081349] .059 .000   
[@EQ=11076737] .000 .071   
[@EQ=13246851] .059 .000   
[@EQ=14155473] .059 .000   
[@EQ=15303237] .000 .071   
[@EQ=20442138] .059 .000   
[@EQ=22613599] .059 .000   
[@EQ=22666145] .000 .071   
[@EQ=90509604] .059 .000   
[@EQ=113356788] .059 .000   
[@EQ=122200884] .059 .000   
[@EQ=150459018] .059 .000   
[@EQ=150848495] .118 .000   
[FA=0] .000 .286   
[FA=34750] .000 .071   
[FA=68784] .059 .000   
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[FA=160879] .059 .000   
[FA=449244] .059 .000   
[FA=536379] .059 .000   
[FA=1678149] .059 .000   
[FA=3548102] .059 .000   
[FA=3787748] .059 .000   
[FA=4219890] .000 .071   
[FA=5003618] .000 .071   
[FA=5010537] .000 .071   
[FA=5023514] .000 .071   
[FA=5226024] .000 .071   
[FA=5387980] .000 .071   
[FA=6856268] .000 .071   
[FA=7549688] .059 .000   
[FA=10189537] .059 .000   
[FA=12781207] .059 .000   
[FA=20085037] .059 .000   
[FA=31861802] .059 .000   
[FA=32352585] .000 .071   
[FA=40649558] .059 .000   
[FA=43927810] .059 .000   
[FA=53074764] .000 .071   
[FA=90012820] .059 .000   
[FA=183607225] .118 .000   
[RA=0] .118 .071   
[RA=3200] .059 .000   
[RA=12780] .000 .071   
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[RA=24840] .059 .000   
[RA=47744] .000 .071   
[RA=89225] .000 .071   
[RA=116700] .000 .071   
[RA=147064] .000 .071   
[RA=529949] .000 .071   
[RA=625045] .059 .000   
[RA=652853] .059 .000   
[RA=793494] .059 .000   
[RA=1186259] .000 .071   
[RA=1371031] .059 .000   
[RA=1727777] .059 .000   
[RA=1831993] .000 .071   
[RA=2616078] .000 .071   
[RA=3042911] .000 .071   
[RA=3293838] .059 .000   
[RA=13902129] .000 .071   
[RA=14696428] .059 .000   
[RA=15496428] .059 .000   
[RA=19401114] .000 .071   
[RA=46351540] .059 .000   
[RA=58457450] .000 .071   
[RA=82295898] .059 .000   
[RA=187644122] .059 .000   
[RA=243179618] .059 .000   
[RA=267163795] .059 .000   
[Borrowers’Status=0] .176 .000   
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[Borrowers’ Status=1] .824 1.000   
[Equity Origin=0] .765 1.000   
[Equity Origin=1] .118 .000   
[Equity Origin=2] .118 .000   
[Business administration=0] .765 .929   
[Business administration=1] .235 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.17] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.19] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.28] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.35] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.43] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.61] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=.64] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.77] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1.32] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=2.88] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=2.97] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=3.13] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=3.21] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=4.23] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=4.71] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=5.36] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=5.77] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=6.79] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=7.51] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=8.19] .000 .071   
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[ILR9PATR=8.66] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=9.96] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=19.07] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=19.75] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=21.45] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=23.38] .000 .071   
[ILR9PATR=75.65] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=145.00] .059 .000   
[ILR9PATR=293.40] .000 .071   
OE6AT -.174 .211   
Onwnership Gender -.294 .357   
Administrator Gender -.292 .355   
GA2OCF -.044 .053   
INV .186 -.225   
ILR2WC .307 -.372   
ILR4CR .026 -.032   
ILR7ITR -.265 .322   
BoS .440 -.534   
Hidden Unit Width 1.423 1.316   
Hidden Layer H(1)   -.369 .510 
H(2)   .637 -.880 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  35. Parameters estimates/RBF-in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA3ICR STD 
Input Layer [OE7ROE=-.02] .000 .250   
[OE7ROE=.02] .200 .000   
[OE7ROE=.08] .200 .000   
[OE7ROE=.10] .200 .000   
[OE7ROE=5.00] .000 .250   
[OE7ROE=10.00] .200 .000   
[OE7ROE=13.00] .000 .250   
[OE7ROE=14.00] .200 .000   
[GA1ROA=-1.02] .200 .000   
[GA1ROA=.01] .000 .250   
[GA1ROA=.02] .400 .000   
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .250   
[GA1ROA=.04] .200 .000   
[GA1ROA=.06] .200 .000   
[GA1ROA=9.74] .000 .250   
[Firm Age=10] .400 .000   
[Firm Age=13] .000 .250   
[Firm Age=14] .200 .000   
[Firm Age=15] .200 .000   
[Firm Age=16] .200 .000   
[Firm Age=18] .000 .250   
[Firm Age=20] .000 .500   
[CV=22331444] .200 .000   
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[CV=47609329] .200 .000   
[CV=53903602] .000 .250   
[CV=68186302] .200 .000   
[CV=71476888] .000 .250   
[CV=196543403] .000 .250   
[CV=667983284] .000 .250   
[CV=1355743780] .200 .000   
[CV=1395951970] .200 .000   
[OE3GPM=0] .400 .000   
[OE3GPM=1] .200 .000   
[OE3GPM=2] .200 .000   
[OE3GPM=8] .000 .250   
[OE3GPM=49] .000 .250   
[NP=-11374763.00] .000 .250   
[NP=.00] .200 .000   
[NP=248331.00] .200 .000   
[NP=718988.00] .200 .000   
[NP=1699669.00] .200 .000   
[NP=3021111.00] .000 .250   
[NP=3401796.00] .000 .250   
[NP=13185246.00] .000 .250   
[NP=84114018.00] .200 .000   
[@EQ=-494426337] .200 .000   
[@EQ=6914347] .200 .000   
[@EQ=15248331] .200 .000   
[@EQ=22287802] .200 .000   
[@EQ=24857172] .000 .250   
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[@EQ=152493466] .000 .250   
[@EQ=253936015] .000 .250   
[@EQ=464959044] .000 .250   
[@EQ=586603131] .200 .000   
[FA=15103509] .200 .000   
[FA=32199795] .200 .000   
[FA=36456824] .000 .250   
[FA=46116696] .200 .000   
[FA=48342230] .000 .250   
[FA=132928933] .000 .250   
[FA=451779626] .000 .250   
[FA=916935248] .200 .000   
[FA=944129403] .200 .000   
[RA=249474] .000 .250   
[RA=5265375] .200 .000   
[RA=6092564] .200 .000   
[RA=14321710] .200 .000   
[RA=26709155] .000 .250   
[RA=80367273] .000 .250   
[RA=109571129] .200 .000   
[RA=163654975] .000 .250   
[RA=212654108] .200 .000   
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .200 .250   
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .800 .750   
[Business administration=0] .800 .250   
[Business administration=1] .200 .750   
[ILR9PATR=-1] .000 .250   
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[ILR9PATR=0] .200 .000   
[ILR9PATR=3] .000 .250   
[ILR9PATR=4] .200 .000   
OE6AT .161 -.201   
Ownership Gender -.114 .142   
Administrator Gender -.403 .504   
GA2OCF .414 -.517   
INV .107 -.134   
ILR2WC -.077 .096   
ILR7ITR .334 -.417   
ILR4CR .086 -.108   
BoS .012 -.015   
Hidden Unit Width 1.492 1.259   
Hidden Layer H(1)   .216 -.003 
H(2)   -.482 .006 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  36. Parameters estimates/RBF-in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA3ICR STD 
Input Layer [OE7ROE=0] .250 .000   
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 1.000   
[GA1ROA=.01] .250 .000   
[GA1ROA=.02] .250 .000   
[GA1ROA=.33] .250 .000   
[Firm Age=5] .000 .500   
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[Firm Age=6] .500 .000   
[Firm Age=9] .250 .000   
[Firm Age=16] .000 .500   
[Firm Age=20] .250 .000   
[CV=1547896] .000 .500   
[CV=2149263] .250 .000   
[CV=6055068] .000 .500   
[CV=49934316] .250 .000   
[CV=115287140] .250 .000   
[CV=247450065] .250 .000   
[OE3GPM=-2] .000 .500   
[OE3GPM=0] .250 .000   
[OE3GPM=2] .250 .000   
[NP=-585957] .000 .500   
[NP=0] .000 .500   
[NP=1224024] .250 .000   
[NP=4553070] .250 .000   
[NP=5671411] .250 .000   
[NP=12922280] .250 .000   
[Equity Origin=0] .250 .500   
[Equity Origin=1] .500 .500   
[Equity Origin=2] .250 .000   
[FA=0] .000 .500   
[FA=1582846] .250 .000   
[FA=4459316] .000 .500   
[FA=36774629] .250 .000   
[FA=84904373] .250 .000   
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[FA=182237088] .250 .000   
[RA=0] .250 .000   
[RA=5111721] .000 .500   
[RA=31353832] .000 .500   
[RA=51250009] .250 .000   
[RA=90267910] .250 .000   
[RA=102201314] .250 .000   
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .000 1.000   
[Borrowers’ Status=1] 1.000 .000   
[@EQ=2530729] .000 .500   
[@EQ=20032277] .000 .500   
[@EQ=31801382] .250 .000   
[@EQ=53454752] .250 .000   
[@EQ=66980745] .250 .000   
[@EQ=91402631] .250 .000   
[Business administration=0] .750 1.000   
[Business administration=1] .250 .000   
[ILR9PATR=0] .250 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1] .000 .500   
[ILR9PATR=2] .250 .000   
OE6AT .492 -.985   
Ownership Gender -.456 .913   
GA2OCF -.420 .840   
INV .297 -.594   
ILR2WC .101 -.202   
ILR7ITR -.413 .826   
ILR4CR .178 -.355   
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BoS .480 -.961   
Hidden Unit Width 1.340 .982 
  
Hidden Layer H(1)   .344 .316 
H(2)   -.723 -.663 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  37. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA3ICR STD 
Input Layer [OE7ROE=-13.28%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=-.10%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=.00%] .000 .375   
[OE7ROE=.02%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=.06%] .125 .000   
[OE7ROE=.12%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=.14%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=.16%] .062 .062   
[OE7ROE=.20%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=.36%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=.39%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=.48%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=.79%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=4.70%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=9.44%] .062 .000   
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[OE7ROE=9.50%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=11.00%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=12.60%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=14.00%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=20.00%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=35.00%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=54.00%] .000 .062   
[OE7ROE=59.00%] .062 .000   
[OE7ROE=131.00%] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=-13.28] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=-4.16] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=-.07] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.00] .062 .062   
[GA1ROA=.01] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.02] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.05] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.06] .125 .000   
[GA1ROA=.07] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.10] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.16] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.17] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.23] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.27] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=.28] .000 .062   
[GA1ROA=.29] .062 .000   
[GA1ROA=9.22] .062 .000   
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[FA=0] .000 .062   
[FA=192000] .062 .000   
[FA=220065] .000 .062   
[FA=242977] .000 .062   
[FA=539814] .062 .000   
[FA=668775] .000 .062   
[FA=1252157] .000 .062   
[FA=1472119] .062 .000   
[FA=1646495] .000 .062   
[FA=2092470] .000 .062   
[FA=2220065] .000 .062   
[FA=2513934] .062 .000   
[FA=3380947] .062 .000   
[FA=6246564] .062 .000   
[FA=8247696] .000 .062   
[FA=9399554] .062 .000   
[FA=9662304] .062 .000   
[FA=15557224] .000 .062   
[FA=15712710] .062 .000   
[FA=29863727] .062 .000   
[FA=37704897] .000 .062   
[FA=46622402] .000 .062   
[FA=51250806] .062 .000   
[FA=55430002] .062 .000   
[FA=82713762] .000 .062   
[FA=85312660] .000 .062   
[FA=182990455] .062 .000   
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[FA=243986951] .000 .062   
[FA=300079581] .062 .000   
[FA=343826252] .000 .062   
[FA=953567200] .062 .000   
[FA=10766746000] .062 .000   
[FirmAge=4] .062 .000   
[FirmAge=7] .000 .125   
[FirmAge=13] .125 .000   
[FirmAge=14] .062 .125   
[FirmAge=15] .188 .125   
[FirmAge=16] .062 .062   
[FirmAge=17] .000 .062   
[FirmAge=18] .062 .062   
[FirmAge=19] .188 .000   
[FirmAge=20] .125 .250   
[FirmAge=21] .125 .125   
[FirmAge=22] .000 .062   
[CV=283884.10] .062 .000   
[CV=325379.97] .000 .062   
[CV=359256.80] .000 .062   
[CV=798149.01] .062 .000   
[CV=988825.97] .000 .062   
[CV=1457896.00] .000 .062   
[CV=1851393.01] .000 .062   
[CV=2176620.68] .062 .000   
[CV=2434446.59] .000 .062   
[CV=3093848.72] .000 .062   
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[CV=3282505.97] .000 .062   
[CV=3717009.80] .062 .000   
[CV=4998943.14] .062 .000   
[CV=9235938.41] .062 .000   
[CV=12194738.14] .000 .062   
[CV=13897832.76] .062 .000   
[CV=14286325.19] .062 .000   
[CV=23002335.79] .000 .062   
[CV=23232231.64] .062 .000   
[CV=44155401.78] .062 .000   
[CV=55749065.62] .000 .062   
[CV=68934158.57] .000 .062   
[CV=75777545.47] .062 .000   
[CV=81956750.05] .062 .000   
[CV=122297508.08] .000 .062   
[CV=126140142.51] .000 .062   
[CV=270562916.12] .062 .000   
[CV=360750078.23] .000 .062   
[CV=443686565.52] .062 .000   
[CV=508368774.64] .000 .062   
[CV=1409909179.93] .062 .000   
[CV=15919312266.00] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=-7.700%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=-.520%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.010%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=.070%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.119%] .000 .062   
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[OE3GPM=.170%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.200%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.202%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=.290%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.300%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.317%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=.470%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.790%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=.870%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=.990%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=3.900%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=4.600%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=4.800%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=5.000%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=5.400%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=7.000%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=10.000%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=11.500%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=20.300%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=28.000%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=28.900%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=30.100%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=38.000%] .000 .062   
[OE3GPM=42.900%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=44.400%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=50.000%] .062 .000   
[OE3GPM=58.000%] .062 .000   
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[NP=-18074750800] .062 .000   
[NP=-44492239] .000 .062   
[NP=-807392] .062 .000   
[NP=35557] .000 .062   
[NP=289484] .000 .125   
[NP=441919] .062 .000   
[NP=468129] .000 .062   
[NP=502818] .062 .000   
[NP=601987] .000 .062   
[NP=699380] .062 .000   
[NP=706837] .062 .000   
[NP=773252] .062 .000   
[NP=830055] .000 .062   
[NP=872996] .062 .000   
[NP=1064880] .000 .062   
[NP=1360912] .000 .062   
[NP=1733570] .062 .000   
[NP=1956659] .062 .000   
[NP=2033649] .000 .062   
[NP=2254255] .062 .000   
[NP=3321071] .000 .062   
[NP=3854599] .000 .062   
[NP=3891456] .062 .000   
[NP=11562679] .000 .062   
[NP=12094162] .000 .062   
[NP=16989305] .000 .062   
[NP=54723556] .062 .000   
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[NP=61056994] .000 .062   
[NP=62657728] .062 .000   
[NP=122743440] .062 .000   
[NP=3851868000] .062 .000   
[@EQ=-309835763] .000 .062   
[@EQ=836828] .062 .000   
[@EQ=2632141] .062 .000   
[@EQ=3021682] .000 .062   
[@EQ=3305744] .062 .000   
[@EQ=3807051] .000 .062   
[@EQ=4269752] .000 .125   
[@EQ=4618159] .000 .062   
[@EQ=5078429] .062 .000   
[@EQ=6110936] .062 .000   
[@EQ=7722016] .000 .062   
[@EQ=9768261] .000 .062   
[@EQ=10413469] .000 .062   
[@EQ=10664258] .062 .000   
[@EQ=12998122] .062 .000   
[@EQ=14596896] .000 .062   
[@EQ=14701776] .062 .000   
[@EQ=16351575] .062 .000   
[@EQ=18664619] .062 .000   
[@EQ=19606355] .000 .062   
[@EQ=21980163] .000 .062   
[@EQ=25144275] .000 .062   
[@EQ=31154664] .062 .000   
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[@EQ=100115135] .000 .062   
[@EQ=100377451] .000 .062   
[@EQ=126298437] .000 .062   
[@EQ=177663527] .062 .000   
[@EQ=303025325] .062 .000   
[@EQ=340756087] .062 .000   
[@EQ=1347810200] .062 .000   
[@EQ=40432622000] .062 .000   
[Equity Origin=0] .812 1.000   
[Equity Origin=2] .188 .000   
[Business administration=0] .375 1.000   
[Business administration=1] .625 .000   
[ILR9PATR=-16.80] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=.00] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.05] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.13] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.34] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=.51] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.59] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.61] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=.69] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=.70] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=.75] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=.95] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=1.04] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1.37] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=1.50] .000 .062   
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[ILR9PATR=1.60] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1.62] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1.85] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=2.08] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=3.49] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=4.65] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=4.88] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=4.89] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=5.30] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=5.38] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=5.60] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=6.43] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=9.24] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=16.60] .000 .062   
[ILR9PATR=29.37] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=45.11] .062 .000   
[ILR9PATR=1557.00] .062 .000   
OE6AT -.064 .064   
Ownership Gender .248 -.248   
Administrator Gender -.315 .315   
GA2OCF .178 -.178   
INV .172 -.172   
ILR2WC .181 -.181   
ILR7ITR .081 -.081   
ILR4CR .199 -.199   
BoS .170 -.170   
Hidden Unit Width 1.620 1.011   
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Hidden Layer H(1)   .197 .176 
H(2)   -2.810 -2.512 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  38. Parameters estimates/RBF-in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA5LTLEV RA1LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=1] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=3] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=4] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=5] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=6] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=13] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=16] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=26] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=30] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=34] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=35] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=43] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=46] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=53] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=57] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=77] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=81] .062 .000    
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[ILR6ACP=133] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=182] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=183] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=579] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=589] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=608] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=687] .000 .067    
[ILR6ACP=1043] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=1258] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=.17] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.19] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.28] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=.35] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=.43] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.61] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=.64] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.77] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=1.32] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=2.88] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=2.97] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=3.13] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=3.21] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=4.23] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=4.71] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=5.36] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=5.77] .062 .000    
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[ILR9PATR=6.79] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=7.51] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=8.19] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=8.66] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=9.96] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=19.07] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=19.75] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=21.45] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=23.38] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=75.65] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=145.00] .000 .067    
[ILR9PATR=293.40] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=0] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=1] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=3] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=5] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=16] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=17] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=18] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=19] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=37] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=42] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=45] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=49] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=54] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=63] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=68] .000 .067    
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[ILR10APP=78] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=86] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=114] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=116] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=123] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=127] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=275] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=472] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=474] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=570] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=598] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=849] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=1043] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=1303] .000 .067    
[ILR10APP=1921] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=2147] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=-3.54] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.21] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.06] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.00] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.01] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.02] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.03] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.04] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.05] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.08] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.10] .062 .000    
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[OE5NPM=.12] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.23] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.24] .000 .067    
[OE5NPM=.51] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=-17.58] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=-.22] .125 .000    
[GA1ROE=.00] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.01] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.02] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.03] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.06] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.07] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.10] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.12] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.15] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.17] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.20] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.24] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.25] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.29] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.31] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.38] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.47] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.49] .062 .000    
[GA1ROE=.59] .000 .067    
[GA1ROE=.81] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=-.16] .062 .000    
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[GA1ROA=-.15] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=.01] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.02] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=.05] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=.06] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.10] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=.11] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.12] .000 .067    
[GA1ROA=.14] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.15] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.17] .062 .067    
[GA1ROA=.25] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.41] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.47] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.000000000000] .000 .267    
[OE8TAN=.001606161226] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.002878782635] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.006710047006] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.021072981648] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.076994479139] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.083335715631] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.087778793229] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.121975419306] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.145065897242] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.170353886490] .000 .067    
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[OE8TAN=.177335106867] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.238005180276] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.267121685103] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.278355318823] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.316158489640] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.326321129820] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.354710127050] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.372805266496] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.478928897119] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.508668827982] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.667528088165] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.714581853071] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.719468752248] .000 .067    
[OE8TAN=.778290538487] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.847202814370] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.869289700988] .125 .000    
[@EQ=-160797] .062 .000    
[@EQ=110938] .000 .067    
[@EQ=281917] .062 .000    
[@EQ=783046] .000 .067    
[@EQ=1510106] .000 .067    
[@EQ=1522161] .062 .000    
[@EQ=1570359] .062 .000    
[@EQ=2916965] .000 .067    
[@EQ=4210001] .062 .000    
[@EQ=4220378] .062 .000    
[@EQ=5500242] .000 .067    
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[@EQ=5510892] .062 .000    
[@EQ=5784375] .000 .067    
[@EQ=6030400] .000 .067    
[@EQ=8477306] .062 .000    
[@EQ=9376621] .062 .000    
[@EQ=9771901] .000 .067    
[@EQ=10081349] .000 .067    
[@EQ=11076737] .062 .000    
[@EQ=13246851] .062 .000    
[@EQ=14155473] .062 .000    
[@EQ=15303237] .000 .067    
[@EQ=20442138] .000 .067    
[@EQ=22613599] .062 .000    
[@EQ=22666145] .000 .067    
[@EQ=90509604] .000 .067    
[@EQ=113356788] .000 .067    
[@EQ=122200884] .000 .067    
[@EQ=150459018] .062 .000    
[@EQ=150848495] .125 .000    
[Ownership Gender=0] .250 .200    
[Ownership Gender=1] .688 .667    
[Ownership Gender=2] .062 .133    
[Equity Origin=0] .750 1.000    
[Equity Origin=1] .125 .000    
[Equity Origin=2] .125 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .188 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .812 1.000    
594                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
[CV=0] .000 .267    
[CV=46838] .000 .067    
[CV=92711] .062 .000    
[CV=216842] .062 .000    
[CV=605517] .000 .067    
[CV=722963] .062 .000    
[CV=2261907] .062 .000    
[CV=4782338] .062 .000    
[CV=5105346] .062 .000    
[CV=5687812] .000 .067    
[CV=6744167] .000 .067    
[CV=6753492] .062 .000    
[CV=6770984] .062 .000    
[CV=7043938] .062 .000    
[CV=7262232] .000 .067    
[CV=9241276] .062 .000    
[CV=10175907] .062 .000    
[CV=13734049] .000 .067    
[CV=17227252] .000 .067    
[CV=27071778] .062 .000    
[CV=42945185] .000 .067    
[CV=43606691] .000 .067    
[CV=54789832] .062 .000    
[CV=59208450] .000 .067    
[CV=71537245] .062 .000    
[CV=121324500] .000 .067    
[CV=247476467] .125 .000    
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[RA4TOTALLEV=.00] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.01] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.06] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.08] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.15] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.29] .125 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.30] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.40] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.41] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.48] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.51] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.55] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.59] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.62] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.64] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.65] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.67] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.70] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.73] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.76] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.80] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.81] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.82] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.92] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.93] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.95] .000 .067    
[RA4TOTALLEV=.96] .062 .000    
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[RA4TOTALLEV=1.01] .062 .000    
[RA4TOTALLEV=1.78] .000 .067    
OE10FATA .413 -.441    
Administrator Gender -.195 .208    
OwnersNo .153 -.163    
FirmAge -.173 .185    
Business administration -.264 .282    
INV -.014 .015    
ILR2WC -.305 .326    
ILR4CR .009 -.009    
OE2FATR .142 -.151    
BoS .000 .001    
Hidden Unit Width 1.485 1.378    
Hidden Layer H(1)   -.656 -.587 -.859 
H(2)   1.215 1.087 1.592 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table 39. Parameters estimates/RBF-in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA5LTLEV RA1LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .250 .250    
[ILR6ACP=6] .125 .000    
[ILR6ACP=9] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=24] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=27] .125 .000    
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[ILR6ACP=34] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=41] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=46] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=73] .125 .000    
[ILR6ACP=185] .125 .000    
[ILR6ACP=301] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=429] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=462] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=474] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=500] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=588] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=701] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=1940] .125 .000    
[ILR6ACP=4563] .125 .000    
[ILR9PATR=-91] .125 .000    
[ILR9PATR=-1] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=0] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=1] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=3] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=4] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=9] .125 .000    
[ILR9PATR=12] .125 .000    
[ILR9PATR=32] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=-4055] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=-2027] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=-4] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=0] .250 .500    
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[ILR10APP=12] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=29] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=40] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=102] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=118] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=445] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=716] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=1121] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=2607] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=3650] .125 .000    
[ILR10APP=5214] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=-1] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=0] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=1] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=2] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=3] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=5] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=6] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=7] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=9] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=20] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=24] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=26] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=45] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=88] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=-8.00] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=-.02] .125 .000    
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[OE7ROE=.00] .000 .125    
[OE7ROE=.01] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.02] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.08] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.10] .250 .000    
[OE7ROE=.60] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=3.27] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=4.00] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=5.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=6.90] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=10.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=12.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=13.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=14.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=20.70] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=26.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=36.00] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=45.00] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=98.00] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=-1.02] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.01] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.02] .000 .125    
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.04] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.05] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.06] .000 .062    
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[GA1ROA=.09] .125 .062    
[GA1ROA=.11] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.12] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.41] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=9.74] .000 .062    
[OE8TAN=0] .000 .062    
[OE8TAN=1] .000 .062    
[@EQ=-494426337] .125 .000    
[@EQ=942022] .125 .000    
[@EQ=2958407] .125 .000    
[@EQ=3122819] .000 .062    
[@EQ=6612214] .000 .062    
[@EQ=6914347] .000 .062    
[@EQ=10950716] .125 .000    
[@EQ=11145475] .000 .062    
[@EQ=14877229] .000 .062    
[@EQ=15248331] .000 .062    
[@EQ=22287802] .000 .062    
[@EQ=24857172] .000 .062    
[@EQ=28700457] .000 .062    
[@EQ=34213705] .000 .062    
[@EQ=47381580] .125 .000    
[@EQ=109218963] .125 .000    
[@EQ=152493466] .000 .062    
[@EQ=176236749] .000 .062    
[@EQ=253936015] .000 .062    
[@EQ=303256053] .125 .000    
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[@EQ=430325374] .000 .062    
[@EQ=464959044] .125 .000    
[@EQ=513092556] .000 .062    
[@EQ=586603131] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.00] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=.01] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=.16] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=.22] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.26] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.27] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.46] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.56] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.58] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.65] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.78] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.81] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=.86] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.92] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=.93] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=.98] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.02] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.36] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.39] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.44] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.47] .125 .000    
[RA4TotalLEV=1.60] .000 .062    
[RA4TotalLEV=7.54] .125 .000    
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[BoS=14.91] .125 .000    
[BoS=16.82] .125 .000    
[BoS=17.24] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.42] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.56] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.66] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.69] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.31] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.33] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.41] .125 .000    
[BoS=18.95] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.03] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.08] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.24] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.88] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.89] .125 .000    
[BoS=20.02] .000 .062    
[BoS=20.24] .000 .062    
[BoS=20.28] .125 .000    
[BoS=20.34] .125 .000    
[BoS=20.64] .000 .062    
[BoS=20.92] .125 .000    
[BoS=21.01] .000 .062    
[BoS=21.17] .125 .000    
[Ownership Gender=0] .750 .375    
[Ownership Gender=1] .250 .375    
[Ownership Gender=2] .000 .250    
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[Borrowers’ Status=0] .375 .062    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .625 .938    
[CV=281913] .125 .000    
[CV=1104276] .125 .000    
[CV=2580849] .125 .000    
[CV=22331444] .000 .062    
[CV=36686817] .125 .000    
[CV=39071788] .000 .062    
[CV=47609329] .000 .062    
[CV=49558052] .000 .062    
[CV=53903602] .000 .062    
[CV=68186302] .000 .062    
[CV=71476888] .125 .000    
[CV=80852151] .000 .062    
[CV=82696219] .000 .062    
[CV=85651025] .000 .062    
[CV=114722068] .125 .000    
[CV=154789235] .000 .062    
[CV=196543403] .000 .062    
[CV=262047308] .000 .062    
[CV=550015474] .000 .062    
[CV=667983284] .000 .062    
[CV=1032085243] .000 .062    
[CV=1179124377] .125 .000    
[CV=1355743780] .125 .000    
[CV=1395951970] .000 .062    
OE10FATA -.705 .353    
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Administrator Gender -.148 .074    
Owners No .128 -.064    
Firm Age .226 -.113    
INV .471 -.236    
ILR2WC .333 -.166    
ILR4CR .294 -.147    
OE2FATR .790 -.395    
Business administration -.506 .253    
Hidden Unit Width 1.633 1.282    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .176 .439 .242 
H(2)   -.481 -1.202 -.662 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  40. Parameters estimates/RBF-in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA5TLLEV RA1LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=6] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=9] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=87] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=91] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=332] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=406] .000 .250    
[ILR6ACP=480] .143 .000    
[ILR6ACP=1352] .000 .250    
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[ILR6ACP=1521] .000 .250    
[ILR6ACP=7300] .000 .250    
[ILR9PATR=0] .143 .000    
[ILR9PATR=1] .143 .000    
[ILR9PATR=2] .143 .000    
[ILR9PATR=15] .143 .000    
[ILR10APP=0] .571 1.000    
[ILR10APP=1] .143 .000    
[ILR10APP=187] .143 .000    
[ILR10APP=890] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=-2] .000 .250    
[OE5NPM=0] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=4] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=6] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=7] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=147] .000 .250    
[OE7ROE=0] .000 .250    
[GA1ROA=.00] .143 .500    
[GA1ROA=.01] .143 .000    
[GA1ROA=.02] .143 .000    
[GA1ROA=.04] .000 .250    
[GA1ROA=.05] .143 .000    
[GA1ROA=.09] .143 .000    
[GA1ROA=.16] .000 .250    
[GA1ROA=.33] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.00] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.01] .143 .000    
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[OE8TAN=.03] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.09] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.19] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.46] .000 .250    
[OE8TAN=.47] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.49] .143 .000    
[OE8TAN=.78] .000 .250    
[OE8TAN=.87] .000 .250    
[OE8TAN=.93] .000 .250    
[@EQ=83205] .143 .000    
[@EQ=2530729] .143 .000    
[@EQ=14084812] .000 .250    
[@EQ=20032277] .000 .250    
[@EQ=32524727] .143 .000    
[@EQ=53454752] .143 .000    
[@EQ=66980745] .143 .000    
[@EQ=69222679] .000 .250    
[@EQ=91402631] .143 .000    
[@EQ=94595623] .143 .000    
[@EQ=113071137] .000 .250    
[RA4LEV=.09] .000 .250    
[RA4LEV=.19] .143 .000    
[RA4LEV=.36] .000 .250    
[RA4LEV=.86] .143 .000    
[RA4LEV=.88] .000 .250    
[RA4LEV=.89] .000 .250    
[RA4LEV=.91] .143 .000    
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[RA4LEV=.95] .143 .000    
[RA4LEV=1.05] .143 .000    
[RA4LEV=1.39] .143 .000    
[RA4LEV=3.50] .143 .000    
[BoS=16.09] .000 .250    
[BoS=17.42] .143 .000    
[BoS=18.41] .143 .000    
[BoS=18.46] .000 .250    
[BoS=18.54] .143 .000    
[BoS=18.74] .000 .250    
[BoS=19.78] .143 .000    
[BoS=19.92] .143 .000    
[BoS=20.16] .143 .000    
[BoS=20.69] .000 .250    
[BoS=20.93] .143 .000    
[Ownership Gender=0] .571 .000    
[Ownership Gender=1] .429 .500    
[Ownership Gender=2] .000 .500    
[Equity Origin=0] .429 .000    
[Equity Origin=1] .571 1.000    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .143 .750    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .857 .250    
[CV=1547896] .143 .000    
[CV=2149263] .143 .000    
[CV=6055068] .000 .250    
[CV=11916748] .143 .000    
[CV=53316136] .143 .000    
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[CV=110082297] .000 .250    
[CV=115287140] .143 .000    
[CV=162982714] .000 .250    
[CV=247450065] .143 .000    
[CV=378341781] .143 .000    
[CV=1218678032] .000 .250    
OE10FATA -.594 1.040    
Owners No .241 -.422    
Firm Age -.170 .298    
Business administration .334 -.584    
INV .327 -.572    
ILR2WC .114 -.199    
ILR4CR -.150 .262    
OE2FATR .201 -.352    
Hidden Unit Width 1.460 1.080    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .215 .278 .348 
H(2)   -.660 -.852 -1.067 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.    
Table  41. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA5LTLEV RA1LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .062 .125    
[ILR6ACP=4] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=11] .000 .062    
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[ILR6ACP=14] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=40] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=73] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=82] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=84] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=89] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=97] .062 .062    
[ILR6ACP=99] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=101] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=119] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=141] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=156] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=165] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=173] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=174] .000 .125    
[ILR6ACP=215] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=252] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=283] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=507] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=588] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=760] .000 .062    
[ILR6ACP=1074] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=1352] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=3544] .062 .000    
[ILR6ACP=5984] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=-16.80] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .062    
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[ILR9PATR=.05] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.13] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.34] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=.51] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.59] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.61] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.69] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=.70] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.75] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=.95] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=1.04] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=1.37] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=1.50] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=1.60] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=1.62] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=1.85] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=2.08] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=3.49] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=4.65] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=4.88] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=4.89] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=5.30] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=5.38] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=5.60] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=6.43] .000 .062    
[ILR9PATR=9.24] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=16.60] .000 .062    
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[ILR9PATR=29.37] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=45.11] .062 .000    
[ILR9PATR=1557.00] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=-21] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=0] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=8] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=12] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=22] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=40] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=57] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=65] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=68] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=69] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=75] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=78] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=105] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=175] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=197] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=225] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=228] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=243] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=266] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=351] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=384] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=487] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=521] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=529] .000 .062    
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[ILR10APP=598] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=619] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=716] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=1073] .000 .062    
[ILR10APP=2807] .062 .000    
[ILR10APP=7300] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=-21.30%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.53%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.02%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=.03%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=.05%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.06%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.07%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=.08%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.14%] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=.21%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.26%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=.39%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=1.47%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=2.50%] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=3.50%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=4.80%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=6.00%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=6.30%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=6.80%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=6.90%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=7.50%] .000 .125    
CHAPTER XI: ANNEXES 613 
 
[OE5NPM=7.70%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=9.40%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=18.00%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=18.10%] .000 .062    
[OE5NPM=18.18%] .062 .000    
[OE5NPM=38.00%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=-13.28%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=-.10%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=.00%] .062 .312    
[OE7ROE=.02%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=.06%] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=.12%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.14%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=.16%] .125 .000    
[OE7ROE=.20%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.36%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=.39%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.48%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=.79%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=4.70%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=9.44%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=9.50%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=11.00%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=12.60%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=14.00%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=20.00%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=35.00%] .062 .000    
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[OE7ROE=54.00%] .000 .062    
[OE7ROE=59.00%] .062 .000    
[OE7ROE=131.00%] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=-13.28] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=-4.16] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=-.07] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.00] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.01] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.02] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.05] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.06] .125 .000    
[GA1ROA=.07] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.10] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.16] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.17] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.23] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.27] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=.28] .000 .062    
[GA1ROA=.29] .062 .000    
[GA1ROA=9.22] .062 .000    
[OE8TAN=.000000000000
%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=2.683324288681
%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=2.880775504766
%] 
.062 .000 
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[OE8TAN=2.886334172824
%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=4.337575907704
%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=4.433798202034
%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=4.828293032677
%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=5.708326351345
%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=6.774897331444
%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=11.13061152052
9%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=12.94962834644
4%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=13.19646353827
4%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=13.21135928990
2%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=14.89408460933
5%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=17.99039002779
0%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=19.32526309453
6%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=20.35773568219
2%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=23.72115414011
1%] 
.000 .062 
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[OE8TAN=28.12033491197
8%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=31.56697623529
5%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=37.91639781539
6%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=41.04577352364
4%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=41.63919356843
9%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=46.07088160852
7%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=70.06772319534
5%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=71.66408648997
3%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=73.53037509241
5%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=77.83316431418
6%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=78.19125063779
2%] 
.062 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=78.60393894680
6%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=79.13195894677
8%] 
.000 .062 
   
[OE8TAN=93.28357856102
7%] 
.062 .000 
   
[@EQ=-309835763] .062 .000    
[@EQ=836828] .062 .000    
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[@EQ=2632141] .000 .062    
[@EQ=3021682] .062 .000    
[@EQ=3305744] .062 .000    
[@EQ=3807051] .000 .062    
[@EQ=4269752] .000 .125    
[@EQ=4618159] .000 .062    
[@EQ=5078429] .062 .000    
[@EQ=6110936] .000 .062    
[@EQ=7722016] .000 .062    
[@EQ=9768261] .000 .062    
[@EQ=10413469] .000 .062    
[@EQ=10664258] .062 .000    
[@EQ=12998122] .062 .000    
[@EQ=14596896] .000 .062    
[@EQ=14701776] .062 .000    
[@EQ=16351575] .062 .000    
[@EQ=18664619] .000 .062    
[@EQ=19606355] .000 .062    
[@EQ=21980163] .062 .000    
[@EQ=25144275] .000 .062    
[@EQ=31154664] .062 .000    
[@EQ=100115135] .000 .062    
[@EQ=100377451] .000 .062    
[@EQ=126298437] .000 .062    
[@EQ=177663527] .062 .000    
[@EQ=303025325] .062 .000    
[@EQ=340756087] .062 .000    
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[@EQ=1347810200] .062 .000    
[@EQ=40432622000] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.01] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.02] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.06] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.10] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.14] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.15] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.27] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.35] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.36] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.41] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.50] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.51] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.58] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.67] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.70] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.71] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.72] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.80] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.91] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.92] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.93] .062 .000    
[RA4LEV=.97] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=.98] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=1.16] .000 .062    
[RA4LEV=2.76] .000 .062    
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[RA4LEV=30.02] .062 .000    
[BoS=15.16] .000 .062    
[BoS=15.58] .000 .062    
[BoS=15.71] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.02] .000 .062    
[BoS=16.07] .000 .062    
[BoS=16.17] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.18] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.27] .000 .062    
[BoS=16.31] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.38] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.52] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.90] .062 .000    
[BoS=16.96] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.34] .062 .000    
[BoS=17.69] .000 .062    
[BoS=17.73] .062 .000    
[BoS=17.99] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.06] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.37] .062 .000    
[BoS=18.76] .000 .062    
[BoS=18.93] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.42] .062 .000    
[BoS=19.55] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.59] .062 .000    
[BoS=19.70] .000 .062    
[BoS=19.80] .062 .000    
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[BoS=20.27] .000 .062    
[BoS=20.55] .000 .062    
[BoS=21.03] .062 .000    
[BoS=25.12] .062 .000    
[Ownership Gender=0] .188 .000    
[Ownership Gender=1] .500 1.000    
[Ownership Gender=2] .312 .000    
[Equity Origin=0] .812 1.000    
[Equity Origin=2] .188 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .188 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .812 1.000    
[CV=283884.10] .062 .000    
[CV=325379.97] .000 .062    
[CV=359256.80] .000 .062    
[CV=798149.01] .062 .000    
[CV=988825.97] .000 .062    
[CV=1457896.00] .062 .000    
[CV=1851393.01] .000 .062    
[CV=2176620.68] .000 .062    
[CV=2434446.59] .062 .000    
[CV=3093848.72] .000 .062    
[CV=3282505.97] .000 .062    
[CV=3717009.80] .062 .000    
[CV=4998943.14] .062 .000    
[CV=9235938.41] .062 .000    
[CV=12194738.14] .062 .000    
[CV=13897832.76] .062 .000    
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[CV=14286325.19] .000 .062    
[CV=23002335.79] .000 .062    
[CV=23232231.64] .062 .000    
[CV=44155401.78] .062 .000    
[CV=55749065.62] .000 .062    
[CV=68934158.57] .000 .062    
[CV=75777545.47] .000 .062    
[CV=81956750.05] .062 .000    
[CV=122297508.08] .000 .062    
[CV=126140142.51] .000 .062    
[CV=270562916.12] .062 .000    
[CV=360750078.23] .000 .062    
[CV=443686565.52] .062 .000    
[CV=508368774.64] .000 .062    
[CV=1409909179.93] .062 .000    
[CV=15919312266.00] .062 .000    
OE10FATA .142 -.142    
Administrator Gender -.473 .473    
Business administration .664 -.664    
Owners No .302 -.302    
Firm Age -.206 .206    
INV .165 -.165    
ILR2WC .181 -.181    
ILR4CR .225 -.225    
OE2FATR -.008 .008    
Hidden Unit Width 1.619 1.146    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .053 -.028 -.116 
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H(2)   -.380 .200 .836 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table  42. Parameters estimates/RBF-in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) RA3ICR STD 
RA5 
LTLEV 
RA1 
LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=1] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=3] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=4] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=5] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=6] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=13] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=16] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=26] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=30] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=34] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=35] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=43] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=46] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=53] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=57] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=77] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=81] .062 .000      
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[ILR6ACP=133] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=182] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=183] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=579] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=589] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=608] .062 .000      
[ILR6ACP=687] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=1043] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=1258] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=0] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=1] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=3] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=5] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=16] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=17] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=18] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=19] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=37] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=42] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=45] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=49] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=54] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=63] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=68] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=78] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=86] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=114] .000 .067      
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[ILR10APP=116] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=123] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=127] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=275] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=472] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=474] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=570] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=598] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=849] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=1043] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=1303] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=1921] .062 .000      
[ILR10APP=2147] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=-3.54] .125 .000      
[OE5NPM=-.21] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=-.06] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.00] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.01] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.02] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.03] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.04] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.05] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.08] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.10] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.12] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.23] .062 .000      
[OE5NPM=.24] .000 .067      
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[OE5NPM=.51] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=-17.58] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=-.22] .125 .000      
[GA1ROE=.00] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.01] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.02] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.03] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.06] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.07] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.10] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.12] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.15] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.17] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.20] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.24] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.25] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.29] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.31] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.38] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.47] .062 .000      
[GA1ROE=.49] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.59] .000 .067      
[GA1ROE=.81] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=-.16] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=-.15] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.00] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.01] .062 .000      
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[GA1ROA=.02] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.05] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.06] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.10] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.11] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.12] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.14] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.15] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.17] .125 .000      
[GA1ROA=.25] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.41] .062 .000      
[GA1ROA=.47] .000 .067      
[OE8TAN=.000000000
000] 
.062 .200 
     
[OE8TAN=.001606161
226] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.002878782
635] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.006710047
006] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.021072981
648] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.076994479
139] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.083335715
631] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.087778793
229] 
.062 .000 
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[OE8TAN=.121975419
306] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.145065897
242] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.170353886
490] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.177335106
867] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.238005180
276] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.267121685
103] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.278355318
823] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.316158489
640] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.326321129
820] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.354710127
050] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.372805266
496] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.478928897
119] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.508668827
982] 
.000 .067 
     
[OE8TAN=.667528088
165] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.714581853
071] 
.062 .000 
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[OE8TAN=.719468752
248] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.778290538
487] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.847202814
370] 
.062 .000 
     
[OE8TAN=.869289700
988] 
.125 .000 
     
[BoS=13.82] .000 .067      
[BoS=14.26] .000 .067      
[BoS=14.32] .062 .000      
[BoS=14.89] .062 .000      
[BoS=15.58] .062 .000      
[BoS=15.68] .062 .000      
[BoS=15.77] .062 .000      
[BoS=15.82] .000 .067      
[BoS=15.87] .062 .000      
[BoS=15.99] .062 .000      
[BoS=16.36] .062 .000      
[BoS=16.46] .062 .000      
[BoS=16.77] .062 .000      
[BoS=16.87] .000 .067      
[BoS=16.98] .062 .000      
[BoS=16.99] .062 .000      
[BoS=17.20] .062 .000      
[BoS=17.23] .000 .067      
[BoS=17.48] .000 .067      
[BoS=17.52] .000 .067      
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[BoS=18.61] .000 .067      
[BoS=18.77] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.03] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.17] .125 .000      
[BoS=19.45] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.62] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.84] .000 .067      
[BoS=20.25] .000 .067      
[Ownership Gender=0] .250 .200      
[Ownership Gender=1] .625 .733      
[Ownership Gender=2] .125 .067      
[Equity Origin=0] .750 1.000      
[Equity Origin=1] .125 .000      
[Equity Origin=2] .125 .000      
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .188 .000      
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .812 1.000      
[CV=0] .062 .200      
[CV=46838] .062 .000      
[CV=92711] .062 .000      
[CV=216842] .062 .000      
[CV=605517] .000 .067      
[CV=722963] .062 .000      
[CV=2261907] .062 .000      
[CV=4782338] .062 .000      
[CV=5105346] .000 .067      
[CV=5687812] .062 .000      
[CV=6744167] .062 .000      
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[CV=6753492] .062 .000      
[CV=6770984] .062 .000      
[CV=7043938] .062 .000      
[CV=7262232] .000 .067      
[CV=9241276] .062 .000      
[CV=10175907] .000 .067      
[CV=13734049] .000 .067      
[CV=17227252] .000 .067      
[CV=27071778] .062 .000      
[CV=42945185] .000 .067      
[CV=43606691] .000 .067      
[CV=54789832] .000 .067      
[CV=59208450] .000 .067      
[CV=71537245] .000 .067      
[CV=121324500] .000 .067      
[CV=247476467] .125 .000      
[OE3GPM=-2.5] .125 .000      
[OE3GPM=-.4] .062 .000      
[OE3GPM=.0] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.1] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.2] .125 .000      
[OE3GPM=.3] .062 .000      
[OE3GPM=.9] .000 .067      
[NP=-33221424] .125 .000      
[NP=-2827447] .062 .000      
[NP=1568] .062 .000      
[NP=5774] .000 .067      
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[NP=7792] .062 .000      
[NP=87336] .000 .067      
[NP=90194] .000 .067      
[NP=100675] .062 .000      
[NP=138916] .000 .067      
[NP=150740] .062 .000      
[NP=203493] .062 .000      
[NP=261094] .000 .067      
[NP=360687] .062 .000      
[NP=431861] .062 .000      
[NP=469568] .000 .067      
[NP=680071] .000 .067      
[NP=1000389] .062 .000      
[NP=1082388] .062 .000      
[NP=1425367] .000 .067      
[NP=1430406] .000 .067      
[NP=2070659] .000 .067      
[NP=2302155] .062 .000      
[NP=2671479] .062 .000      
[NP=3319238] .000 .067      
[NP=3510380] .000 .067      
[NP=4166189] .062 .000      
[NP=6325381] .062 .000      
[NP=6839527] .000 .067      
[NP=18476291] .000 .067      
[NP=47459018] .000 .067      
[FA=0] .062 .200      
632                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
[FA=34750] .062 .000      
[FA=68784] .062 .000      
[FA=160879] .062 .000      
[FA=449244] .000 .067      
[FA=536379] .062 .000      
[FA=1678149] .062 .000      
[FA=3548102] .062 .000      
[FA=3787748] .000 .067      
[FA=4219890] .062 .000      
[FA=5003618] .062 .000      
[FA=5010537] .062 .000      
[FA=5023514] .062 .000      
[FA=5226024] .062 .000      
[FA=5387980] .000 .067      
[FA=6856268] .062 .000      
[FA=7549688] .000 .067      
[FA=10189537] .000 .067      
[FA=12781207] .000 .067      
[FA=20085037] .062 .000      
[FA=31861802] .000 .067      
[FA=32352585] .000 .067      
[FA=40649558] .000 .067      
[FA=43927810] .000 .067      
[FA=53074764] .000 .067      
[FA=90012820] .000 .067      
[FA=183607225] .125 .000      
[RA=0] .062 .133      
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[RA=3200] .000 .067      
[RA=12780] .000 .067      
[RA=24840] .000 .067      
[RA=47744] .062 .000      
[RA=89225] .000 .067      
[RA=116700] .062 .000      
[RA=147064] .062 .000      
[RA=529949] .062 .000      
[RA=625045] .062 .000      
[RA=652853] .062 .000      
[RA=793494] .062 .000      
[RA=1186259] .000 .067      
[RA=1371031] .062 .000      
[RA=1727777] .062 .000      
[RA=1831993] .062 .000      
[RA=2616078] .062 .000      
[RA=3042911] .000 .067      
[RA=3293838] .062 .000      
[RA=13902129] .000 .067      
[RA=14696428] .062 .000      
[RA=15496428] .062 .000      
[RA=19401114] .062 .000      
[RA=46351540] .000 .067      
[RA=58457450] .000 .067      
[RA=82295898] .000 .067      
[RA=187644122] .000 .067      
[RA=243179618] .000 .067      
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[RA=267163795] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.00] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.17] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.19] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.28] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.35] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.43] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.61] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.64] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.77] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1.32] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=2.88] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=2.97] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=3.13] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=3.21] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=4.23] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=4.71] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=5.36] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=5.77] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=6.79] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=7.51] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=8.19] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=8.66] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=9.96] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=19.07] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=19.75] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=21.45] .062 .000      
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[ILR9PATR=23.38] .062 .000      
[ILR9PATR=75.65] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=145.00] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=293.40] .062 .000      
OE10FATA .328 -.350      
Administrator Gender -.195 .208      
Owners No .177 -.189      
Firm Age .095 -.102      
Business 
administration 
-.097 .104 
     
INV -.401 .427      
ILR2WC -.432 .461      
ILR4CR .300 -.321      
OE2FATR .144 -.154      
GA2OCF .128 -.137      
OE6AT .175 -.186      
ILR7ITR .311 -.331      
Hidden Unit Width 1.655 1.500      
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1)   -.048 -.413 -.909 -.399 -.845 
H(2)   .097 .843 1.857 .816 1.725 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden 
unit. 
      
Table  43. Parameters estimates/RBF-in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) 
RA3 
ICR STD 
RA5 
LTLEV 
RA1 
LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .308 .125      
[ILR6ACP=6] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=9] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=24] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=27] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=34] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=46] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=73] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=185] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=301] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=429] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=462] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=500] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=588] .000 .125      
[ILR6ACP=701] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=1940] .077 .000      
[ILR6ACP=4563] .000 .125      
[ILR9PATR=-91] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=-1] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=0] .000 .125      
[ILR9PATR=1] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=3] .000 .125      
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[ILR9PATR=4] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=9] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=12] .077 .000      
[ILR9PATR=32] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=-4055] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=-2027] .000 .125      
[ILR10APP=-4] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=0] .154 .625      
[ILR10APP=12] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=29] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=40] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=102] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=118] .000 .125      
[ILR10APP=445] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=716] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=1121] .000 .125      
[ILR10APP=2607] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=3650] .077 .000      
[ILR10APP=5214] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=-1] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=0] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=1] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=2] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=3] .000 .125      
[OE5NPM=5] .000 .125      
[OE5NPM=6] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=7] .077 .000      
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[OE5NPM=9] .000 .125      
[OE5NPM=24] .077 .000      
[OE5NPM=26] .000 .125      
[OE5NPM=45] .000 .125      
[OE5NPM=88] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=-8.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=-.02] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=.00] .000 .250      
[OE7ROE=.02] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=.08] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=.10] .000 .250      
[OE7ROE=.60] .000 .125      
[OE7ROE=4.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=5.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=6.90] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=10.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=12.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=13.00] .000 .125      
[OE7ROE=14.00] .000 .125      
[OE7ROE=26.00] .000 .125      
[OE7ROE=36.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=45.00] .077 .000      
[OE7ROE=98.00] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=-1.02] .000 .125      
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 .125      
[GA1ROA=.01] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.02] .154 .000      
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[GA1ROA=.03] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.04] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.05] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.06] .000 .125      
[GA1ROA=.09] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.11] .000 .125      
[GA1ROA=.12] .077 .000      
[GA1ROA=.41] .000 .125      
[GA1ROA=9.74] .000 .125      
[OE8TAN=0] .077 .000      
[OE8TAN=1] .000 .125      
[@EQ=-494426337] .000 .125      
[@EQ=942022] .077 .000      
[@EQ=2958407] .077 .000      
[@EQ=6612214] .077 .000      
[@EQ=6914347] .077 .000      
[@EQ=10950716] .000 .125      
[@EQ=14877229] .077 .000      
[@EQ=15248331] .077 .000      
[@EQ=22287802] .077 .000      
[@EQ=24857172] .000 .125      
[@EQ=28700457] .000 .125      
[@EQ=47381580] .077 .000      
[@EQ=109218963] .077 .000      
[@EQ=152493466] .077 .000      
[@EQ=176236749] .000 .125      
[@EQ=253936015] .077 .000      
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[@EQ=303256053] .077 .000      
[@EQ=430325374] .000 .125      
[@EQ=464959044] .077 .000      
[@EQ=513092556] .000 .125      
[@EQ=586603131] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.00] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.01] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.16] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.22] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.26] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.27] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.46] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.56] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=.58] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.65] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.78] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.81] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.86] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.92] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.93] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=.98] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=1.02] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=1.39] .000 .125      
[RA4TotalLEV=1.44] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=1.47] .077 .000      
[RA4TotalLEV=7.54] .077 .000      
[BoS=14.91] .077 .000      
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[BoS=16.82] .077 .000      
[BoS=17.24] .077 .000      
[BoS=17.42] .000 .125      
[BoS=17.66] .077 .000      
[BoS=17.69] .077 .000      
[BoS=18.31] .077 .000      
[BoS=18.41] .077 .000      
[BoS=19.03] .000 .125      
[BoS=19.08] .077 .000      
[BoS=19.24] .000 .125      
[BoS=19.88] .077 .000      
[BoS=19.89] .077 .000      
[BoS=20.02] .000 .125      
[BoS=20.24] .077 .000      
[BoS=20.28] .077 .000      
[BoS=20.34] .000 .125      
[BoS=20.64] .000 .125      
[BoS=20.92] .000 .125      
[BoS=21.01] .000 .125      
[BoS=21.17] .077 .000      
[Ownership 
Gender=0] 
.385 .625 
     
[Ownership 
Gender=1] 
.538 .125 
     
[Ownership 
Gender=2] 
.077 .250 
     
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .154 .250      
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .846 .750      
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[CV=281913] .077 .000      
[CV=1104276] .000 .125      
[CV=2580849] .077 .000      
[CV=22331444] .077 .000      
[CV=36686817] .077 .000      
[CV=39071788] .077 .000      
[CV=47609329] .077 .000      
[CV=53903602] .000 .125      
[CV=68186302] .077 .000      
[CV=71476888] .077 .000      
[CV=80852151] .077 .000      
[CV=85651025] .000 .125      
[CV=114722068] .077 .000      
[CV=196543403] .077 .000      
[CV=262047308] .000 .125      
[CV=550015474] .000 .125      
[CV=667983284] .077 .000      
[CV=1032085243] .000 .125      
[CV=1179124377] .077 .000      
[CV=1355743780] .000 .125      
[CV=1395951970] .000 .125      
[OE3GPM=0] .000 .125      
[OE3GPM=1] .000 .125      
[OE3GPM=2] .077 .000      
[OE3GPM=7] .077 .000      
[OE3GPM=8] .077 .000      
[OE3GPM=11] .000 .125      
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[OE3GPM=35] .077 .000      
[OE3GPM=49] .000 .125      
[NP=-11374763.00] .077 .000      
[NP=-83702.00] .077 .000      
[NP=.00] .000 .250      
[NP=147515.00] .077 .000      
[NP=230608.00] .000 .125      
[NP=248331.00] .077 .000      
[NP=718988.00] .077 .000      
[NP=824358.00] .077 .000      
[NP=1369745.00] .000 .125      
[NP=1699669.00] .077 .000      
[NP=3021111.00] .077 .000      
[NP=3270613.00] .000 .125      
[NP=3401796.00] .000 .125      
[NP=6808048.00] .077 .000      
[NP=7554275.00] .000 .125      
[NP=9424662.00] .077 .000      
[NP=13185246.00] .077 .000      
[NP=21056053.00] .077 .000      
[NP=40099511.00] .077 .000      
[NP=84114018.00] .000 .125      
[FA=190667] .077 .000      
[FA=746859] .000 .125      
[FA=1745515] .077 .000      
[FA=15103509] .077 .000      
[FA=24812532] .077 .000      
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[FA=26425568] .077 .000      
[FA=32199795] .077 .000      
[FA=36456824] .000 .125      
[FA=46116696] .077 .000      
[FA=48342230] .077 .000      
[FA=54683037] .077 .000      
[FA=57928677] .000 .125      
[FA=77590404] .077 .000      
[FA=132928933] .077 .000      
[FA=177231433] .000 .125      
[FA=371994017] .000 .125      
[FA=451779626] .077 .000      
[FA=698034062] .000 .125      
[FA=797481588] .077 .000      
[FA=916935248] .000 .125      
[FA=944129403] .000 .125      
[RA=-587073812] .077 .000      
[RA=249474] .000 .125      
[RA=1204633] .077 .000      
[RA=1937327] .077 .000      
[RA=5265375] .077 .000      
[RA=6092564] .077 .000      
[RA=12264964] .000 .125      
[RA=14321710] .077 .000      
[RA=18403370] .077 .000      
[RA=26709155] .077 .000      
[RA=70324564] .000 .125      
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[RA=80367273] .077 .000      
[RA=107668190] .077 .000      
[RA=109571129] .000 .125      
[RA=118690807] .000 .125      
[RA=163654975] .077 .000      
[RA=171178531] .077 .000      
[RA=183489560] .000 .125      
[RA=212654108] .000 .125      
[RA=334144473] .077 .000      
[RA=682212500] .000 .125      
Administrator Gender .061 -.099      
Business 
administration 
-.390 .634 
     
Owners No -.074 .121      
Firm Age -.165 .267      
INV .142 -.230      
ILR2WC -.170 .276      
ILR4CR .225 -.366      
OE2FATR .144 -.234      
OE6AT .072 -.117      
ILR7ITR .091 -.149      
Hidden Unit Width 1.634 1.465      
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1)   .277 .234 .211 .402 .154 
H(2)   -.743 -.627 -.565 -1.078 -.414 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.      
Table  44. Parameters estimates/RBF-in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) 
RA3 
ICR STD 
RA5 
LTLEV 
RA1 
LTDER LTD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .250 .000      
[ILR6ACP=6] .250 .000      
[ILR6ACP=9] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=87] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=91] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=332] .250 .000      
[ILR6ACP=406] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=480] .250 .000      
[ILR6ACP=1352] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=1521] .000 .143      
[ILR6ACP=7300] .000 .143      
[ILR9PATR=0] .250 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1] .000 .143      
[ILR9PATR=2] .250 .000      
[ILR9PATR=15] .250 .000      
[ILR10APP=0] .250 1.000      
[ILR10APP=1] .250 .000      
[ILR10APP=187] .250 .000      
[ILR10APP=890] .250 .000      
[OE5NPM=-2] .000 .143      
[OE5NPM=0] .250 .000      
[OE5NPM=4] .000 .143      
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[OE5NPM=6] .250 .000      
[OE5NPM=7] .250 .000      
[OE5NPM=147] .000 .143      
[OE7ROE=0] .000 .143      
[GA1ROA=.00] .000 .429      
[GA1ROA=.01] .250 .000      
[GA1ROA=.02] .000 .143      
[GA1ROA=.04] .000 .143      
[GA1ROA=.05] .250 .000      
[GA1ROA=.09] .000 .143      
[GA1ROA=.16] .000 .143      
[GA1ROA=.33] .250 .000      
[OE8TAN=.00] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.01] .250 .000      
[OE8TAN=.03] .250 .000      
[OE8TAN=.09] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.19] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.46] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.47] .250 .000      
[OE8TAN=.49] .250 .000      
[OE8TAN=.78] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.87] .000 .143      
[OE8TAN=.93] .000 .143      
[@EQ=83205] .250 .000      
[@EQ=2530729] .000 .143      
[@EQ=14084812] .000 .143      
[@EQ=20032277] .000 .143      
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[@EQ=32524727] .000 .143      
[@EQ=53454752] .250 .000      
[@EQ=66980745] .000 .143      
[@EQ=69222679] .000 .143      
[@EQ=91402631] .250 .000      
[@EQ=94595623] .250 .000      
[@EQ=113071137] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=.09] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=.19] .250 .000      
[RA4LEV=.36] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=.86] .250 .000      
[RA4LEV=.88] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=.89] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=.91] .250 .000      
[RA4LEV=.95] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=1.05] .250 .000      
[RA4LEV=1.39] .000 .143      
[RA4LEV=3.50] .000 .143      
[BoS=16.09] .000 .143      
[BoS=17.42] .000 .143      
[BoS=18.41] .000 .143      
[BoS=18.46] .000 .143      
[BoS=18.54] .250 .000      
[BoS=18.74] .000 .143      
[BoS=19.78] .250 .000      
[BoS=19.92] .000 .143      
[BoS=20.16] .250 .000      
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[BoS=20.69] .000 .143      
[BoS=20.93] .250 .000      
[Ownership 
Gender=0] 
1.000 .000 
     
[Ownership 
Gender=1] 
.000 .714 
     
[Ownership 
Gender=2] 
.000 .286 
     
[Equity Origin=0] .250 .286      
[Equity Origin=1] .750 .714      
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .000 .571      
[Borrowers’ Status=1] 1.000 .429      
[CV=1547896] .000 .143      
[CV=2149263] .250 .000      
[CV=6055068] .000 .143      
[CV=11916748] .000 .143      
[CV=53316136] .250 .000      
[CV=110082297] .000 .143      
[CV=115287140] .000 .143      
[CV=162982714] .000 .143      
[CV=247450065] .250 .000      
[CV=378341781] .250 .000      
[CV=1218678032] .000 .143      
[OE3GPM=-2] .000 .143      
[OE3GPM=0] .250 .000      
[OE3GPM=1] .000 .286      
[OE3GPM=2] .000 .143      
[OE3GPM=8] .250 .000      
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[OE3GPM=11] .250 .000      
[OE3GPM=100] .000 .143      
[NP=-5417828] .000 .143      
[NP=-585957] .000 .143      
[NP=0] .000 .286      
[NP=3599347] .000 .143      
[NP=3814808] .000 .143      
[NP=4553070] .250 .000      
[NP=5671411] .250 .000      
[NP=8220938] .250 .000      
[NP=10237565] .250 .000      
[NP=12922280] .000 .143      
[FA=0] .000 .143      
[FA=1582846] .250 .000      
[FA=4459316] .000 .143      
[FA=8776209] .000 .143      
[FA=39265204] .250 .000      
[FA=81071214] .000 .143      
[FA=84904373] .000 .143      
[FA=120030258] .000 .143      
[FA=182237088] .250 .000      
[FA=278633608] .250 .000      
[FA=897507688] .000 .143      
[RA=5111721] .000 .143      
[RA=17155608] .000 .143      
[RA=23155785] .000 .143      
[RA=30848198] .000 .143      
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[RA=31353832] .000 .143      
[RA=51250009] .000 .143      
[RA=88807085] .000 .143      
[RA=90267910] .250 .000      
[RA=102201314] .250 .000      
[RA=124515285] .250 .000      
[RA=1112524165] .250 .000      
OE10FATA -.402 .230      
Business 
administration 
-.049 .028 
     
Owners No .738 -.422      
Firm Age -.004 .002      
INV .263 -.150      
ILR2WC -.084 .048      
ILR4CR -.271 .155      
OE2FATR .587 -.335      
OE6AT .528 -.302      
ILR7ITR -.266 .152      
Hidden Unit Width 1.661 1.464      
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1)   .232 .740 -.350 .491 .500 
H(2)   -.227 -.723 .343 -.480 -.489 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.      
Table  45. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) 
RA5 
LTLEV 
RA1 
LTDER LTD 
RA3 
ICR STD 
Input Layer [ILR6ACP=0] .059 .133      
[ILR6ACP=4] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=11] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=14] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=40] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=73] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=82] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=84] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=89] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=97] .059 .067      
[ILR6ACP=99] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=101] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=119] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=141] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=156] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=165] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=173] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=174] .000 .133      
[ILR6ACP=215] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=252] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=283] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=507] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=588] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=760] .000 .067      
[ILR6ACP=1074] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=1352] .059 .000      
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[ILR6ACP=3544] .059 .000      
[ILR6ACP=5984] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=-16.80] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.00] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.05] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.13] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.34] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.51] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.59] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.61] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.69] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=.70] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.75] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=.95] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1.04] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1.37] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=1.50] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=1.60] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=1.62] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1.85] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=2.08] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=3.49] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=4.65] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=4.88] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=4.89] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=5.30] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=5.38] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=5.60] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=6.43] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=9.24] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=16.60] .000 .067      
[ILR9PATR=29.37] .059 .000      
654                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
[ILR9PATR=45.11] .059 .000      
[ILR9PATR=1557.00] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=-21] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=0] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=8] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=12] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=22] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=40] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=57] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=65] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=68] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=69] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=75] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=78] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=105] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=175] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=197] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=225] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=228] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=243] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=266] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=351] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=384] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=487] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=521] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=529] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=598] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=619] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=716] .059 .000      
[ILR10APP=1073] .000 .067      
[ILR10APP=2807] .059 .000      
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[ILR10APP=7300] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=-21.30%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=-.53%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.02%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.03%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.05%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.06%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.07%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=.08%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.14%] .059 .067      
[OE5NPM=.21%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.26%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=.39%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=1.47%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=2.50%] .000 .133      
[OE5NPM=3.50%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=4.80%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=6.00%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=6.30%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=6.80%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=6.90%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=7.50%] .000 .133      
[OE5NPM=7.70%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=9.40%] .000 .067      
[OE5NPM=18.00%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=18.10%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=18.18%] .059 .000      
[OE5NPM=38.00%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=-13.28%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=-.10%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=.00%] .059 .333      
[OE7ROE=.02%] .059 .000      
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[OE7ROE=.06%] .059 .067      
[OE7ROE=.12%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=.14%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=.16%] .118 .000      
[OE7ROE=.20%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=.36%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=.39%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=.48%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=.79%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=4.70%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=9.44%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=9.50%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=11.00%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=12.60%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=14.00%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=20.00%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=35.00%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=54.00%] .000 .067      
[OE7ROE=59.00%] .059 .000      
[OE7ROE=131.00%] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=-13.28] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=-4.16] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=-.07] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.00] .118 .000      
[GA1ROA=.01] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.02] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.03] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.05] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.06] .059 .067      
[GA1ROA=.07] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.10] .000 .067      
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[GA1ROA=.16] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.17] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.23] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.27] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=.28] .000 .067      
[GA1ROA=.29] .059 .000      
[GA1ROA=9.22] .059 .000      
[OE8TAN=.00000000
0000%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=2.6833242
88681%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=2.8807755
04766%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=2.8863341
72824%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=4.3375759
07704%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=4.4337982
02034%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=4.8282930
32677%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=5.7083263
51345%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=6.7748973
31444%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=11.130611
520529%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=12.949628
346444%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=13.196463
538274%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=13.211359
289902%] 
.000 .067      
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[OE8TAN=14.894084
609335%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=17.990390
027790%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=19.325263
094536%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=20.357735
682192%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=23.721154
140111%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=28.120334
911978%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=31.566976
235295%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=37.916397
815396%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=41.045773
523644%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=41.639193
568439%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=46.070881
608527%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=70.067723
195345%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=71.664086
489973%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=73.530375
092415%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=77.833164
314186%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=78.191250
637792%] 
.059 .000      
[OE8TAN=78.603938 .000 .067      
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946806%] 
[OE8TAN=79.131958
946778%] 
.000 .067      
[OE8TAN=93.283578
561027%] 
.059 .000      
[@EQ=-309835763] .059 .000      
[@EQ=836828] .059 .000      
[@EQ=2632141] .000 .067      
[@EQ=3021682] .059 .000      
[@EQ=3305744] .059 .000      
[@EQ=3807051] .000 .067      
[@EQ=4269752] .000 .133      
[@EQ=4618159] .000 .067      
[@EQ=5078429] .000 .067      
[@EQ=6110936] .059 .000      
[@EQ=7722016] .000 .067      
[@EQ=9768261] .000 .067      
[@EQ=10413469] .000 .067      
[@EQ=10664258] .059 .000      
[@EQ=12998122] .059 .000      
[@EQ=14596896] .059 .000      
[@EQ=14701776] .059 .000      
[@EQ=16351575] .059 .000      
[@EQ=18664619] .000 .067      
[@EQ=19606355] .059 .000      
[@EQ=21980163] .059 .000      
[@EQ=25144275] .000 .067      
[@EQ=31154664] .000 .067      
[@EQ=100115135] .000 .067      
[@EQ=100377451] .000 .067      
[@EQ=126298437] .059 .000      
[@EQ=177663527] .059 .000      
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[@EQ=303025325] .059 .000      
[@EQ=340756087] .059 .000      
[@EQ=1347810200] .059 .000      
[@EQ=40432622000] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.01] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.02] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.06] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.10] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.14] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.15] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.27] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.35] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.36] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.41] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.50] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.51] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.58] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.67] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.70] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.71] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.72] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.80] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.91] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.92] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.93] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=.97] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=.98] .059 .000      
[RA4LEV=1.16] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=2.76] .000 .067      
[RA4LEV=30.02] .059 .000      
[BoS=15.16] .000 .067      
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[BoS=15.58] .000 .067      
[BoS=15.71] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.02] .000 .067      
[BoS=16.07] .000 .067      
[BoS=16.17] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.18] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.27] .000 .067      
[BoS=16.31] .000 .067      
[BoS=16.38] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.52] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.90] .059 .000      
[BoS=16.96] .059 .000      
[BoS=17.34] .059 .000      
[BoS=17.69] .000 .067      
[BoS=17.73] .059 .000      
[BoS=17.99] .059 .000      
[BoS=18.06] .000 .067      
[BoS=18.37] .000 .067      
[BoS=18.76] .000 .067      
[BoS=18.93] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.42] .059 .000      
[BoS=19.55] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.59] .059 .000      
[BoS=19.70] .000 .067      
[BoS=19.80] .059 .000      
[BoS=20.27] .059 .000      
[BoS=20.55] .059 .000      
[BoS=21.03] .059 .000      
[BoS=25.12] .000 .067      
[Ownership 
Gender=0] 
.176 .000      
[Ownership .529 1.000      
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Gender=1] 
[Ownership 
Gender=2] 
.294 .000      
[Equity Origin=0] .824 1.000      
[Equity Origin=2] .176 .000      
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .176 .000      
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .824 1.000      
[CV=283884.10] .059 .000      
[CV=325379.97] .000 .067      
[CV=359256.80] .000 .067      
[CV=798149.01] .000 .067      
[CV=988825.97] .059 .000      
[CV=1457896.00] .059 .000      
[CV=1851393.01] .000 .067      
[CV=2176620.68] .000 .067      
[CV=2434446.59] .059 .000      
[CV=3093848.72] .000 .067      
[CV=3282505.97] .000 .067      
[CV=3717009.80] .059 .000      
[CV=4998943.14] .059 .000      
[CV=9235938.41] .059 .000      
[CV=12194738.14] .059 .000      
[CV=13897832.76] .059 .000      
[CV=14286325.19] .059 .000      
[CV=23002335.79] .000 .067      
[CV=23232231.64] .059 .000      
[CV=44155401.78] .000 .067      
[CV=55749065.62] .000 .067      
[CV=68934158.57] .000 .067      
[CV=75777545.47] .000 .067      
[CV=81956750.05] .059 .000      
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[CV=122297508.08] .059 .000      
[CV=126140142.51] .000 .067      
[CV=270562916.12] .059 .000      
[CV=360750078.23] .000 .067      
[CV=443686565.52] .059 .000      
[CV=508368774.64] .059 .000      
[CV=1409909179.93] .059 .000      
[CV=15919312266.00
] 
.000 .067      
[OE3GPM=-7.700%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=-.520%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.010%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.070%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.119%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.170%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.200%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.202%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.290%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.300%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.317%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.470%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.790%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=.870%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=.990%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=3.900%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=4.600%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=4.800%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=5.000%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=5.400%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=7.000%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=10.000%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=11.500%] .000 .067      
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[OE3GPM=20.300%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=28.000%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=28.900%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=30.100%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=38.000%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=42.900%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=44.400%] .000 .067      
[OE3GPM=50.000%] .059 .000      
[OE3GPM=58.000%] .059 .000      
[NP=-18074750800] .059 .000      
[NP=-44492239] .059 .000      
[NP=-807392] .059 .000      
[NP=35557] .059 .000      
[NP=289484] .000 .133      
[NP=441919] .000 .067      
[NP=468129] .000 .067      
[NP=502818] .059 .000      
[NP=601987] .059 .000      
[NP=699380] .000 .067      
[NP=706837] .000 .067      
[NP=773252] .059 .000      
[NP=830055] .000 .067      
[NP=872996] .059 .000      
[NP=1064880] .000 .067      
[NP=1360912] .000 .067      
[NP=1733570] .000 .067      
[NP=1956659] .059 .000      
[NP=2033649] .000 .067      
[NP=2254255] .059 .000      
[NP=3321071] .059 .000      
[NP=3854599] .000 .067      
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[NP=3891456] .059 .000      
[NP=11562679] .059 .000      
[NP=12094162] .000 .067      
[NP=16989305] .000 .067      
[NP=54723556] .059 .000      
[NP=61056994] .059 .000      
[NP=62657728] .059 .000      
[NP=122743440] .059 .000      
[NP=3851868000] .000 .067      
[FA=0] .059 .000      
[FA=192000] .059 .000      
[FA=220065] .000 .067      
[FA=242977] .000 .067      
[FA=539814] .000 .067      
[FA=668775] .059 .000      
[FA=1252157] .000 .067      
[FA=1472119] .000 .067      
[FA=1646495] .059 .000      
[FA=2092470] .000 .067      
[FA=2220065] .000 .067      
[FA=2513934] .059 .000      
[FA=3380947] .059 .000      
[FA=6246564] .059 .000      
[FA=8247696] .059 .000      
[FA=9399554] .059 .000      
[FA=9662304] .059 .000      
[FA=15557224] .000 .067      
[FA=15712710] .059 .000      
[FA=29863727] .000 .067      
[FA=37704897] .000 .067      
[FA=46622402] .000 .067      
[FA=51250806] .000 .067      
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[FA=55430002] .059 .000      
[FA=82713762] .059 .000      
[FA=85312660] .000 .067      
[FA=182990455] .059 .000      
[FA=243986951] .000 .067      
[FA=300079581] .059 .000      
[FA=343826252] .059 .000      
[FA=953567200] .059 .000      
[FA=10766746000] .000 .067      
[RA=0] .059 .133      
[RA=19432] .000 .067      
[RA=962529] .059 .000      
[RA=1030923] .059 .000      
[RA=1260100] .000 .133      
[RA=1671054] .059 .000      
[RA=3339310] .000 .067      
[RA=3636884] .059 .000      
[RA=3902885] .059 .000      
[RA=4157936] .059 .000      
[RA=4470029] .059 .000      
[RA=5252543] .000 .067      
[RA=5814961] .059 .000      
[RA=6076257] .000 .067      
[RA=8267434] .000 .067      
[RA=9172778] .000 .067      
[RA=10191330] .059 .000      
[RA=22356696] .000 .067      
[RA=32395696] .059 .000      
[RA=32520104] .059 .000      
[RA=34152255] .059 .000      
[RA=44799439] .059 .000      
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[RA=50010925] .059 .000      
[RA=93199521] .000 .067      
[RA=100030043] .000 .067      
[RA=156630242] .000 .067      
[RA=178738089] .059 .000      
[RA=304436283] .059 .000      
[RA=15160044000] .000 .067      
Administrator Gender -.417 .473      
Business 
administration 
.211 -.239      
Owners No .222 -.251      
Firm Age -.228 .258      
INV -.180 .203      
ILR2WC -.174 .197      
ILR4CR .217 -.246      
OE2FATR .056 -.064      
GA2OCF -.178 .202      
OE6AT -.037 .042      
ILR7ITR .243 -.275      
Hidden Unit Width 
1.673 1.529      
Hidden 
Layer 
H(1)   .016 .031 -.151 .283 .050 
H(2)   -.032 -.061 .296 -.553 -.098 
a. Displays the center vector for each 
hidden unit. 
      
Table  46. Parameters estimates/RBF-in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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APPENDIX C- Risk –Adjusted approaches estimations 
 
                                              Levene's Test of Equality of Error Varianceaͣ 
 
Dependent Variable:GA1-ROE 
 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.778 2 30 .469 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships Gender 
 
Table  1. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownerships gender vs ROE) in 
trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.236 2 30 .124 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships Gender 
Table   2. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownerships gender vs ROE) in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.521 2 28 .600 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships Gender 
 
Table  3. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownerships gender vs ROE) in 
construction sector 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.888 2 29 .422 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Ownerships  Gender 
Table  4. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Ownerships gender vs ROE) in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
28.398 2 30 .000 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin 
Table  5. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs GOM) in trade 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.336 2 30 .114 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin 
Table  6. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs GOM) in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
12.292 1 23 .002 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin 
Table  7. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin vs GOM) in service 
sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
4.249 1 31 .048 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
Table  8. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs ROA) 
in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
13.114 1 31 .001 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
Table  9. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs ROA) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.504 1 30 .124 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
 
Table  10. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs ROA) 
in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
4.930 1 30 .034 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration 
Table  11. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration vs ROA) 
in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.677 1 31 .417 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  12. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in 
trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
3.488 1 31 .071 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  13. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in 
production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.032 1 29 .318 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  14. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in 
construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.319 1 30 .577 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  15. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status vs ROE) in 
service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.840 2 30 .176 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators  Gender 
Table  16. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs GOM) 
in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.402 1 31 .531 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators  Gender 
Table  17. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs GOM) 
in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.171 1 31 .682 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators Gender 
 
Table  18. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs GOM) 
in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
4.433 1 23 .046 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Administrators  Gender 
Table  19. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Administrators gender vs GOM) 
in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.262 26 6 .993 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + RA1LTDER * Borrowers’ Status + RA1LTDER + Borrowers’ Status 
Table  20. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs 
GOM) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 32 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a.Design: Intercept + RA1LTDER + Borrowers’ Status + RA1LTDER * Borrowers’ Status 
 
Table  21. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs 
GOM) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 32 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + RA1LTDER + Borrowers’ Status + RA1LTDER * Borrowers’ Status 
Table  22. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs 
GOM) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-4 GOM  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.027 16 8 .511 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a.Design: Intercept + Borrowers’ Status + RA1LTDER + Borrowers’ Status * RA1LTDER 
 
Table  23. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status and LTDER vs 
GOM) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA1-ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 31 1 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a.Design: Intercept + ILR5RATR + Business administration + ILR5RATR * Business administration 
 
Table  24. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework and RATR vs ROE) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.474 23 9 .928 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ILR5RATR + Business administration + ILR5RATR * Business administration 
 
Table  25. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework and RATR vs ROE) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.573 19 11 .862 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ILR5RATR + Business administration + ILR5RATR * Business administration 
Table  26. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework and RATR vs ROE) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 30 1 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ILR5RATR + Business administration + ILR5RATR * Business administration 
Table  27. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework and RATR vs ROE) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 32 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin + BoS + Firm Age + Equity Origin * BoS * Firm Age 
Table  28. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin, business size and 
firm age vs ROA) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 32 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Equity Origin + Firm Age + BoS + Equity Origin * Firm Age * BoS 
Table  29. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin, business size and 
firm age vs ROA) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 31 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Firm Age + Equity Origin + BoS + Firm Age * Equity Origin * BoS 
Table  30. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin, business size and 
firm age vs ROA) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:GA-1 ROA  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 31 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Firm Age + Equity Origin + BoS + Firm Age * Equity Origin * BoS 
 
Table  31. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Equity origin, business size and 
firm age vs ROA) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
GA-1 ROA .468 29 3 .883 
GA1-ROE .563 29 3 .826 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OE8TAN + Firm age_A + Borrowers’ Status + OE8TAN * Firm age_A * 
Borrowers’ Status 
Table  32. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status, assets 
tangibility and firm age vs ROA and ROE) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
OE-7 ROE . 31 1 . 
GA-1 ROA . 31 1 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OE8TAN + Firm age_A + Borrowers’ Status + OE8TAN * Firm age_A * 
Borrowers’ Status 
Table  33. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status, assets 
tangibility and firm age vs ROA and ROE) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
OE-7 ROE . 29 1 . 
GA-1 ROA . 29 1 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OE8TAN + Firm age_A + Borrowers’ Status + OE8TAN * Firm age_A * 
Borrowers’ Status 
Table  34. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status, assets 
tangibility and firm age vs ROA and ROE) in construction sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
OE-7 ROE . 31 0 . 
GA-1 ROA . 31 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OE8TAN + Firm age_A + Borrowers’ Status + OE8TAN * Firm age_A * 
Borrowers’ Status 
Table  35. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Borrowers’ status, assets 
tangibility and firm age vs ROA and ROE) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 32 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Business administration + ILR11MCC + OE5NPM + Business administration 
* ILR11MCC * OE5NPM 
Table  36. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM vs ROE) in trade sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.186 29 2 .990 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ILR11MCC + OE5NPM + Business administration + ILR11MCC * OE5NPM * 
Business administration 
Table  37. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM vs ROE) in production sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.352 24 6 .969 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OE5NPM + ILR11MCC + Business administration + OE5NPM * 
ILR11MCC * Business administration 
Table  38. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration framework, 
MCC and NPM vs ROE) in construction sector 
Source:  Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:OE-7 ROE  
F df1 df2 Sig. 
. 30 0 . 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ILR11MCC + OE5NPM + Business administration + ILR11MCC * OE5NPM * 
Business administration 
 
Table  39. Levene's Test of Equality of Errors’ Variances (Business administration 
framework, MCC and NPM vs ROE) in service sector 
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) OE7ROE GA1ROA OE4GOM 
Input Layer [RA1LTDER=.0] .071 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.1] .071 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.3] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=.4] .143 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.5] .000 .118    
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[RA1LTDER=.6] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=.7] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=.8] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=.9] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=1.1] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=2.0] .071 .000    
[RA1LTDER=2.1] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=3.5] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=22.1] .071 .000    
[RA1LTDER=22.2] .000 .059    
[RA1LTDER=47.9] .071 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.00] .857 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.09] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.16] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.18] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.19] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.23] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.26] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.27] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.34] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.42] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.44] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.46] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.50] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.53] .071 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.58] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.66] .000 .059    
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[RA5LTLEV=.68] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.84] .000 .059    
[RA5LTLEV=.94] .071 .000    
[LTD=0] .857 .059    
[LTD=700000] .000 .059    
[LTD=1100000] .000 .059    
[LTD=2200594] .000 .059    
[LTD=4470343] .000 .059    
[LTD=5601160] .000 .059    
[LTD=6263723] .000 .059    
[LTD=7861872] .000 .059    
[LTD=11194329] .071 .000    
[LTD=11755000] .000 .059    
[LTD=17051317] .000 .059    
[LTD=17883211] .000 .059    
[LTD=25590845] .000 .059    
[LTD=48951962] .000 .059    
[LTD=70807301] .000 .059    
[LTD=145700000] .000 .059    
[LTD=263458441] .071 .000    
[LTD=273113251] .000 .059    
[LTD=424526088] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=-59.5] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=-59.4] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=-16.7] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=.0] .357 .412    
[RA3ICR=.5] .000 .059    
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[RA3ICR=1.2] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=2.6] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=4.2] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=5.0] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=5.7] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=6.3] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=13.0] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=14.2] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=21.6] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=137.6] .000 .059    
[RA3ICR=157.9] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=16384.6] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=16546.5] .071 .000    
[RA3ICR=34696.0] .000 .059    
[STD=0] .071 .000    
[STD=80911] .071 .000    
[STD=138925] .071 .000    
[STD=842225] .000 .059    
[STD=900753] .000 .059    
[STD=1362239] .000 .059    
[STD=1428617] .071 .000    
[STD=1453516] .071 .000    
[STD=1618028] .000 .059    
[STD=1709627] .000 .059    
[STD=1787664] .071 .000    
[STD=1862436] .071 .000    
[STD=2347975] .000 .059    
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[STD=2543456] .071 .000    
[STD=2713608] .000 .059    
[STD=5259617] .000 .059    
[STD=7239035] .071 .000    
[STD=8107647] .000 .059    
[STD=9800973] .000 .059    
[STD=9915723] .071 .000    
[STD=16490770] .000 .059    
[STD=19278729] .071 .000    
[STD=19600003] .071 .000    
[STD=27349268] .000 .059    
[STD=27642086] .000 .059    
[STD=37101226] .000 .059    
[STD=45105047] .000 .059    
[STD=60366736] .143 .000    
[STD=74126174] .000 .059    
[STD=105698336] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=-32758730] .143 .000    
[ILR2WC=-16407182] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=-5285909] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=-1838946] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=-800537] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=-783046] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=110938] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=296864] .000 .118    
[ILR2WC=622925] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=1046584] .000 .059    
686                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
[ILR2WC=1475356] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=2757892] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=2916965] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=3186377] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=4768283] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=6382397] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=7336127] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=8504292] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=8542685] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=18565032] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=22452720] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=25445826] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=32354554] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=61120861] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=95533756] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=255509460] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=277822578] .071 .000    
[ILR2WC=354608237] .000 .059    
[ILR2WC=456357082] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=.0] .071 .059    
[ILR5RATR=.3] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.4] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=.5] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.6] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=1.9] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=2.0] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=2.7] .000 .059    
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[ILR5RATR=4.5] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=4.8] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=6.4] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=6.9] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=7.9] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=8.4] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=10.5] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=10.7] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=12.3] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=13.9] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=23.3] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=27.8] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=63.6] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=66.5] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=89.0] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=128.0] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=526.9] .071 .000    
[ILR5RATR=593.4] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=3266.4] .000 .059    
[ILR5RATR=3974.0] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=-475] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=-116] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-42] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-27] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=-14] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=-7] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=8] .071 .000    
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[ILR11MCC=11] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=12] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=32] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=35] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=43] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=46] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=48] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=56] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=98] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=113] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=119] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=128] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=141] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=142] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=168] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=209] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=564] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=613] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=640] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=819] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=1392] .071 .000    
[ILR11MCC=2255] .000 .059    
[ILR11MCC=21770] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=-3.54] .143 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.21] .071 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.06] .071 .000    
[OE5NPM=.00] .071 .000    
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[OE5NPM=.01] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.02] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.03] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.04] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.05] .071 .000    
[OE5NPM=.08] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.10] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.12] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.23] .000 .059    
[OE5NPM=.24] .071 .000    
[OE5NPM=.51] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.000000000000] .214 .059    
[OE8TAN=.001606161226] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.002878782635] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.006710047006] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.021072981648] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.076994479139] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.083335715631] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.087778793229] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.121975419306] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.145065897242] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.170353886490] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.177335106867] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.238005180276] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.267121685103] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.278355318823] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.316158489640] .000 .059    
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[OE8TAN=.326321129820] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.354710127050] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.372805266496] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.478928897119] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.508668827982] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.667528088165] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.714581853071] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.719468752248] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.778290538487] .071 .000    
[OE8TAN=.847202814370] .000 .059    
[OE8TAN=.869289700988] .143 .000    
[BS=13.82] .071 .000    
[BS=14.26] .071 .000    
[BS=14.32] .071 .000    
[BS=14.89] .071 .000    
[BS=15.58] .071 .000    
[BS=15.68] .000 .059    
[BS=15.77] .000 .059    
[BS=15.82] .000 .059    
[BS=15.87] .000 .059    
[BS=15.99] .071 .000    
[BS=16.36] .071 .000    
[BS=16.46] .071 .000    
[BS=16.77] .071 .000    
[BS=16.87] .071 .000    
[BS=16.98] .000 .059    
[BS=16.99] .000 .059    
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[BS=17.20] .071 .000    
[BS=17.23] .000 .059    
[BS=17.48] .000 .059    
[BS=17.52] .000 .059    
[BS=18.61] .000 .059    
[BS=18.77] .000 .059    
[BS=19.03] .000 .059    
[BS=19.17] .143 .000    
[BS=19.45] .071 .000    
[BS=19.62] .000 .059    
[BS=19.84] .000 .059    
[BS=20.25] .000 .059    
[Ownership Gender=0] .143 .294    
[Ownership Gender=1] .714 .647    
[Ownership Gender=2] .143 .059    
[Equity Origin=0] .714 1.000    
[Equity Origin=1] .143 .000    
[Equity Origin=2] .143 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .214 .000    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .786 1.000    
[Business administration=0] .714 .941    
[Business administration=1] .286 .059    
[Administrator Gender=0] .143 .235    
[Administrator Gender=1] .857 .706    
[Administrator Gender=2] .000 .059    
[Firm age_A=0] .000 .059    
[Firm age_A=1] .429 .588    
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[Firm age_A=2] .571 .353    
ILR6ACP .205 -.169    
ILR9PATR .132 -.109    
CV .095 -.078    
FA .095 -.078    
OE9ITA -.256 .211    
INV -.405 .333    
STA -.301 .248    
Owners No .213 -.175    
Hidden Unit Width 1.490 1.341    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .267 -.182 -.664 
H(2)   -.478 .325 1.187 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table  40. Parameters estimates/RBF-in trade sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) OE7ROE GA1ROA OE4GOM 
Input Layer [RA1LTDER=-.39] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=-.22] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=.02] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=.14] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=.56] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.65] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.70] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=4.90] .077 .000    
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[RA1LTDER=6.28] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=20.00] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=43.00] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=66.00] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=81.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=127.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=302.00] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=346.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=414.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=890.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=1090.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=1200.00] .000 .111    
[RA1LTDER=1203.00] .077 .000    
[RA1LTDER=1255.00] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.00] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.01] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.02] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.13] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.16] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.18] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.21] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.27] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.37] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.42] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.56] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.66] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.83] .077 .000    
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[RA5LTLEV=.85] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.92] .077 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.98] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=7.53] .000 .111    
[LTD=0] .077 .111    
[LTD=21450] .077 .000    
[LTD=1096248] .000 .111    
[LTD=4389163] .077 .000    
[LTD=4907268] .000 .111    
[LTD=11315916] .000 .111    
[LTD=11501441] .077 .000    
[LTD=12452824] .077 .000    
[LTD=35929596] .000 .111    
[LTD=41000000] .000 .111    
[LTD=63036495] .000 .111    
[LTD=74620013] .077 .000    
[LTD=88643359] .077 .000    
[LTD=120980364] .077 .000    
[LTD=167997536] .000 .111    
[LTD=177742864] .077 .000    
[LTD=194419337] .077 .000    
[LTD=242287673] .077 .000    
[LTD=283190496] .077 .000    
[LTD=381884815] .077 .000    
[LTD=3260503300] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=-67] .077 .000    
[RA3ICR=-10] .077 .000    
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[RA3ICR=0] .538 .667    
[RA3ICR=1] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=2] .077 .000    
[RA3ICR=24] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=48] .077 .000    
[RA3ICR=171] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=629] .077 .000    
[STD=0] .231 .000    
[STD=21450] .077 .000    
[STD=142747] .000 .111    
[STD=557978] .000 .111    
[STD=1085448] .000 .111    
[STD=1244114] .077 .000    
[STD=4062057] .000 .111    
[STD=12431236] .077 .000    
[STD=18512051] .000 .111    
[STD=35790671] .077 .000    
[STD=44650049] .000 .111    
[STD=54628670] .077 .000    
[STD=63036495] .000 .111    
[STD=100908252] .000 .111    
[STD=134633845] .077 .000    
[STD=188841328] .077 .000    
[STD=189548721] .000 .111    
[STD=503856392] .077 .000    
[STD=594464132] .077 .000    
[STD=974362860] .077 .000    
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[ILR2WC=-211035039] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=-115239196] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=-50516408] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=-23201732] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=-10877023] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=-8947856] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=-88244] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=-31181] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=2540627] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=2763462] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=2767740] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=3312280] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=3912584] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=21186646] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=22569048] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=58627219] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=102755122] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=108095892] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=137937057] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=182542345] .077 .000    
[ILR2WC=351120265] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=573948960] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=0] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=1] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=2] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=5] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=8] .077 .000    
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[ILR5RATR=11] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=14] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=15] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=31] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=41] .077 .000    
[ILR5RATR=66] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-3627] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-3389] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-895] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-773] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-670] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-167] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-108] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-84] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=0] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=25] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=97] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=301] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=462] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=500] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=576] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=842] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=1344] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=1657] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=2013] .077 .000    
[ILR11MCC=2878] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=4563] .000 .111    
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[ILR11MCC=18506] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=-1] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=0] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=1] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=2] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=3] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=5] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=6] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=7] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=9] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=24] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=26] .077 .000    
[OE5NPM=45] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=88] .000 .111    
[OE8TAN=0] .077 .000    
[OE8TAN=1] .000 .111    
[Firmage_A=0] .077 .000    
[Firmage_A=1] .615 .111    
[Firmage_A=2] .308 .889    
[BS=14.91] .077 .000    
[BS=15.38] .077 .000    
[BS=16.82] .000 .111    
[BS=17.24] .077 .000    
[BS=17.42] .000 .111    
[BS=17.66] .077 .000    
[BS=17.69] .000 .111    
[BS=18.31] .077 .000    
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[BS=18.41] .000 .111    
[BS=19.03] .077 .000    
[BS=19.08] .077 .000    
[BS=19.24] .000 .111    
[BS=19.88] .077 .000    
[BS=19.89] .000 .111    
[BS=20.02] .000 .111    
[BS=20.24] .000 .111    
[BS=20.28] .077 .000    
[BS=20.34] .000 .111    
[BS=20.64] .077 .000    
[BS=20.92] .077 .000    
[BS=21.01] .077 .000    
[BS=21.17] .077 .000    
[Ownership Gender=0] .385 .667    
[Ownership Gender=1] .462 .222    
[Ownership Gender=2] .154 .111    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .077 .333    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .923 .667    
[Administrator Gender=0] .154 .000    
[Administrator Gender=1] .846 1.000    
[Business administration=0] .692 .444    
[Business administration=1] .308 .556    
ILR6ACP -.226 .326    
ILR9PATR -.206 .297    
CV .196 -.283    
FA .196 -.283    
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OE9ITA .235 -.339    
INV .250 -.360    
STA .109 -.158    
Owners No -.310 .448    
Hidden Unit Width 1.461 1.339    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .338 -.303 -.570 
H(2)   -.655 .587 1.104 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table  41. Parameters estimates/RBF-in production sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
 
 
 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) OE7ROE GA1ROA 
OE4GO
M 
Input Layer [RA1LTDER=.01] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.13] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.17] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=.22] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.23] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=.64] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=.84] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=.96] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=2.04] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=2.30] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=4.97] .000 .125    
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[RA1LTDER=5.71] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=6.30] .000 .125    
[RA1LTDER=6.78] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=13.62] .125 .000    
[RA1LTDER=38.80] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=.01] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.07] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=.08] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=.17] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.18] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.22] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=.35] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.66] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=.67] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.85] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=.87] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=1.70] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=1.99] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=2.41] .000 .125    
[RA5TLLEV=2.57] .125 .000    
[RA5TLLEV=4.41] .000 .125    
[LTD=18424] .125 .000    
[LTD=3357696] .125 .000    
[LTD=8526248] .000 .125    
[LTD=24578180] .125 .000    
[LTD=66297833] .125 .000    
[LTD=66720000] .000 .125    
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[LTD=73034789] .000 .125    
[LTD=90693393] .000 .125    
[LTD=94464745] .125 .000    
[LTD=94595623] .125 .000    
[LTD=140169269] .000 .125    
[LTD=256133343] .000 .125    
[LTD=272360080] .000 .125    
[LTD=287341450] .125 .000    
[LTD=382558705] .125 .000    
[LTD=445542774] .000 .125    
[RA3ICR=-59241.87] .125 .000    
[RA3ICR=.00] .375 .750    
[RA3ICR=1.18] .000 .125    
[RA3ICR=9.79] .000 .125    
[RA3ICR=25.19] .125 .000    
[RA3ICR=32.59] .125 .000    
[RA3ICR=58.97] .125 .000    
[RA3ICR=5425.60] .125 .000    
[STD=18424] .125 .000    
[STD=682094] .000 .125    
[STD=1133616] .000 .125    
[STD=3359329] .125 .000    
[STD=5224221] .125 .000    
[STD=13129374] .000 .125    
[STD=24578180] .125 .000    
[STD=24608313] .000 .125    
[STD=27122395] .125 .000    
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[STD=34464745] .125 .000    
[STD=42056236] .000 .125    
[STD=73034789] .000 .125    
[STD=80888983] .000 .125    
[STD=242558707] .125 .000    
[STD=424861575] .125 .000    
[STD=1010844282] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=-235999204] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=-134940539] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=-73034789] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=-47893353] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=-6959121] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=-515264] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=0] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=571796] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=2334306] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=22082991] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=38484991] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=62891235] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=98346033] .000 .125    
[ILR2WC=122076369] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=165208048] .125 .000    
[ILR2WC=177241360] .000 .125    
[ILR5RATR=0] .125 .000    
[ILR5RATR=1] .000 .125    
[ILR5RATR=2] .000 .125    
[ILR5RATR=4] .125 .000    
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[ILR5RATR=31] .125 .000    
[ILR5RATR=42] .125 .000    
[ILR5RATR=63] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=-556] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=0] .125 .125    
[ILR11MCC=12] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=35] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=234] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=341] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=406] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=471] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=777] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=1259] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=1521] .000 .125    
[ILR11MCC=5223] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=7416] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=9125] .125 .000    
[ILR11MCC=45625] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=-2] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=0] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=4] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=6] .125 .000    
[OE5NPM=7] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=24] .000 .125    
[OE5NPM=147] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=.00] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.01] .000 .125    
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[OE8TAN=.03] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=.09] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.19] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.46] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.47] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=.49] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.61] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.78] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=.87] .125 .000    
[OE8TAN=.93] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=.99] .000 .125    
[OE8TAN=1.00] .000 .125    
[Firmage_A=0] .125 .000    
[Firmage_A=1] .250 .500    
[Firmage_A=2] .625 .500    
[BS=14.24] .125 .000    
[BS=16.09] .125 .000    
[BS=17.27] .000 .125    
[BS=17.42] .125 .000    
[BS=18.41] .125 .000    
[BS=18.46] .000 .125    
[BS=18.54] .000 .125    
[BS=18.74] .125 .000    
[BS=18.95] .125 .000    
[BS=19.04] .000 .125    
[BS=19.78] .000 .125    
[BS=19.92] .125 .000    
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[BS=20.16] .125 .000    
[BS=20.69] .000 .125    
[BS=20.93] .000 .125    
[Ownership Gender=0] .125 .625    
[Ownership Gender=1] .875 .125    
[Ownership Gender=2] .000 .250    
[Equity Origin=0] .500 .250    
[Equity Origin=1] .500 .500    
[Equity Origin=2] .000 .250    
[Borrowers’ Status=0] .375 .125    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .625 .875    
[Business administration=0] .500 1.000    
[Business administration=1] .500 .000    
ILR6ACP -.191 .191    
ILR9PATR -.267 .267    
CV -.215 .215    
FA -.215 .215    
OE9ITA .278 -.278    
INV .312 -.312    
STA -.174 .174    
OwnersNo .217 -.217    
Hidden Unit Width 1.374 1.485    
Hidden Layer H(1)   -.351 -.596 -.494 
H(2)   .226 .383 .317 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table  42. Parameters estimates/RBF-in construction sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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Parameter Estimates 
Predictor 
Predicted 
Hidden Layera Output Layer 
H(1) H(2) OE7ROE GA1ROA OE4GOM 
Input Layer [RA1LTDER=0] .067 .111    
[RA1LTDER=1] .067 .000    
[RA1LTDER=2] .067 .000    
[RA1LTDER=6] .067 .000    
[RA1LTDER=13] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.00] .400 .667    
[RA5LTLEV=.04] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.06] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.10] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.24] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.28] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.36] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.39] .000 .111    
[RA5LTLEV=.40] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.61] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=.62] .067 .000    
[RA5LTLEV=29.97] .067 .000    
[LTD=0] .400 .667    
[LTD=5107053] .067 .000    
[LTD=8446273] .000 .111    
[LTD=15534103] .067 .000    
[LTD=18465736] .000 .111    
[LTD=38058820] .067 .000    
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[LTD=39684228] .067 .000    
[LTD=43350000] .067 .000    
[LTD=46622402] .067 .000    
[LTD=87833532] .067 .000    
[LTD=110268475] .067 .000    
[LTD=156287921] .000 .111    
[LTD=319995083] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=.0] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=.3] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=1.7] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=2.1] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=2.5] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=3.8] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=3.9] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=4.3] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=5.2] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=12.8] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=13.3] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=18.8] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=23.0] .067 .000    
[RA3ICR=34.7] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=47.4] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=93.3] .000 .111    
[RA3ICR=177.4] .067 .000    
[STD=194262] .000 .111    
[STD=299869] .000 .111    
[STD=517250] .067 .000    
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[STD=2814970] .000 .111    
[STD=3359128] .000 .111    
[STD=3564039] .067 .000    
[STD=5685564] .067 .000    
[STD=7096550] .067 .000    
[STD=10415000] .000 .111    
[STD=11239713] .067 .000    
[STD=12120812] .067 .000    
[STD=13112000] .000 .111    
[STD=19078269] .067 .000    
[STD=25390848] .067 .000    
[STD=31306607] .067 .000    
[STD=33552458] .000 .111    
[STD=40903110] .067 .000    
[STD=94616273] .000 .111    
[STD=97683292] .067 .000    
[STD=130855611] .067 .000    
[STD=145408386] .067 .000    
[STD=259532880] .067 .000    
[STD=356148282] .000 .111    
[STD=735234994] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=-241395824] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=-33341024] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=-26234747] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=-6643120] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=79603] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=1160023] .067 .000    
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[ILR2WC=3113744] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=3397821] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=8455212] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=8562726] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=10159320] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=12763813] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=12970628] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=14802475] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=18937580] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=20333668] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=21411480] .067 .111    
[ILR2WC=36132860] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=39349757] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=45386151] .067 .000    
[ILR2WC=122233525] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=199872596] .000 .111    
[ILR2WC=394244000] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=.00] .067 .111    
[ILR5RATR=.06] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.27] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.34] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=.48] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.62] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=.72] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=1.03] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=1.29] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=1.45] .000 .111    
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[ILR5RATR=1.70] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=2.11] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=2.34] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=2.59] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=3.08] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=3.67] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=3.75] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=3.78] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=4.37] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=4.46] .000 .111    
[ILR5RATR=5.03] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=26.80] .067 .000    
[ILR5RATR=88.00] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-297] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-258] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-169] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-128] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-96] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-83] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=-37] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=-25] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=0] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=10] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=25] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=48] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=96] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=131] .067 .000    
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[ILR11MCC=164] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=247] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=509] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=759] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=865] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=906] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=1108] .000 .111    
[ILR11MCC=1460] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=5462] .067 .000    
[ILR11MCC=6333] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=-21.30%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=-.53%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=.02%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=.03%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=.05%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=.06%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=.07%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=.08%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=.14%] .067 .111    
[OE5NPM=.21%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=.26%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=.39%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=2.50%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=4.80%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=6.00%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=6.80%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=7.70%] .000 .111    
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[OE5NPM=18.00%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=18.10%] .067 .000    
[OE5NPM=18.18%] .000 .111    
[OE5NPM=38.00%] .000 .111    
[OE8TAN=.00000000000
0%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=2.8807755047
66%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=2.8863341728
24%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=4.3375759077
04%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=4.4337982020
34%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=4.8282930326
77%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=6.7748973314
44%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=11.130611520
529%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=12.949628346
444%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=14.894084609
335%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=19.325263094
536%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=20.357735682
192%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=23.721154140
111%] 
.067 .000 
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[OE8TAN=28.120334911
978%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=31.566976235
295%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=41.045773523
644%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=41.639193568
439%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=46.070881608
527%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=70.067723195
345%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=71.664086489
973%] 
.000 .111 
   
[OE8TAN=73.530375092
415%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=77.833164314
186%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=79.131958946
778%] 
.067 .000 
   
[OE8TAN=93.283578561
027%] 
.000 .111 
   
[Firm age_A=1] .267 .667    
[Firm age_A=2] .733 .333    
[Ownership Gender=0] .000 .222    
[Ownership Gender=1] 1.000 .222    
[Ownership Gender=2] .000 .556    
[Equity Origin=0] 1.000 .667    
[Equity Origin=2] .000 .333    
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[Borrowers’ Status=0] .133 .111    
[Borrowers’ Status=1] .867 .889    
[Business 
administration=0] 
.733 .444 
   
[Business 
administration=1] 
.267 .556 
   
[Administrator Gender=0] .000 .556    
[Administrator Gender=1] 1.000 .444    
[BS=15.71] .000 .111    
[BS=16.18] .067 .000    
[BS=16.31] .067 .000    
[BS=16.38] .000 .111    
[BS=16.52] .000 .111    
[BS=16.90] .000 .111    
[BS=16.96] .067 .000    
[BS=17.34] .067 .000    
[BS=17.73] .000 .111    
[BS=17.99] .067 .000    
[BS=18.06] .067 .000    
[BS=18.37] .067 .000    
[BS=18.76] .067 .000    
[BS=18.93] .067 .000    
[BS=19.42] .000 .111    
[BS=19.55] .067 .000    
[BS=19.59] .000 .111    
[BS=19.70] .067 .000    
[BS=19.80] .067 .000    
[BS=20.27] .000 .111    
716                                                                                                    ARDITA TODRI 
 
 
[BS=20.55] .067 .000    
[BS=21.03] .000 .111    
ILR6ACP .178 -.296    
ILR9PATR -.211 .352    
CV -.162 .270    
FA -.162 .270    
OE9ITA .318 -.531    
INV .290 -.483    
STA -.092 .153    
Owners No -.283 .472    
Hidden Unit Width 1.307 1.543    
Hidden Layer H(1)   .534 .199 .318 
H(2)   -.291 -.108 -.173 
a. Displays the center vector for each hidden unit.     
Table  43. Parameters estimates/RBF-in service sector  
Source: Primary data collection, Author elaboration with SPSS 
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